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




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TEN SERMONS.

NIHIL NOVI DOCEMUS, SED VETERA ET QUÆ ANTE NOS APOSTOLI
ET OMNES PII DOCTORES DOCUERUNT, INCULCAMUS ET STABILIMUS.
ET UTINAM BENE POSSEMUS INCULCARE ET STABILIRE, UT NON SOLUM
IN ORE, SED IN PROFUNDO CORDE EA BENE MEDITATA HABEREMUS,
ET PRÆCIPUE IN AGONE MORTIS UTI POSSEMUS.

LUTHER. IN EP. AD GALAT. CAP. I.

AN ATTEMPT TO EXPLAIN AND ESTABLISH THE DOCTRINE OF
JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH ONLY,

IN

TEN SERMONS

UPON

THE NATURE AND THE EFFECTS

OF

FAITH,

PREACHED IN

THE CHAPEL OF TRINITY COLLEGE, DUBLIN.

BY

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DIVINITY, IN THE UNIVERSITY OF DUBLIN.



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1833.

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P R E F A C E.

I do not believe that any topic will be found in the following Discourses, for which their title ought not to prepare; but it is not unlikely that several may be looked for in them which they do not contain. Some of these omissions possibly occur through inadvertence, or ignorance, but those that will probably be thought the most important have no such excuse. I have been most anxious to omit nothing really essential to the great truth which I have undertaken to establish and explain; but I have *designedly* avoided every reference to other doctrines, which, however easily and commonly connected with the Scriptural Doctrine of Justification, are not, in my apprehension, necessary to a right understanding and full belief of it. I have not adopted this plan from want of fixed views upon most of these disputed points, or from any reluctance to state distinctly my views upon them to the congregation that I

addressed, or to any other, when I thought the discussion of them likely to be useful. But, through this course of Sermons, I resolved, from the first, to abstain steadily from such discussions; partly from a desire to avoid embarrassing myself and my hearers by a needless multiplication of subjects, when we had abundant occupation in the one of which I was professedly treating: and partly because I am sure that they who differ, and shall always differ, widely upon these more doubtful, and, I think, far less important points, may agree cordially upon that certain and fundamental truth: and I was anxious to avoid throwing any obstacles in the way of this agreement, by the unnecessary introduction of questions upon which it could not be reasonably hoped.

But even upon the subject to which I have confined myself, I believe I have to account for some omissions: some arguments in support of this truth, which are highly valued by its advocates, are passed lightly over in these Sermons, and others wholly omitted. I cannot, of course, enter into a detailed defence of the line that I have taken throughout; but I desire, in general, to obviate the impression, that I disapprove of all the arguments of which I make no use. Some certainly have been left out because I was not able to ascribe to them

the force which they appear to many to possess. But I have omitted some, merely because I found it difficult, within my limits, to manage them so as to give them their due force : while some do not appear, because they were too familiar to my hearers ; and not a few, I doubt not, because they were unknown to myself. In those that I knew and approved of, however, there was sufficient variety to make selection absolutely necessary. I have, of course, no reason to presume that I have always made a wise choice ; but I may venture to say that I have not often chosen carelessly : where the arguments were of nearly equal value, I, in general, endeavoured to consider my hearers and myself in deciding ; and to select what I was capable of doing most justice to, and what was likely to impress them most.

The plan of the Sermons is very simple, and it will be found throughout steadily adhered to. I begin by attempting (Sermons I. and II.) to ascertain the Scriptural meaning of *Faith* ; how the principle is wrought in the mind ; and what is the whole preceding or accompanying change of mind which is essential to the existence of genuine faith. I next seek (Sermon III.), in the same way, to fix the sense of *Justification* in the Bible : and then to determine (Sermon IV.) what is the connexion which the Scriptures

declare to exist between this change of mind which God has wrought in us, and this change of our condition before Him. This ends in the establishment of the doctrine of *Justification by Faith only*; with a clear understanding of its meaning. And to this are naturally added, in the way of confirmation, an exposure of the chief corruptions of this doctrine (Sermon V.) and an answer to the chief objections against it (Sermon VI.). Regarding this great truth, then, as sufficiently explained, established, and guarded, I pass, in the remaining Sermons, to a consideration of the other effects of *faith*:—its operation in the sanctification of believers;—how it moves and restrains them; and how it calls into exercise and sustains, all the other natural forces by which God designs to restrain and to move His people.

This is the outline of my plan. And upon the full re-consideration of it, which has been forced upon me while this volume has been passing through the press, I see nothing in the plan itself which I desire to alter; while, I can add unfeignedly, that, in the execution of it, every reference to what I have written discovers to me some new defects. Many of these, I know, arise from want of power and skill; and they would, of course, remain, or be replaced by similar ones, were I to re-write the book

now : there are others, however, which I should certainly hope to remove, if I could devote more time to revision. But there must be some limit to the process of correcting ; and whatever be my success in it, I am more inclined to apprehend that I have expended too much than too little time upon it.

I have found it necessary to add some Notes. They are intended to supply explanations and enforcements of my reasoning, which could not easily be comprised in the Sermons ; which, at least, I found myself unable to introduce there, without awkwardness and confusion. But their leading object is to sustain the doctrinal statements in the Discourses, by authorities from the Confessions of the Protestant churches, and the writings of the eminent Protestant divines of the period of the Reformation. They are, in both ways, chiefly fitted to assist or direct students in Divinity : but some of them, and parts of almost all, will be intelligible to any one to whom the Discourses are intelligible ; and will interest all whom *they* interest.

In stating the opinions of others, and in maintaining my own, whether in the Sermons or the Notes, I am not conscious that I have neglected any reasonable, that is, any practicable pains to avoid errors ; but I am fully prepared for finding that I have not always

succeeded. It would be very false humility to express any anticipation that I shall be shown reason to change my views, in any respect, upon the main points of the volume; but, upon many subordinate matters, I not only hold myself open to correction, but I have a full expectation that I may have left much room for it: that I may have made some hasty assertions, admitted some over-statements, or some under-statements, pressed some arguments too far, and refrained from carrying others as far as I ought: these, and similar lapses, notwithstanding my anxiety to avoid them, I may, no doubt, have committed; and though I am unable to detect any myself, many may disclose themselves to a keener and less partial eye. I shall always hold myself ready to receive any proofs of such mistakes: if they were offered with tolerable civility, I should even be disposed to receive them thankfully; but, in whatever spirit or tone they may be offered, I hope I shall weigh them fairly, and endeavour to profit by them.

Some will, I am sure, be disappointed that I have not carried the proofs given in the notes much higher; and added authorities from the Fathers of the Christian Church, to those which I have supplied in such abundance, from the illustrious restorers of true religion in the sixteenth century. It would have been very easy

to have made this addition if I had thought it important. For however I may be myself *in antiquitate plane hospes*, the early divines from whom I draw so largely, were certainly at home there : and they were led to conduct the great contest which they maintained for this vital truth, so as to furnish any one who desires to make an array of ancient authorities in support of it, with an ample store of citations, and with great facilities for enlarging it.

But Romish controversial writers produced counter-authorities from the same sources ; and, though I am far from believing that upon this, any more than upon the other points which divide the two Churches, there is room for reasonable doubt about the opinions, or, at least, the principles of the ancient fathers ; yet to fix with precision the meaning of writers who, confessedly, (at least, before the Pelagian controversy), wrote with great looseness upon this doctrine, would require much reading and thought. I should not, I hope, decline any labour to which I was equal, if I believed it necessary for clearly apprehending or successfully maintaining the true doctrine of Justification. But I confess that I shrank from a task to which I was not led by any such sense of its importance to myself or others. For myself, in all such conflicts of ancient opinions, I feel,

ready heartily to adopt the spirit of Calvin's summary decision of one of them:—Scio eos posse Origenem et Hieronymum citare, suæ expositionis suffragatores: possem et illis vicissim Augustinum opponere; sed quid illi opinati sint nostra nihil refert, si constat quid voluerit Paulus. And I think, in the present case, that I have shown,—I am sure I see,—that we are able to make out Paul's meaning very clearly without their assistance.

In this matter—the most important, doubtless—we are not less independent of the other authorities, about which I take so much pains. But even one who does not feel differently towards *them* must allow that we bear a very different relation to them. I acknowledge that for the Martyrs and Confessors to whom, under Him who raised them up, and enlightened and strengthened them, we owe the Reformation of the sixteenth century, I entertain a far deeper feeling of reverence than for any guides which the Church has had since the Apostles. But the importance of the citations which I give from these illustrious men, does not rest upon this feeling, in which my readers may not be prepared to share. No Protestant can be unconcerned in his accordance with any doctrine in which all Protestant churches are shown to agree: and as a member

and a minister of the Church of England, I have a more direct interest in proving my agreement with her recorded principles upon this fundamental doctrine of the gospel. Upon every ground, both of feeling and principle, I confess to a real anxiety to establish that the doctrine of Justification by Faith only, as it is maintained in these Discourses, was the doctrine of all the great Protestant Churches at the period of their foundation, and of all the great Protestant Divines by whom they were founded.*

And, accordingly, this point is laboriously pursued in the Notes ; and proofs of it multiplied and reiterated, so as, I fear, to try the patience of those who, coming to the question with a moderately fair spirit themselves, can hardly form a due estimate of the extent to which it is necessary to provide here against evasions of the plain force of the plainest language. I am sure that they who know best the way in which this controversy has been conducted, will be least likely to complain of any precautions against misrepresentation as

* Some well-known and some obscure controversies upon Justification, or points intimately connected with it, which have disturbed and divided the German churches for a long time, took their rise so very early that an account of them would naturally occur in these Notes. I found, however, that any thing like a satisfactory notice of them would extend this volume much too far, and would be likely to obscure its main subject. I have, therefore, kept back the materials which I had collected to illustrate these fierce and protracted contests : but I hope to be able soon to complete a History of the Doctrine, in which they will, of course, find a place.

superfluous. I have not, however, multiplied and guarded these proofs in the vain expectation of rendering misrepresentation impossible, but with the hope of lessening its force. And I do entertain some hopes that what I have done will be found sufficient to convince all who are accessible to evidence upon the point :—that ALL Protestant churches, however separated by differences in discipline and doctrine, and ALL early Protestant divines to whom any reverence is due, whatever were their differences upon other points, agreed in maintaining the doctrine of JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH ONLY, as it is maintained in these Discourses. This strong assertion is made in the body of the work ; and if the notes establish it, they have, as I have said, attained their chief end. To those who are better qualified for the task, and who have more time and more inclination for it, I leave willingly the office of tracing this doctrine to remoter times. If I have proved that the doctrine of Justification, which I have found in the Bible, was found there by the Reformers of the Continent and of Britain, I have traced my religious principles to the only human parentage which I feel very solicitous to establish for them.

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E R R A T A.

- Page 49, line 1, for ledge read knowledge.
- Page 64, line 20, for same read most.
- Page 87, line 3, for servings read deservings.
- Page 103, line 9, for might read must.
- Page 103, line 25, for objection read difficulty.
- Page 111, line 2, for Romans xi. read Romans iii.
- Page 115, line 26, for proof read proofs.
- Page 126, line 18, for justified read justifying.
- Page 173, line 24, for by read from.
- Page 194, line 14, for in read to.
- Page 208, line 5, for human read common.
- Page 219, line 2, for John v. 6 read John v. 4.
- Page 263, line 31, for too read more.
- Page 266, line 24, for accordingly if read if accordingly.
- Page 296, line 25, for conandire read conandive.
- Page 302, line 30, for certainty read assurance.
- Page 312, line 3, for or read nor.
- Page 323, the quotations from Becon and Hooper should have
been marked as from the Tract Soc. Ed.
- Page 351, line 35, the words intimating some doubt, "as far
as I can collect," which are annexed to the statement of
Edwards's meaning of *impute*, are intended for Arminius's.
- Page 366, line 21, for the Duke read the Duke of Saxe Weimar.
- Page 366, line 30, for passionem et obedientiam read passione
et obedientia.

SERMON I.

ON THE NATURE OF FAITH.

Fides ergo est fiducia constans misericordiæ Dei erga nos, in corde vivens, et efficaciter agens, quâ projecimus nos toti in Deum, et permittimus nos Deo, quâ certò freti non dubitemus millies mortem oppetere.

LUTHER, Præfat. Method. in Ep. ad Rom.

[*E. Vernac. in Lat. 1523.*]

Fayth is, then, a lively and a steadfast trust in the favour of God, wherewith we commit ourselves altogether unto God, and that trust is so surely grounded, and sticketh so fast in our hartes, that a man would not once doubt of it though he should die a thousand times therefore.

TYNDALL on the *Epistle to the Romans*.

SERMON I.

ACTS XVI. 31.

Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt be saved.

I DO not mean to spend time in recalling to your minds, my brethren, the circumstances under which these memorable words were spoken. The striking narrative from which they are taken is, probably indeed, distinctly in the recollection of most of my hearers. Sufficiently remembered for my purpose it must be by all. For, for my purpose in bringing forward this passage, it is quite enough that you remember that it is an authoritative answer to the demand of an alarmed conscience, earnestly desiring to be satisfied upon the only subject that an alarmed conscience feels to be of any importance ;—that it is the answer made by God's ambassadors to a sinner, who, in an agony of newly-awakened terror for his soul, demands of them, *What must I do to be saved?*

Since this fundamental doctrine of the gospel was thus simply and distinctly promulgated, many centuries have passed away ; while the religion of the gospel, through severe and varied trials—through the hard trials of *the times of its tribulation*, and the harder trials of *the times of its*

wealth—has gone on unceasingly extending itself, until it has now obtained some footing in every part of the habitable globe, and is, under some form, professed in *every nation, and kindred, and tongue, and people*. During its entire progress, wherever it has been preached, this doctrine, however corrupted or neutralized it may *in fact* have been, has always been *in terms* preached. Wherever it is professed, *faith* in the Redeemer is professed; and wherever it is truly embraced, there men truly *believe on the Lord Jesus Christ*. Every where there have been, and there are, true followers of the Lord, sustained through all the trials of life, and cheered under all its afflictions by the peace and joy which are the fruits and marks of this belief in him. Yea, there are daily some whose warfare is accomplished—who, having fought a good fight, and finished their course, and kept the faith, are by it enabled, in pain, and weakness, and decay, to triumph over man's last enemy—to depart from this scene of our cares and affections, in the humble but undoubting hope which, in that trying hour, faith in a sufficient Saviour, and it only, is able to bestow.

Yet, notwithstanding this wide profession of faith in Christ, and the extent, too, to which men truly believe in him, if we ask, What is faith?—What is believing on the Lord Jesus Christ?—we are met continually by answers the most vague or conflicting. The notions annexed to the words appear as unsettled as if the words themselves had now for the first time been introduced into religious language. In-somuch as, also, to render in the highest degree

uncertain the real import of the emphatic declaration in my text, and of the similar publications of the gospel with which the Bible abounds ; which yet at their first delivery were addressed to all, without distinction—to Jew and Gentile, to bond and free, to learned and unlearned alike, without any apprehension of misconception, without explanation given, or asked, or needed.

This is a strange, and, at first sight at least, a depressing circumstance. Where there is such wide variance, there must be much uncertainty and much error. And, whatever faith be, it has a degree of prominence in the Scripture plan of salvation which can hardly allow us to regard uncertainty about it comfortable, or error safe.

In abatement of such apprehensions, it is true that it may be remarked, that as the healthful exercise of our bodily organs, fortunately for us, does not require an acquaintance with physiology or animal mechanics, so the full enjoyment and use of our mental powers are equally independent of any knowledge of the nature or modes of operation of the mind. They whose feelings are all in a sound state, and all exercised upon their proper objects, may employ language the most confused in endeavouring to describe them. Even those states of mind with which we are most familiar, are, by one little accustomed to reflect carefully upon the movements of his own mind, recalled with great difficulty and very indistinctly : and they of course assume still more distorted forms when attempted to be put into words. Though there may be therefore, in the

world, much gross and dangerous error upon this important subject, we are not to think that there is quite as much as there appears to be. We are not obliged to apprehend that true faith is at all as rare as just notions or correct statements concerning it.

This is no doubt true, and it is of some importance too. But, while there is much error to which it does not profess to apply, how far is it from showing that the misapprehensions to which it is really applicable are wholly without danger! For even in this, the most mitigated form in which error can exist—where the faith, that is, of an individual, is sound, and where his erroneous views of the nature of faith result entirely from his inability to present distinctly to himself or others the real state of his own mind—would it not be rash to represent error as of no practical importance? We can easily conceive various ways in which his false views may react unfavourably upon such an one; and they may certainly produce ill effects in ways that we cannot conceive, and to an extent that we are quite incapable of appreciating. But, supposing their entire innocence with respect to himself, is it not plain that, introduced into the minds of others where there is nothing to neutralize their injurious influence, they may produce there all the ill effects that error is capable of producing? For how different the two cases are, and how greatly the disadvantage and the danger lie on the side of the latter, it cannot, I suppose, be necessary to expend time in pointing out.

Indeed, if we were at liberty to consider the principle of faith as of little importance in religion,

and this question concerning it as purely a speculative one, it would be but a suspicious excuse for indifference about it. In any other pursuit which cordially engages the mind, the interest that we feel is certainly not often confined so strictly to fundamentals and essentials as to allow of no care for any thing beyond them. On the contrary, in the very degree in which the main object interests us, do matters remotely or accidentally connected with it derive attractions from it which secure to them a measure of attention to which of themselves they would be felt to have but slender claims. And we seem to have good cause to distrust the reality of our concern about religion, when we find it so much more easily regulated than our interest about any thing else.

But to leave the subject in this state would be to do great injustice to its importance. In religion, faith surely cannot be spoken of as a thing subordinate or accessory. It holds, as all who know any thing of the Bible know, an essential and most important place in that scheme of redemption which was designed to display the character of God in new lustre both to men and angels. And it would seem eminently weak and presumptuous in us to speak or think lightly of any errors which have a direct tendency to obscure, in any degree, that glorious manifestation. I may add too, without entering prematurely upon a consideration of the effects of revealed truth upon the character, that to regard as purely speculative any errors which tend to alter our apprehensions of the object of our adoration, of our relation to him, and of his dealings

with us, betrays a strange ignorance of the design and mode of operation of all religion.

† In engaging your attention, therefore, my brethren, for a plain attempt to point out some popular errors concerning the *nature* and the *effects* of FAITH; and to state and establish the true scriptural doctrine upon both these important subjects, I do not apprehend that I am misemploying this opportunity of addressing you. It ought no doubt to be felt, that the main business of the Preacher is to win men to accept the offers of mercy held out in the gospel; or *to stir up by way of remembrance the pure minds* of those who have already embraced these gracious offers, *that they may walk worthy of their calling*. But it can hardly, I should hope, be thought beside his office, anywhere, to labour to supply correct views upon an important part of that message of reconciliation which is designed to draw men to God, and to keep them in the course that he has appointed for them. And least of all can it be thought so in a congregation whence so many chosen vessels to diffuse divine truth are to be taken; where truth and error assume new and awful importance from the certainty that what is here taught will not lie idle, but be widely propagated through the land.

Among old errors concerning the nature of faith,—old, that is, among the errors of Protestants upon it—are to be placed all those representations which, in some shape or other, more or less important, make obedience to God's law a part of the notion for which faith stands. There are, no doubt, different shades of misrepresentation which would thus be classed together; and elsewhere, and for other

purposes, it might be important to consider them distinctly. But discriminating between them carefully, or examining them in detail, is not necessary for any concern that I have with them here. Whatever points of difference they have, they agree in what may be shown to be an error; and whatever, therefore, be their differences, they may be overthrown together. To include obedience in the notion expressed by the term faith, is to deviate manifestly from its meaning in common language, as I presume all who contend for this as its scriptural sense would be ready to acknowledge. That it is no less a deviation from its scriptural sense will speedily, I trust, appear, by the investigation upon which I am about to enter to establish that sense. And this, for my immediate purposes, ought to be enough. But some would probably be inclined to grant this also—would grant that of its general signification in the Bible obedience forms no part, and yet maintain that in certain passages it is necessary that where FAITH is used, obedience should be understood as a part, more or less important, of what is meant. Instead of employing the general meaning of *faith* in the Bible to fix the sense of these important passages, this mode of proceeding proposes to arrive at the signification of faith by first assigning a certain sense to these passages; and thus to ground the signification of the term, in the cases in which its sense is most important, upon doctrinal views, concerning the mode of reconciling sinners to God. To enter upon a discussion of these views now would be to invert the course,—the fairer, I think, and more

natural course,—which I have laid down for myself. I shall have to examine them in the progress of this inquiry, and I trust I shall show that they differ as widely from the doctrine of Scripture as the meaning which they propose to assign to faith does from the sense which its common use in Scripture establishes :—that they are all opposed to express and reiterated statements of the apostle, to whom we owe the most copious and exact information which the Bible furnishes upon the subject ; and not less to the whole current of his reasoning about it :—that, wherever he treats professedly upon them, faith and obedience are not only represented as distinct, but (as modes of acceptance with God) presented in direct contrast ; and that the course of his reasoning upon the question is as clear as his declarations concerning it are express.

All this, which most fair readers of the Bible already feel, I expect to be able distinctly to show ; insomuch that it is not easy to conceive how any inquirer, resorting to the Bible with the simple object of obtaining truth, could find there either this erroneous view of the nature of faith or the false doctrine by which it is supported. Nor do I believe that this class of errors has often arisen in so humble and honest a course ; but that some who mistake the nature both of God and man, and who have founded upon the mistake a total misconception of the design and mode of operation of the gospel, first modify the gospel from these false views, and then change the notion for which faith stands to accommodate the Scripture publications of the truth to their misrepresentations

of it. When their motives are the best that are compatible with such a course, this is the account that is to be given of the matter. Ill-grounded fears of the moral consequences of proclaiming, as the gospel does, full and gratuitous pardon to all believers, send such persons in search of conditions to clog the freeness of this acceptance, or to limit its fulness. Faith, in its true Scripture sense, will serve such a purpose badly; but obedience is found in the Bible to be the unfailing characteristic of believers; and this, which should in fairness show that God has himself guarded effectually against the consequences apprehended, is misused to suggest the human safeguard of enlarging the meaning of faith, and to supply some of the weak sophistry by which the proceeding is defended. But this is matter for future discussion.

Similar principles of inquiry, if this should be styled inquiry, have led others into directly opposite errors. Some, no less zealous for God's honour, but regarding it as chiefly involved in the maintenance of the freeness of the gospel, seem in the same way to consider themselves at liberty to fix upon such a notion of the nature of faith as may consist best with their view of what the freeness of the gospel is, and what it requires. Were this view in all respects unimpeachably correct, it is plain that they would not be secure from error in attempting to derive from it the meaning of faith. And I think it is curious to observe that, in fact, this course has led them to the same representation of its nature that is given by

the church most opposed to the freeness of the gospel; and that the account of faith given by these ardent assertors of gospel freeness concurs with that of the Romish church in representing it as a process purely intellectual; and ends in describing it as a belief in the narrative of the Bible, or an intelligent assent to certain propositions concerning the incarnation, life, and death, of the blessed Lord.

This view was for a good while maintained by a well-known class of controversial writers with some ingenuity, but with little impression upon the public mind. It has lately acquired greater currency; which I believe it owes chiefly to its having been adopted by a writer of a very different school. And his support of it has certainly given it all the advantage in the way of prepossession which a doctrine naturally derives from the advocacy of one who is himself a distinguished example of the happiest influences of religion. But it has, I think, received in his hands but little additional strength in the way of argument—at least, of argument from the testimony of Scripture. It has, indeed, in no hands, much the air of having been originally found in the Bible, or sought for there; but appears, as I intimated, to have been taken up under apprehensions, lest ascribing to faith a closer connexion with the affections should impair the simplicity of the gospel, or prejudice the doctrines of free grace, or lead to some form of self-righteousness. As this representation, however, only errs in defect, the progress of the inquiry into the true meaning of faith will

sufficiently exhibit it. I am, therefore, here only concerned with the principle of the proceeding; and this is plainly the same as that which led to the other class of errors, though the results are so widely different; the one modifying the representations of Scripture from an apprehension of licentiousness, and the other from a fear of self-righteousness. Both manifest a forgetfulness of man's relation to divine truth, and make him teach where it ought to be his desire humbly to learn. Both require, and equally, to be denounced as presumptuous attempts to supply safeguards which God has seen fit to omit. And the issue is in both cases as unhappy as might be anticipated from a principle of investigation so preposterous. All attempts to guard the purity of the law at the expense of the freeness of the gospel, end, as by the wise connexion between them they must end, in the overthrow both of law and gospel. Nor are human devices for the protection of that freeness more justifiable in their nature, or likely to be more innocent in their results. God's servants are, indeed, to be zealous for his honour: but the carnal pride and blindness of our fallen nature require that we should be continually reminded, that God's honour is to be maintained by the safeguards which he himself has provided for it, not by our devising new muniments for its protection.

Investigating the subject upon sounder principles, in a more patient course, and in an humbler spirit, you, my brethren, will find, I am persuaded, that the true notion of FAITH, when we are most concerned

to ascertain its meaning, is TRUST. That the true meaning, therefore, of *faith in Christ*, or *in God through Christ*, is not merely or properly belief in the Scripture narrative concerning our Lord; or an assent of the understanding to certain propositions derived from that narrative, however true, and however important they be: but that it is TRUST IN CHRIST, or IN GOD THROUGH CHRIST, founded upon such an assent; an entire and unreserved confidence in the efficacy of what Christ has done and suffered for us; a full reliance upon him and upon his work.

There are several acceptations of the word which we may safely pass over with little notice. It sometimes signifies fidelity to engagements, sometimes persuasion of the innocency of an act, sometimes reliance upon the veracity of another; and, tracing out the connexion of these and other senses of the word, might be in various ways pleasant and profitable. But, for my immediate purpose, it would be trifling to bestow time upon any of its senses except that in which it stands for the saving principle which seems so distinctly described as uniting us to Christ, and making us partakers of all the benefits of his life and death; as justifying us before God, and reconciling us to Him; and that this faith is *faith in Christ*, *faith in his name*, *faith in his blood*, or *faith in God* through him, must be too well known to every reader of the Bible to require distinct proof.

Now, whatever diversity of meaning the term

Gal. ii. 16; iii. 24.

Rom. iii. 22; v. 1.

Rom. iii. 25.

may have in its other uses, that in such a use of it as this it ordinarily expresses confidence is manifest. That faith in any being, or in any quality of any being, is confidence in him or it, can hardly, I suppose, be questioned by any one. Faith in a person stands so naturally for trust in him, as the sure instrument by which something desirable or useful is secured to us; or trust in him, as the certain source from which such benefits are to flow, that reliance on the procurer or the bestower of good would be by most persons, I presume, expressed indifferently by *faith in him* or *trust in him*.

There is, it is true, a limited meaning of the phrase, in which faith in a man is used to express reliance upon his veracity. But even there it is clearly distinct from belief in his testimony, of which it is properly the cause. Belief in testimony may spring from faith in a person, in this more confined meaning of the phrase; or may give rise to it in its more enlarged meaning; but is plainly distinct from it in both: as distinguishable as it is from any other species of evidence upon which belief is grounded, or any other emotion to which belief gives rise.

Thus, to apply these general principles to the case before us, faith in God's veracity is the fit foundation of belief in his testimony; while that belief might, according to the nature of the testimony, call into exercise various feelings and affections of the mind; might raise surprise, or joy, or sorrow, or aversion, or love, or hope, or fear; might present God himself, or any other being, as an

object of dread or an object of confidence. No one can confound things so manifestly distinct as the simple state of mind in which we acquiesce in the evidence for a truth which we understand, and the state of feeling which results from an application of this truth to ourselves, our own interests, or our own desires. But what I wish here to impress upon you is, that common language keeps distinct these very distinct states of the mind in the case before us. And that while faith in a truth means not merely firm belief in that truth, but also the emotion of hope which the application of it to ourselves adds to belief in it; faith in a person includes, in addition to both, the notion of a particular being as the instrument by which the thing hoped for is procured, or as the source from which it is to flow. So that you must see that, when we interpret *faith in Christ*, or *faith in God through Christ*, as trust in Christ as the procurer of salvation, or trust in God as the giver of salvation for Christ's sake, we have all the advantage which belongs to the interpretation that makes the Bible employ words in their common meaning, in a case which seems to furnish no occasion for departing from the use of common language, and in which no intimation is given of any design to deviate from it.

But the question about the meaning of a scriptural term must be ultimately determined by an appeal to Scripture. And though I am confined, by the circumstances of this inquiry, to a very limited portion of the Bible, I am persuaded that a fair examination of it will be abundantly sufficient

for my purpose. I avoid all reference to the Old Testament ; not because it would be difficult to find there the most decisive instances of this use of the term, but because the application of them would require some preliminary discussion unsuited to this place. And from a large proportion of the texts in the New Testament, in which the term occurs, I am also excluded obviously, by the course of investigation which I have laid down. But the remainder will, I think, supply abundant materials, when fairly considered, for the determination of this question.

The Bible, however, is, as you know, a book of a cast so little formal and didactic that you can hardly expect to find there regular definitions of the terms employed in it ; but must be content, for the most part, to collect their meaning from their use. Of the examination required in the present case, I can, of course, give but an outline : it shall, however, I hope, be defective in few points which there can be any difficulty in supplying. When, for example, you find our Lord thus addressing his disciples, “ Wherefore, if God so clothe the grass of the field, which to-day is and to-morrow is cast into the oven, how much more shall he clothe you, O ye of little *faith* ! ” you can have no doubt, I presume, of the sense in which he employs the word *faith*. No one can, I suppose, question that he means by it that confidence in God’s protection which the perception of his care for the lowest parts of his creation ought to inspire in his children—in those who should feel that they were objects of warmer love and of ten-

Matthew vi 30.

Luke xii. 28.

C

derer care. A glance at the whole passage will show that it is designed to condemn, in God's servants, all that unreasonable solicitude about life and its wants which they are so prone to indulge—to banish *a doubtful mind* concerning the supply of our necessities, by the recollection that *our heavenly Father knoweth that we have need of these things*. To dispel all vain anxieties and too curious care, not merely by the depressing reflection that they can really do nothing for us, but by the more cheering thought that *we are better* than those animals who are harassed by no such anxieties, nor can exercise any such care, and yet for whom *He who is our Father* amply provides. You will see, that in the reproof which I have quoted, it is so little the Lord's purpose to charge those to whom he speaks with ignorance of God's providential care or disbelief of it; that, on the contrary, the justice of his reproof of their want of *faith* rests chiefly upon the impossibility of their being ignorant of, or doubting, the facts upon which such confidence in God should be grounded.

When the wild alarm to which they gave way at the approach of danger draws from him the rebuke, "Why are ye so *fearful*?" "How is it that ye have *no faith*?" or, "Where is your *faith*?"—you have plain instances of a similar use of the term. And you all must remember the beautiful incident that leads to a touching reproof of the apostle Peter, which furnishes a clear example of the same kind. One of the evangelists relates, you remember, that

Matthew viii. 26.

Mark iv. 40.

Luke viii. 25.

on a stormy night, when his disciples were in the midst of the sea tossed with waves, the Lord was seen coming to them, walking upon the sea: that when he drew nigh to the ship, and made himself known to them, this ardent follower entreated that he might be commanded to go down to him upon the water; and, being commanded, at once descended. But when he saw himself surrounded by the dangers which he had voluntarily encountered, his heart died within him—his confidence in his Lord's power and in His love, was strong enough to make him dare all perils, but too weak to keep him tranquil in the midst of them; and he cried, "Lord, save me! And immediately Jesus stretched forth his hand, and caught him, and said unto him, O thou of *little faith*, wherefore didst thou *doubt*?" And to these striking instances, to fix the sense of the word, your own memory will probably add others of the same class.

Now, on the other hand, look on any of those instances of *faith* which draw forth the Lord's gracious approbation, and analyze the feeling that he commends. Take, for example, the notable case of the Syrophenician woman, whose faith he seems to have regarded as especially worthy of remark; and see in what it consists:—She, believing him to be from God, and invested with miraculous powers to execute his gracious purposes, seeks him out to engage his assistance on behalf of her child, whose disease was beyond all human aid. She is received by him, as you remember, in a way calculated to

Matthew xiv. 30.

Matthew xv. 22.

Mark vii. 25.

extinguish all the hopes of relief which she had cherished—"he answered her not a word." But she perseveres, under this heavy discouragement, in earnestly supplicating his compassion; and when her importunity, at length, wrings from him an answer, it is one which to confidence less steadfast would have been a final repulse:—"It is not meet to take the children's bread, and to cast it unto dogs." Her memorable reply, however, shows at once the nature, the foundation, and the strength, of the principle which urged her to prayer and sustained her in it. It showed that she confided in the Ruler of the world, not because she was insensible to the great and perplexing inequalities of human condition which he had established there, but because she had been enabled to see, in all the arrangements of his providence, the gracious character which pervades them all—to see that his tender mercies are over all his works—that he has wisely and kindly accommodated the circumstances to the nature of meaner animals, so as bountifully to provide for the wants of the very lowest of the beings that he has made. Her reply, I say, proves that she had been enabled to discern all this, and enabled too to draw, from all that she saw, that lesson of humble confidence in God which the Lord's touching expostulation, to which we have just now adverted, was designed to teach to those who were much more favourably circumstanced for collecting it. "Truth, Lord," she replies, "yet the dogs eat of the crumbs that fall from their master's table." Is it not the conviction thus affectingly expressed—

that however low were the place that she occupied among mankind—however far removed she was from the high privileges which she unrepiningly saw others enjoying,—she was not scorned or neglected by her Creator; but, filling the station assigned her by his wisdom, was still the object, in the proper degree of which He alone was the proper judge, of His love and care?—Is it not manifest, I say, that it is this humble and steadfast confidence in God, formed under circumstances so untoward, and retained under a trial so severe, that moves the admiration and wonder (if we may so speak) which appear in the Lord's reply, "O woman, great is thy faith!"

The former instances, rightly considered, not only fix the true nature of the principle, but sufficiently overthrow both the erroneous notions of it. For you see that when the Lord reprehends the want of faith of those to whom he speaks, there is no failure in obedience—no want of belief in any specific proposition proposed as the object of belief—no want of belief in any sense which does not identify belief with trust;—it is plainly want of trust that he condemns. But this last instance seems even more conclusive. There his emphatic commendation of faith is drawn forth by no signal act of obedience—by no act of obedience of any kind, and still less by any act of belief as distinguished from trust; it is manifestly, as I have before said, by an exhibition of trust in God, every way deserving of wonder; but of trust, it is to be remarked, not manifested in believing what the

Lord said, but in disbelieving it, when, in its apparent sense, it contradicted her views of God's character, and tended to shake her confidence in Him, by representing Him as careless about her sufferings, and indisposed to relieve them. This, then, even more strongly than the former cases, establishes the sense assigned to the word. And if you examine, in the same way, other instances, you will find, I think, just the same elements in the state of mind commended by our Lord under the name of *faith*. Strong desire for some benefit, and a strong hope of receiving it; firm confidence that the Being applied to could and would bestow it, appears in all. But I must leave it to private investigation to establish this; and must pass over all intermediate instances of the use of the word, in the Acts and the Epistles, that we may have time for considering a passage which it is impossible to omit, and which seems to render the consideration of others superfluous; I mean the well-known account of faith which occurs in the Epistle to the Hebrews.

The apostle, as you know, there describes it as "the substance of things hoped for; the evidence of things not seen." And though there may be, at first, a little obscurity in the word "substance," yet, I suppose, most persons understand it as conveying, that it is the character or property of faith to give to things future and hoped for all the reality of actual existence—all the effect upon feelings and conduct of *substantial realities*. And this is so easy a figure, and so fairly represents the apostle's sense,

Hebrews xi. 1.

that I do not know whether it be worth mentioning here, that the original probably expresses his meaning more directly. For while "substance" (taken in its common signification) is one of the primitive meanings of the word in the original, for which it stands in our translation ; that word has, among its derived meanings, *confident expectation* ; and is, in fact, used familiarly in that sense both by sacred and profane writers. And when you recollect that, in this way of writing, the *things not seen*, in the second clause, of which faith is the evidence (or conviction) are the *things hoped for* in the first, you must see that this character of faith, which describes it as the confident expectation of the things for which we hope, and a conviction that though unseen they are real and sure, coincides with the account which I have attempted to give from other sources : and the entire of what follows falls in perfectly with this account, and strongly confirms it.

I do not mean to go, in detail, through all the instances of the force of *faith in God*, which the apostle takes from the lives of patriarchs, and prophets, and martyrs, to illustrate his general account of the principle. But, by referring to the place, you will easily see that in all these servants of God, the principle, though existing doubtless in different degrees, though tried and exhibited in very different ways, and upon very different occasions, is every where the same ; that it is confidence in God, grounded upon such a manifestation of His character as he saw fit to make ;—a reliance so deep and

sincere upon His power, His goodness, and His truth, as enabled them to expect undoubtingly all that He promised, and in hope to endure patiently all that He appointed, and to perform resolutely whatever He enjoined. The apostle points to Noah, for example, sustained by this principle amidst the scoffs of a faithless generation, in his patient preparation of the appointed refuge against the day of God's wrath:—to the severely tried father of the faithful, in the strength of the same principle, raising his hand to slay his son—*his only son Isaac, whom he loved*, at the command of Him who had given him that son by a miracle, and in whom he trusted as able and true to restore him by a miracle again:—to Moses, in faith, abandoning the luxuries of a sinful court; choosing rather to suffer affliction with the people of God, and esteeming the reproach of Christ greater riches than all the treasures of Egypt, in certain hope of a future *recompence of reward*; and fearlessly encountering the vindictive rage of an earthly monarch, under a sense of the presence of Him who is invisible:—to Jephthah, and Gideon, and the other heroes of Jewish history, who in faith renounced the arm of flesh in peril, and fearlessly trusted in Him who is mighty to save:—yea, even to the heathen Rahab, in faith, severing so many of the strongest human ties, forsaking her country and her country's idols, and taking her portion with the people of the true God.

But are these exercises of faith *in Christ*? Some excellent persons maintain that they *all* are; but,

I think, without sufficiently weighing the nature of some of them, or the design of the apostle in bringing the whole forward. They have probably been led into the error (for such I cannot help regarding it) by a desire to uphold the certain and important truth that "the fathers looked not only for transitory promises." But that sound doctrine does not require that we should strain the meaning of any passage of Holy Writ; and I certainly think that we do so, and very obviously too, when we take some of these instances as any thing more than evidences of the extent to which reliance upon God, as a promiser, was able to sustain his servants of old. To take some of these instances for any thing more, seems, I think, offering great violence to very plain language, and with very little purpose. For, under this view, are they not all pertinently brought forward by the apostle, both as illustrating his general account of the principle, and as supporting the exhortations to the same course of persevering obedience which he addresses to those who professed a reliance upon promises far more glorious, and whose trust rested on a foundation so much more secure?

All these instances are, I say, pertinent to the purpose of the apostle; because the principle, by which those whom he addressed ought to be animated, is the same as that exhibited and exercised in all the cases to which he directs them. It is still trust in God; but under larger information and with better support. The distinction being, as he intimates, that of the Christian's faith Christ is the

author and the finisher—he bestows it and perfects it, and is himself its foundation and consummation. It is trust in God; but it is trust in Him through our Lord Jesus Christ, “through whom we have boldness and access, with confidence, through the faith of Him.” It is still grounded upon the manifestation of God’s character; but it is that brighter manifestation of all His infinite perfections as they shine concentrated in Him in whom “dwelt all the fulness of the Godhead bodily.” We are not left to collect God’s lovingkindness and tender mercies from the predominant indications, clear as they are, of a benevolent design, amidst the conflicting appearances of the course of His providence; but we have the infinitely stronger and more persuasive proofs which the mysteries of redemption supply—proofs which seem framed to meet and satisfy every movement of distrust in the human breast, and to fill it with confidence and good hope towards God. The single appeal which the apostle derives from them, “He that spared not his own Son, but delivered him up for us all, how shall he not with him also freely give us all things?” seems to address itself with equal force to the understanding and to the affections,—to challenge the scrutiny of the reason for the claims that it makes upon the confidence of the heart. But the cogency of the appeal may be distinctly seen while this confidence is withheld; and, until it be yielded by the heart, faith, as we have seen, is not possessed. Nor will the firmest

Hebrews xii. 2.

Ephesians iii. 12.

Colossians ii. 9.

Romans viii. 32.

belief in the Scripture narrative, with the clearest apprehensions of the gospel scheme, and the soundest views of Christian doctrine, constitute faith in Christ, until, to this clear conviction of the sufficiency of his atoning sacrifice, be added a real desire for its fruits, and heartfelt confidence in its efficacy; until the Spirit has enabled us to repose in humble reliance, for time and for eternity, upon the mercy and the truth of a reconciled God.

How entirely those admirable men, the martyrs and confessors, to whom we owe the homilies of our church, agree in this view of the nature of faith, none can need to be informed who are at all acquainted with that valuable body of sound, scriptural divinity. They declare that "true lively faith is not only the common belief of the articles of our faith, but it is also a true trust and confidence in the mercy of God through our Lord Jesus Christ; and a steadfast hope of all good things to be received at God's hands." They tell us that "the right and true Christian faith is not only to believe that Holy Scripture and all the articles of our faith are true, but also to have a sure trust and confidence in God's merciful promises." And they, in substance, deny that any knowledge or belief, until it has issued in such trust, deserves the name of faith in any other sense than that in which the clear apprehensions and firm belief of devils are styled faith. And to this decisive testimony of our own church, I could add, if the occasion allowed such details, declarations equally express of the same views, from the public acts of ALL protestant churches, and from the

writings of ALL the early reformers whose names still carry in those churches much and well-deserved weight.

But it will be asked, Of what real importance are these distinctions? Upon the one hand, you maintain that good works are the certain fruits of faith in the believer's life, why then labour so much to prove that they are not included in the notion of that saving grace? Is this a point of any practical importance? On the other hand, many of those who hold that faith is a process purely intellectual would allow, and even maintain, that, from the nature of the truths revealed, and from their relation to us, confidence in God must be the result of genuine belief in them; how is it then practically of so much moment to establish that, instead of being thus among the necessary results of faith, it is really the notion for which the term properly stands? Objections of this kind are constantly heard to discussions of the nature of that in which I have sought to engage you; and they certainly admit, in the present case, a sufficient reply of the kind that they aim at. To give that reply fully now, would require an anticipation of doctrinal views, which would be a deviation from my plan, even if it did not demand details for which no time remains. But I trust that, grossly misconceived and abused as the word *practical* is in religion, there can be few of my hearers who will be inclined to doubt that differences concerning the mode of reconciling sinners to God, if they be not themselves *practical*, must, at least, *lead* to momentous *practical* results. And I trust, indeed,

that some who hear me would feel that, even were we unable to point out those consequences, these objections would deserve but little attention—that we are departing widely from that modesty which in matters of this nature is surely our true wisdom, when we presume to determine the value of revealed truth by our power of distinctly ascertaining its value. If there be, as there plainly is, an intelligible distinction between these accounts of the nature of faith, is it not manifestly the very height of arrogant folly in us to pronounce that it is of little consequence to determine which of them is the scriptural account?

For some, I trust, this reflection would be enough; to others I can only say, that if this principle of fixing the importance of revelation were as sound and safe in the general, as I am sure it is unsound and dangerous, the present offers no fair occasion for the application of it. For that we can see practical differences resulting from these different statements of the nature of faith; and see too that they are of no small moment. These differences, which for the reason assigned above I can only glance at now, will probably appear more distinctly when I resume this subject, to pursue the remaining part—the effects of faith; which I hope to be able to do at some future opportunity.

Now unto God, the Father, the Son, and the Spirit, be ascribed all might, majesty, and dominion, for ever. Amen.

SERMON II.

ON THE SOURCE OF FAITH, AND ON THE REPENTANCE WHICH IS ESSENTIAL TO TRUE FAITH.

DE contritione præcidimus illas otiosas et infinitas disputationes, quando ex dilectione Dei, quando ex timore pœnæ doleamus? Sed dicimus contritiones esse veros terrores conscientiae quæ Deum sentit irasci peccato, et dolet se peccasse. Et hæc contritio ita fit quando verbo Dei arguuntur peccata, quia hæc est summa prædicationis Evangelii, arguere peccata, et offerre remissionem peccatorum et justitiam propter Christum; et Spiritum Sanctum, et vitam æternam; et ut renati beneficiamus.

MELANCTHON. *Apologia.*

SERMON II.

HEBREWS XI. 1.

*Now faith is the substance of things hoped for ;
the evidence of things not seen.*

BEFORE I pursue, as I proposed when I last addressed you, my brethren, the consideration of the *effects* of faith, I shall have something to say to you of its *source*. But I must first employ a moment in bringing back to your minds what we were then able to collect from Scripture concerning its *nature*.

Declining all merely curious investigations of the various senses of the word and their connexion, and inquiring simply into its meaning when it stands for a saving principle, we saw, you will remember, that the leading part of the notion which it is there employed to convey is TRUST. The apostle's account of the nature of the principle in general is, that it is a *confident expectation of the things for which we hope, and a conviction of their existence though they be not seen*. This coincides sufficiently exactly with the sense which the common use of language assigns it; and he proceeds to illustrate the particular exercise of the principle with which he is more immediately concerned, by striking instances

of the force of FAITH IN GOD, taken from the lives of the most remarkable characters in Jewish history. In these, as might be expected from his purpose, there is great variety in the objects hoped for; and the grounds of the expectations entertained are as different as the degrees of acquaintance with God's character and designs which the several individuals possessed were different. But the principle unequivocally manifested in all is the same—it is the confident expectation of some benefit at God's hands, or by His appointment—it is firm trust in Him for some good that is desired—it is reliance upon the faithfulness and the lovingkindness of the Most High.

Such is the general account which this remarkable passage supplies of the nature of *faith in God*. And, with this account, we found that several important cases of its use in other parts of Scripture, which were abundantly clear, and which might very easily have been multiplied, perfectly concurred.

Now faith in God through Christ—the exercise of this principle with which we have to do—differs plainly from any case of faith in God only in the grounds upon which it rests, and the object about which it is exercised: not at all—manifestly not at all,—in the state of mind which the words are intended to express. The distinction is, that the benefit hoped for from God is salvation; and the foundation of the hope, the merits and the sufferings of Christ. It includes,—as every other case of faith in God (or, I may add, in any being) does,—desire of something to be received from Him, and trust that we shall receive it. And to this confidence in Him

who is to bestow the benefit upon us, it adds confidence in Him who has earned it for us. It is grounded upon the testimony of God's word, and requires, of course, a belief in that testimony; but it is manifestly distinct from such belief. It leads, we learn, to obedience to God's will, but it is even more manifestly distinct from such obedience.

Of the two misrepresentations of the meaning of faith, which this account of its nature thus equally overthrows, that which makes it mere belief in the testimony of the Bible is the one against which I felt, and feel, especially solicitous to guard you. The opposite error, in which obedience to God's will is made a part of the notion for which *faith* stands, is easily exposed; even independently of any exact knowledge of the true meaning of the term. But against this more dangerous error there is, I think, no effectual security, except in clear views of the true nature of the principle which it misrepresents. I call it more dangerous, not because I regard it as more injurious in its effects, or in itself more opposed to divine truth. On the contrary, though I cannot avoid ascribing to it, much of what is to be condemned in the heartless and paralysing religious system of which it forms a part, I am sure that it is much less at war with the principles of the gospel than the other. But it is far more dangerous, as far more likely to mislead. In fact, the other, as I said, rests exclusively upon doctrinal views, which assume generally the form of such gross and palpable misrepresentations of Scripture as can deceive, only so long as a spirit of party, deference to authority, or utter

carelessness about the matter, prevents men from bringing them to the test of God's word. And even in their best form, when their opposition to it is most carefully softened down and best concealed; a moderately diligent examination of the Bible, under the direction of moderate honesty, can hardly, I think, fail to provide any inquirer with a satisfactory refutation of them. And further study will certainly only serve to show more clearly, how entirely irreconcilable they are to the fundamental principles of the scheme of mercy which it is the object of the Bible to reveal.

But the error which makes faith stand for belief in testimony, does not admit of this direct refutation from the first principles of the gospel; it seems, on the contrary, to assert these principles in their fullest extent. It seems, too, to exhibit the characteristic simplicity of the gospel no less than the truer statement; and, under favour of the ambiguities of language, seems sometimes to have the support of express texts of Holy Scripture. All these advantages it owes to the fact to which I before adverted—of its erring *in defect*. So long as a misstatement of the nature of faith makes no addition to the real constituents of that principle, it is plain that it cannot oppose the freeness or the simplicity of the gospel. And it requires but a little consideration to see how such a system is likely to secure the other advantage also. Supposing our account of the principle correct, you could not, upon reflection, be surprised to find *faith* sometimes employed to express a belief in testimony, or

a belief in testimony sometimes used for *faith*. For you must be aware that this occurs constantly, with respect to our complex ideas, in all writings whatsoever. Where but a part of the notion is wanted, the word which expresses the entire is sometimes used for that part; when the whole is required, it may be occasionally conveyed, too, by expressing an important part and implying the rest. And this, as every one knows, occurs familiarly, in writings far more artificial and exact than the books of the New Testament, and without giving rise to uncertainty or mistake.

But the instances in the Bible, to which we are called upon to apply this fair and obvious reflection, are of a kind that makes the application peculiarly easy. They are cases in which belief in God's testimony concerning his Son is used as equivalent to saving faith. Now this testimony comprehends all the promises which form the foundation of all our hopes; and that belief in these promises should be employed for trust in Him who has promised, though it furnishes an occasion to apply this reflection, seems among the simplest cases that could offer themselves for the application of it. And, on the whole, when you have once fixed the true sense of the term, by completing the scriptural investigation of which I gave you an outline; I think that if you apply discreetly the reflection which I have just made, and remember too the fair rule of interpretation—to explain the parts which are doubtful by those which are clear

—I think that there is in the Bible no latitude in the use of this term which can create any considerable or permanent embarrassment.

It might be thought unnecessary here to add any thing of the source of this important principle ; for all who profess submission to the authority of God's word must agree—and do, in fact, agree—in representing it as the gift of God. But under this agreement in words, there lies, as might be expected, a real and very wide difference ; a difference which, for various reasons, it seems important to exhibit clearly.

Those who hold the view of the nature of faith which I have endeavoured to support, find an obvious necessity for the operation of the Spirit of God to produce it. To convince of sin—to awaken a lively sense of its guilt and danger—to inspire a real desire for deliverance, and prompt the repentant cry, “What must I do to be saved?”—and then to extinguish all self-dependance—to repress all self-righteous strivings, and effectually to teach that *in confidence and quietness is our strength* ; to tranquillize the fears of the awakened sinner by the efficacy of the atoning work of the Saviour ; and, what is harder still, to cleanse his conscience and silence its reproaches by the sufficiency of the same stupendous offering for sin :—all this must be done before the heart can truly feel that *confidence in God, through Christ*, which we maintain to be saving faith ; and to effect this change in all the natural feelings of the heart, will, assuredly, by all who know the heart, be easily admitted to be the work,

not of man's might or of his power, but of the Spirit of the Lord of Hosts.

But those who hold that view of faith to which I have so often adverted—who represent it, that is, as merely an intelligent assent to the testimony of the Bible concerning our Lord—believe, no less than we, that to the production of FAITH the operation of God's Spirit is essential. They must, therefore—and I think the necessity adds plainly to the difficulties with which their system is pressed—they must represent that divine agency as required to enable us to estimate the evidence for the authority of revelation, or to apprehend the terms in which it is conveyed.

Now this is a subject upon which I hope I should be most anxious to speak guardedly. And, no doubt, as there are many cases in which the first direction of the mind to the consideration of religion in any shape is due to the secret influences of the Spirit of God; so is it likely that there are many where, in the wisdom of God, the same influence is employed in leading the mind to yield assent to the force of the evidence for the divine origin of revelation, and in opening the understanding to the perception of its meaning. This is doubtless to be confessed; but this is plainly not enough for this position. And to maintain all that the position requires—to pronounce this agency in all cases essential to effects which seem such proper results of man's unassisted powers—seems certainly a great sacrifice to system. That the evidence for revelation is so essentially different from all other evidence, that it is only by

the aid of the Spirit of God that a man can ever properly estimate its force;—that the Scripture narrative of our Lord's life and death, or the Scripture statements concerning his atonement, which we are required to believe, contain notions so different in kind from those with which we come to be furnished naturally, that the same higher aid is necessary to enable us to apprehend them:—these are positions so plainly taken up and maintained, because a narrow view of the nature of faith makes it necessary to maintain them, that I do not feel called on to point out in detail the mistakes on which they are founded, and the inconsistencies to which they lead.

But it is retorted, “Does not a desire for the objects of faith necessarily flow from a correct apprehension of them?—and is not trust in Christ thus a necessary result of a true belief of what he is recorded to have wrought for us?—And does not faith thus, even in your view of its nature, seem attainable by man without the necessity of spiritual aid?” This would no doubt follow, if the foundation of the inference were granted; but it is denied, and I think, too, denied on very sufficient grounds. That the salvation which Christ lived and died to secure is an object of real desire to man, so soon as he knows what it is, seems certainly not true in any important sense. Happiness is no doubt universally desired, and salvation is certainly happiness. But it is not presented to the mind as happiness in the abstract; it is happiness of a particular kind, and bestowed in a particular way. Present pardon and

restoration to God's favour are no doubt offered in the gospel to ALL, freely,—without any of those limitations and qualifications with which we are so disposed to restrict and encumber that gracious offer. But this pardon and reconciliation are only objects of real desire to those who feel their need of them deeply. Have men naturally this deep feeling of their real wants? None, it is said, can believe the truth without feeling this need, and consequently this desire. But this is assuming the very point at issue, or a most important part of it; it is assuming that a man cannot believe a truth without making such an application of the truth to himself, as to feel all the emotions to which his relation to it ought to give rise. I do not know any position which I believe to be more at war with the common experience and common judgment of mankind. But it may be said that, whatever becomes of the general principle, the objects in this case are too plainly of momentous importance to allow one who truly believes the Scripture testimony concerning them not to feel a real desire for them. Be it so. Let it be supposed that belief in the truth in this case necessarily generates some feeling of desire. Has the desire for deliverance no difficulties to overcome before the heart *submits itself to the righteousness of God*, and trusts, not in profession, but truly, not in part, but altogether, in the blood and merits of the Redeemer? Is man's moral pride an inconsiderable obstacle to this trust in another; or is it the same thing to be convinced that this pride is

wrong, or injurious, or destructive even, and to cease to feel it?

Suppose, however, that this obstacle is overcome, it is not the only one which the corruption of the human heart offers to trusting in the Redeemer, even under the fullest knowledge and firmest belief of the truth. I said, that of the salvation which Christ died to secure us, pardon of all sin and full acceptance with God are but a part; a deliverance from the power of sin is no less fully secured, and no less distinctly promised. And may not this latter promise be an object of dread, to one to whom the former is an object of desire? I think this is not barely conceivable; but I am sure that, in fact, an apprehension of the fulfilment of this part of the promise often abates effectually the desire that men feel for the blessings held out in the former part;—disposes them, not to relinquish all hopes of obtaining these blessings, or to renounce their conviction that they are to be obtained but in one way, but to postpone seeking for them in that way. I am sure, I say, even when we *tremble at judgment to come*, a corrupt dread of *righteousness and temperance* often prevails to make us defer to a *more convenient season* the commencement of the course, which we feel commences with our acceptance of God's free justification of us in Christ; and that this is among the most potent of the causes why we *will not come to Him that we might have life*.

All who believe or understand the truth must see that it is distinctly declared to us, that to fit those who embrace God's offers of mercy for the blessings

which he has prepared for them, it is essential that they be freed from the dominion of sin, and conformed to the image of their Redeemer. And they see too that, in God's ordinary dealings, this change of character is effected by a course of discipline, and they learn that upon this course they are entering when they become believers in Christ. All know that His word declares, that without taking His yoke and burden upon us, denying ourselves daily, taking up the cross and following Him; renouncing the friendship of the world, which is enmity against God; turning in heart and affections, not from its vanities and vices merely, but, at His call, from its most allowed enjoyments; abandoning at His command every thing dear to man's natural heart—wealth, and ease, and reputation—love, and friendship, and kindred affections—we *cannot* be His disciples. They hear in the Bible reiterated warnings that, in coming to Christ, this is the profession in which we are engaging, that we are engaging in a warfare in which we must endure hardness as His soldiers, that God scourgeth every son whom He receiveth, and that it is only through much tribulation that we can enter upon the promised bliss, if we be indeed followers of Him who entered not into his reward, but first He suffered. Is there nothing formidable in the prospect of such a course? I do not ask, Do all men desire this kind of happiness?—but, Do they desire any kind of happiness which is to be bestowed in this way? I believe that the power,

Mark viii. 34; x. 21. Matt. x. 38. Luke xiv. 26, 27; ix. 23.

Heb. xii. 6.

Acts xiv. 22.

which all confess to be essential to sustain us in such a course, is no less necessary to vanquish our repugnance to entering upon it.

Nor do I mean that men cease to desire to be reconciled to God, from apprehending that this arduous course of obedience to his will is demanded of them, as the price or condition of that reconciliation. I do not suppose in the case any such gross misconception of the true nature of the gospel, or any misconception of any kind. On the contrary, I suppose that they fully understand that they are pressed to be reconciled to God *now*; that they are *now* offered, upon his part, pardon of all their offences, and free acceptance in Christ as dear children; and that they know, too, that to enable them to walk as becomes children, a power is engaged which can and will support them in this most arduous course. But I am sure that, from this message thus understood, man naturally recoils with an aversion just proportioned to the degree in which he understands it. And if this be the case—if it be that, when this message of mercy is best understood, it is naturally most distasteful—there is plainly an obstacle to trust in the Redeemer which no degree of knowledge, and no strength of conviction, can of themselves overcome; nothing but the power of God's Spirit effectually subdue.

There is doubtless no part of the mysteries of our faith upon which it less becomes us, that are but dust and ashes, to dogmatize, than the mode of operation of the Infinite Spirit, who deigns to take upon him the work of our conversion to God. But

I hope there is nothing in these views which makes them fairly liable to the charge of such presumption. We say that we find in Scripture the most express reference of faith to the power of God upon the heart ; but that we find there no assertion that this supernatural aid is in all cases exercised to produce belief in the testimony of the Bible, which we have proved to be but a part of faith ; and that reason does not show, in the nature of the thing, a necessity for such influence ; but that, whether this influence be thus exerted or not to enable us to appreciate the evidence for revelation, and to understand its meaning ; we do see a necessity for influences from above, to fill our hearts with a genuine desire for salvation, and to enable us, in entire self-renunciation, to trust for it unreservedly to the work of the Redeemer, and to it alone.

If the aim of dwelling upon the difference, in this respect, between these views of faith were to confirm the refutation which I have given of the one that I hold to be erroneous, it might be more easily attained. It would be enough for this purpose to ask, with respect to the desire which the truth is said to produce, When is it produced in the mind ? If it be said to follow that belief in the testimony of the Bible which in this view constitutes faith, then may you be assured that this faith is not the faith of St. Paul ; for, according to him, faith is the confident expectation of *things hoped for*. No expectation of an event, therefore, until the event be an object of hope, that is, of desire, in his view of the prin-

Hebrews xi. 1.

ciple, constitutes faith. If it be said that a belief in a part of the truth produces this desire, and that belief in the remainder follows it, then you must remark that this statement ends in representing desire and belief not merely as actually existing together in the believer's mind, but as necessarily existing together there before he can be styled a believer. And so far as this coincides with the account of that character which the apostle gives, it is plainly an abandonment, for all practical purposes, of that view of the nature of faith which I have been opposing.

But the controversial bearing of what I have been saying is but incidental to its main design, and of far inferior importance. My chief purpose was to show that what we know of the nature of our own minds furnishes a sufficient reason for what the Bible so distinctly reveals—for the necessity of the influence of the Spirit to effect that change of heart which ends in a joyful and humble acceptance of redemption in the way which God has appointed. I think that, for this object, what has been said is enough, if it be but fairly considered. I hope, too, that, at the same time, a sufficient account has been given of what that change of heart includes; and that thus materials are supplied for an answer to a question which is often asked, though not always with a sincere desire for information, namely, How far is repentance essential to faith? For, if by repentance be meant the whole change of mind which a sinner undergoes under the operation of divine grace, it is only necessary to recal what we

have established about the nature of faith, to be enabled to give to this question a sufficient reply ; since just so much of that change as is necessary to render faith real, is to be pronounced strictly essential to it, and no more.

Faith, as we have said, is trust in the Redeemer and in his work. But that this trust be genuine, it is plainly necessary that we should feel truly our need of redemption, and truly desire it ; as well as truly believe that Christ died to redeem us. Faith, then, is not the act of one careless about the interests of his immortal soul, and therefore consenting easily to confide any where or in any one a charge in which he feels but little concern, but of one alive to the soul's infinite value, and to the momentous importance of eternity. It is not the act of one at ease about the safety of his soul, with little sense of guilt and little fear of punishment ; but of one who feels himself condemned by God's righteous law, and, by its sentence, a sinner in thought, and word, and deed ; and who feels, too, the certainty of his danger as well as the reality of his guilt ; and who seeks relief from this terror and remorse in none of those refuges of lies by which such salutary alarm is so often mitigated and finally extinguished ; but who, feeling the nothingness of them all, and renouncing them all, has, under this sense of sin, and danger, and helplessness, come in sincerity to Christ for every thing,—for safety, and innocence, and strength. It is plain, I say, that it is idle in this case to talk of trust being reposed in the Redeemer, unless by one who

feels thus that he is lost, and that he has no power of himself to help himself. A serious impression, therefore, of the importance of eternity and its interests—a real conviction of sin and of its exceeding sinfulness—a heartfelt sense of our own guilt and depravity—a heartfelt sense, too, of our helplessness, of our weakness, and our wants—must be felt by all who can be truly said to trust in Christ; as knowing in whom they trust, and knowing, also, what they are confiding to his care.

This part of repentance, therefore, is implied in faith rightly understood, and is, strictly speaking, essential to it. And this reply to the question, in its more important sense, offers a sufficient answer to it in what is perhaps its more common meaning, in which repentance is used in the more confined signification of sorrow for sin. It is plain that, by all who feel truly the state to which sin has brought them, sorrow for sin must be felt; and, though the predominant feeling is likely to be that sorrow which an apprehension of punishment produces, yet no one who knows any thing of the human mind can imagine that this is the only sorrow which, under such circumstances, is experienced. They who know that a part of man has survived the general degradation of his nature in the fall, and the further depravation of it by his own iniquity, which is still able to condemn his corruptions, however powerless it be to restrain them, must be aware that the conviction of sin which I have described as a part of what is essential to genuine faith, cannot exist in the human mind without the

painful emotion of remorse which conscience has still the power of producing under such convictions. This sorrow for sin, therefore, must also be felt by all whom the Spirit brings, through these convictions, to faith. But there is a sorrow for sin which is the portion of God's children, and which is not felt by the unreconciled. Sorrow for sin as rebellion against the rightful Lord of our hearts, as ingratitude to our gracious Saviour, as displeasing to our reconciled Father, as shaming the profession of the gospel, and grieving the Spirit of grace—this is manifestly the feeling of those who have received from Him, by faith, the Spirit of adoption, and is to be looked for only in those hearts in which the *love of God has been shed abroad by the power of the Holy Ghost*. The graces of filial love, and of that filial fear which is its inseparable companion, from whence spring a genuine desire to obey, and genuine sorrow at all our failures in obedience, are themselves (as will, I trust, hereafter more distinctly appear) wrought by the Spirit of God mainly through the instrumentality of the faith which he has bestowed, and under that sense of entire reconciliation with God which faith supplies. And to describe the possession of these graces as essential to the genuineness of faith, is to mistake the nature of faith, to misrepresent the order of the Spirit's gifts, and in its direct tendency to frustrate all the effects of faith, and the whole design of the gospel.

In what ways the Spirit of God, in bestowing

Rom. v. 5.

faith, scatters, too, the seeds of all those graces which by faith he afterwards brings to maturity, we cannot without great presumption determine; and any attempt to fix strictly the order in which they appear, the relative rapidity of their advancement, and their relative strength as constituents of the Christian character, is not only a presumptuous limitation of the free Spirit by whom they are wrought, but a weak forgetfulness of those wide diversities of natural character and disposition by which all the effects of religion upon men are so extensively modified. The first operations of the Spirit upon the heart, with which alone I have at present any concern, are of course exposed to be considerably affected by such differences in the subjects of His operation. In one mind alarm at the divine threatenings, in another desire of the promises, may strikingly predominate over all the accompanying feelings; in another the leading feature may be remorse, while another may be penetrated and melted down at once by the unmerited love and generous compassion which the gospel displays. And in all the statements that I have made of the change of mind which is essential to faith, I desire to be understood to speak, not only with a full allowance for such variations as these in the work of the Holy Spirit upon man; but also with a reservation for all further variations which, in the perfect freedom of his ways, that Omniscient Agent may see fit to introduce. Such reservations being made, however, I think this question has been truly answered, and that our

ledge of the human mind allows us, with great confidence, to say, that the trust in the Redeemer for which *faith* stands, may be felt by any heart which the Spirit of God has, by the word of God, brought to a true sense of its lost state before Him; and in which the same Spirit has also wrought a real desire of deliverance from the destruction which it dreads. There is in such convictions, and in such desire, plainly a sufficient foundation for genuine trust in the Redeemer—a reliance upon Him not blind or careless, but intelligent and cordial; and, wherever such confidence is felt, there is genuine faith.

When such questions are raised by man's perverse or contentious spirit, it seems necessary to settle them; but the preaching of the truth, which takes the word of God for its example, will not often have a tendency to engage the mind in such inquiries. The Bible does little to lead a sinner from a contemplation of that work which is the proper foundation of faith, to a scrutiny into the state of his own mind in repenting and believing. It calls upon all to repent and to believe; and brings to act upon all, forces fitted to move in all remorse and alarm; but it treats our sorrow and fear not as modes of propitiating an offended Deity, but as the course through which sinners are to be brought to confide in a reconciled God. To all it presents the same grounds of trust, and gives no warrant to delay faith, or to disquiet the peace of believing, by the old enquiry, "*Have I repented enough to believe?*" And as little does it countenance

the new one, by which, in the same spirit, the professors of a very opposite system impede or disturb the communion of the soul with God,—“*Do I believe correctly enough to be allowed to pray?*”

Knowing that the Spirit works in and by means, he who preaches the truth in simplicity will employ appointed means, in humble reliance on the secret agency by which they are rendered effectual to the salvation of souls—will seek to abase the sinner’s mind by the terrors of the law, and to raise it again by the mercies of the gospel. And to those whose solicitude about their soul is awakened, and who can find no rest—who feel strong convictions, but whose confidence is cold—to them he will not hesitate to say,—Persevere. However imperfectly we can trace it, there is doubtless connected with the mysterious dispensations of God’s grace, a constitution as regular as that by which his providence administers the affairs of the natural world; and they who, in the humble use of appointed means, are presenting their hearts to the influence of the source of spiritual life, may trust that that life will spring up within them, and go on to perfection; as he who casts his seed into the ground, relies on an influence no less unseen and uncontrollable to bring it to maturity, And, above all, remember that the Bible directs us to PRAYER, as the prevailing instrument by which these transforming influences are to be brought down from on high; assuring us that our heavenly Father is ready to give his Holy Spirit to them that ask him. Ask, therefore, and it shall be given you.

“What!” the class of religionists to whom I have alluded are ready to exclaim, upon every such exhortation as this, “desire a man to pray before he has faith?” No, we do not desire a man to pray before he has faith. The apostle sufficiently guards us against such an error, if it were possible to fall into what is so like a contradiction in terms. He tells us that it is impossible to approach God acceptably without faith; but he at the same time tells us the kind and degree of faith necessary to warrant such an approach: and we should surely beware how we add to the conditions. “He that cometh to Him,” saith he, “must believe that He is, and that He is a rewarder of them that diligently seek Him.” Now, is not prayer to God—(I do not mean a repetition of a form of words, but real prayer)—the proper expression of this kind of faith, presupposing and requiring it? And is not a man, convinced upon the evidence of the Bible that faith in Christ is the gift of God, and that He is ready to bestow it upon all who ask it, in a condition to offer this prayer, which is of faith and for faith?

Doubtless he is. And of all the errors of this head-religion—and they are many—the interposing barriers between God and a soul, that, wrung with remorse, or softened by affliction, or shaken by terror, is about to cast itself upon God for light, and strength, and succour, seems the worst,—the most presumptuous, and the most pernicious.

But prayer is too extensive a subject to be entered

Heb. xi. 6.

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upon incidentally, and too important not to make me anxious to return to it. Meanwhile, I have no apprehensions—none at all—that I am misleading you, my brethren, when I say,—If any of you be convinced, by God's word, that you are lost sinners, and that it is only by faith in Christ that you can be saved; and if you feel that your trust in him falls far short of what He deserves and demands; and if you believe, on the same evidence, that faith is the gift of God, and that God is a hearer of prayer;—thrust from you the frigid system, as shallow and false as it is cold, which would bar your access to the throne of grace, and stifle the cry of spiritual distress from rising to Him before whom it never rose in vain. In the self-abasement of conscious guilt,—in the self-renunciation of conscious helplessness,—with the fervour of heartfelt *poverty, and nakedness, and blindness, and misery*, implore Him *who giveth to all liberally, and upbraideth not*, that He would *help your unbelief*, and *increase your faith*, and it shall be unto you even as you will.

I have been led away from the subject which I proposed—the effects of faith—too far to return to it now; but I hope to be able to pursue it when I have next an opportunity of addressing you.

SERMON III.
ON THE NATURE AND THE GROUNDS OF
JUSTIFICATION.

Justificare ergo nihil aliud est, quam eum qui reus agebatur, tanquam approbata innocentia a reatu absolvere. Quum itaque nos Christi intercessionem justificet Deus, non propriæ innocentiae approbatione, sed justitiæ imputatione nos absolvit: ut pro justis in Christo censeamur, qui in nobis non sunt.

CALVIN. *Inst. lib. 3, cap. 11, § 3.*

In præsentiarum vero breviter dico, *credere me peccatores sola Christi obedientia justos constitui: et quod justitia Christi, sola meritoria causa sit, propter quam Deus credentibus peccatum condonet, eosque pro justis reputat; non aliter atque si legem perfecte implevissent. Quoniam vero Deus justitiam Christi nemini imputat nisi fidelibus, statuo hoc sensu bene et proprie dici, fidem homini credenti, in justitiam, ex gratia imputari: quatenus Deus Jesum Christum Filium suum proposuit tribunal gratiæ sive propitiationem per fidem in sanguine ipsius. Sed quidquid hic sit, mea sententia non usque adeo discrepat a sententia Calvinii, quem tamen nemo nostrum reprehendit atque male in hac re sentientem: quin paratus essem manus meæ subnotatione subscribere illis, quæ in tertio libro Institutionum suarum de hac re dicit, usque calculum meum adjicere.*

ARMINIUS *Declaratio sententiæ suæ, §c.*

SERMON III.

ACTS XIII. 38, 39.

Be it known unto you, therefore, men and brethren, that through this man is preached unto you forgiveness of sins ; and by him all that believe are justified from all things from which ye could not be justified by the law of Moses.

Every one must, I suppose, have noticed how strong and how widely spread the impression is, that we ought to ascribe to the leading terms of Scripture some sense different from that which they bear in other writings, or in common discourse. If it were important, it would not be at all difficult to assign some, at least, of the causes which may have given currency to this strange impression. It leaves almost indefinite room for evasion in argument, which answers the purposes of some who entertain it ; it favours vague notions in matters of religion, which to most minds are far more comfortable than more exact ones ; and it indulges that passion for the mysterious in theology, which, in some degree or other, is, I believe, natural to us all. It might be possible, perhaps, to add to these reasons for its

easy reception ; but we are much more interested in its truth than in its origin. Upon that, however, I can at present only stop to say, that, whatever foundation such a view may have in general—and I cannot help thinking that it has much less than is usually supposed—it manifestly can have none at all, where these terms stand for states of the human mind. All the processes of man's intellect, and all the varieties of his affections, are manifestly the same in kind, whether they be employed about things temporal or things eternal—about this world or the next. Whether we reason, and judge, and believe, concerning law, or politics, or religion, no one can, I suppose, doubt that we reason, and judge, and believe, in the same way. And, surely, just as little ground is there for questioning that, whether our hopes and fears, our desires and aversions, be excited by the passing shadows of the present scene, or by the permanent realities of the invisible world, they are essentially the same emotions. They differ when exercised about objects of these widely different spheres, it is true ; but only as they differ when employed about different objects of the one surrounding us, and acting upon our senses ;—they differ, that is, in duration and in intensity,—in the facility and certainty with which they answer the calls fitted to draw them forth,—in the degree in which they enter into man's character,—in the extent to which they regulate his conduct ;—in these and such like ways they differ, but in no other. They are essentially the same affections, whether they be lavished, as they so

often are, upon some of the transitory objects that engross and debase them ; or find a worthy exercise in what tasks and baffles the faculties of angels—in God and in his law,—in the mysteries of redemption,—in the bounties of grace,—in heaven and in hell,—in judgment, and eternity.

The truth of this is, I presume, too evident to make any confirmation of it necessary. It might rather appear, perhaps, that some excuse was required, for putting forward a principle so obvious, in so detailed a form. For you, however, my brethren, this, too, would be superfluous. The class of truths, of any value, of which men do not require sometimes to be reminded is a very scanty one ; and you cannot think that this is among them, when you recollect that we have been engaged in combating some errors concerning one important scriptural term, which could not easily have existed, if this principle were not sometimes either disbelieved or forgotten.

You will, however, also, I hope, remember that neither in the refutation of these errors, nor in the investigation of the true meaning of the term, was any assistance borrowed from this principle, indisputable as it is. But that it was ascertained, by direct examination of the Bible, that faith (the term with which we had to do) is used there in no sense different from that which it bears in the ordinary use of common language. So that they who know what is meant by faith in a promise, know what is meant by faith in the gospel ;—they who know what is meant by faith in a remedy, know what is meant

by faith in the blood of the Redeemer;—they who know what is meant by faith in a physician, faith in an advocate, faith in a friend, know, too, what the Scriptures mean to express when they speak of faith in the Lord Jesus Christ.

Where this is held, and remembered, the sense of this important phrase is fixed, with all the exactness that is practicable or desirable. No one who bore it in mind could easily, for example, fall into the gross error of those who regard faith in the Redeemer as standing for that combination of spiritual graces and active virtues which forms the Christian character. Nor would he readily be betrayed even into the opposite mistake of those who understand by it simply a belief in testimony. For this, though a far more covert error than the former, is one into which few would be likely to fall, except in matters of religion. Any where else, such a misuse of common language would hardly be committed; or, if fallen into accidentally, would be at once detected. Men speak familiarly of faith in a living physician, or in a living patriot; but who is there that would not be startled at hearing one now speak of his faith in Machaon, or his faith in Aristides? Even those who had least reflected on the force of language, would feel instinctively, how false and vicious a mode this was of expressing our conviction, however firm, of skill or probity, from which we expected no benefit. It might not be easy, perhaps, to find many who would succeed in defining the term exactly, or even in pointing out precisely where the impropriety of its use lay; but it would not be at all hard to

collect from the general correctness with which it is employed, and from the immediate sense manifested of any departure from a proper use of it, that the true impression is very widely and firmly established—namely, that it requires an interest in the end, and a real desire for it, to render our conviction of the efficacy of any means for securing it, properly styled *faith* in them.

What is true and well known of such language, when applied to common life and its concerns, we found, as I said, on examination of the Bible, to hold true also in religion. And it is this connection of faith with the affections, which constitutes, as we saw reason to believe, the proper necessity of the operation of the Spirit of God to produce in us faith in Christ. Without presuming to question the actual exercise of this mysterious agency, in aiding the intellectual part of the process; we saw that in effecting the remaining part, it was essential. That sense of the reality both of the danger and of the guilt of sin, of the certainty and of the justice of God's condemnation of it, without which REDEMPTION may indeed be sought in words, but cannot be felt to be a deliverance from a righteous as well as a sure sentence, and, therefore, cannot be sought as God has willed and commanded that it should be sought;—the submission of the heart to God's humbling plan for forgiving and for restoring us—abjuring all trust in ourselves, or in any thing in ourselves—in our purity of conduct, or our goodness of heart, or sincerity of purpose, in our humility, or in our faith—trusting wholly in another, in

another's sufferings, and in another's righteousness ; and in these trusting so truly, as to have all our natural alienation from God and our fear of Him vanquished ; to be enabled, however far or long we may have wandered from Him, to turn to Him in filial affection as to a reconciled Father :—All this is too hard for flesh and blood ; and our best knowledge of the constitution of our own minds confirms the testimony of the Bible upon the subject,—that faith in Christ, to which all this is essential, is truly the gift of God.

Having seen so much of the nature of faith, and of its source, we are now to inquire, my brethren, into what alone gives to either all that it has beyond speculative interest for us,—into its effects. And these divide themselves so easily into effects upon our state before God, and effects upon our character ; and there is such an obvious convenience in employing so simple and natural a division of the subject, that, in all that I shall say to you upon it, I shall endeavour to keep these two heads distinct.

As to the first then—the effect of faith upon our state before God—the Bible is upon it so clear and copious that I do not think it too much to say, that a plain man, who had read no other book on the subject, would find it hard to conceive how any difficulty could have ever risen about it. It is there very expressly, and in a great variety of forms, asserted that, in the matter of justification before God, faith is, by His gracious appointment, counted for obedience ;—that it restores us to that state of

favour and acceptance with Him, in which the perfect righteousness of His law would have sustained us, had we been able to have attained to that righteousness, and to have preserved it.

This fundamental doctrine of the gospel of Christ—the doctrine of JUSTIFICATION by FAITH *only*—the undoubted doctrine of our church, and of all pure reformed churches,—I have been anxious to state thus,—as simply and as unequivocally as I am able to state it: mainly, I hope, because I regard it as of vital importance to true religion; but certainly, in some degree also, I acknowledge, because vague apprehensions of its tendency lead often to a reluctance to state it in distinct terms, and that in this reluctance I should be most sorry to be understood to share. I do not share, in any degree, in the apprehensions that give birth to it; and, I trust, I shall be able to satisfy you that they are grounded upon very gross misconceptions: but if I entertained them ever so strongly, I should certainly not feel that they warranted me in holding back or qualifying any doctrine so distinctly and so prominently revealed in God's word. A fitter season, however, for enlarging on this will arrive when the truth of the doctrine shall have been established. And to the proofs by which it may, I think, be conclusively established, I should at once proceed to direct your attention; but that, for understanding its full import, it will be convenient to fix first the true sense of the important term JUSTIFICATION.

I omit, for the present, any notice of the different senses assigned to the word, by those who have set

themselves to lower the doctrine with which it is connected. Some of them I shall have occasion to advert to as I proceed ; and all (as in the case of the important term *faith*) will be best overthrown by establishing the true meaning of the word. Neglecting then, as in that case, the kindred and derived senses which, in common with every important word in every language, it has, JUSTIFICATION will, I think, be found to be, in its proper and common meaning, *a judicial declaration of the innocence of the person justified*.

I do not mean to support this sense by any arguments from etymology. However useful etymology may be in fixing the general meaning of words, it rarely affords much assistance in determining their exact force ; and scarcely ever gives any, where the question lies between kindred senses. Whatever aid, too, it might be fitted to give in the present case, this is no place to avail ourselves of ; but the best, and in all cases the final mode of establishing the meaning of a word lies open to us even here ; and a brief consideration of the *use* of JUSTIFICATION in the sacred writings will, I hope, leave no reasonable ground for doubting that its meaning has been correctly stated.

Thus, in warning against sin, God declares of himself that “ He will not *justify* the wicked ;” which is explained, if it need explanation, by the corresponding declaration, that He “ will by no means *clear* the guilty.” He commands the judges of his people, who were to decide between litigants,

Exodus xxiii. 7.

Exodus xxxiv. 7.

to *justify* the righteous and to *condemn* the wicked. He expresses abhorrence alike of those who "*justify* the wicked and *condemn* the just;" and in repeating the denunciation against this unrighteous judgment, periphrases occur for both terms which can leave no shadow of doubt as to their meaning. "It is not good to *accept the person* of the wicked, to overthrow the righteous in judgment." "He that saith unto the wicked, *Thou art righteous*, him shall the people curse; nations shall abhor him." And, "Woe unto them. . . . which *justify* the wicked for reward, and *take away the righteousness* of the righteous from him."—"How," it is elsewhere asked, "can a man be *justified* with God?" and the exegetical clause is subjoined, "How can he be *clean* that is born of a woman?" Every day you hear an equally unequivocal use of the word, in the same sense, in that humble petition of the Psalmist, which expresses so well the frame of mind that becomes a sinner drawing near to God, and which forms, therefore, so suitable an introduction to our daily prayer, "*Enter not into judgment* with thy servant, O Lord! for in thy sight shall no man living be *justified*." And, finally, the same forensic sense appears with equal distinctness, in that passage in the sublime supplication of Solomon, "Hear thou in heaven, and do, and *judge* thy servants, *condemning* the wicked, to bring his way upon his head, and *justifying* the righteous, to give him

Deuteronomy xxv. 1.

Proverbs xvii. 15.

Proverbs xviii. 5

Proverbs xxiv. 24.

Isaiah v. 23.

Job xxv. 4.

Psalm cxliii. 2.

1 Kings viii. 32.

according to his righteousness." In the New Testament, too, without touching upon any passage in which the sense of the word depends in any respect upon doctrinal views, it would be easy to supply texts which clearly require the same signification: "By thy words thou shalt be *justified*, and by thy words thou shalt be *condemned*;" "Who shall *lay any thing to the charge* of God's elect? It is God that *justifieth*,"—seem, among others, clear instances of this kind.

You will find no difficulty in adding to these passages; but they seem sufficiently numerous, and are, I think, sufficiently clear. Whether you derive the meaning of the word from the clauses in which it stands, taken in their natural sense, or in the sense assigned to them by the clauses with which they are contrasted, or by the clauses by which they are explained, you will be led to the same result; and cannot, I think, reasonably doubt that it was used—and in the same unforced and familiar manner too—to express, as I before said, a judicial act, by which the innocence of the person justified is established or declared. And, I suppose, its derived meanings, when it is used so as to include some of the consequences of such a declaration; or when it is employed to express a *mental* decision by a judge; or a similar decision by one who is not a judge; or in such phrases as a man *justifying himself*; his works, or any thing else, *justifying him* (in the sense of proving, or establishing, or constituting his innocence, so as to cause or merit such a declaration

Matthew xii.

Romans viii. 33.

of it); such derived meanings, I say, cannot create any difficulty that requires distinct explanation. It is evident, then, that in the justification with which we have to do—in which man is the party and God the judge—we have only to look to the law to which man is amenable, to see what his justification means—what this declaration of his innocence by his all-seeing Judge includes. And finding that that law contains clear precepts, to which exact obedience is required, no less than strict prohibitions enforced with equal rigour; finding that any failure in performing every part of all that it enjoins to be performed, as effectually overthrows innocence, as the plainest commission of all that it forbids to be done; we seem warranted and obliged to conclude, that man's justification comprehends, not only his acquittal from having violated the divine law, but his acceptance also, as having perfectly fulfilled it.

The various devices that have been resorted to to evade the force of this fair inference would be well worth a detailed consideration, on various grounds; but I can only afford now to advert to some of them, and very cursorily. I presume, however, it cannot be necessary to dwell long on the one which it is natural first to notice—the view of those who deny that justification is a judicial act at all,—asserting that justifying a sinner is not declaring him to be righteous, but making him so. I do not advert to the Romish view of the nature of justification, but to a kindred error which boasts the support of an eminent Protestant name. Among Protestants, however, I cannot think it necessary to set about a

formal confutation of a view which confounds the justification of sinners with their sanctification. It belongs to a class of errors which, I think, ought rarely, among Protestants, to receive any reply. If those who have the Bible open to them will not consult it, so far as to be able to detect, for themselves, such flagrant misrepresentations of its testimony, there can be little use in discussing particular doctrines with them, and there may be some injury in doing so; for it is manifestly calculated to fall in with the false notions concerning their real state, under which persons must lie, who neglect the word of God, and yet speak as if they had *part or lot in the matter*.

Many who feel the impossibility of denying that "Justification" is an act of God, not as our sanctifier but as our judge, hold still that it ought to be applied to that final act of judgment, by which all believers in Christ, who have been sanctified by the Spirit of God, and have kept a course of consistent obedience to the end, are at the last, for Christ's sake, accepted by the righteous Judge of all, and received into the kingdom prepared for the Lord's true followers.

Now you will remark that the question is not, whether *justification* might be used to express this act; or even whether it be actually employed in any case in Scripture to express it; but whether this be its signification in the great majority of passages in which it occurs, and these, too, the very passages, and the only passages, with which the argument is concerned. And I hope it cannot be necessary to spend time in convincing you that it is not. That

men are spoken of there as actually justified, whatever justification means, and in actual enjoyment of its fruits, whatever they be, must be known to every reader of the Bible. "Being *now* justified we shall be saved from wrath, through him"—"Being justified, we *have* peace with God"—"But ye *are* washed, but ye *are* sanctified, but ye *are justified*"—which are among the first passages that must come to every mind, would of themselves leave no doubt on the subject.

And, accordingly, there are a large class of persons who cannot receive the whole testimony of the Bible upon this subject, who yet so far receive it as to reject both the former error, concerning the nature of justification, and this last mentioned one, about the period at which it takes place. They, however, make a last struggle to retain for man a share in the work of his own redemption, which God's plan does not allow him, maintaining that justification is pardon for past sin, and no more; and that a man is not accepted as righteous until he becomes so.

This is to be found stated variously, and supported variously, in the writings of many divines, who, whatever may have been their claims to attention on other subjects, exhibit too gross misconceptions concerning the Gospel to allow their authority to carry much weight upon this. And their arguments for this restriction of the meaning of justification consist of little more than statements of such erroneous views about the principles of the Gospel as are irreconcilable with the true sense of the term.

Romans v. 9.

Romans v. 1.

1 Corinthians vi. 11.

To these erroneous views I must hereafter call your attention; and in overthrowing them, which I hope to be able to do, the chief support, as I said, in the way of argument for this limited notion of justification, will be taken away. But as I believe some loose and ill-considered analogies recommend this notion to many who embrace it, and as the same analogies lead often to inaccurate language, at least, in some who oppose it, I think I may be doing some service in directing your attention, before I pass from the subject, to the consideration of this fruitful source of error upon it.

First, then, let me remind you, that when we describe man's justification as including, not only an acquittal from the charge of having violated the divine law, but acceptance also as having fulfilled it; we are not to be understood to intimate that, with respect to that law, these are distinct acts, one of which is performed in any case without the other: but, on the contrary, to maintain that, however distinct they are in conception, and however constantly they are actually separated in the case of other laws, the nature of the divine law requires their union: that it provides for no distinct courses by one of which a man may escape its punishments, and by another earn its rewards; and recognizes no intermediate state between the guilt of violating it and the merit of obeying it: that a failure in active obedience to any of its commands is sin, no less than positive disobedience of any of its prohibitions; and that, therefore, innocence of necessity includes a performance of all

that it enjoins, no less than an avoidance of all that it forbids. So that, when we are charged with making distinctions which the Bible no where makes, we are actually engaged in an endeavour to prevent such distinctions from being made: by showing that, for such distinctions, there is really no place in the Bible. We are guarding against or combating errors that spring naturally from our familiarity with prohibitory codes; under which, abstaining from prohibited acts constitutes *innocence*, and immunity from punishment is the proper result of innocence. And having shown that justification is a declaration of innocence with respect to some law, we are merely explaining what innocence must include, and what it must secure, in a law which must be allowed to be prohibitory and mandatory, and which does not denounce punishment only, but also promises rewards.

But men do not merely limit unwarrantably the extent of justification, by this false analogy with human law; but by an analogy with human tribunals, they persuade themselves that there is a difficulty connected with the acceptance of a sinner as righteous, which does not belong to the pardon of his offences. And here I think there is a mistake as to the true state of the case to which they refer, and I am sure there is an error in supposing that any ground for the comparison exists.

The case seems to be this:—we are so accustomed to see the sentence of law virtually remitted, or modified, by those who, as judges, are charged with the execution of it, that we naturally begin

to consider pardoning criminals nearly as much a part of the judicial office as ascertaining their guilt. Whereas it appears properly no part of that office; or if it should be thought that it is (and I have no intention of doing any thing so idle as moving a question upon that subject here), it is so upon grounds manifestly wholly inapplicable to the judicial proceedings of God. For you see that, if human legislators could anticipate all modes and circumstances of crime, and comprehend all varieties of it under strict descriptions, there would be no reason for allowing the judge's office ever to exceed, what at all times appears to form his proper business—ascertaining the guilt or innocence of the accused according to law, and pronouncing its sentence. But men can exercise no such forecast; and, even if they could, it would be impossible to devise descriptions, which should exactly designate the multiplied varieties of actions, to which it would be necessary that they should extend. The most imperfect notion of the proper end of human law, is enough to show that the character of human actions, as they are its objects, is so materially altered by circumstances, that punishing with the same degree of severity two actions comprehended under the same descriptions,—even where legal descriptions are best and most exact,—might be attended with the most opposite effects. Hence arises an obvious necessity, in every country governed by law, of reserving to the chief executive authority, a power of mitigating the rigour of legal enactments: and a portion of this power is often, for convenience'

sake, given to those who represent the executive in the judicial character. It does not, as I said, appear to belong to that character properly, or to the executive either, but to the legislative: but that is a point of minor consequence, and, whatever be settled with respect to it, it must be allowed, for it is most manifest, that it is exercised by the judicial office among men, upon grounds which can find no place at all in the proceedings of the Deity. For what is establishing any analogy here, but representing God as discovering, when he comes to apply His law to individual cases,—that its provisions are not suited to man's frailty, and require relaxation,—that its sanctions are too severe to be enforced, and require mitigation?

“But God is legislator as well as judge.” Doubtless he is, and it is that very fact that renders the analogy so utterly baseless. For we have seen that the exercise of such power as it is supposed so easy for God to exercise as judge—proves, because it springs from, want of forecast in the legislator, and imperfection in his law.

It is true, that this gross error sometimes assumes a shape in which this confutation cannot in terms be applied to it. Some persons speak, and others, who would hardly venture to express such thoughts distinctly, allow themselves, it is to be feared, to think, as if the Deity denounced against sin severities which he never designed to execute, and demanded a degree of perfection which he never meant to exact; and that so HE stimulates to exertion and deters from crime by a device often employed among

men to produce the same effect. This certainly does not charge the author of the divine law with want of foresight, and I desire to avoid giving utterance to the charge that it seems to make against him. The impiety or indecency of such language may be explained away; and I have no intention of ascribing either, in design, to those who use it. But see, independently of all objections of that kind, how the scheme stands on the score of coherency.

It cannot be meant—I suppose it cannot be meant—that God has any where distinctly said, that this is the true purpose of the rigid requirements and the awful sanctions of his holy law. Not to mention the total want of support for such an assertion, it would not be easy to see how his threats and commands, so explained, were to produce the effect that they are said to be designed to produce. And if he has not so said, but the knowledge that it is so is to be collected from principles laid down in his word; or upon general principles of reason, and from the nature of the thing; or in whatever way it is to be attained by those who think they possess it;—is the absurdity at all lessened?—does it not seem rather increased when God is thus represented as concerned to conceal his purpose, and as designing to do so, and so framing this important design that it is penetrated and baffled by the very beings upon whom it was intended that it should operate?

I do not know whether loose and irreverent talk of this kind, upon such a subject, deserves any reply; but I am sure that time would be miserably mis-

spent in giving it a more detailed one. You, my brethren, are, I trust, but little likely to be affected by such crude and presumptuous schemes. You feel, I trust, the awful and certain truth, which we are all so concerned to feel, that when God established his righteous law, not the whole course of human conduct only, but all the springs of human actions, lay open to his view: that the frailty of our nature, the snares of temptation, the tyranny of passion, the corrupting force of evil education, the seductions of evil example—all those palliations of crime which our perverted reason urges to tranquillize our inward monitor—all stood before his sight; and that, with this omniscient knowledge of every offence and every offender, he framed and consecrated his holy law; limiting, strictly limiting, its blessings to uniform and perfect obedience, and denouncing, as expressly, a curse against every violation of it.

Well, it may be said, this was no doubt the case; but must it not be allowed to be a purpose of Christ's coming to annul this law, and to substitute one less rigorous in its room? As this misconception of Christ's real work with respect to the law,—which represents him as promulgating a relaxed moral code,—lies at the bottom of so many errors concerning the gospel, I ought, perhaps, to bestow some time in removing it. But I must confine myself to my immediate subject; and, for it, it is quite enough to inquire, what shadow of scriptural ground is there for the assertion? When the Lord speaks of the law, we find him continually endeavouring to

show the carnal-minded people whom he addressed how far they were from understanding its wide extent and true spiritual import; opening out its distinct precepts, and showing how much higher they aim than to restrain from the few overt acts which they specify; and enforcing in various ways this larger sense upon the reason and conscience of his hearers.

But besides these labours in detail to restore to their proper limits, those exceeding broad commandments which try the heart and the reins; we find him solemnly republishing the whole in that most beautiful but most awful form, in which that duty which comprehends all duties is pressed with such emphatic reiteration upon us,—that duty which the heart of every human being acknowledges to be of imperative obligation, while it testifies against him that he never has fulfilled it—“Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heart, and with all thy mind, and with all thy soul, and with all thy strength.” Would it not appear, then, that with much more show of reason the Lord might be represented to have added to the strictness of the law, than to have detracted from it? And as to annulling it, as he is described to have done, does not his own impressive declaration seem framed to meet directly the vain imagination? “Think not that I am come to destroy the law and the prophets; I am not come to destroy, but to fulfil. For verily I say unto you, till heaven and earth pass away, one jot or one tittle of the law shall in no

wise pass away till all be fulfilled." And is it a law, thus solemnly established by God, and thus solemnly republished and declared immutable by his Son, that is represented, sometimes as thrust aside when it ought to be applied, sometimes as modified in the application of it, sometimes as altogether superseded by some unassigned and unassignable code; according as the one statement or the other seems demanded by the exigencies of a bad argument?

I have taken you very far in following out the exposure of those misconceived analogies with human law and human tribunals, which, as much as any other prejudice perhaps, impede the general admission of the full and proper sense of justification. But the time has not been ill-bestowed if it has served to remove from any mind this serious obstacle to just views upon this important subject.

But though this may remove some impediments to the reception of the truth, it does nothing to take away its difficulties. If the justification of man be indeed a declaration of his innocence with respect to the divine law, how may sinful man be justified? We have seen what God's exceeding broad commandments require, and we all know how we have answered their demands. The sentence might be safely trusted even to our own corrupt hearts; but the express declarations of scripture spare us the necessity of the appeal. It declares, that he that keeps the whole law, and yet offends in one point, the same is guilty of all; and adds, what the least enlightened conscience must assuredly confirm, that not

James ii. 10.

in one point only, but in many things, we offend all. How, then, can a man be justified with God ?

This is the mystery of redemption to which the apostle enables us to reply,—We are “justified *freely* by God’s grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus.” HE is the PROPITIATION ; through which God is just when he thus *justifies the ungodly* who are found in Him, for *He died for the ungodly*. *All have sinned*, and *death is the wages of sin* ; but he, by the grace of God, hath tasted death for every man. And now all who are *found in Him* are JUSTIFIED. God doth not impute to them the sin that they have committed, for Christ hath come to take away sin by the sacrifice of himself ; they are found in Him, and his blood cleanseth from all sin. God doth impute to them the righteousness which they have not, for they are *found in Christ, accepted in the beloved, not having their own righteousness, which is of the law, but the righteousness which is of God*. To the church which he has purchased with his blood, the Lord is joined by a bond that finds a faint image in the closest and tenderest of human ties : and we are *one with Him* as members of that pure church of which He is the spouse ; *one with Him* as members of the spotless body of which He is the glorious head ; yea, *one with Him* in a union so intimate that it is by himself described as shadowing his own ineffable

Rom. iii. 24 ;	iv. 5 ;	iii. 23 ;	vi. 23.	Heb. ii. 9.	Rom. iv. 8.
Heb. ix. 26.	1 John i. 7.	Rom. iv. 6.	Eph. i. 6.	Phil. iii. 9.	
Eph. v. 22—32.	Rom. xii. 5.	1 Cor. xii. 12, 13, 27.			
Eph. iv. 16.		John xvii. 21.			

union with the Father. Thus, ONE WITH HIM, we share in his exaltation as He deigned to share in our abasement. Because we merited punishment, he endured it; and because He, in his humiliation, earned the rewards of perfect obedience, we obtain them. Such, the apostle tells us, is God's gracious appointment, who for us *made him to be sin, that knew no sin, that we might be made the righteousness of God in him.*

In thus stating the grounds of the justification of sinners, and declaring them to be justified by imputed righteousness no less than by vicarious sufferings; we have something of the same task to perform as in guarding the statement of the nature of their justification. As then we had to point out that it was designed to prevent, not to institute, a separation between the acts of pardon and of acceptance; so here we have to explain (and the caution is rendered necessary by some modes of supporting as well as of assailing the doctrine) that we design no formal division of the Redeemer's reconciling work into sufferings and obedience, one kind of efficacy being strictly ascribed to the one part, and another kind to the other. The scheme, rightly understood, requires no such artificial divisions; though in speaking upon the subject, for distinctness' sake, and for an orderly consideration of it, language which may seem to countenance such views must often be used. But this only results from the way in which our limited faculties oblige us to take in, and to present to others, an extensive subject. It occurs continually, in

matters of religion : notably in speaking of the atonement in reference to the persons of the Trinity ; in which we often employ a mode of explaining their agency which seems, at first view, inconsistent with the orthodox belief that it has its source in the love, no less than in the wisdom of the one eternal and indivisible Godhead. Just in the same way here, too, we are obliged, in entering into details, sometimes to speak in a way which makes it necessary to take occasion to state, that, as we did not mean, in setting forth the extent of justification, that God pardons believers first, and accepts them afterwards, or declares them free from guilt, and possessed of righteousness, by separate judicial acts ; so, in stating the grounds of it, we do not mean to sever the blessed Redeemer's sufferings and his obedience, but to represent both as united in one mediatorial work. That this, beginning with his birth in this world of sin and sorrow, and ending with his death upon the cross of shame, was one work of obedience which his Father gave him to do. That it comprised satisfaction for man's violations of the written law, and obedience to all the law's demands, and required both ; but that it was above and beyond them, and that by it all who are united to HIM are saved from punishment, secured from danger, freed from guilt, and fully accepted, in Him pardoned, and in Him righteous.

It would be rash, and would show great ignorance of the matter, to say, that this mode of dealing with us does not involve great difficulties. Difficulties !—doubtless it does. Have we the thoughtless

arrogance to demand that all the ways of the High and Holy One, who inhabiteth eternity, should be made plain to us? What kings and prophets desired to see in vain, what even the angels that surround God's throne longed to look into, has been made manifest to us; and, amidst this bright manifestation of God's nature and his purposes, have we the perverseness and the folly, instead of rejoicing in the light, to repine that some darkness remains? We, to whom there is nothing so familiar that it does not contain much that is obscure, who find in the meanest work of nature, in the simplest movement of our own minds, in every thing within us and around us, mysteries unfathomable;—are we wisely impatient that this law of our being is not suspended, just where beforehand we ought to expect to find it in its fullest strength? Do we require fairly, that in matters so high, and in these only, nothing should remain to remind us that to know every thing *in part* is the condition, if not of our finite capacities, certainly of their exercise, in this present imperfect state of being?

How far the difficulties alluded to are of this kind, how far they discourage, and to what extent they invite, investigation, no time remains to inquire if my immediate purpose led naturally to the examination; but it does not. All that I am at present concerned to say on the subject may be said very briefly, and it is this: that the part of the doctrine which is retained by all who make any profession of receiving the doctrine of the atonement, is just as encumbered with difficulties, and with difficulties of the

same kind, too, as that which so many reject. All who profess to receive that doctrine, in any form, hold the imputation of our sins to Christ strictly, and in a sense of his sufferings to us ; and if he was *made sin who knew no sin*—if the appointed mode of *redeeming us from the curse of the law* was his being *made a curse for us*—if he *bare our sins in his own body upon the tree*, and the Lord *laid upon him the iniquities of us all*, it does not appear easily how it can be represented as contrary to God's mode of dealing with man, that *by his obedience should many be made righteous ; that he should be to us the end of the law for righteousness ; that we should be found in him, not having our own righteousness, but the righteousness which is of God.*

For the present, I must stop here. When I am able to return to the consideration of the doctrine, you will, I think, find that, in spending so much time in establishing the true nature and the grounds of justification, I have not wandered so far from the subject proposed as you might at first imagine. For while right views upon both heads are essential to understanding fully, they will be found, I think, greatly to facilitate the proof of the doctrine of our church which I proposed to establish and explain—the doctrine of JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH *only*. Now unto God the Father, the Son, and the Spirit, be ascribed all glory and praise !

Rom. v. 19.

Rom. x. 4,

Phil. iii. 9.

SERMON IV.

**ON THE CONNEXION BETWEEN FAITH
AND JUSTIFICATION.**

Nunc ostendemus quod fides justificet; ubi primum hoc monendi sunt lectores quod sicut necesse est hanc sententiam tueri, *quod Christus sit Mediator*, ita necesse sit defendere *quod fides justificet*.....

Sed nonnulli fortassis cum dicitur quod fides justificet intelligunt de principio, quod fides sit initium justificationis, seu præparatio ad justificationem; ita ut non sit ipsa fides illud quo accepti sumus Deo, sed opera quæ sequuntur. Et somniant fidem ideo valde laudari quia sit principium. Non sic de fide sentimus. Sed hoc defendimus, quod proprie, ac vere, ipsa fide, propter Christum, justi reputamur, seu accepti Deo simus.....

.....APOLOGIA AUGUSTANÆ CONFESSIONIS.

[*Quod sola Fides in Christum justificet.*]

SERMON IV.

ROMANS III. 38.

Therefore we conclude that a man is justified by faith without the deeds of the law.

IN resuming, after so long an interval, the consideration of the important subject for which I have already so often endeavoured to engage your attention, I find it necessary, my brethren, to begin by reminding you, that what has been done, or attempted, hitherto, has been, to fix from the word of God the nature and the source of faith, and to explain the nature and the grounds of justification.

With respect to the former, it was shown that, in the Bible, faith in Christ is trust in him founded upon the knowledge of what he has done for us. The two extreme errors upon the subject,—of the many who make it mean much more, and of the smaller religious body, who maintain that it means something less,—were distinctly pointed out, and shown to be as really opposed to the authority of scripture, as they obviously are to the ordinary meaning of common language. And the true meaning of the phrase was established by direct

examination of the Bible, at such length as to forbid recapitulation, and, I hope, to render it unnecessary. And finally, from this account of the nature of faith, some reasons, drawn from acknowledged principles concerning the constitution of the human mind, were offered for that important truth, which, whether we succeed in accounting for it or not, is known to us by the sure testimony of sacred Scripture—namely, that faith in Christ is the gift of God, and that it requires a change of mind, which is the work of His Holy Spirit.

With respect to the justification of man, it was shown, by the same course of scriptural proof, that it means the judicial declaration of his innocence by God, the judge of all—of his innocence with respect to that divine law, to which he is amenable, and by which he is tried. Certain erroneous opinions upon this subject, too, were stated and exposed, and were found to rest chiefly upon ill-considered analogies. And I think it important to add even now, in the way of caution, that by such analogies we are here so surrounded, that almost every word which we use serves to introduce some of them.

Thus, though justified sinners are, in one view of their case, pardoned, and acquitted in another, we cannot, without danger of mistake, speak of their justification as *pardon* or *acquittal*. For both terms are calculated to conceal from us, though in different ways, the true grounds of the act, and both to mislead us as to its extent.

Pardon, in the cases in which we are familiar

with it, is the immediate result of commiseration, under no restraint except such as arises from a prudential regard for the interests of society, the security of which is the proper end of human law. The remission of the punishment due to our offences no less truly results from the tender compassion of the Most High ; but we are informed (what *pardon* never suggests to us, and what yet it is most important that we should bear in mind) that this compassion could not, consistently with His other perfections, proceed as human mercy does ; but that his law was to be satisfied by suffering and by obedience before mercy could be shown to those who had violated it ; and that mercy has been thus reconciled to justice by the unimpeachable obedience and the bitter sufferings of the Son of God. When we speak, then, as with this caution we may, of our justification as pardon, and ascribe it, as we ought, to the free mercy of God as to its true source, we are not to forget that its grounds are the merits of another, and the sufferings of another.

“ Acquittal,” in like manner, sends us, by all our associations with the word, to a scheme of prohibitory enactments, some part of which a man is accused of having violated ; whereas a sinner’s justification has reference to the whole of God’s law—a law composed of commands, no less than of prohibitions—professing to regulate, not the outward conduct merely, but the affections ; which a man may disobey without performing any outward act, and which no course of outward acts will of itself satisfy.

Again, "pardon" not only presumes the establishment of guilt, but it gives no intimation that that guilt has been taken away: while of all the consequences of guilt, it only secures against the legal punishment to which the offender is exposed, and so leaves him to suffer others which are often still harder to be borne. Even *acquittal*,—as from the imperfection of human tribunals it so often arises from a failure of proof of guilt, where guilt really exists,—does not necessarily suggest the notion of innocence; and in fact often fails to restore us even to the outward advantages of innocence. So that both terms greatly and almost equally fail to convey to us the completeness of our reconciliation to offended authority, the perfect restoration of our lost estate and all its high privileges, the entire recovery of the quiet confidence and inward peace of innocence which justification includes. Whatever words, then, it may at any time be found convenient to substitute for *justification*, we are not to lose sight of its true force; but to bear in mind that the justification of sinners is a judicial act of the just God, and yet the Saviour, by which he remits the punishment due to their offences, because Christ has suffered; by which he accepts them as righteous, as fulfilling the law which all have violated, because Christ has obeyed.

Having thus seen the nature of faith and of justification, we are now to show their connexion, by setting forth that which our church truly styles "a wholesome doctrine, and very full of comfort,"—the doctrine of JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH *only*; to show that, in the office of justifying the believer, faith

admits no fellowship—that none of his acts or qualities, none of his gifts or graces, none of his virtues or servings, of whatever kind,—whether concomitants of faith or consequents of it,—share with it in this its office; but that it is by FAITH, and by it *only*, that we possess that efficacious interest in Christ's suffering, that availing title to his obedience, which shield us from the curse of the law, and secure to us its blessings and its rewards.

I hoped, as I believe I intimated, that explaining the nature of justification would prepare an easy admission for the scripture account of the grounds of it: for if it be really a declaration of our innocence by an unerring judge, it would seem plain that it cannot be our own performance of the law which he contemplates. And I expected, also, that the establishment of the grounds of the act might remove the chief obstacles which bar the way against a reception of the scripture account of the *mode* of the procedure: for if it be a proceeding, in its whole nature and principles, so entirely beyond our experience, and above our conceptions; it would seem a plain dictate of reason that it is our wisdom to receive the *whole* account of the matter from the word of God, without doubt or reservation. Nothing certainly but the power of his Spirit can effectually subdue that indocility of our proud and darkened reason, which is among the worst parts of our sad inheritance; and bring us, in child-like simplicity, in all things to submit to the teaching of the Most High. But, in the order of means, it would seem of no small efficacy towards securing decent attention

to a voice that addresses us on an important subject, that we should be convinced that it is, upon that subject, our only source of information. And surely, if any where in religion, this conviction ought to be felt here. If we really believe that God forgives our sins, that he views us as innocent,—that he accepts us as righteous,—because another has suffered punishment in our stead,—because another has fulfilled what we were bound to perform, and have not performed,—if we really believe this, surely we must feel that this is a proceeding too wonderful in its nature—too much beyond our reach and above our capacities—to make it wise or *rational* for us to assume to prejudge the mode in which it ought to be conducted. Surely we ought to feel that we are henceforth as hitherto,—in what remains to be known, as well as in what we have already learned on this high and mysterious subject,—*wholly* dependent upon the information, which God in his word deigns to communicate to us.

And certainly, if a man can be led to consult the Bible in this fair and humble spirit, I do not think he can long hesitate on this question. Objections to the doctrine there doubtless are, and difficulties about it; objections and difficulties in abundance,—some of them old, and some new—some of them devised by ingenious men, and some by men of slender ingenuity—some springing no doubt from a real solicitude for moral purity, and some which it is not easy to ascribe to a source so commendable—these all in different ways and degrees are calculated to move the mind, and may appear to have

some force, so long as men are kept from the Bible, and confined to such partial quotations from it as controversy loves to deal in. But all united will offer feeble opposition indeed to the mass of evidence for this doctrine, which a fair review of scripture will bring out. With pains not more than proportioned to its importance, and to the hostility with which it is sure to be encountered, by many of the strongest and most abiding principles of our fallen nature—but with pains in some degree foreign to the general tone of the Bible, it is presented there in every variety of form in which such a truth could appear, and may, therefore, be supported by every kind of evidence by which such a truth could be sustained. It is asserted, it is assumed, it is defended, it is explained; formal statements are made of it in terms the most explicit, often rendered, if possible, still more unequivocal by embodying distinct negations of what may be styled the opposite doctrine; incidental mention is continually made of it, often in a way which shows it to have been familiar to those whom the writer addresses as well as to himself, and precious to both; it is supported by reasoning as well as authoritatively asserted; objections are anticipated and answered to which it is apparently liable, but which by no possibility seem to apply to any doctrine that has ever been given in opposition to it, as a representation of the apostle's meaning; or abuses are guarded against to which also it appears exposed, but to which, as before, no opposing doctrine seems to furnish any occasion. Not only are there arguments

fitted to satisfy all reasonable doubts, but it seems impossible for caprice to demand any kind or description of evidence, direct or indirect, which it is not in our power to supply, and in abundance too.

It is plain that almost any one division of these proofs, followed out into the detail that it would admit, and that, indeed, it might seem to require, would exceed the limits which I am obliged to prescribe to myself here. But, on the other hand, to leave these strong statements without any kind of proof, would be to leave the doctrine itself in a much less advantageous position than I hope to place it in by even such an outline of the proofs for it as my limits allow. I shall attempt in this hope to present such an outline; with the hope, also, that no one who hears me to whom the subject is at all new, will content himself with the imperfect review of the arguments for this important truth, to which I am necessarily confined.

As to express statements of the doctrine, there would be no difficulty whatever in bringing forward many; but of all kinds of proofs for a doctrine, there seems least purpose in multiplying this kind. For a fair enquirer, one such unequivocal statement as that contained in my text would seem enough; and, on the other hand, the very devices by which one such statement is explained away would serve for a thousand. They who are able to find that when the apostle says, "therefore we conclude that a man is justified by faith without the deeds of the law," he really means that a man is justified partly

by faith and partly by the deeds of the law, must possess some principles of interpretation which would enable them to dispose as easily of any other statement or any number of statements on this subject, or I think on any subject.

Hear, however, another brief statement, containing a comprehensive, exact, and even a minute account of the whole proceeding. "Now unto him that worketh is the reward reckoned, not of grace, but of debt; but unto him that worketh not, but believeth upon him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is counted unto him for righteousness." This is language which I should feel myself idly employed in endeavouring to explain. It might be possible, doubtless, for human ingenuity to devise some form of expression more entirely free from ambiguity, but it would not I think be easy, and I am sure it could answer no useful end. I am sure, that if any one now desired to convey the information, that it is the ungodly whom God justifies,—those who have violated his law, not those who have obeyed it,—and that this *mode* of proceeding is to count the faith which they have for the righteousness which they have not; and if for this purpose the language of the apostle occurred to him, "but unto him that worketh not, but believeth upon him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is counted unto him for righteousness,"—I am sure, I say, that such an one would never reject this statement, or add to it, or abridge it, or in any respect alter it, under an apprehension that his meaning could be mistaken by

Rom. iv. 4.

any fair mind. And to attempt any thing beyond this by any statement seems vain. To set about fabricating forms of expression that shall baffle the pernicious ingenuity with which we contrive to evade the natural force of plain language, when it conveys to us what we do not like to hear, betrays an ignorance alike of the imperfections of human language, and of the wiles of the human heart. The whole history of legislation shows sufficiently that no specifications, however curiously framed and laboriously multiplied, can anticipate a tithe of the subtleties with which men are supplied when they search for them for such objects. And the Bible does not make the attempt. It denounces this unfairness of spirit, it warns us against it, and supplies abundant remedies for it, but it makes no provision for this warfare in detail against it;—a warfare so likely to be interminable and so little likely to be profitable. When the apostle preached through Christ “the forgiveness of sins,” and distinctly declared that, “by Him, ALL that believe are justified from *all things* from which they could not be justified by the law of Moses,” he probably knew, —the Being under whose inspiration he was speaking certainly knew,—that almost every word in this plain sentence should afford an exercise to the perverted ingenuity of those who will not receive the message that it conveys, or submit themselves to the righteousness of God. But he does not therefore stop to explain these terms, and to guard them from perversion; which could only be done

Acts xiii. 39.

by other terms no less liable to be wrested from their natural meaning. He does not do this, but he, by a solemn warning, commends his simple publication of the gospel to that honest consideration which renders such precautions superfluous, while the want of it as certainly renders all precautions unavailing—"Beware, therefore, lest that come upon you which is spoken of in the Prophets; Behold, ye despisers, and wonder, and perish: for I work a work in your days, a work which ye shall in nowise believe, though a man declare it unto you."

Time would fail me if I were to go through the less formal statements of this truth, which are to be met with every where in the sacred volume. I must be satisfied with taking a few; and I shall select some that I think most likely to affect a fair mind, as occurring where the immediate object of the apostle was not to communicate this doctrine, but where he pauses or turns aside to notice it in a way which, while it sufficiently conveys the truth, evinces clearly his sense of its importance, and the extent to which it occupied his thoughts.

Thus, explaining how the gospel shows forth *the righteousness of God without the law*, he stops to mark the way in which that righteousness is communicated, "even the righteousness of God which is *by faith of Jesus Christ* unto all and upon all them that believe." For the manifestation of this righteousness, Christ is set forth by God, he tells us, as a propitiation, but it is, he fails not to notice,

a propitiation through faith in his blood; and while he refers to this glorious offering as establishing the justice of God in freely justifying sinners, he takes occasion to specify who are the sinners that are the objects of this free pardon, "to declare, I say, at this time his righteousness, that he might be just, and the justifier of him *which believeth in Jesus*." Is he magnifying God's free grace? He finds room to notice how it operates:—"By grace are ye saved, *through faith*."—Or commemorating his eternal purposes in Christ concerning his church? The very name of the Redeemer forces him, as it were, to glance at the benefits which we owe to him, and at the way in which they have been secured to us: "According to the eternal purpose which he purposed in Christ Jesus our Lord; in whom we have boldness and access with confidence, *by the faith of him*." He does not extol the great instrument of salvation, the sacred Scriptures, as able to give us heavenly wisdom unto salvation, without subjoining that they do so "*through faith which is in Christ Jesus*." Gentiles, he tells us, attained unto righteousness, while the Jew, with larger knowledge of God and of his will, failed to attain it; and the reason is given: "The Gentiles which followed not after righteousness have attained unto righteousness, even the righteousness which is of faith; but Israel, which followed after the law of righteousness, hath not attained to the law of righteousness. Wherefore? *because they*

Rom. iii. 26.

Eph. ii. 8.

Eph. iii. 11.

2 Tim. iii. 15.

Rom. ix. 30.

sought it not by faith." Do Jews, however, as well as Gentiles, believe in the Saviour? They do so, he tells us, "knowing that a man is not justified by the deeds of the law, but by faith of Jesus Christ." And this, too, was the conviction under which he himself, he informs us, embraced this profession, renounced all national privileges, and all personal distinctions, and cast from him all his trust in that obedience which was so long his pride, treading all under foot, and counting all but loss that he might win Christ, "and be found in him," he adds, "not having mine own righteousness, which is of the law, but that which is *through faith in Christ*,"—"the righteousness," he emphatically reiterates, "*which is of God by faith.*"

In reasoning on the subject, he always treats this method of justifying sinners by faith as a scheme of free forgiveness. They are *justified by his grace*—*justified freely by his grace*; indeed, he distinctly intimates that a reason at least for appointing faith to be the channel of communicating the promised blessings was in order that they might be gratuitous, "therefore it is of faith, that it might be by grace." In answer to some difficulties connected with this part of the subject, I shall speak more fully hereafter; I only now notice it that you may perceive the application of some of those arguments of which I shall attempt to give you a brief abstract.

His arguments, indeed, in proof of this doctrine of free forgiveness, as opposed to the schemes in which works have a place in procuring it, are too

various for any thing beyond an abstract; sometimes they are taken from man's nature and condition,—sometimes from the nature of law,—sometimes from the records to be found in Scripture of God's past dealings with his servants,—and sometimes from the prophetic declarations there concerning his future plans.

Of his principal and most detailed argument I have before spoken incidentally. It is that which forms the opening of his Epistle to the Romans; where, antecedently to his publication of God's mode of redeeming man, he establishes universally man's guilt; shows that the whole world, Jew and Gentile, stood condemned before God—the Gentile abusing the bounties of providence, blinding himself to the manifestation of God's character which He has stamped upon creation, and violating that law which He has written upon the hearts of all: the Jew abusing more precious mercies, and sinning against brighter light; but both sinners—both to be justified, if justified, *freely by his grace, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus*. To this proof, that *by the deeds of the law there shall no flesh be justified in God's sight*, is appended a full publication of God's mode of justifying man. But his own collection from the entire conveys his view of its bearing as distinctly as the most minute analysis could, and more authoritatively: it is the passage which I have chosen for my text: "Therefore we conclude that a man is justified by faith without the deeds of the law."

Elsewhere, indeed, he shows, what is sufficiently

That this was no new method of teaching with man is proved by the record of God's justification of him from whom the Jews derived all their privileges. He dwells upon the case of Abraham, and recurs to it as exhibiting most strikingly that justification by faith which was the great subject of his own preaching. No one who reads his account of God's proceeding with Abraham fairly, can doubt what is meant by *his faith*;—he is described as *against hope believing in hope, that he might be the father of many nations*; as being *not weak in faith, nor un-*

Rom. iv.

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by any of the circumstances which rendered the fulfilment of God's promise so improbable; as *not staggering at the promise of God through unbelief*; as *strong in faith, giving the glory to God*, and being *fully persuaded* that what he had promised he was also able to perform. And after thus establishing the nature of Abraham's *faith* by showing the reality and the strength of his trust in God's promises, the Apostle adds, "and *therefore* it was imputed to him for righteousness;" and then he goes on to tell us, that the record of this act, and of the mode of it, which the Old Testament contains, was designed to insure to all Abraham's true children, all who share in his faith, that they shall also share in his justification. "Now it was not written for his sake only that it was imputed to him, but for us also, to whom it shall be imputed, if we believe on Him who raised up Jesus our Lord from the dead."

He tells us that it was not unknown to God's servants of old that this was their true dependance—that he who is of purer eyes than to behold iniquity should *impute* to them *righteousness without works*; that the man after God's own heart describes this as man's real happiness, saying, "Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven, whose sins are covered; blessed is the man to whom the Lord doth not impute sin:" and that the instrumentality of *faith* in this merciful work was declared by his prophet when he said "the just shall live by his faith." And finally he shows forth the covenant

Rom. iv. 23.

Rom. iv. 6.

Psalm xxxii. 1.

Rom. i. 17.

Gal. ii. 11.

Heb. x. 38.

Hab. ii. 4.

which he was commissioned to preach, as the fulfilment of the promise and the hope of ancient prophecy, in which God had engaged himself to sway the hearts of his people, not by terror, but by gratitude and love; to graft in their hearts an un-failing principle of cheerful obedience; to constrain them to a willing conformity to His will, by manifesting himself unto them in his true character, as a God *ready to forgive*: “This is the covenant that I will make with the house of Israel after those days, saith the Lord: I will put my laws into their minds, and will write them in their hearts; and I will be to them a God, and they shall be to me a people. And they shall not teach every man his neighbour, and every man his brother, saying, know the Lord; for all shall know me from the least to the greatest; FOR I will be merciful to their unrighteousness, and their sins and their iniquities I will remember no more.”

Look now to the objections which he notices; and you must see, that they are plainly to this doctrine of the free forgiveness and unreserved acceptance of sinners who come to God in Christ. He expressly states that some slanderously reported that he said (that is, that his doctrine amounted to this), “let us do evil that good may come.” And if you look at the question which conveys the same imputation upon the moral tendency of his doctrine, “Shall we continue in sin that grace may abound?”—and read carefully the preceding passage, which gives rise

Heb. viii. 10.

Jer. xxxi. 33.

Ezek. xi. 19; xxxvi. 26.

Rom. iii. 8.

Rom vi. 1.

to it, as the apostle himself so clearly intimates; you will, I think, see the connexion without any difficulty:—you must see that he supposes a man to say, if all sin, both before the law and since, has been met by new manifestations of God's mercy, which have not merely provided for the exigency, but have gone beyond its demands—have showered down upon sinners, who might have been looking for demonstrations of God's wrath, fresh and larger measures of his love; are we not laying a restraint upon this chosen attribute of God—are we not casting an obstacle in the way of a brighter display of his mercy, when we depart from sin which is the occasion of its exercise—shall we not continue in sin that grace may abound? If you take the objection, I say, in this connexion, it is easily understood. Wicked and unsound though it is, it is at least intelligible when applied thus to the doctrines of free grace, and growing out of a statement of them; but it seems utterly without meaning when urged against the doctrine which describes us as reconciled to God by that course of obedience which he has appointed for us. Weak objections to a truth are as likely to be made as strong ones; and may sometimes, in prudence, no less require an answer: but even the unfairest or dullest assailant would be unlikely to employ cavils which have no conceivable application; and if such were employed, no sensible defender would think that they merited any reply; still less would he be likely himself to suggest them and anticipate them.

Again, would any sane man, who had preached,

as by some the apostle Paul is held to have preached, that by faith we are admitted into the Christian church; but that our acceptance with God is suspended upon obedience to his commands: would, I say, any sane man, who had preached this doctrine, or any such doctrine, think himself bound to guard against the risk of its being abused to favour licentiousness, or of its being supposed to do so;—of its conveying the false impression, either to friends or foes, that Believers were emancipated from all moral restraints? Would he think himself bound, as the Apostle plainly does, to anticipate and answer the question, “Shall we sin because we are not under the law, but under grace?” How he answers this, or the former question, it is beside my present purpose to notice. My business with them at present is only to show, that the doctrine which he preached was assailed by such cavils, or in his judgment had reason to fear such. To his answers I shall probably return, and if you, meanwhile, consult them, you will find that they do not, in the slightest particular, detract from the freedom and the fulness of his original statement of the doctrines of free grace.

Such is an imperfect statement, necessarily a very imperfect statement, of the Scriptural authority upon which this doctrine rests. And the authority next in degree to Scriptural is no less express in its support. Whatever were the differences among the first Reformers upon other points, they were upon this agreed. All those venerable men to whom God assigned the glorious task of overthrowing false reli-

Rom. vi. 15.

gion and establishing the true faith, have embodied this doctrine in the Confessions of the Churches founded by them; and by the prominence which they have given it there, and by the zeal with which they maintained it in conferences, in debates, in controversies, they sufficiently proved how deep their conviction was that, as the greatest of them emphatically declared, *if this Article be lost, all Christian Doctrine is lost*. So that it now stands distinctly in the formularies of faith of every reformed church in Europe, unless it be expunged in some of those that have fallen from their first purity.

We are, however, chiefly concerned with our own. And in it certainly pains every way remarkable have been taken to put the doctrine beyond the possibility of mistake, or, as far as human precautions can effect such an object, beyond the possibility of evasion. It is asserted, as you know, in simple and distinct terms in an Article appropriated to the subject. Still further to secure it, reference is there made to one of the Homilies as containing a fuller statement of it: there, in strict conformity with the mode adopted in sacred Scripture, the doctrine is distinctly stated, is clearly explained, is supported by argument, is defended from cavilling, is guarded against abuse;—and finally an additional precaution is taken, which must have secured the object if any thing could have secured it: that no doubt might remain as to the sense in which we are said to be justified by faith only,—no doubt of the extent to which our own works are excluded from the office of justifying us before God,—another Article is added,

in which it is expressly stated, that no works which we do are well pleasing in God's sight until after we be justified.

I know very well that a position established by such plenary proof has often to contend with a prejudice, springing from the very conclusiveness of the proofs by which it is supported. Persons are apt to say, "This seems, no doubt, conclusive, but something might be kept back, or this doctrine could never have met the steady opposition that it has always encountered. Men who hold opposite views so resolutely must have some grounds for them, and this representation seems to leave them none." Such reflections are natural, and, perhaps, unavoidable; they at least cannot be complained of as unfair, except when they are used, as they so often are, not to lead the mind to investigation, but to keep it tolerably tranquil under unsettled views. If they should have arisen in the case before us, they must, for the present, be satisfied by my purpose of reviewing the principal objections which this doctrine has had to encounter since its first promulgation,—an examination in which I mean to engage, before I consider the proper effects of the doctrine upon moral character. There is one objection, however, which I wish to notice briefly before I conclude, not merely because it is often heard, and seems to lie at the bottom of many others, but because what I shall say upon it is necessary to complete the view of the nature of faith, and of its connexion with justification, which I am anxious to leave upon your minds.

You will often hear it asked, what is the peculiar

excellence of faith, which secures to it that pre-eminence over the other graces of the believer, of being to the exclusion of all of them the instrument of his justification? Sometimes, doubtless, this question is proposed under a feeling of real embarrassment about the subject, and with a real desire for information upon it. But you will oftener, I think, find it asked with a hostile purpose, and with an air that seems to intimate, that it contains a weighty difficulty connected with this doctrine.

Now, I shall not stop to dwell upon the obvious remark, that if you are satisfied of the direct evidence for this doctrine or any such doctrine, you ought not to be in any way affected by such a difficulty. You may find yourselves unable to answer satisfactorily many questions of this kind, but your inability should not, in the slightest degree, impair your confidence in the truth, if established by sufficient and proper proof. For there is no probability (to confine ourselves to the present case) not even the lowest probability, that, because we are certain that God has appointed faith to be the instrument of our justification, we should be able to tell also why he has done so. Yet you see that it is only upon the supposition that there is such a probability, that your inability to answer such a question can be converted into an argument or a presumption against the certainty of the doctrine.

Though I cannot avoid making this remark, I do not mean to dwell upon it; for the question, I think, in whatever spirit it be proposed, admits of an easy answer. And I trust there are many who hear me,

who would be able and ready to reply to such an inquiry, that if by *peculiar excellence* be meant *peculiar merit, virtue, or deserving*, faith has none. It can neither under the law which God gave to his Jewish people, nor under that larger code which he has written on the hearts of all his intelligent creation, claim the merit or the rewards of virtue, and in this sense has no peculiar excellence either natural or conventional ; nor ought it to have any. If it had, the Apostle's distinction, between justification by faith, and justification by works, would seem to have less foundation ; and boasting to be no more excluded by the law of faith, than by the law of works. The question has, in fact, in this sense, no application to any true statement of the doctrine ; though to loose notions about it, or loose statements of it, it may seem to apply ; for the true view of this doctrine does not, as the question supposes, represent that faith justifies us, as it is a virtue in ourselves, but as it unites us to Him who is the fountain of all virtue, and gives us, by God's appointment, a title to all that He has earned.

But if by *peculiar excellence* be meant, peculiar fitness for its office, then I think we can see in faith—what no doubt is in it, whether we can see it or not—a fitness for this its office of justifying the Believer, which belongs to no other part of his character.—God having, in his infinite wisdom and mercy, appointed that we should be pardoned and rewarded for the sufferings and for the merits of another, seems most fitly to have appointed too, that our voluntary acceptance of this His mode of freely forgiving and

receiving us, should necessarily precede our full participation of all the benefits of this gracious scheme, and that nothing else should. I designedly, according to my plan, avoid speaking here of the effects of faith in forming the Believer's character. But, altogether independently of any reasons for the selection of it, which these may seem to offer, does not the fitness of the choice sufficiently appear from what I have said? If for our justification it be essential, and sufficient, that we be found in Christ, does not the act whereby we take him for our defence against that wrath which we feel that we have earned,—whereby, abjuring all self-dependance, we cast ourselves unreservedly upon God's free mercies in the Redeemer, with a full sense of our guilt and our danger, but in a full reliance upon the efficacy of all that He has wrought and endured;—does not this act, whereby we cleave to Him, and, as far as in us lies, become one with him, seem the fit act whereunto to annex the full enjoyment of all those inestimable benefits, which, however dearly purchased they were by Him who bought them, were designed to be, with respect to us upon whom they are bestowed, emphatically free?—With less than this, our part in the procedure could not have been—what it was manifestly designed to be—intelligent and voluntary. With more it might seem to be meritorious. Whereas faith unites all the advantages that we ought to look for in the instrument whereby we were to lay hold on the blessings thus freely offered to us; it makes us voluntary recipients of them, and yet does not seem to leave,

even to the deceitfulness of our own deceitful hearts, the power of ascribing to ourselves any meritorious share in procuring them.

It is very true that it may be said, that it is not at all uncommon to find this latter object frustrated : that among those who are most zealous for this doctrine of justification by faith only, we find not a few, who are really resting their confidence upon their faith, and manifestly regarding it as a personal quality entitling them, by its proper worth, to God's favour and their own approbation.

And this is no doubt the case. Among the various devices of human folly and pride, for making void the Cross of Christ, this strange one has certainly a place. But is this any objection to what has been stated ? A drowning man rescued from destruction by the heroic self-devotion of a friend, may claim a part of the merit of his own preservation, because he clung to the hand of his preserver. One restored from a deadly distemper by the benevolence and skill of another, may urge, in abatement of the claims upon his gratitude, that had he obstinately rejected the remedies provided for him, no benevolence or skill could have availed to his recovery. There seem, absolutely, no limits whatever to the wayward perversions of the natural feelings of the human heart ; but these feelings are, notwithstanding, real ; it is upon them, and not upon the perversions of them, that we calculate in all our dealings with each other,—in our reasonings, in our threatenings, in our promises. In plans for the improvement of man, in laws to regulate his conduct, in any human

system designed for human nature, common sense confines us to the sober aim of influencing profitably the natural principles of the human mind,—exciting or restraining its natural movements; and forbids the chimerical attempt of calculating and combating its monstrous anomalies. Is it strange to find a religion designed for man framed upon the same rational and practical principles?

The question—is faith the sole instrument of man's justification? is to be determined by the authority of holy Scripture, and by it alone. Upon that authority it has been answered. The further question—is it a fit instrument? if it should be considered at all, is to be determined, not by faith's liability to be abused—which it shares with every thing else, and seems more secure against than any thing else that could have been chosen for that purpose—but by its legitimate and natural effects. Now, that the act whereby, feeling and confessing that we deserve God's righteous indignation against sin, we renounce all merit of our own, and put our whole confidence in another's—that the act whereby we abjure all trust in ourselves, or in any thing that we possess or can perform, and put our whole trust in another and in what he has done—that this act should, by a reflex operation of the mind, become itself a ground of dependance, to the exclusion of the true ground, or in participation with it,—this, I think, must be felt (however possible it be) to be about as natural and legitimate as that a man (which is plainly possible too) should be proud of his humility. And I do not fear to say, that upon a fair consideration it must appear, that

to object to preaching the doctrine of justification by faith only, on the grounds that by this curious perversion, it may lead to a form of self-righteousness, is not a jot more reasonable than it would be to discountenance enforcing upon believers the cultivation of the Christian grace of humility, under an apprehension that the possession of that virtue might engender pride. The more closely scrutinized the cases are, the more perfect, for all important purposes, will the analogy appear to be. But I have gone too far to dwell on the comparison, and of the reflections that it suggests can add but one. That is, that as you would conclude, that there was something hollow and false in a man's humility, if you found that while it forbade pride in any other virtue, or good quality, it allowed him to contemplate with self-complacency his lowliness of mind ; even so, and with the same certainty, conclude against the genuineness of your own faith, if you find it allow you to put your trust in any thing but your crucified Redeemer.

To Him, with the Father and the Spirit, be all the praise, now and ever!

SERMON V.

ON THE CORRUPTIONS OF THE DOCTRINE OF JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH ONLY.

Etsi autem in corruptelis hujus dicti, *fide justificamur*, alii aliter locuti sunt, tamen eadem causa erroris omnibus, et eandem falsam sententiam omnes astruunt. Omnes intelligunt *fide* tantum significari notitiam historiæ, et justum intelligunt philosophicè, habentem ipsas virtutes.....Hoc modo cum de vocabulis errent, affingunt deinde alienas interpretationes, quæ tamen omnes in summa hoc volunt;— in hac propositione synechdochen esse, *fide* justificamur, id est, *fide et cæteris virtutibus* justificamur; seu fide præparamur ut postea aliis virtutibus justi simus. Monachi sic locuti sunt, fide formatâ, scilicet dilectione, justificamur quod sic intellexerunt propter dilectionem justi sumus. Alii sic interpretati sunt, fide, id est, operibus Deo mandatis justi sumus, non operibus traditionum humanarum. Alii hoc modo depravant, fide, id est interiore cultu non externis operibus justi sumus.

Hæ interpretationes omnes hoc volunt: homo est justus, id est, Deo acceptus ad vitam æternam, propter proprias virtutes et opera. Et hoc alii enarrant absurdius, alii quædam absurda omittunt.

MELANCTHON, *Arg. in Ep. ad Romanos.*

SERMON V.

ROMANS XI. 28.

Therefore we conclude that a man is justified by faith, without the deeds of the law.

YOU will remember, I trust, my brethren, that the main object of my last address to you from this place, was to establish that important doctrine which is so distinctly stated in my text—the doctrine of justification by faith only.

I showed you that when we receive, in their plain and natural signification, this passage and the parallel passages of the New Testament, we have unusual means of satisfying ourselves that we are assigning to them the exact import which the writer intended that they should bear. These means are not derived merely, or principally, from the number of distinct enunciations of this doctrine which these passages supply; all testifying the same truth under some variety of form, and enabling us by comparing them together to fix with more certainty their common sense. Great as this advantage is, we have in this case far greater advantages. For these texts are not detached propositions; the interpretation of which may often, from the imperfections of language,

remain liable to some reasonable doubt, and can never, be they ever so reiterated and express, be set beyond the possibility of unreasonable cavils. They are but condensed publications of a system which is elsewhere set forth in full detail; and this system may be examined apart from these brief declarations of it, and compared with them. They are given sometimes as inferences from a train of reasoning; and the argument may be separately weighed, and its fair force employed, to ascertain the sense of these conclusions from it. They profess to reveal God's mode of reconciling sinners to himself; such a revelation when first published would be likely to be judged, as it is now, by the notions that men have of God's nature and their own, by their views of His designs concerning man, and of the best mode of carrying those designs into effect; and crude objections, founded on some discordance real or imaginary between such a revelation and these preconceptions, would be likely to be offered then, as they are now. Such objections by their tone and quality would greatly aid us, if we possessed them, in ascertaining the true character of the doctrine which they impugned; and still more, if we were also furnished with the answer made to them by the first promulger of the doctrine. Now, such aids also we have in the present case; for the apostle from whom these passages are chiefly taken, states and discusses such objections to the doctrine which he preached.

These several confirmations, for such we found them all to be, of the presumption which always lies in favour of the interpretation that receives language

in its natural meaning, branch out widely. And of the varied evidence hence arising for this doctrine, as a Scriptural truth, I then gave you the kind of abstract that my limits allowed.

I besides *stated*, what I certainly wanted nothing but time for *proving*, that this clear doctrine of the Bible is no less clearly the doctrine of all those reformed Churches, whose glory and strength it is that *the Bible is their religion*. And with respect to that pure Church to which it is our happiness to belong, and in whose principles we have, therefore, an especial interest, I showed you that we are assured that she receives this truth simply as it is stated in her brief but explicit declaration of it; in no qualified or deceptive sense of that statement; but in the plain meaning and fullest force of the terms in which it is conceived: for that, both in her Articles and Homilies, further precautions are taken by her (of which I then gave you some account) which have manifestly for their object, to fix such a meaning of these terms, to establish the doctrine so explained, and to guard it from misconception, evasion, or abuse.

To say that these precautions have not always been completely successful, is but to vindicate the wisdom by which the necessity for precautions was foreseen. Doubtless, they have not always succeeded in securing this truth from neglect or perversion. No human means could effect this for a doctrine so unpalatable to man's natural heart; nor has it, indeed, seemed fit to God to invest with such force any of truth's safeguards, whether human or divine. But these wise cares have been at no time wholly ineffectual;

they preserved sound doctrines for a better day, and mainly contributed to hasten its coming; they have since supplied ample materials for the propagation and defence of the truth; and even in the darkest season there was doubtless *a remnant*, to whom they served to attest the pure principles which they were intended to guard.

I supposed, then, that the fair effect of this statement of the evidence for this important doctrine might be somewhat impeded by a reflection, to which it is, no doubt, calculated to give rise. How, namely, is it, that among men interested about religion, and professing to take their views of it from God's word, there have always been found many in determined opposition to a doctrine which seems so clearly and so prominently revealed there? How is it that a doctrine, so distinctly asserted by our Church in the most solemn confession of her faith, and guarded by her with such multiplied precautions and such anxious care, should have ever fallen into disrepute among her members; especially among those to whom she confides the maintenance of her doctrines, and from whom (previously to reposing in them so weighty a trust) she exacts an express declaration of strict accordance with the principles which they are engaged to defend?

To these inquiries, I promised to return an answer; but, lest there should be some misconception concerning the extent of the engagement so formed, I think it right to premise that I only mean to notice such questions so far as they seem likely, if left unanswered, to prejudice the case that I have

endeavoured to establish. That I only mean, that is, to state the reasons which from time to time have been urged in support of the opposition which this doctrine has encountered, and to show their insufficiency: without speaking at all of the motives to which the opposition has owed its rise. I propose to consider them solely as they suggest an objection to the adoption of the conclusion to which I have been anxious to lead you: and if this leave untouched a difficulty which they equally present, it must be felt to be a difficulty which I am not, so far as respects my present purpose, called upon to remove.

The difficulty, indeed, which I mean to answer, is one that I might easily hold myself excused from considering. The only form in which such questions suggest any objection to what I have stated is this:—If the direct evidence to prove this a doctrine of Scripture and of our church, be as conclusive as it is asserted to be, would it not have produced conviction more extensively than we see that it has done? In reply to this, it would seem enough, to deny that such a difficulty, whatever be its weight in other cases, is fairly urged here. If, in advocating any doctrine, a man were to content himself with asserting, that the position which he maintains is supported by irrefragable proof; it might seem fair enough to qualify or suspend our assent, by the consideration, that the success which these proofs have had, seems hardly consistent with such high pretensions for them: but is the same a fair way of dealing with one who gives the argument on which he means to rely?

It would seem, in the present case, enough to say, the evidence for this truth has been laid before you; the sources from which it has been drawn are all within your reach; it is of a kind that you must be competent to examine; and you are, surely, deeply interested in examining it fairly. Will you rather avail yourself of a vague and precarious presumption against it, to dismiss it without examination? Surely a man who feels himself at liberty so to turn away from a fair consideration of proofs fairly laid before him, and pressed upon him, ought to feel that the effect which these proofs have produced upon the world at large is but an indifferent test of their real strength. It would not be a good mode of ascertaining their strength, or a mode that any independent mind would voluntarily adopt, even if it were certain that they had been brought fairly before every individual who had ever judged of them, and had been honestly and carefully weighed by him. But there appears a peculiar inconsistency in one relying so confidently upon this test, at the very time that his own mode of deciding shows it to be of so little value—by showing clearly how probable it is, that these arguments have been often resolutely rejected by men who never troubled themselves to ascertain fairly whether they were strong or weak.

This, I think, is as full an answer as such an objection could fairly claim. But I do not, of course, feel it right here to confine myself to such a reply as the strict rules of reasoning might adjudge to an adversary. To silence an objector is

not necessarily to remove an objection any where, and least of all in religion. And to remove objections to the truth which I have taught, is here my business and my desire. I shall therefore attempt to give a more direct answer to these questions, still under the limitation of their bearing which I have already laid down.

Every reader of the Bible must know that it is there very distinctly declared, *that we are justified by faith, without the deeds of the law.* And it is no less generally known, that our Church has adopted this doctrine in the equivalent assertion—that *we are justified in faith only.* The doctrine of JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH ONLY must then be *in terms* received, by all who do not deny the authority of Scripture, or of our Church as an expounder of its sense. The only course therefore open to those who desire to oppose this truth and who yet are not prepared to do so by such a denial is to divert from its natural meaning some one of the leading words of such passages—to give some new sense to *works*, or to *faith*, or to *justification*. And, however easy it may be to account for it upon consideration, it appears, at first sight remarkable, that upon every one of these terms, at some time or other, has this dangerous process been tried. Labourers have never been wanting to effect the main object of such changes: though the ways in which they endeavoured to promote it were often not only different but inconsistent with each other. When one mode, from any cause, lost its efficacy, another has been

Rom. iii. 28.

tried; and so arguments have been supplied to restrict the meaning of *works*, or to extend the meaning of *faith*, or to show that *justification* has nearly no meaning whatever; according as the genius of the writer, or the temper of the times, or the success of the last effort in the same cause, seemed to give advantage to the one method or the other.

One of the first attempts in the reformed Churches to reconcile a verbal profession of this doctrine with a real opposition to it, was by reviving the strange notion, first, I believe, promulged by Origen, that the apostle, in speaking of *works* here, and in the parallel passages of his epistles, means the works of the ceremonial law. As we know that this father, from whom this exploded gloss is borrowed, was a sincere and eminently gifted, though certainly most erring divine, we must be content to regard it as one of the many instances in which a love of system does the worst work of ignorance or dishonesty. For to either we would hardly hesitate to ascribe such a position if we were unacquainted with its first author. Few would think it too much to say, that if so audacious a misrepresentation did not spring from gross ignorance of the Bible in him who made it, it, at least, relied upon finding those upon whom it was pressed but slenderly acquainted with the sacred volume.

Whether in some passages cited in support of this view, the apostle is really speaking of the ceremonial part of the Mosaical code, exclusively of the moral, and how far these passages have any

bearing upon the question, it is quite superfluous to inquire; because it is certain, and may be easily proved too, that to limit in this way the sense of *law*, in a variety of passages which undoubtedly do apply to the question, is impracticable.

When the apostle speaks of law, in connexion with this subject, he sometimes means the whole Jewish law, both ritual and moral; sometimes the moral part of it especially; sometimes, as in my text, all divine law, both natural and revealed. When he first introduces it, he treats it as corresponding to the law written by God upon the hearts of the Gentiles; which would of itself seem enough to fix its true character. He goes on, however, to give a long and black catalogue of offences against this law; all of which, without even a single exception, are moral delinquencies. He describes it as a law in which he delighted according to the inner man—a law which the consciences, even of those who are violating it, are constrained to acknowledge as holy, and just, and good; as the law by which we have the knowledge of sin. And if all these characteristics of the law of which he speaks, could be reconciled to the belief that he means by it a system of ceremonial observances, he seems to take away the possibility of such a misconception, by a passage in which he speaks of this law as containing the commandment, *thou shalt not covet*. “What shall we say then?—is the law sin? God forbid. Nay, I had not known sin but by the law. For I had not known lust, except the law had said unto me, Thou shalt

not covet." This ought, I think, to be enough to show how grossly the sense of Scripture is misrepresented by such a restriction of the meaning of *the deeds of the law*: and that our Church has not fallen into this error, I should proceed to prove directly, but that this will appear incidentally under the next head; to which I think it more important to proceed, without dwelling further on a view which is too easily exposed to allow any defender of the truth to apprehend much danger from it.

The term *faith* has been subjected to similar violence, but in a much greater variety of forms. Sometimes it is settled that it stands for fidelity, which is itself a virtue, and no inconsiderable one too, and then there is no difficulty in the Scriptural statements—"God's counting faith for righteousness, was not counting it instead of righteousness, but as being itself real righteousness;" or faith and grace are, by a figure easily understood, put for the Gospel, as by law and works are meant the Jewish religion; and then being justified by grace, through faith, will mean that we shall, through God's favour, be accepted upon "the terms of the Gospel; namely, faith, including good works, without a compliance with the works of the Jewish law;" or faith being the beginning and the root of all evangelical righteousness, it is, by St. Paul, put for the whole of evangelical obedience, "by a metonymy of the antecedent for the consequent, or rather of the efficient cause for the effect." All these misrepresentations of the true signification of FAITH, and of its true place in the work of our justification—and if there be any other—I may

regard myself as having sufficiently replied to already, in the account which I gave you of the sense which Scripture assigns that term when it stands for a saving principle; and of the place which it assigns to that principle in the justification of sinners. I showed you in full detail, and in a way liable to no fair exception that I am aware of, that faith in Christ is like faith in any other person, or in any other thing—that it is trust in Him. And that the attempts of some to simplify the meaning of the term, by confining it to an assent of the understanding to evidence; and of others to complicate its meaning, by making it represent all Christian virtues, whether in disposition or act, are equally discountenanced by the Bible. And I showed you too, that to this FAITH, when genuine—to it, distinct from all graces that accompany it in the believer's soul, and all the virtues which follow it and spring from it in his life—to it, and to it *only*, is the office of his justification assigned. And may not all this be regarded as again proved in what I have established, a moment since, in opposition to the misrepresentation of the meaning of *law*? For if *law*, in my text, mean or include the moral law, and therefore *deeds of the law* be moral virtues, or comprehend them, does the assertion *that we are justified by faith without the deeds of the law*, mean any thing more or less than what I have now stated?

If you ask, however, whether this is the real, as it is doubtless the natural meaning of the assertion of our church, *that we are justified by faith only*; you may see that in the Article which makes the

assertion, *our works and deservings* are expressly excluded from a share in our justification. If it be said, as it is sometimes curiously said, that they are only excluded as its meritorious cause; I answer, that they are, doubtless, excluded as its meritorious cause, when that is said to be, *only the merits and the sufferings of the Redeemer*; but that they are no less clearly excluded as its instrumental cause when that is said to be *faith only*. But for removing all doubt upon that head (if any doubt remain), look to the larger statement in the homily to which you are remitted, and you will see in what express terms the office of justification is limited to faith: "And, therefore, St. Paul here declareth nothing upon the behalf of man concerning his justification, but only a true and lively faith. And yet that faith doth not shut out repentance, hope, love, dread, and the fear of God, in every man that is justified, BUT IT SHUTTETH THEM OUT FROM THE OFFICE OF JUSTIFYING. So that though they be all present together in him that is justified, yet they justify not altogether."

This would seem abundantly clear. But, in fact, confining yourselves wholly to the articles, you may arrive with equal certainty at the same conclusion. First appears an Article declaring expressly our justification to be *by faith only*; to this succeeds another Article, assigning their true scriptural place and character to *good works*, describing them as the *fruits of faith*, and as *following after justification*; and finally, we have

Art. xi.

Art. xi.

Art. xii.

Art. xiii.

an Article expressly denying the character of *good works*, and ascribing a very opposite character to ALL WORKS *preceding justification*. This seems to leave nothing on the subject unprovided for—no inquiry concerning the principles of the church without an answer—no doubt unsatisfied. Does any one ask, are we justified *for* our good works? “Nay,” replies the article, “not *for* our works or deservings, but only *for* the merit of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, *by* FAITH.” Are we justified *by* our good works? “Nay,” again replies the article, “we are justified *by faith only*.” “What then,” should an objector to the doctrine subjoin the old interrogatory *ad invidiam*, “What then, have good works no place in the doctrine?” They have, the following article enables us to reply; an essential place; but a place wholly irreconcilable with the office which you desire to assign them. They are commanded by God; and those whom He has freely justified, with glad and grateful hearts obey his commandments: though unable to meet the severity of his judgment, they are, when performed by his children, well pleasing in his sight; and his reconciled children will delight to bring him the offering: they are the necessary fruits of true faith, and, therefore, will necessarily appear in the lives of those whose faith is genuine; but they manifestly cannot combine with it in the work of our justification; for, springing from it, they follow after justification. “And are there no other good works save these?”—should one go on to ask. None, is the decisive testimony of the remaining Article. All

man's works which precede his justification, neither springing from the source nor possessing the qualities that secure God's gracious acceptance of those which follow it, *are not pleasant in his sight, and we doubt not that they have the nature of sin.* Is not this an indissoluble chain? Even with the advantage of knowing all the devices that have been adopted to evade these precautions, I do not see how we could now suggest a reasonable addition to them.

Some, however, when they can no longer deny the conclusiveness of this proof, contrive to render it useless to themselves, and as far as they can to others, by undervaluing the importance of the point established. For if it can be shown that there is really no important difference between these different statements of God's mode of justifying man, we may of course adopt whichever seems upon any grounds most convenient or prudent. "And is not the controversy," it is sometimes said, "is not the controversy, when you take in the whole doctrine on both sides, something very like a verbal one? Does not, for example, your statement of the doctrine of the church end, no less than that which it opposes, in establishing, that works are as essential to justification as faith is?"

If questions of this kind, which you hear so constantly, seem to have any force for their purpose, they owe it entirely to the ambiguous terms in which they are conceived. This ambiguity may sometimes doubtless be attributable to design, but should oftener be ascribed to the confused apprehensions on

this subject which great carelessness about the truth naturally generates. But, whatever be its cause, it is here easy to exhibit and to correct it. Is it then, we may ask in turn, is it meant to enquire whether it has not been shown to be the doctrine of Scripture and of our church, that faith and works bear the same relation to justification, or that it has the same dependance upon both? If this be meant, and less than this would hardly serve the purpose of the question, the simple answer is, that what has been established is the direct contrary of this. What has been established to be the doctrine of Scripture and of the Church is, that God has instituted such a connexion between faith and justification, that those upon whom He bestows faith, He also justifies; that He justifies them when He bestows faith upon them; that He justifies them by faith, counting this faith for that righteousness which is the proper legal ground of justification. The connexion of good works with faith and with justification is no less distinctly laid down. Those who are so justified will certainly bring forth good works; for such obedience to God's will is the proper consequence of the principle by which they have been justified; while before the change in their condition before God, and the change of mind by which faith has been given to them, they are incapable of any work well pleasing in God's sight. This, I say, which establishes so distinctly the connexion in nature, and the order too, of faith, justification, and obedience, has been proved to be the doctrine of Scripture and of the church to which we belong.

And does this allow the authority of either to be fairly pleaded, for any view which assigns the same place in the work of man's justification to faith and to obedience? Does it show that justification is suspended upon good works, as it is confessedly suspended upon faith? It shows that no good work can be performed until justification be accomplished.

This is a sufficient answer to the question—are not *good works and faith alike essential to justification?* in the only sense in which it can be of any support to the views of those who ask it. It shows that to assert that we are justified before God *by good works*, in any sense, is to contradict the testimony of Scripture and of the Church, and to reverse the order of the proceeding which both so distinctly lay down. It shows at the same time that both declare such works to be necessary results of justified faith, and essential marks of justified persons; so that when these are absent, we may collect the absence of that internal principle which we can only discern in others by its proper effects; and collect too that the act of God, which is only performed when that principle is really possessed, has not been performed: and what may be a guide in the case of others, answers the far more important end of a safeguard in our own. If, therefore, the meaning of the inquiry be, as faith necessarily precedes justification, will not good works necessarily follow it? The question, if this be its meaning, though cast in a form fitted to disguise its real meaning and to convey a false one, is to be answered in the affirmative, and the

affirmative to be strenuously maintained. But it is unnecessary to repeat how little the question in this form promotes its real purpose, or rather how directly it frustrates that purpose.

What then, it is said, is this after all the true use of moral virtues? Can no higher end be assigned for that obedience which we are commanded to render,—for those gifts and graces of the Spirit, which Christ died to secure and which God has promised to bestow? Has Christ left us in his life an example that we should follow his steps, and did He die that He might purify to himself a peculiar people *zealous of good works*, merely that they themselves and others should be provided with evidence that their's is a genuine faith?

There is a sort of perverse sophistry which, if it ever appear any where but in religious controversy, it is certainly not often any where else thought necessary to answer. We are told in the Acts of the Apostles, that, “there sat a certain man at Lystra, impotent in his feet, being a cripple from his mother’s womb, which never had walked. The same heard Paul speak, who steadfastly beholding him, and perceiving that he had faith to be healed, said with a loud voice, stand upright on thy feet; and he leaped and walked.” If there could be found any one who was disposed to maintain that the leaping and walking of this man, preceded his restoration to strength; that the recovery of his power over his limbs, depended upon these acts as the instrument, means, or condition of that recovery; and were he to fortify his position by citing authorities to show the

dependance of health, strength, and activity, upon exercise,—or by any *argument* of any kind; he ought doubtless be attended to patiently, and the errors of his view of the matter should be patiently exposed. . But if,—upon your pointing out that not reason only, but the plain terms of the narrative in the Bible, showed that this man's cure was effected by preternatural power before he was capable of thus exerting his limbs,—that these healthful acts could not have been performed until health had been restored,—that they proved indeed the efficiency of the remedy, but in no sense wrought or contributed to the cure,—if he were then to cry, “Can you speak thus coldly of the blessing of renovated health? Can you see a fellow-creature restored to the enjoyment of it with so little feeling for his happiness? Do you think decrepitude of no further consequence than as it shows that a man has not yet been relieved effectually; and the activity bestowed on this impotent man of no higher value than as it demonstrated the completeness of his cure?” Would you think that such wild declamation required or merited a reply?

If, however, for the sake of others, an answer ought to be made, to the corresponding rant upon the subject immediately before us, I presume it would be felt abundantly sufficient to say, that we have hitherto neither asserted nor intimated any thing of the value of good works; that we have been endeavouring to rectify errors with respect to their proper cause and their proper effects; but that the view which we maintained was not derived

from any disparagement of them, but would be equally true or false whatever were their importance, —whether they were of great moment or of little,—whether they served to promote higher ends or were themselves an ultimate end ; and that therefore all this talk about their importance, was altogether beside any purpose of fair argument on the subject.

They who maintain that we are justified by faith only, and that to assert that we are justified by faith and works is a gross error, in which the period of justification is mis-stated, and the connexion between it and obedience misplaced, cannot be in any fairness represented as in this depreciating the value of good works. They, in this, assert nothing of their importance ; they intimate nothing of their importance ; they merely deny to them an office falsely assigned to them. They who say that such works are an evidence of faith, or of justification which is by faith ; when they speak thus of a legitimate use to be made of good works, cannot in any fairness be accused of asserting that these works serve no other. What their other uses are, is to be hereafter shown ; how far they are secured by this system, is also a question for another time ; and when that time arrives, I do not fear that I shall have much difficulty in showing, that the order established in Scripture is better fitted to secure good works, than that which human wisdom has always struggled to substitute for it : that God's humbling plan of forgiving man to make him virtuous, is not only more worthy of its author, but founded upon sounder and larger views of human nature, and

more effectual in securing obedience to His will, than man's proud plan of becoming virtuous to obtain forgiveness.

Whether for the reasons that I have given, or for others, it matters little ; but certain it is, that some, well affected to the objects proposed to be attained by tampering thus with the term faith, have despaired of effecting them in this way, and have not scrupled to confess unequivocally,—“that the doctrine of St. Paul is clear beyond a doubt ; namely, that we are justified by faith, and that without works of any kind, even works of moral righteousness.”—And is not this to concede the doctrine in question ? By no means. The words are on the contrary quoted from one of its steady opponents. They make a large concession doubtless, but a larger qualification is appended. There is an effectual device in reserve, to nullify even this ample and express admission of the truth. For you will observe, that in this confession *justification* is spoken of simply. Now there are (we are told) “two sorts of justification spoken of by the apostle, namely, a *first* and a *final justification*.”—“The first (and indeed that which is the chief subject of St. Paul's argument, when he treats of justification at all,) is that by which the unconverted are admitted into the fellowship of Christ's church, or made members of the Christian community : the *second*, whereby they, who are thus become Christians, shall, after having duly qualified themselves for it, be put into possession of eternal life.” “The *first* is going on always ; *now*, in

Rom. iii. 26.

this present time, as the apostle expresses it. The *second* does not take place until the last day." . . . "To the *first* nothing is necessary but faith without regard to works, even of morality. . . . This is, therefore, the acceptance which is intended by St. Paul, when he speaks so repeatedly as he does, of our *being justified by faith without the works of any law*. He means that *first* kind of justification or acceptance whereby converts, whether Jews or Gentiles, whether of his own or any succeeding times, should be admitted into the body of Christ's visible church in this present world."

Of all the strange perversions of Scripture to which this controversy has given birth, I am inclined to regard this representation of the nature and extent of justification, as the most extraordinary. I showed you in the proper place that *justification* means generally, in Scripture, a declaration of innocence with respect to some law; and that God's justification of sinners is his acknowledgment of their innocence with respect to his holy law: whence follow all the consequences of innocence,—immunity from punishment, and full and unreserved acceptance. Now, if any one will call the solemn act of judgment by which, at the last day, God receives into their reward all who are then found in his Son, their *final justification*, there seems no impropriety in such a use of the term. I do not believe that it is any where in Scripture so styled; but if it were felt convenient so to designate it, there could be no objection to doing so: except so far as this was made subservient to conveying a false notion of what is

thus styled, their *first justification*—their justification by faith in the Redeemer. That justification is,—as I have sufficiently established and often repeated,—the act of our Almighty Judge, whereby he accepts as righteous all whom faith in Christ has made one with HIM. And they who, in any degree, detract from the completeness of this gracious act of amnesty and reconciliation, do wrong to the infinite love which is its true source, and derogate from the sufficiency of that work which is its sole foundation. Every representation which ascribes to this justification any imperfections or reservations, is so far an inadequate and a false one: but when it is proposed to reduce it to a participation in the outward privileges of church communion, the misrepresentation amounts to a height that renders it hard to meet it seriously; it becomes so gross and flagrant as to make it matter of real amazement, how even the blindness of controversy could have been insensible to it. Why, *justification by faith*, meets us perpetually in the New Testament; and whether you collect what it means from the demands of the law of God, which it satisfies;—from the nature of that justification by works, to which it is equivalent;—from the representations of the change in the condition and feelings of those who are so justified;—or from the account given of God's mode of proceeding in justifying them;—you will see how utterly without countenance from the Bible is the limitation.

I have been too large upon this subject already,

Rom. iii. 20, seqq.

Rom. v. 1; viii. 33.

Eph. ii. iii. 12.

Heb. x. 19.

Rom. iv. 3—5.

and have too little time now remaining to enter into the details, which would be necessary to show that all these modes of fixing the signification of this term, concur in establishing the meaning that I have so often already assigned to it. One of these modes, however, is so conclusive, and yet so brief,—so easily apprehended and retained,—that I cannot, even now, refrain from drawing your attention to it. It is that furnished by the way in which St. Paul introduces my text, to which I have, for other purposes, before adverted. Having established the guilt both of Jew and Gentile, he infers that these violators of the divine law cannot be justified by it,—“Therefore, we conclude, that by the deeds of the law shall no flesh living be justified.” He goes on to show, however, that though they cannot, in this way be justified, yet that God’s wisdom and goodness have devised another mode whereby they may :—for that *the righteousness of God without the law is manifested—even the righteousness of God which is by faith of Jesus Christ, which is unto all and upon all them that believe ;* and that thus, though *all have sinned*, yet are sinners *justified freely, by his grace, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus.* And after a further setting forth of this free justification, and of the propitiation which makes God just when he thus justifies the ungodly, he collects, “therefore, we conclude, that a man is justified *by faith*, without the deeds of the law.” The course of his reasoning is clear ; but my concern here with the passage is this—that any one who looks at it must see, that, to give it coherency, it is absolutely necessary

that we ascribe the same meaning to *justification* throughout. JUSTIFICATION *by the deeds of the law*, and JUSTIFICATION *by faith*, are plainly in it, not two different things, but the same thing effected in two different ways. That innocence, therefore, which belongs to a righteous fulfilment of law, which man could not possess, from his moral inability to render to the law its demands—that is precisely what becomes his under the Gospel, by faith;—*His iniquities are forgiven* (as the following passage distinctly declares), *his sins covered; righteousness is imputed to him without works, his faith being counted for righteousness.*

That this is the view of our Church, concerning the nature and extent of justification by faith, will appear to any one simply upon a fair consideration of the eleventh Article, and without going beyond it. The title of that Article is, “Of the Justification of Man;” and in setting the doctrine forth, in the body of the Article, *we are counted righteous before God*, is used instead of, *we are justified*, and as synonymous with it. And whether you regard the interchange of phrases as the result of a design to convey distinctly the views of the church upon the nature of justification; or think that it was made unconsciously, from the equivalence of the forms of expression in the estimation of the framers of the Articles; the effect of the substitution is the same in determining their views. And this is enough, without pressing any other proof of the same point which the next Articles supply.

In what a variety of forms this view of justification is set forth in the Homilies is too well known, even

to the most cursory readers of that volume, to require any detailed citations. Take a single brief one—"So that Christ is now the righteousness of all them that do truly believe in him. He for them paid their ransom by his death. He for them fulfilled the law in his life. So that in him, and by him, every true Christian man may be called a fulfiller of the law; forasmuch as what their infirmity lacked, Christ's justice [i. e. righteousness] supplied."

Such is the language of the founders of the Church of England; and in her best and purest days, her sons shrank not from maintaining the same precious truths, and in language no less strong and explicit. Hear, for example, the memorable words in which Richard Hooker has recorded his confession of this foundation of the believer's hopes.

"Christ hath merited righteousness for as many as are found in Him. In him God findeth us, if we be faithful, for by faith we are incorporated into Christ. Then, although in ourselves we be altogether sinful and unrighteous; yet even the man which is impious in himself—full of iniquity, full of sin—him being found in Christ, through faith, and having his sin remitted through repentance, him God beholdeth with a gracious eye; putteth away his sin by not imputing it; taketh away the punishment due thereto by pardoning it; and accepteth him in Jesus Christ, as perfectly righteous as if he had himself fulfilled all that was commanded him in the law. Shall I say, more perfectly righteous than if himself had fulfilled the whole law? I must take heed what I say: but the apostle saith, God made him to be sin for us, who knew no sin, that

we might be made the righteousness of God in Him. Such are we, in the sight of God the Father, as is the very Son of God himself."

I have quoted this eloquent passage, not to derive authority from it, or even as adopting it to the letter; but simply to show, what intrepid plainness of speech was then employed on this momentous subject; and what intense energy of expression was not deemed inappropriate to it, by one whose sobriety of judgment was not among the least of his high gifts. And I abstain from multiplying such citations, because I should be sorry to give any countenance to the supposition, that I desire to make this discussion a warfare of great names. To the Bible, in a question of scriptural truth—to the articles, homilies, and liturgy, in any question concerning the principles of our church—I desire to confine myself. I rarely wander from them to other authorities; and am anxious never to do so in any form which could lead to the mistake of regarding any other authorities, however high, as upon such points decisive.

Having now supported the direct proof which I gave of this important doctrine,—by showing that the language of the Bible, and of our church, admits of no other than the natural meaning,—I should desire to pass to that consideration of the effects of faith which I have so long been obliged to postpone. But there are other difficulties connected with the doctrine first to be removed, and other objections of somewhat a different kind answered. And these I propose to consider when I next have an opportunity of addressing you.

SERMON VI.

**ON THE OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE DOCTRINE
OF JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH ONLY.**

Quamquam vero invisa sit multis sententia, *fide absque operibus*, vel *sola fide justificari credentes*, declarant multorum in nos non tam calumnia quam impia Scripta, nos autem nihilominus constanter asserimus *fide absque operibus* vel *sola fide justificari credentes*.....

BULLINGER. *De gratia Dei justificante nos propter Christum per solam fidem absque operibus bonis, fide interim exuberante in opera bona.*

SERMON VI.

ROMANS III. 28.

Therefore we conclude that a man is justified by faith without the deeds of the law.

HAVING explained, from the Bible, the nature of faith and of justification, I proceeded, you will remember, from the same source, to point out their connexion. And, stating the true scriptural doctrine of *justification by faith only*, I gave you some account of the leading arguments upon which it rests; and finally, I confirmed the strong proof of the doctrine which they supply, by showing the entire failure of the most important attempts that have ever been made to overthrow it.

Having done so much, if this truth were one of common interest or moderate importance, I should certainly hold, that enough had been done for its security; and I should not seek to engage attention further, for those minor assaults to which every truth is liable, and which none nearly affecting man's interests, here or hereafter, has ever been long before his unquiet mind without provoking. There is, on the one hand, some danger lest protracting a

discussion of this kind, should exhaust the attention upon which its utility must mainly depend. And, on the other hand, it may be thought that there is some reason to fear, that fixing the attention long upon an inquiry, which, from its nature, must rather deal in the establishment of truth than the application of it, may have a tendency to lead us to regard the establishment of truth as an ultimate end; may dispose the mind to acquiesce in it as the final aim of religion, overlooking, or thinking lightly, of those further ends to which truth itself is but subsidiary—the part that it has to perform, in the discipline and improvement of man—in expanding, raising, and regulating the affections—purifying the heart, and elevating our fallen nature.

I am not insensible to either of these dangers; though I do not suffer either to deter me from proceeding to complete, in the best manner that I am able, the investigation which has occupied us so long. I cannot allow myself to fear that the interest which this momentous doctrine is fitted, upon the bare statement of it, to excite, it is not also able to sustain, through even a longer investigation than the present. It seems impossible that any mind, at all raised above the sphere of sense, can contemplate the gospel plan of redemption, that this doctrine proclaims, without a measure of the interest which, even as a matter of speculation, it challenges. Even they who feel little concern for the undying interests which it secures, cannot regard it, one would think, merely as a wise contrivance for overcoming difficulties, without wonder. Free forgiveness of sinners,

without impeachment of the truth of the Most High, or of his purity ; without encouragement to sin, or tolerance of it ; mercy and love to offenders, not reconciled to justice merely, but ordained by it ; all the attributes of God—those from which our sinful nature shrinks with aversion and fear, no less than those to which, at times, it turns in uncertain and transient hope—all alike,—without strife or opposition, without compromise or accommodation—but all alike—in full consent and unimpaired vigour,—harmonized in the salvation of guilty man. No one can, I say, hear of a plan which embraces such inexhaustible wonders, without feeling that it merits, even as matter of speculation, all the labour that may be required to explain its nature and to establish its truth.

But there are, I trust, not a few among those who hear me, who feel, in this doctrine, a deeper and more cordial interest ; who not only contemplate the doctrine of the Cross of Christ, with amazement and awe, as *the wisdom of God*, and *the power of God* ; but with minds awake to its connexion with their own eternal happiness, and with hearts subdued to love by the ineffable love which it displays. Such will take a livelier concern than belongs to any speculative inquiry, in all investigations connected with this sure charter of a sinner's hopes ; in all exertions to restore it to scriptural simplicity—to free it from adulteration—to defend it from assault. To them no means will appear superfluous which promise to conduce to the purity and the stability of a truth, o which all truth—even all revealed truth—must

be felt to be subordinate in interest : for surely, until revelation has informed a sinner how he may be reconciled to God, whom he has offended, all the knowledge that it brings, however high and wonderful it be, is but, at the best, matter of mournful curiosity to him.

As to the danger of fixing attention exclusively and long, upon what in itself forms but means to a higher end—that is certainly a danger, in some degree, inseparable from every detailed examination of the evidences for religious or moral truth. And it is likely too, I may add, to be greatest, just in the case in which the necessity for that examination is the most imperative ; where the truth is most corrupted, or most abused, or most assailed ; where it is of such difficulty as to require minute investigation, and of such importance as to deserve it. It would be but a bad use of this just reflection, and a bad mode of escaping this risk, however real, to abandon the defence of truth, or to neglect the exposure of error ; and hardly, if at all, better, to perform either task cursorily and insufficiently. Suppose the danger real, there are many ways of guarding against it ; suppose the injury actually incurred, there are many ways of remedying it. But there is no way of supplying the efficacy of divine truth by any human invention ; nor is there any way of rendering innoxious in operation man's corruptions of the truth. We cannot hold, doubtless, that even divine truth is of itself necessarily efficacious, without losing sight of that important part of it which declares the corruption of our

nature, and the necessity of spiritual aid. But, on the other hand, to hold that its instrumentality can be dispensed with, or its place supplied, is presumptuous and fatal infidelity. And to think lightly of its intermixture with man's devices, is that pestilent latitudinarianism which is less consistent, and hardly less presumptuous and destructive than infidelity itself.

Upon every view of the case then, I feel far easier under some apprehensions that I am dwelling too painfully and too long upon objections to this important doctrine, than I should be if I thought there was reason to fear, that I had dismissed any with insufficient notice. I had far rather commit the error of giving undue importance to feeble assaults upon this truth, than of neglecting to repel any which could, in the least, impair the cordial confidence with which it is embraced by a single believer by whom I may be heard.

When this doctrine is presented upon its proper evidence, it may be, and in fact it has been, assailed in the following easily distinguishable ways. The plain interpretation of the multiplied passages in which it seems so distinctly expressed, may be denied, and a different meaning assigned to them. Or, this sense which they are thus made to speak may be independently derived from other parts of Scripture. Or, lastly, without attempting either of these objects definitely, difficulties of more or less weight may be thrown out, which are supposed in some way to invalidate the doctrine to be impugned.

I have already intimated that I regard objections of the first of these classes, as in their nature far more important than the others. In fact, while the authority of the passages, which seem so unequivocally to declare the doctrine of justification by faith only, is acknowledged, it appears fruitless to proceed a step in the attempt to overthrow that doctrine without first endeavouring to show that these passages will bear some meaning different from that which they seem so distinctly to speak. If this attempt be moderately successful, the other modes of proceeding may doubtless afford it strong confirmation; but if it wholly fail, the others united must be insufficient to overthrow a doctrine, which will then remain distinctly and authoritatively taught in the word of God. And I think I am warranted in asserting, that such is the present position of this question. For, I think I established, in my last address to you from this place, the impossibility of assigning, with any show of reason, a new sense to any of the leading terms of the well-known enunciations of this truth. And if we have in Scripture distinct and reiterated publications of this doctrine, we may rest assured that no other Scripture can contradict these, however we may fail to reconcile them; that no difficulties with which the doctrine may be pressed can be of any real weight, whatever apparent importance they may have in our eyes.

But it may be said, "Is not this true of every clear doctrine of holy Scripture? And if it can be shown that it is clearly taught in any part of the New Testament, that works and faith are alike

concerned in man's justification, is not the principle equally availing to show, that the passages which appear to prove the doctrine of justification by faith only, must have been erroneously interpreted? At least, will not its authority fully warrant all who desire to rest in a state of indecision upon this contested point, and to forbear from pronouncing decisively upon the one side or upon the other?" Be it so. But then let it be remembered that it is necessary, in order to warrant this indecision, that whatever certainty we have for the interpretation of those texts from which the doctrine of justification by faith only is derived, the same, or something like the same certainty we should have for the sense of those passages by which it is to be overthrown;—the same certainty for their meaning if they contradict it expressly; if they contradict it but inferentially, the same certainty for their application. Now, when you think of the multiplied evidence for this truth that has been shown to be contained in the Bible, you will hardly, I think, expect to find the position which is to overthrow it sustained by proof equally conclusive. For you must recollect that this doctrine is not merely founded upon explicit and repeated enunciations; but that it has been shown that the natural and obvious meaning of these texts is the meaning required by the detailed expositions of the system elsewhere given; by the arguments from which these enunciations are inferences; by the objections with which at their first promulgation they were assailed; and by the answers made to these objections, by the writer whose meaning is

the thing sought to be ascertained. It can hardly be thought an unreasonable prejudice which will not allow those, who have examined and approved such a mass of evidence for any position, to expect to find the contrary position sustained by evidence equally satisfactory.

And, in fact, when we come to look at these passages, we find that they consist chiefly of passages which establish some truth, that, rightly understood, in no respect militates against this doctrine.—Thus texts of Scripture are accumulated to prove the important truth, that in the solemn act of final judgment, which is to close this dispensation of mercy, every man shall be recompensed *according to his works*. With what design such passages are brought forward, it is not difficult to see; but what purpose they are fitted in fair reasoning to serve would not be so easy to show. Where lies the inconsistency between these two important truths? The one teaching us that God forgives and accepts us freely for the sake of the propitiation which He himself has provided; that he does so when His Spirit has so convinced us of sin, of danger, and of helplessness, that we lay hold with gratitude and joy of the way of escape freely offered to us; that this forgiveness and acceptance attend with certainty upon this faith: between this truth, I say, and the representation, that men are finally distinguished at the last day according as they have rendered obedience to God's commands or withheld it, what inconsistency can be shown? If we knew these as separate truths upon the same authority, the right

inference to draw from both would be, that God enables those upon whom he bestows faith to maintain the course of obedience which he has prescribed; and that those who do not possess that principle do not render obedience to his commandments.

But the truth, that genuine faith will produce genuine obedience; that this free justification of sinners is itself efficacious in promoting God's will concerning them, even their sanctification,—this truth, I say, combines these other truths into one coherent scheme; and that it is held and maintained by those who hold that we are justified by faith only, I need hardly assert here, where I have so often stated it. They hold, with the venerable framers of our articles, that those whom God thus draws to his Son, “be justified freely; they be made sons of God by adoption; they be made like the image of his only begotten Son Jesus Christ; they walk religiously in good works; and at length by God's mercy they attain everlasting felicity.” Is there in this process any incongruity, which affords any colour for the representation that this revelation concerning the principles of God's righteous judgment at the last day, and the mode of conducting it, is in any respect opposed to the doctrine of justification by faith only?

But no false reasoning that relies upon the carelessness with which men hear, and the precipitancy with which they judge, in matters of religion, will be ever without a measure of success to justify the calculation. And this application of the

common sophism, which establishes, with ostentatious pains, a position perfectly harmonious with the one that it is brought to overthrow, supplies a notable confirmation of the remark. Persons, in general, who see so great pains taken by the opponents of this doctrine, to establish a truth which is already pretty generally acknowledged, do not easily think that such labour would be expended if the truth were not of great importance to their purpose. And then, if loose statements of either or both truths can exhibit any apparent discrepancy between them, it is enough. Careless hearers will gladly take it as real, and as amounting just to what the argument requires that it should amount to, rather than engage in the task of inquiring into its true value.

This is an unfair mode of warfare, which has been employed in this case to an extent that forms something like a parallel for the well-known use of it in the Socinian controversy. The class of arguments, which I have just now noticed, are a sufficient illustration of it; but it appears still more offensively, and, if possible, more unfairly, when the texts which enjoin a holy life and conversation upon Christians are urged in opposition to this doctrine: intelligibly conveying, and being designed to do so, that, according to it, obedience to the will of God and conformity to the life of Christ are matters of little moment or none. If this slander be directed against the professors of the doctrine of justification by faith only, it has received already the proper reply. They have lived it down; so far at least as it is reasonable to expect,

that any thing which has in itself the principle of life so strongly as slander has, should perish from want of food, it has, I think, disappeared. And whenever and wherever it appears, it may be met fearlessly by a fair comparison of the actual effects of this doctrine and of the opposite doctrine. To God, the language, not of the lips only, but of the heart of every true believer is, "Behold, I am vile, what shall I answer thee? I will lay mine hand upon my mouth." But to profane scoffers against His truth, or self-righteous opponents of it, who seek to wound it by vilifying those who maintain it, I do not know that it is forbidden to us to say, that it has no reason to fear the result of a fair comparison of its effects, so far as they are cognisable by man, with the effects of any system that has in any way or upon any motives professed to exercise an influence over human conduct.

The calumny, however, is often levelled at the doctrine directly; and if it be meant that it does not profess to enforce obedience to God's will, and to secure it, a bare statement of the whole doctrine is sufficient to show the groundlessness of the charge. If it be meant that it does not actually make a sufficient provision for this purpose; the assertion (so far as it does not refer to the matter of fact already noticed), is to be examined hereafter; when we come to the second division of the effects of this principle of faith. All arguments, even against the best established truths, deserve serious and patient examination; but in general such

charges against this truth rely more upon other weapons than upon argument. The design is to take advantage of the prejudice, springing often from a commendable source, which is excited by such charges, whether well or ill sustained. The reasoning to sustain them is often therefore a matter of secondary importance; and ends, upon examination, in something like this—"If you do not assign the same place to good works, in your religious system, that they have in ours, it is plain that you can feel but little solicitude to establish their necessity. If your representation of the Scripture plan of salvation does not exact good works for the ends, and enforce them upon the motives, which ours does, it is plain that it makes no effectual provisions for securing them." This reasoning is rather imperious than convincing; but the fit time for discussing it is, as I said, when we come to the consideration of the moral effects of this doctrine; and, as I have often before said, I do not fear, that when that time arrives, I shall have much difficulty in proving, that, from all that we know with most certainty of the constitution of our minds, the place which the wisdom of God has assigned good works in his plan of redemption, is better fitted to secure their performance than that to which human wisdom has always struggled to raise them.

But it is said, have we not at least the undoubted authority of St. James for assigning to them this place in man's justification? Does he not denounce the error of describing a man as justified by faith only, and assert that Abraham was justified by works? As the passage alluded to forms doubtless the Scrip-

tural strength of the opponents of the doctrine of justification by faith only, it merits a careful consideration. But I must first say that, even if no probable meaning can be found for it, but that which makes it directly contradict that doctrine, it seems to furnish but a very insufficient force for the overthrow of a principle collected from such various declarations of Holy Writ, and confirmed by proofs so multiplied and cogent. But if we cannot assign any consistent meaning to this language which will reconcile it to the principles already established, what is to be done? Shall we imitate the rashness of that great reformer, who cut the knot by denying the inspiration of the epistle of James? I do not admire his hardihood, and should not follow it myself or recommend it to the imitation of others. But I should in the case supposed adopt a middle course. This, certainly, I should say, this certainly cannot be the meaning of an inspired writer. Some cause which I cannot discern or remove prevents me from penetrating into his real sense: I shall therefore leave the passage, as I am obliged to leave some others in the Bible, until God shall please to make manifest that which he now sees fit to conceal.

I do not, however, think that we are in a position which renders this necessary; for if we first fix the circumstances under which St. James was speaking, and then make a legitimate use of these circumstances in determining the force of what he has said, it will, I think, appear that his authority cannot be fairly cited against the doctrine of justification by faith only.

I need hardly remind you, I presume, how dependent we are upon a knowledge of the circumstances under which they were spoken, for qualifying or explaining some large and positive declarations in the Bible. A man ignorant of the true principles of religion might imagine that we have the express authority of our Lord for ascribing to alms-giving a proper power of purifying the heart, in the words, "Give alms of that ye have, and behold, all things are clean unto you:"—nay, that his command, "Sell that thou hast and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven," warrants us in assigning to it the power of securing to us eternal rewards:—and this in the case of the unconverted and irreligious, for to such he was in both instances addressing himself. One better taught would know that it was impossible that the Lord could thus contradict the doctrine distinctly preached by himself, and the whole current of the word of God; and would find in the circumstances under which He was speaking a satisfactory mode of clearing up the difficulty. You are not, he would say, to treat our Lord here as laying down any general principles concerning alms-giving. He is addressing a particular class in the one case, a particular individual in the other. In all fairness, what he says, is to be strictly limited to those to whom it is directly addressed. And not only so, but in interpreting its meaning, we ought, in prudence, make use of all that we know of their circumstances and character.—Now, we know that they were both

Luke xi. 41. Mark x. 21.

idolators of mammon. We know, upon his own testimony, that there was no length of oppression, violence, and wrong, to which the Pharisees (to whom the first passage was addressed) did not resort from the love of money : and the young ruler (to whom the other invitation was offered) showed soon by his mode of answering the appeal, how much more he was a lover of riches than a lover of God. Now that Christ should publish to these, that if they truly turned to God there was full forgiveness and full acceptance for them with Him, was but to preach His gospel of repentance and remission of sins ; which we too may do, at all times, and to all. But that He, a discernor of spirits, should see the condition of those whom He addressed, so as to know that they could only escape from the thralldom of this inordinate passion, in effectually turning to God,—that He, a discernor of spirits, should know and name the particular outward acts which were sufficient to show their emancipation from its tyranny complete, and therefore their conversion accomplished,—this is plainly peculiar to Him and to them. It does not warrant us in proposing a similar test, in any case which we may conceive similar ; much less in deriving from this language any general principle applicable to all cases :—except that principle which is elsewhere so distinctly set forth,—that him that cometh to God, He will in nowise cast out.

This mode of fixing the meaning of the passages would, I think, strike any candid mind as the proper proceeding in this case, or any similar one.

And I only desire that the principle of the proceeding may be borne in mind, and fairly applied to the case before us.—It appears, then, easy to show, that the persons with whom St. James had to do, were in error in believing that they possessed the principle of faith ; that they were in error with respect to the true nature of that principle ; and, in consequence, in error with respect to the true meaning of the doctrine which they were abusing.—That they were destitute of the principle which they believed themselves, or professed to believe themselves, possessed of, is abundantly evident. For you may remark first, the language with which St. James commences, “My brethren, what profiteth it, if a man *say* that he has faith, and have not works?” No language can more distinctly convey a false pretence to an efficacious principle than—“what profiteth it, if a man *say* that he has faith;” even if what follows, “and have not works,” did not afford a proof to all who know the truth, that the pretence was a false one. He is made in our English Bible to go on to say, “Can faith save him?” And though I do not suppose there would be any danger of mistaking his meaning, even in this mode of expressing it; I think that upon looking at the original you will be of opinion, that his own language more exactly marks it, and would be better rendered,—can *this* faith save him? or, can *his* faith save him? And this would be enough to put us in possession of the characters that he was addressing.

But the matter is set in a still clearer light by two illustrations which he subjoins. The first is

James ii. 14.

undoubtedly a case in which there is a false pretence to the principle of benevolence.—*If a brother or sister have need, &c.* ; and this is to illustrate the pretence made to faith by those who say that they have it and have not works. And secondly, he intimates a parallel between the principle which they really possess, and the belief of devils, which is necessarily destitute of the characteristic of true faith, and inspires not confidence but terror. Combine these circumstances, and give them only their fair weight, and I think you cannot doubt that the persons whom St. James addressed were careless or immoral professors, who were destitute of faith, though they pretended to it; and who, in fact, mistook that speculative conviction of religious truths which may be arrived at by the natural exercise of the understanding, for that trust in the Redeemer which is grounded upon such convictions, but which is the work of the Spirit upon the heart; and furthermore, who thought of this faith, that it was a principle which, not at the period of his justification, only, but at every period of the believer's course, stood *alone*, not leading to a desire to obey and supplying strength to obedience, but in all cases to be pleaded as a substitute for it. So that they who sought to be *justified by works*, and they only, were bound by their principles to render obedience to God's commands; while those who were *justified by faith* were by their principles exonerated from the obligation of obeying Him.

There was therefore, as I said, a two-fold error to be corrected; one with respect to the individual himself,

and the other with respect to the doctrine. The error, with respect to the individual, was that he possessed the principle of faith. The error, with respect to the doctrine, was closely connected with this—it was a mistake of the true nature and certain effects of faith, and the true nature of justification by faith. St. James addresses himself to the correction of these errors in the practical way, which is so common in the Bible; not by laying down formally the exact doctrine upon the subject, but, by instances, showing the true nature of justifying faith, and the true nature of justification by faith, so far as it was necessary to correct this gross error upon the subject: and he throughout, as is common in the Bible, uses the language of those whose errors he was combating—calls the principle which they called “faith” by the same name; and adopts, too, their language concerning justification by faith, without a formal exposure of their misuse of terms. Read all that he says; remarking, especially, that he employs throughout, the language of those whose errors he is seeking to remove; using *faith* to express their notion of it—not the true one; and, in the same way, suffering *justification by faith* to stand for their false view of it. Read what he says, remarking this, and you will see that it is nothing which you might not expect to hear from St. Paul under the same circumstances.

Suppose that St. Paul,—having preached the doctrine of *justification by faith only*, in the freedom and fulness in which I have described him to have preached it,—saw some of those who professed to

embrace it, dishonouring it in their lives, and pleading their gross misconceptions of it in defence of their licence; would you have any right to feel surprised at finding that he addressed them thus: "What profit, my brethren, can there be in a profession of faith which is contradicted by a man's conduct? Can such faith save him? What would you yourselves collect concerning the benevolence of those whom you heard addressing a brother in distress with kindly talk, but carefully abstaining from affording that assistance which his wants required, which their circumstances allowed, and which true benevolence would certainly have bestowed? Doubtless, that their profession was a false one, and that the principle had no existence in their hearts. Even so conclude concerning what you call your faith, when you find that the acts to which faith naturally leads, when genuine, have no place in your conduct. And, in fact, if you examine the principle which you mistake for faith, you will find that it is that speculative belief which devils have, and which but augments their terror; not that comfortable assurance of reconciliation with God, through the blood of his Son, by which those who are renewed in the spirit of their minds are enabled *to serve him without fear*.—But you refuse to show your faith by your works; and think that works are only to be performed by those who are *justified by works*; that *to be justified by faith only*, is to be relieved from all obligation to rendering obedience to God. Nay, then, every man is *justified by works*, and no man *by faith only*. Abraham, the father of the

faithful, was *justified by works*; for he, when called to obey, where obedience was hardest to flesh and blood, promptly obeyed the call. In this he was, in your view of justification, *justified by works*; but those who know the nature of genuine faith, know that in this he only proved the truth of the declaration in the Bible, that he was *justified by faith*,—that he ‘believed God, and it was counted unto him for righteousness.’—Justification by faith only, in your sense of the proceeding, has never taken place, and it is impossible that it ever should take place; for it could only take place if God were deceived in the principle by which he justifies a sinner. If to obey God, when he demands obedience, be to be justified by works, then he that is not *justified by works* has never been *justified by faith*. The separation between faith and works, in the acceptance of a sinner with God, is a wholesome doctrine, and very full of comfort; the divorce which you make between them, in the life of a believer, is a vain imagination, which but shows a corrupt heart—a stranger to genuine faith, and a dark mind in utter ignorance of the doctrine of justification by faith.”

That such an address from St. Paul would be in nowise inconsistent with the doctrine which I have represented him to have preached, every one would acknowledge: and I feel pretty sure that every candid man will see, on comparing this with what St. James has actually said, that there is no real difference between them. I have been obliged to expand a good deal a part of it, to exhibit the train of thought in the apostle’s mind; but this

proceeding is fully explained and vindicated, by what I first established concerning those whom he addressed, and by what I remarked of the mode in which he pursues his object. And to those who think these preliminary remarks well grounded, the paraphrase which I have given, will, I think, upon a little reflection, appear to be a fair representation of the apostle's meaning, and to do no violence to his language; and, under this view of it, it is plain that this often-cited passage contains no objection of any kind to the doctrine which some sanguine opponents have regarded it as overthrowing.

This takes away all force from the second class of objections; and the two first classes being thus removed, the third remains rather a matter of curiosity than of any real importance. I should not propose to myself, or to you, such an employment,—even had we more time for it,—as a detailed examination of all the difficulties connected with this doctrine, which perverted ingenuity, violent prejudice, or gross misconceptions of its nature, have, from time to time, devised and propounded. This is not the mode of confirming the convictions of its friends, or disarming the hostility of its enemies. Clear statements of the doctrine are, for either end, far more important and more practicable means. And I shall, under this impression, only glance at a few difficulties which spring from confused views upon the subject, or which have a tendency to lead to them.

Some think that they have discovered that as we are justified by faith, and as faith is an act of the

mind, we are really justified by a work, in such a sense as to render the dispute concerning justification by faith, and justification by works, purely a verbal one; while others, more alarmed by this reasoning than seems necessary, have hastened to obviate it, by concluding that as we are certainly not justified by works, and as acts are works, the faith by which we are justified is not an act of the mind. And the jealousy for the freeness of the gospel, which has led to this questionable position in metaphysics, seems to be carried to its utmost length by a recent writer, who holds, that that freeness is as much impaired by making faith, whatever it be, whether act, quality, or state of the mind, the instrument of justification, as by making a man justified by any or by all the deeds of the law; and who, therefore, infers, that with justification, properly speaking, faith has no connexion, as condition, preliminary, preparation, or qualification. And while this amiable and useful writer (for such, notwithstanding this extravagant refinement, every one must regard him) rejects this doctrine, as requiring too much for justification, there are, I need not tell you, abundance of grave authorities who oppose it as exacting too little; and who, though not agreeing perfectly in the amount of the addition, or the rule by which it is to be determined, agree all in thinking that *some* addition is absolutely essential.

How far the medley of inconsistent objections which this doctrine has encountered, coming from extremes which seldom unite except when it is to be weakened or assailed, ought to have a tendency

to confirm it, I shall not stop to inquire. Doubtless, whether considered in their origin or their quality, it would seem that they should have this tendency in some degree; but in what degree I shall not attempt to fix; for I hope what I have already said is sufficient to show that none of them is of any real weight.

Thus, as to the two first difficulties,—what I said of the part which faith really performs in a sinner's justification, (in reply to the question, *what is the peculiar excellence of faith?*) rightly considered, will be seen to afford materials for a satisfactory answer to both. I showed you then, that when believers are justified *by faith, their faith being counted for righteousness*, their faith does not justify them as a part, small or great, of their righteousness; but as the appointed means of uniting them to Him who has chosen, as the name whereby He is to be called, the LORD OUR RIGHTEOUSNESS: and that this is a fit appointment, even according to what we can see of it; for that if we are to be justified altogether by another's merits, and not in any degree by our own, cordial trust in that Being, and a hearty renunciation of all trust in ourselves, would seem to be the precise state of mind to which an efficacious interest in those merits ought to be annexed. Now whether this be an act of the mind or not, would not seem of much importance; so long as it is so clearly distinguished from all other acts, and so clearly fitted for its place in the free justification of sinners. But the truth is, that in all that

St. Paul says to exclude works from a share in our justification, it is plain that he does not speak of works in general, but those works which, being enjoined by law, have a natural tendency to justify man—works in obedience to the known will of God. No one who reads what he has written on this subject, with any tolerable candour, can imagine that he had in view a distinction so little to his purpose as one between active and passive states of mind or body. He seems not to have imagined that by such miserable refinements a question could be raised, as to whether believers receive justification freely, when they receive it by their faith. And he leaves that matter to the common sense and natural feelings of those to whom he wrote, without engaging their attention, or his own, in such artificial difficulties. God had established a particular covenant with the Jewish people, by express revelation; and a more general one with the whole human race, by bestowing upon all a nature capable of appreciating the moral differences of actions—a faculty which, anticipating or expressing His righteous judgment, approves or disapproves of human conduct. Under both covenants there was the notion of duty and sin, of reward and punishment, of merit and demerit; but under neither could faith pretend to merit or claim reward. Neither from the constitution of human nature, nor from the provisions of God's express law, could those be regarded as meritorious who confessedly had failed to perform their duty, and who confessedly had incurred the penalties of law.

Their trust in the obedience of another, and in the sufferings of another, might become, by another revelation, at once a clear duty, and effectual means of deliverance; but that even then this acknowledgment, which adds to an abjuration of *all merit* in ourselves, an ascription of *all merit* to another, left a reserve of *some merit* to the acknowledgment itself, seems never to have crossed the apostle's mind. He seems satisfied, that all who knew either the Jewish law, or the law of nature, would see that God, in annexing justification to faith, was justifying gratuitously; that he was not paying wages, but making a free donation: this is enough for his purpose; and this is surely equally true, whether faith be or be not an act of the mind—a question with which he seems never to have been disturbed, nor need we. It belongs to metaphysicians, and may be safely left to them. They will, probably, continue to determine that it is a complex act of the mind; but for St. Paul's purpose it is plainly a matter of perfect indifference how they shall determine.

The third difficulty opposes this doctrine as impairing the freeness of the gospel; and proposes, therefore, to regard all as justified, whether they believe or disbelieve; but as undergoing a moral change, which fits them for happiness by belief; and as unfitted for happiness and excluded from it when they have not undergone this change. I have no intention of exposing all the inconsistencies with himself and with divine truth into which this scheme leads its respectable author. As to the conclusion to which

he desires to conduct his readers, all the arguments which I have employed to prove the instrumentality of faith in justification, bear directly upon the question, and must excuse me from the task of replying formally to it now. And as to the fear that he expresses lest this instrumentality should impair the freeness of the gospel, I have already, I hope, said enough upon that subject to show that it is a fear by which the apostle Paul seems to have been little affected. He, without any such apprehension, distinctly declares the doctrine, in the form to which the objection seems most obviously to apply; describing God as *counting faith for righteousness*; and after having informed us that Abraham's faith was *reckoned for righteousness*, he describes the same instrumentality of faith in the case of all of his children, not merely as consistent with that perfect freeness which is the characteristic of the gospel, but as unquestionably securing that freeness, "therefore is it of faith, that it might be by grace." And to take another instance out of many,—in the epistle to the Galatians, in which the freeness of justification is so strenuously asserted, he describes the knowledge of this dependence of justification upon faith as a motive for embracing the faith, in terms that seem to allow of no evasion: "We who are Jews by nature, and not sinners of the Gentiles, *knowing* that a man is not justified by the works of the law, but by the faith of Jesus Christ, even we have believed in Jesus Christ, **THAT** we might be justified by the

Rom. iv. 3.

Rom. iv. 16.

Gal. ii. 15.

faith of Christ, and not by the works of the law."

But those who have accompanied me so far in this investigation, cannot be at a loss for arguments either against the reasoning of the writer or the conclusion to which it leads. And I have adverted to an objection which seems so little likely to mislead many, chiefly as it affords so signal and instructive an example of the danger of looking for novelty in the fundamentals of religion. Minds of a tender and elevated cast are peculiarly liable to the danger of being sent in search of something new, from that impatience of common notions in theology, which such minds are more than others under the temptation of indulging. But it is a perilous and most unprofitable pursuit. It is looking for novelty where little new is to be had that is not also erroneous, and where we run grievous risk of losing in the chase what is of real value; losing sight, at the very outset of such a quest, of the landmarks which modesty and prudence alike enjoin us to keep in view in religious inquiries, we are liable to wander widely without any means of being reminded how far we have strayed. This scheme, which proposes to limit the effects of faith to its moral influence upon the human mind, has really nothing in the way of reasoning to support it, of a higher order than the arguments by which the Socinian is able to show the absurdity of ascribing to the sacrifice, which is the object of faith, any other than this moral efficacy. It is a scheme opposed throughout by God's word, and only to be maintained

by doing the most open violence to the plain sense of numberless passages in the Bible; yet it is embraced with good faith, and strenuously maintained, by a man whose writings exhibit every where deep reverence for God's word, a careful study of it, and extensive acquaintance with it! This contains an important lesson, and is fruitful in matter for profitable reflection to you, my brethren; and it is therefore that I have occupied you with it so long.

The last, the oldest, and the most popular objection against this doctrine has already been fully answered, so far as it proposes to substitute the doctrine of justification *by faith and works*, for this doctrine of justification *by faith only*. It has a place here, therefore, only so far as it arraigns the moral tendency of the latter doctrine,—asserting that it weakens or removes all moral restraint, and so leaves man to indulge in that licentiousness which is so natural to his carnal heart. This objection I defer considering now, partly because I have already noticed incidentally some of the mistakes upon which it is grounded; but chiefly because I think it will find the best reply in the examination, upon which I now mean to enter, of the moral effects of faith upon conduct and character.

No one can have formed right apprehensions of the difficulty and extent of that part of this subject, and at the same time entertain hope of treating it worthily. I certainly cherish no such vain expectation; but I do hope that I shall then be able to show that *we do not make void the law through*

Rom. iii. 31.

faith, but establish the law: that the system which I have endeavoured to explain and support, supplies motives to obedience which no legal system could supply; that it calls into exercise, develops, and perfects, principles over which law did not exert any power; that while it ensures to all to whom it gives the spirit of adoption, *an inheritance incorruptible, undefiled, and that fadeth not away, eternal in the heavens*, it is exercising upon them a moral agency, which is fitting them to enjoy it: that it is the great instrument in the hands of the Spirit of God to effect the renovation of our fallen nature, which, if it be not the only intelligible end of revelation, is doubtless, with respect to us, its highest and most important end.

SERMON VII.

UPON THE MORAL EFFECTS OF FAITH.

Conspiciuntur in hac victimâ justitia et ira Dei adversus peccatum, et immensa misericordia erga nos, et amor in Filio erga genus humanum. Tanta est justitiæ severitas, ut non sit facta reconciliatio, nisi pœna persolveretur. Tanta est iræ magnitudo ut æternus Pater non sit placatus, nisi deprecatione et morte Filii. Tanta misericordia ut Filius pro nobis datus sit. Tantus amor in Filio erga nos, ut hanc veram et ingentem iram in se derivaverit. Harum maximarum et arcanarum rerum considerationem in pectoribus accendito tu, FILI DEI Spiritu tuo Sancto, ut vere expavescamus agnitione iræ, et rursus vera consolatione erigamur, et te in omni æternitate celebremus.

CONF. SAXON. [*De rem. Pecc. et Just.*]

SERMON VII.

1, JOHN v. 4.

And this is the victory that overcometh the world, even our faith.

WHEN I was passing from an account of the nature of faith to the consideration of its effects, I proposed, you will remember, to adopt, in treating of them, the simple and obvious division, of effects upon our state before God, and effects upon the character. Upon the former of these I have already said all that I think it important at present to say. I have shown from Scripture the true nature and extent of justification; have stated the doctrine of justification by faith only, in the simplicity and distinctness in which it stands in the word of God, and in the formularies of our church; and, finally, have supported this statement by proof, in as much detail as I thought it necessary or useful to adduce proof here. I proceed now, therefore, to the second head of this branch of my subject, the only part of my original plan that remains to be

considered, and propose to inquire briefly how far we can discover in this principle a provision for promoting God's further designs concerning those upon whom he bestows it; how far we can find in it means to secure their conformity to his will, to regulate their conduct and mould their affections according to the standard of duty which He has assigned them—that pure rule of life by which He leads them, from grace to grace, and from strength to strength, through the successive stages of moral advancement which His wisdom has appointed, to fit them for the immortality of which his mercy has made them heirs.

If the doctrine of spiritual influences were less full and precise than it is—if the work of the sanctification of believers were only referred in some loose and general way to the operation of the Spirit of God,—it would be needless to stop to point out the entire consistency of such an inquiry as this, with an humble and hearty conviction of the truth of that important doctrine. Such general statements would appear sufficiently satisfied, by the distinct recognition already made, of the Spirit's agency in implanting the principle of faith in the heart; and would seem to leave us at liberty to trace to the natural operation of that principle all the good that is performed by the believer or wrought in him. But the true doctrine of spiritual influences goes much further. The Bible is express in referring the sanctification, which it promises to those whom God justifies, to a direct exercise of the power of His everlasting Spirit unto the very end of their mortal

career; distinctly ascribing every advance in holiness which believers make—every act of obedience that they perform—every Christian grace that they acquire—all holy desires by which they are animated—all good counsels by which they are directed—all good works that they bring forth—ALL to the continued exercise of the same power by which it has been first given to them to believe in the Redeemer. And they who feel his first work upon their hearts should with humble confidence look for the fulfilment of his further promises, however imperfectly they were able to trace the manner of his operation in fulfilling them, or though they were unable to trace it at all. But when we are told, as we are distinctly told, that He employs, in the gracious work in which He is engaged, the instrumentality of this principle which He has wrought in us, we seem not merely warranted to undertake such an inquiry as I have proposed, but naturally led to it. In examining faith for some means of operating upon man, according to the ordinary mode of moving his feelings and influencing his conduct, we are then only looking for what we are assured it must contain. Some natural fitness for the work in which it is employed seems included in the very notion of an instrument; though the very highest degree of suitableness to its purpose, is perfectly consistent with the belief, that it owes its efficacy to the hand that wields it, and that it would be powerless in any other. Under this view you will see that this inquiry is so far from being discountenanced by the Scripture doctrine of the influence of the Holy Spirit, that, on the con-

trary, we are led to it by a part of that doctrine which is as clearly revealed as any other part of it.

And while this fully justifies the inquiry, it points out sufficiently what are its proper objects. For as our actions are subject to no external constraint, and as even if we hold that the will is irresistibly controlled by spiritual influences, we must see that, if it be, it is by a force which cannot be rendered palpable, or subjected to examination; all that such an inquiry can propose is the discovery of *motives* to act or feel in a particular way; motives addressing themselves to known principles of our nature, and in a way also well known; soliciting to activity those whose activity religion requires,—imposing restraints upon those which she seeks to control,—and tending to bring the whole man, all his thoughts, propensities, and faculties, all under her sure guidance.

Upon the tendency of these motives it is not likely that much difference of opinion will exist; but very different views may be taken of their force by persons agreed about their tendency; and it may be well, for the sake of such persons, to state at the outset, that in examining the instrument by which the Spirit acts upon us, we ought to bear in mind the limitations of our faculties, and not rashly conclude that it contains no other forces to effect its end than those which our dim perceptions are able to discern in it; but still more should we remember, that if we had good grounds for believing it defective, the Omnipotent Agent

who wields it cannot merely remove all obstacles to its operations, but can supply all its defects. For I cannot help thinking that we speak rashly, and without any Scripture warrant, when we assert that the Almighty Being, upon whom our spiritual life depends, draws supplies for its support only from the springs of life which are made manifest to us; that beyond the forces supplied by revealed truth, and by the principle whereby we effectually receive the truth, there are in his secret workings with the human heart, no others brought into action, to raise its affections, to cleanse its corruptions, to restrain, to soften, and to subdue.

But enough has, probably, been said, not only to show the fitness of this inquiry, but to suggest its proper objects and limits, and to regulate the anticipations with which we engage in it. And a moment will now serve to bring back to your recollection what we have established concerning the nature of the principle, the effects of which we seek to ascertain.

Faith is trust:—reliance upon a promise—confidence in means to secure some desirable end—trust in some being by whom, or through whom, some benefit is expected—all are fitly expressed by FAITH in that which inspires confidence, whatever it be. The particular exercise of the principle with which we have to do, is that which the Bible calls indifferently faith in Christ, or faith in God through Christ. It is trust in Christ as the author of salvation, grounded upon God's testimony in his word concerning Him; or trust in God as the

giver of salvation for Christ's sake. And it is scarcely necessary to repeat, that the state of mind expressed by the phrase, is not merely belief in a truth, together with the emotion of hope which our view of our own relation to the truth adds to belief in it, but that it includes the notion of a particular being as the source of the benefits for which we hope, leading naturally to other emotions connecting themselves also with that being.

To judge, however, of these feelings—to fix the probable effects of this trust in Christ,—it will be necessary to consider briefly, the nature and quality of the truths upon the belief of which it is grounded. It may be thought that this is to complicate the inquiry unnecessarily, or, perhaps, unfairly; that the moral effects of the principle ought to be derived from a consideration of its own nature, and not of any thing extraneous to it. A moment's reflection, however, will show such an impression to be a hasty one. The effects of confidence so depend upon its foundation—upon the relation that we bear to the being in whom we confide—upon the objects for which we hope—upon the other principles of our nature with which it is combined—that without some consideration of its origin, end, and other concomitant circumstances, no one could venture to predict any thing of the moral quality of its consequences, or, indeed, any thing definitely of its consequences in any way. Consider, for a moment, how totally the external conduct to which it leads is changed by a bare change in the relation of the person confiding to him in whom he trusts. In

war, for example, a general relying upon the valour and discipline of his troops—a soldier, upon the skill of his leader—a citizen, upon both, are all under the influence of the same principle; but, from the circumstances of the parties, in the one, this confidence naturally leads to a fearless exercise of authority; in the other, to unhesitating submission to command; while in the last, perhaps, it produces nothing beyond tranquillity of mind—a sense of security, allowing him who enjoys it to pursue his ordinary course of life undisturbed. You may see enough of the firmness and fidelity of a friend to trust in him as a valuable auxiliary in the difficulties of a benevolent undertaking; an observation of firmness and fidelity may as manifestly give rise to confidence in their possessor as a useful accomplice in dangerous crime. The confidence felt, regarded in itself, is the same state of mind in both cases; but no one can think that the moral state of the person feeling it is the same, or its moral consequences likely to be the same, in both.—But it would be trifling to accumulate instances to establish a position so obvious. The state of a man under the fullest influence of this principle of trust in another may obviously be either virtuous or vicious; and the moral effects of the principle itself salutary, pernicious, or neutral; so that by neglecting at the outset all its concomitants, we should only arrive at misty abstractions of no practical application; and can only expect to learn its effects, in any useful form, by considering its source and objects; by inquiring how we are led to

trust in Christ, upon what this trust is grounded, for what end it is entertained, and so forth.

Indeed, even if such considerations could not be thus shown to be formally included in an inquiry into the nature and effects of faith, they have, at least, such a connexion with it as would make it unfit to pass them entirely over. For it is to be remembered, that the real importance of this inquiry lies in its serving to ascertain the moral forces in actual exercise upon the mind of the believer. And, when this is recollected, it must be felt that it would be but a weak affectation of exactness to hold ourselves excluded from considering what, if it do not form properly a part of the proposed subject of inquiry, is so manifestly fitted to secure its end.

From what I have said of faith in the Lord, it must be manifest that it involves necessarily a belief in all that God has revealed to us of our nature, condition, and prospects. Right apprehensions upon all these are essential to render the Scripture notion of a Redeemer intelligible; and upon firm convictions of the truth of the humbling and abasing representations of Scripture concerning them, must trust in the Redeemer be grounded.

Revelation then gives distinctness and certainty to all those momentous truths of natural religion, which, even in the way in which reason makes them known to us, are so fitted to lead the thoughts beyond the visible and the present; and it gives new force and vividness to them all. It enlarges our knowledge of our duty, and, in the same measure, adds to our acquaintance with our guilt; it confirms

and increases all our apprehensions of God as a righteous governor of the world ; and raises all our anticipations of the severity of the judgment that awaits us at his hands.

Solemnly reminding us of the neglected truth, *that it is appointed unto men once to die* ; it proves to us the far more momentous truth, *that after death is the judgment* ;—proves to us, in the way in which such things can be proved, that after death we shall all stand at the judgment-seat of Him who made us, and render there an account of all our acts, and words, and thoughts. Is there not enough in this conviction to tame levity, and make the most careless sinner grave ? Barely to think, that after a few years of the same course of unsatisfying enjoyments, of frivolous amusements, or of grovelling cares, all must come to an end, and be as though it had never been, is a sad thought ; and, as often as it recurs, embitters enjoyment, and forces a momentary seriousness upon minds least disposed to serious reflection,—sometimes even in the midst of pursuits with which reflection harmonizes but ill. But to know that all is to end thus ; to have the conviction forced upon us that we shall be set face to face before Him whom we have been neglecting and offending ; and to know too the awful character of the account which he shall exact of our heedless course of folly and crime,—that not only every vicious act that we have committed, and every good that we have neglected to perform, but that every

idle word that we have spoken—every uncharitable feeling that we have cherished—every angry emotion that we have indulged—every impure thought that we have harboured,—all are written in his book!—To know, further, that he has, by a formal law, demanded of us that homage of the heart which is his undoubted right; that he has commanded us to love him with all our heart, and with all our soul, and with all our mind, and with all our strength; to know this, and to feel (who is there that does not feel?) that of our love, much has been lavished upon objects with which it would be blasphemy to speak of God as holding a divided empire; that even in its most legitimate exercise, the whole energy and warmth of our affections have been expended upon His gifts, with no recollection at all of the higher claims of the Giver, or, what is worse, but a casual, cold, or formal recognition of them;—to feel all this, and to know that for all this he will bring us to judgment; that our corrupt and alienated hearts, no less than our vicious lives, are to abide the scrutiny of Him who chargeth his angels with folly, and the heavens are unclean in his sight! What, upon the commonest principles, should be the effect of such convictions? Let the conviction be wrought in any man that this fiery trial awaits him, and that he is altogether unprepared to meet it—that unending happiness and unending misery rest upon its issue, and what is likely to be the effect? Why, the full effect of such convictions upon the mind of a being capable of conceiving, in any measure, what eternal happiness and eternal misery

are, is easily told. But this effect is not in general likely to be produced. There are many well-known causes in operation to diminish it. There is, for example, the well-known analogy between our visual and mental perceptions; distance in time producing in the latter all the illusions which are the familiar effects of distance in space in the former; confounding or inverting the true proportions of things near and remote, and causing us to be affected rather by the proximity of objects than by their importance. This illusion, it is doubtless the part of sound information and of firm belief to correct, but from our very nature it can never be wholly removed. Again, such convictions can hardly ever be produced in any mind, however ignorant of the true way of escape, which yet shall not have some surmise that there is a way; and this is another impediment to the full effect of such convictions, however strong. But though in this way a real belief in these awful truths may not, and probably will not, produce those wild agonies of despair which would be its natural effects; are we saying too much in saying, that it must cause lively, anxious, painful solicitude concerning the great realities of the unseen state, to supply the place of the strange indifference with which we habitually regard them?

But if revelation stopped here—if it merely awakened us from the spiritual lethargy in which we are sunk, and forced us to contemplate the hopeless ruin in which sin has plunged us,—it would have but slender claims upon our gratitude. It

would seem but vain wisdom to expose the folly of those devices, by which we were contriving to escape the pangs of anticipated misery, and to soothe, even for a little, the remediless diseases of our nature. But Revelation does not merely awaken this sense of guilt and danger, it publishes too the way of escape. It not only unfolds the depths of human corruption, the enormity of our guilt, and the appalling destiny to which that guilt has consigned us; but it discloses also the stupendous means for our restoration and security, which the infinite mercy of the Most High has provided. It tells upon this a truth which is so wonderful and mysterious as to require all the evidence by which Revelation is verified to render it credible; and which, notwithstanding all that evidence, has been ever, and will ever be, *a stumbling-block*, and *foolishness* to moral and intellectual pride. It tells us that when no other means of deliverance could be found for our lost race, our Almighty Creator himself descended from his throne of glory, *and took upon him the form of a servant*—that He assumed the nature which we had polluted, obeyed the law which we had violated, suffered punishment which we had incurred—that, despised and rejected, persecuted and betrayed, and crowning at the last his mysterious humiliation by a death of ignominy and pain, He offered for us a full, perfect, and sufficient sacrifice; a sacrifice which reconciles God's free mercy to sinners, to His truth in denouncing vengeance against sin—peace and good-will to man, to His spotless righteousness; a sacrifice which is the eternal bond of that mysterious union under which

Jehovah delights to reveal himself, of a just God, and yet a Saviour.

It publishes that by the life and death of the Redeemer, a way is now opened for ALL to be reconciled unto God; and for ALL the same way. That there is no continuance in sin, however obstinate and prolonged—no degree of guilt, however black and enormous, that excludes the sinner from the offered pardon, or even modifies—in the slightest particular modifies—the offer of free pardon in the Redeemer which the gospel makes alike to ALL. That to ALL—who hearing the call, turn to God, casting away all other grounds of dependance, and trusting entirely and unreservedly in this alone, receiving salvation simply as the work of the Redeemer, and as His gift,—unreserved pardon, full acceptance, are freely promised in His name.

This is, in brief, that revelation of mercy, upon which faith rests; upon an abiding conviction of these glorious truths it is, that confidence in the Redeemer is grounded: they who believe in Him know in whom they trust, and that they that trust in Him shall never be ashamed. The grounds of confidence cannot be laid broader or deeper: *The Lord is my light and my salvation*, saith the psalmist, *whom then can I fear?* *The Lord is the strength of my life, of whom then shall I be afraid?* What can they fear who are confiding in a crucified and risen Saviour? Which of the natural objects of dread can affright them? He in whom they

Psalm xxvii. 1.

trust has *abolished death*. *The sting of death is sin, and He hath put away sin by the sacrifice of himself. The strength of sin is the law, and He has blotted out the hand-writing of ordinances which was against us, which was contrary to us, nailing it to his cross. He that had the power of death is the Devil, but him the Lord has, THROUGH DEATH, destroyed; and spoiled the principalities and powers of darkness, making a show of them openly.* What remains for them to fear who trust in HIM? Whom, indeed, as the apostle persuasively argues, what, or whom, can Believers fear? Do they dread an accusation from God whom they have offended? It is He who has justified them.—Do they dread condemnation from Him into whose hands all judgment is committed by the Father, and who shall judge quick and dead at the last day? They know that He lived for them, died for them, and rose again for them; that He even now sitteth at the right hand of the Father to plead for them; they trust in Him as a spotless representative, as a sufficient surety, as a prevailing intercessor;—whom can they fear?

What are the natural consequences upon the Believer's heart and in his life of a sense of his new relation to God, and of the way in which it has been established, I cannot hope to present in detail without weakening the effect of this simple statement of the whole. But details are necessary for my purpose: and I proceed therefore to consider, in some detail, the natural effects of faith: at first chiefly

Rom. viii. 33.

2 Tim. i. 10.

1 Cor. xv. 56.

Heb. ix. 26.

Col. ii. 14.

Heb. ii. 14.

considering its operation as a restraining principle; and I shall inquire briefly how, in this way, the views on which it rests of God and of ourselves are likely to act upon us.

With respect to ourselves: no one can have read the Bible so cursorily, as not to have carried away some impressions of the extent to which it labours to impress upon us, the guilt and danger of pride; and those who know it best, know how many of the severest denunciations and most solemn warnings of the Sacred Volume are directed against this besetting sin of our fallen nature—how strikingly its folly and unreasonableness are exposed—how impressively the vices, of which it is the parent, are exhibited; above all—how distinctly is declared God's determination to subdue it in those who obey Him, and to punish it in those who resist him. Every nearer approach that we by any means make to a knowledge of our true relation to God, of our nature and His, has doubtless a tendency to abate this vice; but faith in the Redeemer is founded upon its overthrow, and makes a provision for its extirpation. It is founded upon the ruins of human pride, for it only exists in the degree in which self-dependence is vanquished; and grows, advances, and strengthens as the subjugation is completed. It is not only founded upon the knowledge of what the Bible communicates to us of our nature and condition—of our guilt, degradation, weakness, and wants—of the sufficiency of that provision of mercy by which we are freed from guilt and secured from danger, by which our weakness is to be supported and our wants supplied; but the principle requires that this conviction

should be so complete and intimate as to vanquish all dependence upon ourselves, or on any thing in ourselves, and to lead us to rest our eternal welfare upon the work of the Redeemer, and upon it alone. Its very essence consists in this abjuration from the heart of all merit in ourselves, and unfeigned ascription of all glory to Him.

What obstinate resistance this master-vice makes before it surrenders, and how often it renews the struggle, none can require to be reminded who have ever sustained the conflict. Even where the criminality of our conduct is too clear to be denied, we continually look for some consolatory palliations of it; some peculiarity in our constitution, or circumstances, or in the temptations to which we have been exposed, which, though it may not take away entirely our sense of guilt, abates in no small degree the severity of our self-condemnation. But if we reluctantly condemn our known vices, how much more slowly and reluctantly do we yield to the conviction, that the very acts upon which we most pride ourselves partake of the same ungodly character; that, far from being able to secure forgiveness for our acknowledged offences, they need pardon themselves at the hands of our All-seeing Judge! And even after we are convinced that if we would stand before Jehovah, it must be in the righteousness of another, not our own; that we must, before HIM, withdraw all plea of merit for our works; how often are we found preposterously substituting for this the merit of our faith! And, driven from this more absurd form of pride, still clinging to the notion of some merit in the

humility with which we renounce all merit, both of faith and works ; and even when we discern the folly of all such pretensions clearly, far from being secure from a worse form of self-dependence, a reliance upon the clearness of our religious views, and the soundness of our religious principles. Whatever place our language may give to the Redeemer, still in our inmost thoughts recurring to ourselves—still looking for something in ourselves which may be united to the merits of our blessed Lord, something to be joined to that which we readily in words confess to be above all fellowship in the work of a sinner's justification : insomuch that you will often find men who have passed a great part of their lives in maintaining the doctrine of JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH ONLY, as much strangers to this simple exclusive trust in the Redeemer's work, as those who have been their life-long opposing it. Men are, from various natural causes, brought to take up, to maintain, and defend the doctrine in terms ; but a cordial acquiescence in God's humbling plan, of saving us by the obedience and sufferings of his only begotten Son, is only to be wrought by the Spirit whom He sends. It is only through that Spirit, that a man is ever brought to come to Christ simply as a blind and needy sinner ; to cast down himself and all that he prides himself upon—his works, his faith, his humility, his knowledge—all at the foot of the cross of the Redeemer—glorying only in it, desiring in life, and death, and judgment, to be found in Him that suffered upon it, and in Him to find every thing—wisdom, and righteousness, and sanctification, and

redemption. Now this, and nothing short of this, is faith in the Redeemer; and if you only consider what a fruitful source of error, since the beginning of the world, self-dependence has been; and what the natural consequence of substituting for it a sense of dependence upon God must be, you cannot, I think, fail to see in faith a powerful restraining principle.

It must be apparent, I think, that this frame of mind,—this lowly estimate of ourselves, and just sense of the extent of our dependence upon God,—is not merely right and suitable in itself, but that it must be most salutary also in its effects; that its direct tendency is not merely under every perplexity to turn us to the true source of wisdom for direction, in every difficulty to lead us to the true source of strength for support, but to regulate steadily the ordinary course of our lives by the rule of conduct which He has given us; and that while it does so, this healthful state of mind is, from our mental constitution, itself nurtured, strengthened, and perfected by exercise; and our hearts elevated and purified by the free communion with God which it warrants and promotes. And all this in the way of natural consequence.

Nor can it be said that these salutary effects are likely to be lessened by a belief in the free and unreserved forgiveness of our offences, which is the foundation of this reconciliation,—that it is calculated to weaken the principle of obedience, to diminish the awe with which we regard God, and the dread with which we should view sin. This I say,

however often it is maintained, cannot be maintained fairly. I of course do not mean that a scheme of free forgiveness must necessarily be secure from such consequences. On the contrary, though lenity to sinners could never, under any circumstances, have the effect that seems sometimes ascribed to it, of producing a spirit of disaffection and disobedience; and though its natural tendency is to excite feelings which should promote a conformity to God's will; yet it must be admitted, that it might be so administered as to take away some of the most powerful restraints upon human corruption, by lowering our natural apprehensions of the guilt of sin, and of the holiness of God. This is certainly to be admitted. But to say that God's mercy in his Son, through which we trust in Him as a reconciled Father, does not do this, is to say nothing. It not only does not impair our apprehensions of the purity of God's nature, and of the strictness of His law, but raises them to a height to which nothing else can raise them, and makes inexhaustible provision for continued augmentation of them. This is not the language of common-place exaggeration, but of truth and soberness. There are some subjects, no doubt, upon which the liveliness of our emotions far outstrips the strength of our convictions; but this is one of those on which we can generally reason much farther than we can feel. We can see,—to whatever extent we are ourselves affected by the humiliation and death of the Redeemer,—we can see that they furnish a measure of the enormity of sin, and evidence of the essential opposition of the divine nature to sin, which are fitted

to raise our apprehensions of both to a height constantly increasing with renewed contemplation of this unfathomable mystery; and that this increase ought to be progressive, not to the last hour of our mortal existence merely, but through the countless ages of eternity.

Those, I say, who feel ever so inadequately, can see clearly, that this is but a plain statement of a fair collection of our reason. For when we learn that to reconcile the Most High to sinners, the humiliation and the sufferings of His only begotten Son were essential; that for this atonement it was essential that HE who was in the beginning, who was with God, and who was God—God over all blessed for ever,—should come in the likeness of sinful flesh, should humble himself, and be obedient to death, even the death of the Cross; when we learn, that *THIS CUP could not* pass from HIM unless he drank it; do we not learn that nothing short of an INFINITE SACRIFICE for sin is an adequate declaration of the infinite abhorrence with which sin is regarded by a Being of infinite purity; of which all former demonstrations of His wrath against it were but comparatively faint indications? And if this be so, is it not plain,—not merely how our conceptions of God's abhorrence of sin are impeded by our slow hearts and blunted moral sensibilities here, and how they will be augmented when this body of sin is laid down, and, with minds enlarged and purified, we shall know, even as we are known,—but that they must be continually advancing, as our knowledge of the worth and dignity of the sacrifice in which this hatred was embodied, is augmented;

and that this knowledge—the whole height, and length, and breadth, and depth of which passes all finite capacity—must be receiving unceasing additions through the progress of the infinite duration that awaits us?

This must be so. Nor can we doubt that those higher spirits that stand before God's throne, and enjoy that vision which is promised to *the pure in heart*; who have lived in the light of God's purity since the first dawn of created being, and have witnessed or executed all the awful manifestations of His wrath against sin, since it first appeared among the works of his hands,—we cannot doubt, I say, that *they* find in His last judgment against it,—when *He awoke the sword against the man that is his fellow, and was pleased to bruise and to put to grief* the Son of His love,—new evidence of the holiness before which they veil their faces while they adore it; that they turn from all other monuments of his anger—from the burning cities of the plain—from a deluged world—from the immitigable and unending torments of rebellious angels—to CALVARY—to the spectacle of their Creator, the Creator of all worlds, visible and invisible, in mortal agony for sin; and find in the contemplation matter to deepen all their apprehensions of the infinite malignity of sin, of God's holy hatred of it, and His righteous determination to punish it.

This seems but the legitimate and natural effect of a contemplation of this surpassing mystery, when all obstacles to its effects are done away. And it is only necessary to remember, that upon it is our faith grounded,—that this stupendous sacrifice for sin is

itself the foundation of the sinner's trust,—to see in some measure the wisdom of that scheme, which, while it rests our hopes upon the Rock of Ages, gives just the same stability to the enlarged and elevated apprehensions which it supplies, of the holiness of the God in whom we confide. Now it is only in the light of the divine purity that our own vileness truly appears. Our perceptions of both necessarily advance together. “Before, I have heard of thee,” saith Job, “with the hearing of the ear; but now mine eye seeth thee, *therefore* I abhor myself, and repent in dust and ashes.” This deeper prostration of spirit is the sure effect of every nearer view of the ineffable holiness of the Most High. And thus the renewed contemplations of the foundation of our trust in Him, which are necessary, not merely for its increase, but for its maintenance, while they exalt and strengthen our faith, secure and deepen our humility.

But the effects of the view of God's character which the atoning work of Christ presents to the believer, do not end here. In fact, when you consider how much of religion is actually formed by our views of the Being whom we adore, and how extensively they must influence every thing in it that they do not actually constitute, you must see that we cannot ascribe much to religion in regulating man's conduct, and forming his character, without tracing some most important effects to the views of God, upon which it is grounded. But I have gone too far to pursue the subject upon the present occasion; and must reserve what I have to say upon it for my next opportunity of addressing you.

SERMON VIII.

UPON THE MORAL EFFECTS OF FAITH.

Hæc fides erigit sustentat et vivificat contritos juxta illud, *justificati ex fide pacem habemus*. Hæc fides consequitur remissionem peccatorum, hæc fides justificat coram Deo Nec prius dilectio adest quam sit facta fide reconciliatio. Lex enim non fit sine Christo, juxta illud *per Christum habemus accessum ad Deum*. Et hæc fides paulatim crescit, et per omnem vitam luctatur cum peccato, ut vincat peccatum et mortem. Cæterum fidem sequitur dilectio ut supra diximus. Et sic clare definiri potest filialis timor: talis pavor qui cum fide conjunctus est, hoc est, ubi fides consolatur et sustentat pavidum cor. Servilis timor ubi fides non sustentat pavidum cor.

APOLOGIA *Augustanæ Confessionis*.

[*De Christo in quo promittitur gratis remissio peccatorum.*]

SERMON VIII.

I JOHN v. 4.

And this is the victory that overcometh the world, even our faith.

OF the many surprising inconsistencies that we contrive to combine in ourselves, the steadiness with which we pursue all temporal advantages, while we obstinately turn away from all consideration of our eternal interests, is doubtless the most astonishing. A being framed to shun danger, and provident against future evil, exercising no forecast for eternity, except to lay up for himself wrath against the day of wrath ;—a being framed to desire and to pursue happiness, rejecting the only real and permanent good, the only good that can fill the capacities, and quiet the strivings, of a spirit born for immortality,—turning away from this, though placed within his reach, and pressed upon his acceptance, and persevering from the cradle to the grave in seeking the felicity, which by the necessity of his constitution he continues to seek, in objects

worthless, unsatisfying, or insecure; in pursuits on which the world's sad experience and his own have fixed the impress of vanity, and vexation, and sorrow:—this is a spectacle, which, in spite of the deadening force of habit, moves astonishment, whenever calm attention can be commanded for it for a moment.

Some, it is true, easily dispel such wonder, by saying that it is man's nature;—that he is naturally engrossed by the objects that surround him, and are acting upon him at the moment;—that his attention is filled and occupied by these, so as to leave little solicitude for remote prospects, whether of good or evil. If this were true, to the extent in which it should be to furnish any solution of the difficulty, it would no doubt make all wonder at this particular manifestation of our nature unreasonable; though we would assuredly have abundant cause for amazement, at finding ourselves endowed with a nature which would seem to unfit us for all the highest purposes of our being. But it is hardly necessary to say that it is not true to any such extent. On the contrary, whatever colour the representation may receive from a part of our nature inclining us to this disregard of the future, or from particular instances in which this part may have obtained the mastery of the entire, it is so far from being true, as a general description of mankind, that directly the opposite would seem to approach the truth more nearly. To satisfy ourselves of this, there is no need that we should resort to cases that we only know at a distance, or read of in history,—the heroes, and legislators, and sages,

who have been sustained through toil, and privation, and danger; who, *fallen on evil days and evil tongues*, have found ample recompense for the neglect, or obloquy, or persecution of their own times, in the uncertain promise of a reward so remote and unsubstantial as posthumous renown. There is no occasion to have recourse to what might perhaps be regarded as extreme cases, or to go beyond the exhibition of our nature which meets us in the commonest forms of every-day life, to be satisfied how much such a statement misrepresents it. We see, every where around us, men voluntarily engaged in framing and executing laborious projects, which always bear a reference to some future period, and often look far beyond the limits of their own existence. If we recal the acts and thoughts of the most ordinarily passed day of our own lives, how much of both shall we find expended upon the future and the remote! How often during the day have plans of future happiness employed us; hopes of distant happiness stimulated and cheered us; and how much more frequently has our uneasiness sprung from foreboded than from actual suffering! So that, however strong may be the part of our mental constitution which disposes us to regard only the present, it is, in fact, kept in control by some more powerful part of our nature; and a real solicitude about the future is, in spite of it, a leading principle of human conduct. Why then, it may be asked, does it cease to exert any power, just where reason would seem to assign to it the greatest force?

Some seem to think that a sufficient cause for

every anomaly in human conduct is assigned, when the strength of human passions is alleged. And, no doubt, this disturbing force accounts sufficiently for many of our rash acts, and many of our rash judgments too; but it must be felt to give but a very partial answer to the question under consideration. For our passions, blindly pursuing their proper objects, are equally at war with all prudential consideration of the future, that opposes their present gratification. Yet, in spite of their utmost force, how firm and persevering do we find men in the pursuit of earthly and perishable objects; how resolute are they in repressing all the propensities that would impede or embarrass their progress there! How steadily do they go on, controlling their strongest passions, repressing their most importunate appetites, denying their warmest affections, while they are labouring for the attainment of something remote, uncertain, and perishing in the using; and only deaf to the voice of prudence, when she solicits for some regard for treasures in heaven, incorruptible, and undefiled, and that fade not away! Besides,—and for our purpose it deserves carefully to be remarked,—whenever passion does mislead us in the conduct of our temporal affairs, reason in some degree makes compensation by the correctness of her more deliberate judgments; but, in our spiritual concerns, reason is constantly as dark as passion is misleading; and by its decisions, when removed altogether from the influence of passion, (as in our judgments concerning the conduct of others) shows how deep the cause of this difference

lies, and how widely it affects our entire nature. For while almost any measure of exertion or endurance to secure something mean and transitory, not worth obtaining, or lost as soon as obtained, is esteemed manly and wise; how constantly does the most enlightened reason regard the same patience, resolution, and self-denial, when exercised about the only worthy objects of anxious thought and earnest pursuit, as wild enthusiasm, infallible marks of a poor and feeble mind!

Were we to look at our affections with the same reference, we would only find fresh anomalies of the same kind. We would see even this better part of our nature becoming torpid and inert, barely by connecting the interests of eternity with the objects that are fitted to excite them. So that we, who are prompt to answer minor calls of gratitude, are *then* insensible to the highest benefits. We, who are ready to yield affection to the various objects around us, that are in different degrees fitted to attract it, and to return it even to those that have no other attraction except that they feel it for us, *then* withhold it from the most varied and exalted excellences, and from love the most generous, and tender, and warm. We, who have a natural sympathy with every thing elevated and tender in our nature; who never see, or can see, the shadows of what is noble and excellent, which cross our path in real life, without a glow of admiration; who melt and kindle at every portraiture, even in fictitious narrative, of suffering, and magnanimity, and self-devotion,—are able to read and hear with entire

apathy, the story of the loftiest heroism, the most patient constancy, and the most generous self-abandonment, amidst the most overwhelming afflictions, and most fiery trials: merely, as it would seem, because these sufferings, endured for our sake, have a connexion with our eternal interests. This might be pursued farther; but enough has been said to show how unsatisfactory must any solution of this difficulty be, that proposes to refer this part of our conduct to any of our common principles of action;—to show how deeply interwoven with the whole tissue of our intellectual and moral nature is the cause, whatever it be, of this strange indifference with which we regard things so momentous and ascertained, as death, and judgment, and eternity.

Revelation alone supplies any thing that approaches to a full account of the difficulty. It does not take the difficulty wholly away,—far from it; but it removes an important part of it when it tells us that we are a fallen species: that man did not come from the hands of his Creator, thus curiously framed, to frustrate all His highest designs concerning us; but that the whole constitution of his nature has undergone a violent and most calamitous change: that it is under this change that conscience is robbed of her natural supremacy, the reason darkened, the will perverted, the passions inflamed. It is something to know, that it is not in a state of nature properly, but in a state of disorder and ruin, that the mastery is habitually exercised by the lower parts of our constitution, so that the mind is only acted on, with certainty and force, by

objects earthly, gross, and palpable :—that man has been unfitted for his high destination, before he thus renounces it without a struggle ; and rendered conformable to the dust on which he is treading, before he thinks *it is good to be here*. We cannot wonder that degraded, and bearing about him a sense of degradation, however inadequate,—guilty, and bearing in his breast a sentence of condemnation, however obscured,—we cannot wonder that he shuns, with instinctive aversion and fear, all those contemplations of futurity, and those only, which in conception confront him with a just and holy God. We read, indeed, that the first effect of this awful calamity was to rob man's breast of all filial confidence and affection towards his Maker, and to implant there instead a sense of enmity and fear. It was this that drove him, in the scene of his fall, to fly from his Creator. This is the parent of the multiplied devices of idle and of active life, by which we contrive, with destructive ingenuity, to rid ourselves of the intolerable sense of His presence now, and to banish all consideration of the hour when we can escape it no longer ; and even in that hour we read that the same principle shall still be more awfully manifested ; that even then, some shall still vainly strive to shrink from beholding Him ; and in the wild agonies of hopeless terror, call on the rocks to fall on them, and the mountains to cover them, to hide them from the burning eye of their Judge.

A state of enmity, indeed, with the being who has formed and who governs the world, is fitted to overwhelm the mind with dismay. And it is not

surprising that we should so anxiously seek to escape the sense of utter destitution, which the consciousness of this hostility brings with it. We are so framed that we can, if we will, evade such thoughts for a long time by various contrivances; and by various palliations mitigate their terrors when they force themselves upon us. But there is but one way of rendering judgment and eternity chosen subjects of contemplation; namely, such a new view of our relation to God as may banish our natural fear of Him, and supply its place by cheerful confidence in Him.

How effectually this is done in the gospel we have already seen; but what we have been now remarking, enables us more clearly to discern the wisdom of that scheme as contrasted with every corruption of it. Its characteristic, in contrast with all of them, is, that it publishes at once frank and full forgiveness for all sin, through the blood of Christ—offers unreserved acceptance to *all* sinners who come to God in Him—presents to them God as a reconciled father, and solicits in His name *all* his rebellious children to be reconciled to Him. Designing that believers should walk *by faith and not by sight, looking not at the things that are seen, but the things that are not seen*—it seeks at once, and from the first, to take away our natural aversion to contemplate the world to come: designing to bring us under the influence of the character of God, that we should live, realizing the sense of his presence, *as seeing Him who is invisible*—it sets at once about

2 Cor. v. 7.

2 Cor. iv. 18.

Heb. xi. 27.

removing the main cause why we shrink from beholding him.

And the mode in which this wise end is effected is no less deserving of remark. We saw that though this aversion springs from a sense of our own impurity and of God's holiness—from an apprehension of the strictness of His law, and the knowledge that we have never complied with its requirements,—it is extirpated by a principle which deepens this sense of our own vileness, and exalts our apprehensions of His purity ; which enlarges our view of the wide range of his exceeding broad commandments, and in the same measure adds to our convictions of our fearful failure in fulfilling them ; and that, in the very nature of the foundation of this confidence in God, a provision exists by which every augmentation of it shall still further raise our apprehensions of His holiness, and still further deepen our self-abasement before Him. This would of itself vindicate the divine origin of this plan. Every human invention to set us at peace with God, did so by lowering Him or unduly exalting ourselves ; and every human corruption of divine truth is marked by the same decided characters. Whether with the Socinian we deny a sacrifice for sin ; or seek to lower the infinite worth of that sacrifice, with the Arian ; or labour, with other corruptors of the truth, to diminish the extent to which the blotting out of man's trespasses, and his acceptance with God, are due to Christ's work—by ascribing any part of either to any work of our own, combining our own merits with His in reconciling us to God,—in whichever of those ways we are labouring

to adulterate the gospel, we are but exhibiting under different forms the same principle, and with similar effects ; we are lowering our apprehensions of the strictness of God's law, and raising our imaginations of our own moral power of fulfilling it ; we are weakening our impressions of the infinite malignity of sin, and of the irreconcilable opposition of the divine nature to it : and this, because we find comfort in a law that makes a provision for partial obedience, and admits some compromise with sin ; because we desire a God whom sinners may approach upon some lower footing than through an infinite sacrifice and perfect righteousness ; and because we shrink from the contemplation of the holiness with which his own plan for forgiving and accepting us invests the character of the Most High.

But without pursuing the contrast farther, you must see in this operation of genuine faith, so far as it has been explained, the source of most salutary influences upon the heart and life. It would seem, as I said, a waste of words to attempt to prove that the humility upon which it is grounded, is not only a fitting state of mind for a being so corrupt and guilty, so frail and ignorant as man, but that it must be a great safeguard to him too. And as we saw how much just views of God's holiness, which are also a part of its foundation, are calculated to confirm and deepen this humble frame, it is plain that they thus indirectly contribute in the same measure to our security.—But this is not their only wholesome effect upon the mind. Faith, it must be remembered, is not merely grounded at the first upon these exalted views of the character of God ;

but at all times draws life and strength from them; and including, or it may be said rather, being a cheerful sense of our entire dependance upon Him, under these views of His nature, it obviously, in every exercise of it, brings the mind under the direct influence of His character, as exhibited in the atonement; making him present to Believers, in that manifestation of His infinite perfections, which even in heaven, his dwelling-place, the angels desire to behold. And can it be doubted, that minds habitually directed to such a Being, in a spirit of firm reliance upon Him, of cheerful confidence in Him, must be raised and refined by the contemplation?

It requires, indeed, but little reflection upon the way in which we become assimilated to those, who, near to our affections, and high in our esteem, are our continual companions, and the most familiar objects of our thoughts, to see, that when Jehovah thus becomes to us a subject of delightful contemplation, as the source of peace and joy, the spring of our highest happiness, and of all our hopes, we must be transformed gradually into His likeness; that in the way of *natural consequence*, "We all with open face, beholding, as in a glass, the glory of the Lord, are changed into the same image, from glory to glory, even as by the Spirit of the Lord." "Can two walk together unless they be agreed?" is a question which may be left to any one to answer. And, assuredly, the impressive sentence of the Bible against the framers and worshippers of

false deities, "They that make them are like unto them, and so are all they that put their trust in them," is but expressing a truth of wide application, as well as of deep importance ;—that our notions of the being to whom we offer religious reverence, in whom we habitually confide, are not more surely an indication of our moral character, than they are, by a reaction easily understood, a powerful instrument in forming it.

But to whatever extent you may discern transforming influences in this operation of genuine faith, by which God's presence is realised to believers, you must at least recognise in it a powerful restraint. The old philosopher but spoke honestly the natural feeling of every natural heart, when he said that realising the continual presence of a being to whom all our secret thoughts lay open, was but providing an unceasing source of terror and anxiety. And in accordance with this, we find in the Bible that sin owes all the peace that it enjoys to some mode of keeping Him out of view, or of hiding from ourselves His true character,—to the refuge into which this apprehension drove the Epicurean,—or to the rarer refuge of Atheism,—or to the more common device of either banishing God altogether from our minds, or forming such views of Him as may alleviate the terrors with which a sinner naturally regards Him. The wicked man, who is so often in the Bible with emphatic severity styled *the fool*, is described there as saying in his heart, *there is no God*, and as becoming *corrupt and abominable* under this debasing delusion ;—or as

Psalm cxv. 8.

Psalm xiv. 1, liii. 1.

dissipating the apprehensions which a conviction of God's existence is fitted to awaken, by a denial of His moral government: *Tush! God doth not regard it, he hideth his face, he will never see it*;—or his perseverance in iniquity is accounted for by the fact, that he *has not God in all his thoughts*; or, finally, that thinking of Him, he thinks that *He is altogether such an one as himself*. And there appears no other way by which sin and peace of mind can exist together. To have exalted impressions of God's purity, and an abiding sense of his presence, and not to feel our corruption chastised and restrained by it, seems impossible. It seems, therefore, that in this operation of faith, all must recognise a powerful safeguard; under which, if no more be done, sin at least is rebuked and restrained, whether in act or thought, and purity of life and character naturally promoted.

Nor can it be fairly thought that there is in our sense of reconciliation with God, any thing calculated to impair the restraining influence of a sense of His presence. We have, doubtless, *boldness and access with confidence through the faith of Christ*; but no one who considers the foundation of that faith, can fairly apprehend that our confidence should ever assume a form incompatible with *reverence and godly fear*. To suppose, indeed, that the fullest confidence in a father's love destroys or lessens the reverence with which we regard him; or that, when fear of punishment at his hands is taken away, no salutary fear of displeasing him can

remain, would be to belie our experience of our own nature, corrupt as it is. And the word of God expressly describes a sense of His compassion and loving-kindness, not as hostile to this filial fear of Him, but as its proper source: "There is mercy with thee, *that* thou mayest be feared." And how this filial fear, which is the natural result of such fatherly compassion, must be heightened by the way in which God's mercy to sinners was shown, it cannot be necessary for me now to point out. I have before said enough to show with what awful holiness that dispensation of mercy invests the character of the Most High; and how little likely it is that sin can be thought a light thing by those whose trust in Him is grounded upon the most appalling manifestation of His abhorrence of sin ever made in earth or heaven. I shall not repeat what I then said; but desire to remind you that faith is not merely grounded upon such impressions of God's character, but that to suppose these impressions weakened, is to suppose faith impaired; to suppose them obliterated, is to suppose faith overthrown; for that no confidence in God, except confidence in Him through the atoning work of the Redeemer, is in any thing connected with the doctrine of justification intended to be styled faith in him. When you remember this, you will see that in the restraining influences ascribed to this operation of faith, too much is not attributed to it: that it brings into action, and keeps alive motives, which have plainly a natural tendency to make us dread sin, shun it, and lay hold on all the means which God has provided to secure us

from its snares, and effectually redeem us from its power. And you will recollect that the discovery of such motives in or from this principle, was the object proposed by this examination of it.

But it may be said that we have a plain interest in the further inquiry: Are these motives strong enough to regulate conduct, to control passion, to resist temptation? This is, no doubt, an interesting question; and so far as it is a fair one, I think it admits of a satisfactory answer. If it be meant to ask, whether such motives can be made to act so strongly and so constantly upon the mind, as to restrain passion, and to govern conduct,—it is to be replied, doubtless they can. Nor will any one think that in saying this, too much is ascribed to them, when he reviews them, and considers what motives experience shows to be able to exert such influences; to impose very strong restraints upon our strongest passions; and to secure, in spite of them, great outward decency of conduct.

I will not ask you to imagine what would be the effect upon a man's conduct, if a virtuous friend, whom he revered and loved, were made his constant companion, the observer of all his actions; and what would be the probable influence of such companionship upon his inmost thoughts and feelings, if he knew that they all lay open to the eye of this associate. I prefer referring to your experience, though the parallel which it furnishes is weaker, and less exact. Take, then, what may seem a slight case, but which is not on that account unsuited to our purpose. Consider only what the

fear of man can do in this way; apart from all apprehension, I mean, of violence or injury from him. Consider only what influence is exercised upon us continually by a regard for the decencies of human life; for those proprieties of conduct and demeanour which common use has established in society. This is a force which seems made up of feeble elements; it does literally nothing to amend the heart; yet to what an extent does it act upon us! If you desire to know to what an extent it is constantly influencing us, controlling self-love, and restraining other inordinate passions, you have only to consider how these show themselves when it ceases to operate; to compare, for example, the licence and violence of the manners of savage life, with the decorum and forbearance of civilised society. Now, whatever be the forces which this form of the fear of man brings to bear upon the mind,—whether a sense of shame, respect for others, regard for their good opinion, and the fear of losing it, the apprehension of disturbing relations with them, under which we feel peace and enjoyment, or the like,—that the fear of God, in the form in which it exists in the Believer's mind, has all these at command, and in a degree immeasurably greater, cannot, I suppose, be doubted.

It may be said, it is true, that in exercising upon us an influence which at first sight might seem so disproportioned to any forces at its command, this respect for the forms of society avails itself of the powerful aid of habit; and that it derives, besides, obvious advantages from the fact that it is so

continually in operation upon the mind : that this, not only serves to confirm a habit of forbearance and self-restraint, but leaves it nothing in general to do, but to struggle with the passions that it seeks to control, at their commencement: which every one knows may be done successfully, by a force that would be quite incapable of coping with them in a state of full excitement.

This is, no doubt, true ; but, rightly considered, it would not be found to render the illustration (for it is no more,) at all less exact. If the nature of human life plainly calls into exercise continually the fear of man, it must be evident, on the other hand, that the very nature of religion provides for no less unceasing an exercise of the fear of God. The influence which religion claims to exercise over us, extends to every moment of our existence, and embraces all our acts, and all our thoughts. So that it is plain that occasions are perpetually arising for the exertion of the principle, whatever it be, by which the influence of religion is to be maintained. The fear of God, if it be in the mind, will, from the very nature of religion, have unceasing opportunities of exercising itself. And enough has been said to show that if faith be there, the fear of God cannot be absent.

But what is there to keep faith there?—it may be said. I might answer, that that is beside the subject of this inquiry; which only proposes to ascertain what influence faith exerts, or ensures shall be exerted, while it is in the mind. Or, as the question is certainly an important one,

whether it belong fairly to this inquiry or not, I might in answer attempt to show, in the nature of the principle itself, and in the condition of mind which it supposes and requires, much that seems to give some security for its permanence. But I should feel it to be trifling with a most serious subject, to give any answer short of the full one, to such an inquiry. And if it be asked, what is there to keep faith in the mind? I answer, the Holy Spirit who has wrought it there. Nor is it necessary, for the purposes of the answer, to go into any inquiry into the nature or extent of his operation upon the mind. Every one must see that the bare notion of such an agency is enough to remove the difficulty conveyed in the question, and all kindred difficulties. I have been showing the natural effects of faith, by showing what motives it brings to bear upon the mind; and affording some means of judging of the probable effects of these motives, by pointing to effects actually produced by motives similar in nature, but vastly inferior in strength. It is replied that the actual effects of motives, and their possible effects, are widely different. That the same motives so vary in strength, not merely in different individuals, but in the same individual at different times, that the strength of which they are capable, is a very uncertain proof of their actual effects. That if you considered, for example, only the effect which a dread of eternal punishment, or the hope of eternal reward, is *capable* of exerting upon a rational nature, you would pronounce it an over-match for any temptation, however strong. If you could see the

degree of force which it is *actually* exerting upon many minds, in which it still holds some place, you would see why it is that there is no temptation so feeble by which it is not actually overcome. I answer, that all this is true and important; but that the bare fact, that these motives are applied to the mind by a spiritual agent, of infinite power and wisdom, is a full security that they shall be applied at the proper seasons, and with the proper force; and that their actual effects shall be the highest which they are capable of producing.

Still it may be said that their influence, whatever it be, is met by opposite motives, of the strength of which, unhappily, no question can be entertained; and that in the conflict that must ensue, the frailty of our nature, the insidious approaches which sin makes to our hearts, and the ally that it finds there in indwelling corruption, all afford reasonable grounds for very gloomy forebodings. How are these to be dispelled? All that you have said but shows a provision for maintaining the conflict, but falls far short of establishing with certainty its final result.—The real point at issue, the important meaning of the question asked is, do these motives actually exert such force upon the mind of the believer, as to overcome the temptations by which he is actually assailed? If this be said, I answer, that to the question, in this meaning of it, I never intended to return a reply by reasoning. What degree of probability the affirmative might receive from reasoning, is another point, upon which what we have been saying has an evident bearing; and in the discussion

of which, I have no disposition further to engage you. But I readily admit, that neither in this way, nor in any other way of reasoning, can we hope for certainty upon it. We might go on for a long time, balancing these motives against the passions and evil propensities with which they have to contend; and much unprofitable ingenuity might be expended in comparing and fixing their relative strength, without advancing nearer to certainty than we have already arrived; while we would run much risk of mistaking the proper limits of reasoning upon this subject, and its proper object.

Upon this point I was anxious to speak distinctly at the outset of this investigation; but it is so important, that I shall not be prevented from saying something upon it now, by the fear of falling into repetition.

I never proposed so false an object for this examination of *the effects of faith*, as to establish by it the certainty of the sanctification of Believers. The assurance with which we hold this truth is not built upon human reasoning, but upon multiplied and unequivocal promises of God. By his Prophets of old He had promised, that he would make *an everlasting covenant with His people, to put His fear into their hearts, that they should not depart from Him*; that he would *put a new spirit within them*, that He would *put His own Spirit*, and *cause them to walk in His judgments and to do them*. And when the time arrived for the fulfilment of the promise, it was renewed by the Lord in the

Jer. xxxii. 40.

Ezek. xi. 19; xxxvi. 26.

expressive figure, "Whosoever drinketh of the water that I shall give him, shall never thirst ; but the water which I shall give him shall be in him a well of water, springing up unto everlasting life." Nor while we are so distinctly informed of the unfailing efficacy of the principle implanted, are we left in any doubt about the subjects of the operation ; for when this figure is elsewhere repeated, it is subjoined, that " he spake this of the Spirit, which *they that believe on him* should receive."—But I do not mean to detail the accumulated evidence for this important truth. It is familiar to all readers of Scripture, and forms the proper and sufficient ground of the Believer's hope, that he shall be sustained in the course prescribed to him, and transformed into the image of his Master,

I attach some importance to the inquiry in which I have attempted to engage you ; but I should be sorry to be supposed to exaggerate its importance so weakly as to regard the result of it as capable of affecting this position in either way, either invalidating or establishing it. I rest my hopes of the sanctification of believers, not on my success in investigating the uncertain operation of second causes, but upon my conviction of the power and the truth of the First Cause. I look for it with unshaken confidence, not because I am able to satisfy myself of the force of the instrument employed, but because I am sure of the omnipotence of Him who wields it—because He who has given His blood to cleanse their guilt, has promised His Spirit to subdue their iniquities—

John iv. 14.

John vii. 38.

and because He is faithful who has promised, who also will do it.

Neither did I mean by reasoning to establish the instrumentality of faith, in this restraining, cleansing, and transforming work of the Spirit. That also rests upon higher grounds. The same sure testimony on which we learn the justifying efficacy of faith, has also revealed to us its sanctifying power. They to whom God's Spirit is imparted are described in His word as "kept by the power of God, *through faith*, unto salvation,"—through faith, which the same word represents as *overcoming the world, purifying the heart, and quenching all the fiery darts of the wicked one*. Neither here, then, was there any room for reasoning, nor any design of applying it.

Where, then, it may be asked, has reasoning a place in the doctrine? Its place, as I have attempted before to show, is well defined. It is this:—being informed that the instrumentality of faith is employed by an Almighty Sanctifier, in his gracious work upon our hearts, it seems plainly to belong to reason to show, from an examination of the nature of the principle, how far it is *naturally* fitted to produce the effects which He brings about by means of it. We are to recollect that it is not natural in its production—it is His gift; that it is not natural, strictly speaking, in its operation—it is only efficacious so far as He applies it. But still, so far as it is at all *instrumental*, it must be so by some *natural* fitness to move or to restrain us; by

1 Pet. i. 5.

1 John v. 4.

Acts xv. 9.

Eph. vi. 16.

presenting to us some *natural* motive to act or to abstain from acting ; by offering objects to fear or hope, or some other influential principle of our nature, which stimulate these emotions by some known fitness to excite them. To discover and exhibit such forces in operation upon the believer's mind, so far as they form part of this principle of faith, or naturally result from it, is plainly the office of reason. I have attempted, accordingly, to show that faith in Christ,—in the views of God and of ourselves upon which it is grounded, and which it keeps alive and confirms,—provides a real restraining force, capable of exerting a real and powerful influence on the mind, upon natural principles, and in a natural way of operating upon it. If I have succeeded in this, I have, so far as I have proceeded, attained the only object that I proposed. But whether I have succeeded or not, I trust I have guarded against the preposterous mistake of the true objects of the inquiry, which would convert ill success in it, real or imaginary, into an argument against truths, that rest not upon the uncertain collections of human reasoning, but on the unerring testimony of the word of God. We are so constituted as to receive high satisfaction from being able to follow to any extent a process, in the results of which we are deeply interested. And God has, in gracious accommodation to this part of our constitution, enabled us to do this in a certain degree, even with respect to the most mysterious of his ways. This, which ministers highly to our gratification, is also in no small degree profitable to us ; and when

we avail ourselves humbly of any means within our reach, to enlarge our knowledge of any part of His works, in nature or in grace, we are sure that we are acting suitably to our condition, and conformably to His will: but to regulate our confidence in His promise, not by the certainty that he has made it, but by our power of following him in the performance of it—this is so manifest a perversion of legitimate inquiry, such plain presumption and folly, as not to require or admit any exposure beyond a simple statement of it.

But it may be said, “Supposing all this to be as it is stated, still, in an inquiry *into the natural effects of faith*, it can hardly be thought to be other than a serious difficulty to find that its first natural effect is to take away the strongest natural support of virtue—the support which it derives from a sense of its influence upon our interests in a future life. Whatever be the change wrought in us in bestowing faith upon us, it must be admitted, that in many important respects man remains as before; that his whole bodily constitution, with its long train of wants and desires, remains unaltered; that evil habits cannot be at once eradicated, or good ones at once formed; and under the manifold temptations which such a state secures, is it not a startling thing to find faith, at the very outset, casting away the powerful aid which self-love is able to render; removing restraints upon conduct of acknowledged force, and clear in their mode of operating upon us; and supplying their place by motives, whose operation upon us is hardly so intelligible, and to which,

at least, it is not easy upon any common principles to ascribe equal strength?"

If all that is assumed in this plausible difficulty were strictly true, still the answer should be as before—that these forces are applied to the mind by a being of infinite wisdom and infinite power, who can discern their weakness and effectually supply it; or can, altogether independently of them, effect such a change in the subject of His operations, as to make it susceptible of gentler influences than those which are required to move or to restrain unconverted man. But, in truth, the objection conveys a grossly overcharged statement of the facts of the case, as I hope, in part, appears from what I have already said upon the subject; and as I shall endeavour more fully to establish when I next have an opportunity of addressing you.

SERMON IX.

UPON THE MORAL EFFECTS OF FAITH.

Placet igitur hæc obedientia non quia legi satisfacit, sed quia persona est in Christo reconciliata fide, et credit sibi reliquias peccati condonari. Semper igitur sentiendum est nos consequi remissionem peccatorum, et personam pronuciari justam, id est acceptari, gratis, propter Christum, per fidem. Postea vero placere etiam obedientiam erga legem, et reputari quandam justitiam, et mereri præmia.

CONFESS. AUG. 1540. (Art. 6.)

SERMÒN IX.

I JOHN v. 6.

And this is the victory that overcometh the world, even our faith.

THEY take a narrow and very erroneous view of man's nature, who regard him as necessarily and uniformly governed by self-love; a fairer consideration of the human mind would show that a love of others forms an essential part of it, no less than a love of ourselves. That it contains, besides, a number of subordinate propensities, clearly distinct from either principle, having their appropriate objects altogether different from the interest of others or our own; and that in action this concern for our own happiness sometimes combines with, sometimes opposes, our desire for the happiness of others; while each of them, at times, finds itself aided, and, at times, resisted by some of those other propensities of our nature; is sometimes overmastered by them, sometimes overcomes them. So that the whole man is, at times, governed by a combination of his desires, and, at times, by some single one—by self-love or benevolence; or by some passion or appetite,

which, ruling him at the moment, hurries him in the pursuit of its proper object, not merely with the same injury eventually to his own interest, as to his neighbour's, but with the same disregard, at the moment, for both.

The coarse system, in fact, which derives all human conduct directly from self-love, is too palpably false to require refutation; and the more artificial scheme, which proposes to refer all our actions ultimately to that principle, by treating all our desires and affections as so many modifications of a love of ourselves, rests upon sophistry, which has been often and well exposed. Still, after every proper abatement from these perverse exaggerations of its importance, self-love retains a most important place in the human character. It exists in all minds, and in considerable strength: and though often too weak to resist the sudden violence of passion, and sometimes giving way even to the milder impulses of benevolence, it is sure to regain its influence; and requiring no excitement from outward circumstances, but recurring naturally after every temporary displacement with the same steady force, it exerts upon most minds, on the whole, more power than other principles of our nature, which, though capable of higher energies, are subject to wider fluctuations, depending more upon what is external for stimulus and support. So that while self-love could not with truth be asserted to have ruled, with uninterrupted sway, the most frigid and unfeeling of mankind, it would be found, upon a review of their entire lives, to have exercised a powerful

influence upon the most impetuous and the most tender-hearted.

Accordingly, among the infinite objections with which the doctrine of JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH *only* has been from time to time assailed, the most popular has always been that which charges it with robbing religion of the aid of this active principle of our nature. The fear of punishment, it is said, is an intelligible restraint upon human conduct; but what restraint is there upon him from whom this fear is wholly taken away? The hope of obtaining favour is an intelligible stimulant to exertion; but what is to give activity to one who believes himself fully accepted for what another has done? An answer to the first objection is given in the attempt which I have already made to show the restraining forces which faith substitutes for those which it takes away. From Believers, indeed, the fear of punishment is taken away; for it not only is not the principle by which God designs to govern them, but is wholly incompatible with that principle, as I hope will afterwards more fully appear. But I think it has been shown that the restraints which faith brings to bear upon the mind, are neither few nor inconsiderable; and I only desire to remind you, that they are not merely consistent with the freeness and the fulness of God's forgiveness of us, but that they are derived from these characteristics of the gospel, and derive from them their best efficacy. It is thus that, as we saw, the several elements of which this restraining force is composed are maintained in full strength, and in that mutual action by which each is so

wisely calculated to aid the direct effects of the other, so far as they are salutary, and to restrain them when they would be likely to become injurious. Thus we saw our humility resting upon our sense of guilt and corruption; and this based upon just views of the holiness of Jehovah and the strictness of his law; and these again confirming and receiving strength from the view of the atonement, which represents the sacrifice of the everlasting Son of God as essential to the forgiveness of offenders and all-sufficient for it. In this last is also the true foundation of such confidence in God as effectually prevents our self-abasement from restoring that alienation from Him, and that fear of Him, which of itself it has an obvious tendency to renew. While, on the other hand, this self-abasement no less effectually guards against the danger, that the confidence in Him which springs from the atonement should degenerate into presumption and pride. Again, such a view of the character of the Most High, as the atonement gives, adds powerfully to the natural effects which an abiding sense of his presence is fitted to produce; and such a sense faith has obviously a natural tendency to maintain. But we saw that from this consciousness of the presence of God, even under far less awful views of his nature, the human mind naturally shrinks with aversion and fear; and that any provision for operating upon us by such impressions of God's character, would be ineffectual, unless accompanied by that assurance of reconciliation which is necessary to vanquish the repugnance with which

we contemplate Him.—But this whole investigation is too recent to render it necessary to review it minutely ; and to the answer which it furnishes to this objection, I have no desire to add any thing of my own.

For various reasons, however, I do desire to bring to your minds the animated reply made by the great apostle of the Gentiles, to difficulties of the same kind, connected with these fundamental principles of *his* gospel. When, in magnifying the free mercy of the Most High, he had described it as meeting every variety and every multiplication of human crime ; as growing (as it were) with the growth of our iniquity, and finally going beyond its possible limits, by a provision of mercy which must be more than adequate to any finite demand upon it ; he anticipates that this glowing representation of God's unbounded compassions, which ought to vanquish all hostility against Him in the human heart, may only furnish occasion to some new display of it ; may stimulate man's impurity to some corrupt perversion of this consolatory truth, or prompt his self-righteousness and pride to some profane cavil against it ; and that in either spirit a man may say, *Shall we continue in sin, that grace may abound ?* "*God forbid !*" is his earnest reply, "*How shall we that are dead to sin, live any longer therein ?*" The thought can only pass through a mind, not merely experimentally a stranger to the influence of Christian principle, but wilfully blind to the manifest force of the rite by which men

Rom. vi. 1, 2.

become members of the Christian Church. For the initiatory rite of Christianity (as he goes on to explain it) symbolises death and the resurrection, and specially the death and resurrection of the blessed Lord. So that, by the very force of the figure, all his followers declare, that,—as he died to this world of sin and suffering, and rose to the world of purity and joy,—their profession, in becoming his followers, is death to sin, which is by nature, and, in the strength purchased for them, a rising again to holiness, which is by grace. The rite is thus but a symbolical declaration of the real change that takes place in every true believer. And at least at the very threshold of the Christian Church, the true nature of the Christian profession is thus so emphatically and distinctly set forth, as to stamp dishonesty on the abuse or cavil, whichever it be, that he is considering.

Again, his statement, that Christ has borne the curse of the law for Believers, and that they dread it no longer,—*that they are no longer under the law, but under grace*,—may, he supposes, in the same manner, move the thought, “What, then, shall we sin because we are not under the law, but under grace?” To this, whatever it be, whether scoff, cavil, misconception, or abuse,—his answer is as before, “God forbid!” He reminds those to whom it occurs, that the service into which believers have entered, and the service of sin, are interests so essentially opposite and irreconcilable, that we cannot put on the outward profession of the Gospel

Rom. vi. 14.

without the solemn renunciation of sin, to which he has before adverted; and that this is but a figure of the real change which true believers undergo—that if we have passed under grace, it is by receiving into our hearts a principle, which though it may not, and does not, prevent the assaults of sin, has effectually rescued us from the debasing thralldom to sin in which we were held; though it has not entirely destroyed sin's force, has certainly overthrown its tyranny. And on this statement he leaves the question confidently to common sense—he appeals boldly to the commonest principles of common life for its decision. If one were to profess that he had cast off the authority of his former master, and entered into the service of another, while his whole conduct and way of life remained unchanged;—if he continued to obey the commands of the former, and neglected or disobeyed those of the latter, what would you conclude? Would you not conclude that the professed change was a deceit, whatever were the motives to the deception? Apply these simple principles to the case before us; and if you find that with you the tyranny of sin is unbroken, be assured that you are deceiving yourselves in imagining that you have changed masters. “I speak as a man,” that you should have obeyed the commands of sin formerly, when you were professedly sin's servants, was right; it was but according to the nature of all servitude. But if you are doing so still, the same principles oblige us to conclude that your master is still the same.—This is the answer of the apostle to such

objections, and you see how little it qualifies his large statement of God's forgiveness, which gave rise to the first; or, the statement that we are not under the law, but under grace,—justified by the Lord's obedience, and pleading it, not our own,—which seems to furnish occasion to the second. He derives his answer to both, from the true nature of the Christian profession, which the word of God so distinctly sets forth. By this he is enabled to show, not that Believers are under the law, but that they who are under sin are not Believers. Not that believers in Christ are not freely forgiven, and fully accepted in Him, but that they who see in this, motives or encouragement to disobedience, are strangers to the very elements of the Christian profession.

Be it so, it is said; let the apostle's answer be taken as establishing every thing that it professes to establish; and must it not be felt that, however suited to his purpose it might have been, it is a very insufficient answer to the whole difficulty as stated above; that it in fact leaves the second part of the objection, certainly not an unimportant part, wholly without an answer. We are looking for the natural operation of faith, and may for the present set every thing else out of view; and we deny that, however successful it may be in restraining from sin, it does any thing to stimulate to exertion. Admit that the distinctness with which the Bible presents to us the life and character of the Believer, sufficiently guards a man from imagining himself reconciled to God by faith in the blood of His Son,

while he continues to pursue a course which the Bible unequivocally declares inconsistent with that state of reconciliation. Let it be admitted, too, that the restraint which it provides, is operative as far as it is reasonable to suppose that it can operate; that it keeps Believers not only from all flagrant violations of God's law, but from many lesser derelictions of duty;—from any systematic neglect of express commandments—from any clear opposition to the Scripture character of followers of Christ, which might awaken in us alarm and doubt, whether we really belonged to that class or not. Admit that all this is done, and how much is left undone! How much remains to complete the Christian character! And in all that remains, does not faith in Christ, trust for every thing in his obedience and his death, rather injure than aid,—by taking away the connexion between our exertions here, and our destiny hereafter, which is, after all, the great incentive to active virtue?

I do not know that the objection, upon this principle, to the doctrine of justification by faith only, admits of being put in a subtler or a stronger form than this. If I did, I should be careful to choose that form for it. It certainly, in the form in which I have stated it, deserves an answer: but to avoid misapprehension, I may at the outset say, that I agree fully in the view of religion which makes *any* restraining force insufficient for its purposes. Religion certainly does not consist wholly, or even chiefly, in abstinence from what is forbidden—it lies much more in the performance of what is commanded;

but most of all in the reception and cultivation of new principles of action—new desires—new affections; in that inward and thorough change which can render our reasonable service to God a service of perfect freedom; which can, according to His own gracious word of promise, make the Lord's yoke easy and His burthen light. I think it requires nothing but a fair examination of the principle of faith, to show in it a powerful provision for effecting this entire change of human character, which is, no doubt, the ultimate end of religion: but, for the present, I must confine myself to the more limited object of showing that this objection against its moral effects is a groundless one.

Though I hold the objection deserving of an answer, I should be sorry to be understood to admit, that if it were established it would be conclusive as to the actual effects of the religious views which it assails. For it professedly speaks but of their natural effects upon the mind. It says nothing of the secret operation of the Spirit which accompanies and applies them to the believer's mind—by which, if they had deficiencies, all their deficiencies might be abundantly supplied—by which even their injurious tendencies, if they had such tendencies, might be effectually counteracted. Still it would be a startling thing to find that the instrument wielded by this Omnipotent Agent in the work of our sanctification, was, in truth, so defective, or worse than defective, as the objection represents it. We would be combating for the truth to a disadvantage, if we were obliged to confess that so far as

we can discern its natural tendency, the more thoroughly that we know, and the more firmly that we believe it, the less likely are we to be active in the service of God.

The defenders of gospel truth, however, are in no such unfavourable position. The objection is neither well grounded in what it asserts nor in what it assumes. Faith does not dissolve all connexion between our conduct and our destiny; nor is self-love the most effective principle in securing active obedience. The latter part of this reply is connected with matter which renders it by far the more important part; but, for the present, I must confine myself to the former.

Faith in the Redeemer, doubtless, as the objection supposes, teaches us to regard ourselves as pardoned by God, and restored to His favour—freely; for the sake of a work in which we had not, nor could have had any share. It not only gives us no encouragement to do any thing to procure that pardon or to obtain that favour, but it denounces and stigmatizes all such attempts as derogating from the sufficiency of the Redeemer's work; and, for ourselves, and in our measure, *making void the cross of Christ*. This foundation of the objection is doubtless true; but faith is no less solicitous to impress upon us, that in thus uniting ourselves to the Lord, we are not terminating our course of discipline, but commencing it. That we become by faith *disciples* of Christ; that we, then, but enter the school where we are formed for eternity; by instructions and chastenings, by trials and blessings,

by the outward dispensations of His providence, by the inward leadings of His Spirit, *to be made meet to be partakers of the inheritance of the saints in light*. And surely if the matter stood here, enough would seem supplied to secure anxious interest in the progress of this divine teaching, in the bare knowledge that it was going on. They who felt that they were in God's hands, and for such a purpose, could hardly be unconcerned about the progress that they were making, insensible to the pain of retrograding, to the pleasure of advancing in this heavenward course. The apostle certainly seems to find in this—in the bare consciousness that a power so wonderful is exercised upon us, and within us,—motives the most persuasive to activity and assiduity, no less than to humility and awe. “Work out your own salvation,” saith he, “with fear and trembling, *for* it is God that worketh in you both to will and to do of his good pleasure.”

But in teaching us to regard life as a state of discipline—a state, that is, in which character is formed by conduct—revelation virtually establishes a connexion between our conduct here and our destiny hereafter, which seems well fitted to exercise distinctly a concern for our own interests. We cannot look upon the diversities of moral character that surround us, whether among believers or unbelievers, without feeling sure that men pass through life very differently injured or improved by its teaching, and arrive at its close in very different moral states. If scriptural confirmation

Col. i. 12.

Phil. ii. 12.

were needed for a truth so obvious to common observation, the Lord expressly tells us, that of those who do bring forth good fruit, some bring forth an hundred fold, some sixty, some thirty; and that, on the other hand, a return to the thralldom of sin after a temporary escape from its yoke, can make the last state of a man worse than the first; and that some are two-fold more children of hell than others.

But if this difference exist at the close of life, it is surely impossible to avoid believing that it continues after life is ended. Unless we suppose that God places us here for the formation of character; provides potent means to effect its formation; employs the events of life, the revelation of His will, the operation of His Spirit, to promote this design; brings all means, internal and external, natural and preternatural, to bear upon man to effect this end; and then, when life is over, interferes by an act of power to undo all that this elaborate system of forces had effected: unless, I say, we are prepared to adopt this unreasonable and wild supposition, we must believe that men enter the next world—both the great divisions of it—as they leave this, in widely different degrees of moral advancement and of moral degradation. Now, this, fairly considered, is equivalent to asserting that they enjoy there very different degrees of happiness, and suffer there very different degrees of misery. For under every notion of the happiness of the future state, much of it must be supposed to consist, in the exercise of those principles, in the indulgence of those affections,

which it is the business of moral discipline here to invigorate and to purify. A more advanced state of moral improvement is, therefore, but another name for a higher capacity for this kind of happiness: and, surely, with Him *in whose presence is fulness of joy, and at whose right hand there are pleasures for evermore*—the highest capacity for happiness must be the highest enjoyment of it. So that you see, that unless we suppose an express provision in heaven for excluding men from degrees of happiness of which they have been by God's appointment rendered capable upon earth, we must suppose a wide distinction in the enjoyments of saints in the kingdom of glory; and if we only think how much of the misery of the realms of darkness must consist in the natural working of the evil principles, which the discipline of life, when perverted from its true purpose, serves to foster and aggravate, we must see that there is the same necessity for inferring different degrees of suffering there.

Thus, important differences in the condition of men hereafter would be the natural result of the differences of their moral state in leaving life; and this would be enough for my purpose: but we appear to have good authority for referring some differences in their future lot to what we would call a more direct appointment of God; as express authority as it would be reasonable to expect to have upon a subject, on which the Scriptures always manifest remarkable reserve. The notions of the eternal world, usually entertained, are well expressed by an eloquent writer, when he calls it, *an*

ocean of spirits without bottom and without shore. But such vague notions of the world to come are not scriptural. The Bible, without supplying much food for curiosity, gives us more definite information concerning the state that awaits us. We know from the word of God that there exist now among the inhabitants of heaven wide distinctions. We are told of differences in angelic natures, which we must suppose real and important, but of which (though their existence is distinctly declared to us) we can form no very clear ideas. But, besides these, we read of distinctions among the angelic host, of which we can form better conceptions, distinctions of rank and authority, *thrones, and dominions, and principalities, and powers.* And the glimpses which we are given of the state of saints hereafter, seem to hold out very clearly the existence and maintenance among them of the like distinctions. We have the apostles sitting upon thrones with Christ, judging the twelve tribes of Israel. We have the place of highest dignity on His right hand, and on His left hand, in his kingdom, reserved for those for whom the Father has destined it. We have the undefiled following the Lamb, whithersoever he goeth. While those whom he has brought out of great tribulation, serve Him day and night in his temple. And other intimations will, probably, of themselves come to your minds, tending to establish the same fact—that though in the spiritual world, the righteous shall ALL *shine*

Col. i. 16. Eph. i. 21. 1 Pet. iii. 22. Matt. xix. 28. Luke xxii. 30.

Rev. xx. 4. Matt. xx. 23. Rev. xiv. 4. Rev. vii. 15.

like stars in the firmament for ever, it shall be as in the natural world, where one star differs from another star in glory.

But in addition to all such intimations of permanent distinctions in the condition of the blessed hereafter, it is to be remarked, that the plain aim of some parabolical representations of the final judgment, seems to be to convey to us, that in that righteous award, the precise station shall be assigned to each for which he has been fitted by the discipline of life. The servant whose pound had gained ten pounds, is set over ten cities; he who gained five, over five. And, I may add, though it only bears upon my immediate purpose in showing how entirely the principle pervades God's government, that we are informed distinctly, that in awarding punishments in that hour, the same measure of their severity shall be employed. That ignorance of God's will, for example, which, though it does not take away the guilt of sin, certainly lessens its heinousness, shall also mitigate its punishment; and while *the servant who knew his lord's will, and prepared not himself, neither did according to his will, shall be beaten with many stripes; the servant who knew not his master's will, and did commit things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with few stripes.* So that on the whole, besides those differences in the future happiness of moral agents, which we saw necessarily resulted from the difference of their moral state, it appears that we have good reasons to

Luke xix. 17.

Luke xii. 48.

look for distinctions in their condition hereafter, depending also upon these moral differences: not, however, like the former, resulting naturally from them, but from a direct appointment grounded on them.

To pursue the matter further, is for our purpose needless. Indeed, as I intimated, it was not necessary to have gone so far. In simply stating what is so distinctly stated in God's word, and what is too reasonable, and too much in unison with the general principles of his government, to require a detailed proof, that while the conduct of a believer is forming his character, his character must materially affect his happiness in the world to come, we would seem to have done enough to answer the objection. The objection supposes that Believers, by their principles, are living under a system which separates wholly their conduct and their future interests. The fact is, that they are living under one which establishes a close and important connexion between them: a system which assigns a sure and never-ending reward to every act of genuine obedience to God's will,—which suffers not one to fall to the ground without bringing forth fruit eternal: which assures the believer that of all his devotion in his Master's service, no act is unrecompensed,—that from the blood of martyrdom shed in defence of his truth, to a cup of cold water given to a disciple in His name—not one shall go without its reward. And all this without in the slightest particular impairing the perfect freedom of that grace in which he stands, and desires to stand for ever!

Indeed, so far is reward, under this view of it, from opposing the freeness of divine grace, that in the writings which set forth that freeness most distinctly there is continually no less distinct reference to this provision of recompence. Thus the certain conjunction of present suffering and future glory is often spoken of simply, and without any explanation: "Our hope of you is stedfast, knowing that as ye are partakers of the sufferings of Christ, so shall ye be also of the consolation." "If we suffer, we shall also reign with him." "For which cause we faint not, for though our outward man perish, our inward man is renewed, day by day: for our light affliction, which is but for a moment, *worketh for us* a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory." But at other times we are told how this union is brought about,—that it is by the moral effect of such sufferings upon our character. God's design in sending them to his children, is, we are expressly told, to effect by them this moral change, *to make them partakers of his holiness*. And hence they are not merely to be endured with patience, but received with gratitude and joy: "We glory in tribulation also, *knowing* that tribulation *worketh* patience, and patience *experience*, and *experience* hope, and hope *maketh* not ashamed." And again, the startling command to rejoice in temptations, is accompanied by the satisfactory explanation derived from this effect in strengthening and perfecting the moral character of the sufferer: "My brethren, count it all joy when ye fall into divers

2 Cor. i. 7.

2 Tim. ii. 12.

2 Cor. iv. 16.

Rom. v. 3.

temptations, *knowing this*, that the trying of your faith worketh patience. But let patience have her perfect work, that ye may be perfect and entire, wanting nothing." This is a full explanation of the connexion elsewhere declared, and requires to be borne in memory at times, when, in declaring this certainty of recompense, in perfect confidence that he could not be misunderstood, a strength of language is sometimes employed by the Apostle, which it requires some effort of mind to follow, as, "God is not *unrighteous* to forget your work, and labour of love."—And again, "Seeing it is a *righteous* thing with God to recompense tribulation to them that trouble you; and to you who are troubled, rest with us, when the Lord Jesus shall be revealed from heaven, with his mighty angels." Not surely meaning to put those two things, God's righteous punishment of vice, and his gracious reward of virtue, upon the same footing of natural equity; or, so to contradict himself and the truth, as to assert that the poor returns of love, which Believers are enabled to render for the exceeding love wherewith He first loved them, ever leave God their debtor—or that the afflictions of the present life give any a just claim for compensation in another. None of these things were in the Apostle's mind; but speaking to those to whom he had explained fully the principles of the Gospel, he speaks fearlessly. He apprehends no misconception when he speaks thus strongly of a part of that gracious scheme, as like all the rest of it, though springing from God's

James i. 2.

Heb. vi. 10.

2 Thess. i. 6, 7.

free grace, yet so fixed and consecrated, that He could not depart from it without departing from His faithfulness.

But to return to the objection. What is there that presents so elevated an aim to exertion, applies stronger incentives to activity, or makes them operate more unceasingly, than this view of life—which represents every moment as of real value; every act, every thought, as capable of exercising an intelligible influence upon eternal interests? This not only imparts a dignity and importance to life's meanest incidents, which its weightiest concerns want when separated from such a connexion, but it does so upon principles which all can appreciate and understand. For you see that this is but applying to the acknowledged facts of our situation, a known law of our nature: that well-known law under which conduct is exercising an unceasing influence upon character. Every one sees that under this law, the unheeded events of every day, and every hour, are doing something to form for eternity the character of every human being, calling into exercise some moral principle, developing some propensity, renewing that strife between conscience and passion, which tends to the advancement or degradation of our moral nature, according to its conduct and issue, strengthening some vice, or confirming some virtue. What hour, in fact, of our waking existence, carefully reviewed, even by ourselves, at its close, would not be seen to have brought with it some intelligible demand upon temperance, or fortitude, or self-denial; upon forbearance, or bene-

volence, or active exertion ; upon zeal for God, or love for man. And as these claims are answered or not, as conscience and that Spirit which strives with our spirit, prevail over evil dispositions and indolence, or yield to them, are we not plainly advancing or retrograding in the moral course in which we are treading ; and in either event fitted for some station in the world that we are hereafter to inhabit, for the society with which we shall dwell for ever ? Now, with this view of the connexion of this life with the life that is to come, is there any one that will compare, in their probable operation upon the mind, the notions usually entertained of that connexion ? A vague dread of punishment, banished by some notion of the mercy of God, no less vague ; or presumptuous hopes of reward, betraying ignorance alike of God and of ourselves.

But it may be said, however true and important this view may be, what connexion has it with the principle of faith in the Redeemer ? Why, you are to remember that what has been said was designed to answer an objection which charges that principle with depriving those who are under its influence, of all intelligible motives to activity in the service of God : every degree of activity, at least beyond the very moderate degree required to keep down alarm about our condition. And for this purpose it seems abundantly sufficient. It seems quite enough for this purpose to show that in the form in which a connexion between our conduct and our interests seems best calculated to excite and to sustain exertion, faith does nothing to dissolve that

connexion. So far, on the contrary, as it may rest upon the direct testimony of God's word, faith includes a belief in it. So far as it has for its support fair reasoning upon that testimony, faith does nothing to discountenance it. For answering such an objection, this would appear abundantly sufficient.

But in fact, faith has a much more important part in the matter. It is not only required to establish this connexion upon any certain and satisfactory grounds, but it does much to aid and to regulate these views in operation.—That the notion of reward can only consistently be applied to those who, reconciled to God through Christ, have had all their offences blotted out by His blood, and are accepted in him as dear children, I have already established, if I have established the fundamental principles of the Gospel in opposition to erroneous views of it. Reward, indeed, to those, every part of whose conduct merits punishment, involves insuperable difficulties, and is even glaringly preposterous, when we regard it as administered by a righteous Judge, trying those who are bound to render obedience to a law; but it involves no such difficulties, when we consider that trial as past, and the Judge as a reconciled Father. That our tender Father should look with complacency even upon the feeblest attempts of his dear children to serve and obey him; that he should see with joy the needful transformation of their character going on under such a course of obedience; that he should stimulate and cheer their progress by a sense of his approbation, or by the hope of reward;—this cannot appear, to any one who

fairly considers it, a strange or startling thing. I shall therefore not dwell upon this operation of faith, but pass to the others. Faith alone, as we have seen, takes away the obstinate reluctance to contemplate the world to come, which we all naturally feel. For at the bottom of that reluctance lies a sense of hostility to God, and in faith we behold Him reconciled. But it does not stop here. It tends to carry our contemplations continually to the scene to which we are hastening: not merely reminding us, generally, that we are pilgrims and sojourners here, but, in the toils of our pilgrimage, directing our eyes to our true home, where *a rest remaineth for the people of God*. In the perils of our warfare, sustaining us by the sure promise, that, for all who fight the good fight, *there is laid up a crown of righteousness, which the Lord, the righteous judge, shall give at his appearing*. In the calamities of life, calling to our remembrance, that *the afflictions of this life are not worthy to be compared to the glory that shall be revealed*. In sorrow, and suffering, and bereavement, carrying us in hope to the world where there is neither grief, nor pain, nor separation, and where sorrow and sighing shall flee away.—Nor in our happier hours is it less solicitous to remind us how transient and perishable are the objects upon which we are lavishing our best affections; making here, as before, the great realities of futurity familiar objects of our thoughts; teaching us here, as before, to look *not at the things that are seen, but at the things that are not seen*; by pressing upon us the momentous difference

between them—that *the things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal.*

Now, how all this must aid the views of life which we have been considering, must be evident. For without pursuing the matter into detail, it must be plain that such views as we have been considering, can operate strongly upon a man, only in the degree in which the objects of the unseen state hold their true place in his mind, and have truly engaged his affections: and this is too plain to require a detailed proof.

But if faith be thus useful in aiding the operation of such views, it is absolutely essential in regulating it. It is essential to supply resolution, and to restrain presumption; to prevent failures in this course from restoring the spirit of slavish fear from which we have been delivered, and to prevent success in it from generating pride. How it effects all this, it can hardly be necessary, after all that has been said upon its nature, to employ much time in pointing out. It must be manifest to every one, that the principle of simple unreserved trust in another, at all times, and for every thing, is fitted to abate pride from whatever source; and that the fact that this Being is the everlasting God, is fitted to sustain hope under every trial.

When we look at the struggle in which we are to engage, in which every moment is of importance; every act, and every negligence, producing real effects: when we consider the momentous interests that hang upon this struggle, and the powerful

enemies with whom we have to contend—and then look at ourselves, we naturally shrink back with dismay. “Who is sufficient for these things?” must be the desponding language of every heart. But faith replies that our sufficiency is of God; that His grace is sufficient for us; that His strength is made perfect in weakness. It reminds us that His omnipotence is engaged in the work: that the same everlasting Spirit who has opened our minds to discern divine truth, and our hearts to feel it,—that it is He who heals our infirmities, supports our weakness, supplies our wants; furnishes us with arms for our spiritual warfare, and aids us in the conflict; gives us the desire to pray, and directs our petitions; guides us in drawing from the events of life, from all God’s outward dealings with us, whether trials or blessings, the improvement which all were alike designed to supply; and exercises upon us, within, those transforming influences, by which the world becomes crucified unto us, and we unto the world. Is not this enough? In much weakness, and amidst many fears; amidst all the painful and often recurring proofs that we carry *this treasure in earthen vessels*; in sorrow and shame for dull ingratitude, and barren carelessness; in bitter remorse for wanderings and backslidings; is there not here enough, and more than enough, to support and to cheer the weakest Believer?

Doubtless there is. And the same source supplies abundant materials to repress the pride which is so ready to spring up in our carnal hearts, under

a sense that our course is advancing. The answer which faith supplies, indeed, to the sober question, "*Who made thee to differ?*" must effectually extinguish all presumption in our Christian graces, real or imaginary. Faith, which has brought us to the Cross of the Redeemer for pardon for sin, directs us to the efficacy of the same stupendous sacrifice, for all protection from sin's snares, and all cleansing from its pollution. So far as we are to be restored to the purity of our lost estate here, faith directs us to look for this restoration, not to any visionary spring of renovation in our corrupt and fallen nature, but to the same *fountain open for sin and for uncleanness*,—to the *gifts purchased for the rebellious* by Him who died for them; and gladly and gratefully acknowledges, therefore, that if we do bring forth any fruit in righteousness, it is not ours, but His. But faith rests upon views of God's demands upon us, which will not allow us easily to think highly of such fruit;—it brings our lives to a standard of duty, by which our best actions show too poorly to minister much to spiritual pride; it makes familiar to every believing heart the humble confession, "the little fruit that we have in righteousness, it is, God knoweth, corrupt and unsound." And by the views of God upon which it is grounded, and which by exercise it deepens and confirms, it effectually keeps down the vain imagination, that in the most advanced state to which His grace ever brings us we can challenge or sustain His scrutiny; it keeps alive continually the sense that we only stand in

His sight, as seen and accepted in Him who is THE LORD OUR RIGHTEOUSNESS ; and prompts unceasingly the apostolic prayer, that *we may be found in Him, not having our own righteousness, but the righteousness which is of God.* So that faith is not less powerful to keep alive humility, than it is absolute to banish despair.

And, on the whole, you must see how groundless is this objection,—how groundless any objection must be, that charges faith with robbing religion of the support of that universal and operative principle of human nature, a concern for our own well-being. On the contrary, you see that so far as this is a legitimate principle of action, faith only interferes to add to its force, and to regulate its operation. So that if self-love be, as it is said to be, the surest spring of obedience, here it is, enlightened fully, and fully awakened, stimulated to activity, sustained in exercise, directed to its true ends, and restrained within its proper limits ; and acting, that is, having a tendency to act, upon the Believer at every moment of his existence, to secure his active obedience to the will of God.

But it is to mistake our nature,—fallen as it is,—it is to mistake our nature greatly, to regard self-love as the most effective principle in securing obedience ; and it is grossly to mistake the nature of religion to suppose that it is on the efficacy of self-love that it mainly relies. Christianity certainly does not design to place us under the dominion of self-love, however well-informed or wisely regulated it be ; she seeks to raise us to

a higher principle of action, which is at the same time a surer principle of obedience. What this is, and what part faith has to perform in exciting or supporting it, I shall endeavour to point out when I have next an opportunity of addressing you.

SERMON X.

UPON THE MORAL EFFECTS OF FAITH.

Scimus quidem quod fides nunquam est sola, sed affert secum charitatem et alia multiplicia dona. Qui enim in Deum credit et certus est quod faveat nobis, siquidem et filium dedit et cum filio spem æternæ vitæ, quomodo hic non amaret ex toto corde Deum? Quomodo eum non revereretur? Quomodo non staderet declarare pro tantis beneficiis gratum animum? Quomodo non probaret Deo obedientiam in adversis perferendis?

Sic fides eorum pulcherrimarum virtutum secum ducit: neque unquam sola est. Sed non ideo confundendæ res, et quod solius fidei est, aliis virtutibus tribuendum.

LUTHER IN GEN.—*Cap. 15.*

SERMON X.

I JOHN IV. 19.

We love him because he first loved us.

THE Gospel is professedly designed for man in the low estate to which sin has brought him ; and if it contained nothing bearing a reference to a part of our fallen nature so widely diffused, and so operative, as self-love is, it would be an indication that it did not come from Him who formed us and knows of what we are made. The omission doubtless might admit of a satisfactory account ; but it would plainly present a difficulty requiring to be accounted for.

We have seen, however, my brethren, that, in fact, no such difficulty exists. That not only do the representations of revelation concerning man's condition and prospects, contain matter to alarm this principle and to stimulate it to activity at the first ; but that, after animated by fear and hope, we have, by faith, embraced the offers of divine mercy in Christ, self-love is not left without matter to exercise itself upon. For that, though the faith of a Believer teaches him to look exclusively to the obedience and the sufferings of his Master for

pardon and acceptance with God, and in that reconciling work forbids him to ascribe to himself any part, original or supplementary,—it teaches him also, that the further promises of God, of making him like to Him in whom he trusts, rendering him meet for the inheritance purchased and prepared for him, shall be effected through the gradual teaching of His everlasting Spirit. And that this omnipotent agent employs, in promoting God's gracious will concerning us, *even our sanctification*, the influence of the faith which He has bestowed, of the word which He has dictated, of the outward events of life which He ordains; until it seem fit to divine wisdom to terminate the earthly course of the subject of his teaching. And, lastly, we saw that a right view of such a course of discipline will discover in it a provision for engaging the Believer's concern for his own well-being, from the beginning to the end of his career. For that, independently of all other cause for sorrow at finding himself retarded or retrograding in this moral course, and independently of all other motives to desire improvement, and to take pleasure in a sense of advancement, there is this particular one, addressing itself directly to the principle of self-love; namely, that such an advancement in holiness must be an augmentation of eternal happiness. And of this connexion between the present life and the life to come, of the scriptural grounds upon which it rests, and of the part faith has to act in maintaining it, I gave you, when I last addressed you, a sufficiently detailed account.

I did not think it necessary, nor do I now, to say much to obviate the misapprehension,—to which, nevertheless, I should be sorry to give occasion—that, in establishing such a connexion, I am *building again the things that I destroyed*. Any one who is willing to give fair attention to the subject, must, I think, see that this representation attributes no good effect to human conduct, except as it emanates from, and is governed by, faith; and no reward to it, even then, as of debt, but all of grace; and nothing whatever to it, at any time, or under any view of it, which was before ascribed to faith, or to its objects, exclusively of conduct. I should, I trust, shrink from all *philosophy* as from *vain deceit*, if it led to any thing calculated to mar the simplicity or impair the freeness of the Gospel of Christ. But I am satisfied that this view, rightly considered, has no tendency to do either: that it only requires to be considered apart from prejudice, to see that it gives a satisfactory account of many embarrassing appearances in life; and an intelligible and worthy account of the whole end of life itself; which, unless viewed in some such connexion, presents such an afflicting and perplexing scene: that it gives an easy and consistent meaning to multiplied passages of holy writ, which are usually explained, on the one hand, so as to do great violence to the natural force of the plainest language, and, on the other, so as to contradict the plainest and best established principles of the Gospel. And, lastly, what is most important, that it is sustained, as I then briefly showed, by as strong direct scrip-

tural evidence, as in such a case it would be fair to expect to find. And being thus sure of its soundness, its importance, and its truth, I should be sorry to decline presenting it, under an apprehension, that after every fair precaution to obviate misconception, it may still by some be misconceived.

A being under the direction of self-love thus informed, regulated, and restrained, is no doubt in a very advanced moral state, when compared with one who is governed by more confined or less correct views of his real interests, or by the passion or appetite that happens to be at the moment most inflamed. But it is an error to suppose that he is in the state to which the gospel designs and has the power to raise man. And Christian moralists, who have been content to regard any such end as the ultimate end of divine teaching, have prejudiced and dishonoured Christianity, by a representation which takes for it a lower aim than that of ancient philosophy. For it was only the worst part of that philosophy (as you know) which professed to regard prudence as the highest human virtue, and to make an enlightened self-love the ruling principle of human conduct. The better part failed too,—failed, perhaps, no less signally, to regulate life and to purify the heart; but it failed in a higher and nobler effort, in the attempt to place man under the dominion of a love of virtue. This failure may, in part, perhaps, be ascribed to the abuse of means within the reach of philosophy, but is, doubtless, chiefly due to causes far beyond her control. To whichever it be ascribed, however, it is only with loose thinkers that it can

have the effect—which it seems so often to have—of stamping the character of *visionary* upon the design itself. That design certainly deserves to be very differently regarded. The mode of prosecuting it may be open to much just animadversion; it was found united with the grossest vices in practice, and with many speculative views both false and chimerical. But the design was not more elevated than sound. The design of freeing man from the thralldom of sense, and from the tyranny of appetite, by restoring to the higher powers of his nature the supremacy which these meaner parts had wrested from them, must be regarded with admiration by every one who is not incapacitated from viewing it in its true light by obstinate prejudice, or a cold heart, or a limited understanding. It was one of those aspirations after lost excellence, by which, even in the lowest degradation, the moral part of our fallen nature, from time to time, vindicated its high origin. And the gross errors with which it was accompanied, and the utter failure in which it issued, furnish no reasonable presumption against the soundness of the design; they are but melancholy demonstrations of the depth of our fall.

Religion finds man, as philosophy did, in a state in which conscience is far too feeble of itself to govern passion, and in which it has self-love perpetually arrayed against it, through false views of our real happiness; or at best dormant, under imperfect information concerning it. The attempts of philosophy to obtain for conscience the aid of this important principle, were of necessity attended with indifferent

success. For however clearly it may be shown—and I think it can be shown, and has often been shown most clearly—that virtue promotes the temporal happiness of the species; it must, I think, in all candour be allowed, that there are many conceivable and actual cases in which it is doubtful whether a strict observance of the rules of virtue secures the happiness of an individual in this life—doubtful to such a degree, as to render it impossible to interest self-love always on the side of virtue, without taking into consideration a future state of existence. And to every one who has looked at the matter, it must be plain, that unaided reason had arrived at no views of a future life which were fitted to render conscience any effectual and steady support. But revelation supplies abundantly this defect—when it publishes and proves to us that God hath appointed a day in which he will judge the world—*render to every man according to his works; to those who, by patient continuance in well doing, seek for glory, honour, and immortality,—eternal life. But to them who do not obey the truth, but obey unrighteousness,—indignation, and wrath.* From the moment that revelation establishes that *tribulation and anguish* shall for ever rest upon *every soul of man that doeth evil*, it becomes plainly impossible to interest self-love on the side of vice; and that there are further provisions to engage its active co-operation in the cause of virtue I showed you before. Revelation certainly designs to effect this end; it is obviously one of great importance, it is

Acts xvii. 31.

Rom. ii. 2, 6, 7.

the end to which revelation first addresses itself; and the means which are employed to secure it in the Bible have naturally a prominent place there, so prominent as to render it easy to conceive how its true place in religion has been misconceived. That it has been misconceived, can, I think, be easily shown; that the principle is designed to be strictly subordinate and occasional,—that the means employed to engage it on the side of conscience are but among the elementary means of religion, and among its first operations,—and that the end itself is but subsidiary to a higher end, the end of raising man to a condition in which he may be acted upon by higher parts of his nature, and ultimately brought under the dominion of the love of God,—all this is, I think, easily proved from the word of God; and, I think, must make itself evident to any one who examines patiently and fairly the system which that word presents.

The point might be established, perhaps, in various ways. I choose, as peculiarly fitted to my limits and design, a proof which, to a fair mind, cannot, I think, fail of being perfectly satisfactory, and which is besides one easily stated and understood. I mean that which is furnished by the contrast between the motives employed in the apostolic addresses to believers, whether to restrain or to excite them; and the considerations used to move the impenitent and unbelieving, to invite them, plead with them, threaten, and warn them.

In the addresses to believers, for example, who sparingly do you find the *terror of the Lord*, which

is wielded so powerfully against the world! While, in the cases in which it does occur, you will often find some reason to suppose that some suspicion of the possibility of a false profession has led to the use of it; or that it is used with the design of quickening the concern of those addressed, for the awful state of those who are still unreconciled to God; or of deepening their grateful sense of the mercy by which they have themselves been rescued from a destiny so appalling.—The prospect of eternal reward is doubtless often presented, and with a clear purpose of influencing the mind. But you are to remember, that I do not mean to deny the efficacy or the propriety of such motives in their proper place; but merely to ascertain what that is; what is the place that they are designed to hold in religion. And I may also remark, that though fear—the fear of punishment—is plainly unfit to be the animating motive of our lives, or to have a prominent place among such motives (so plainly as to make it wonderful that it should have ever been thought of for such a purpose), yet the same objections do not apply to the constant exercise of hope. Fear, even when it does not amount to such a height as to paralyse all the active principles of our nature, seems effectually to deaden all its generous emotions. But hope has no such tendency. On the contrary, while it has a plain tendency to call into activity some of the most stirring qualities of the human mind, it offers no obstacle to the exercise of any of its tenderest and kindest sympathies. And in the particular case that we are considering, while the nature of future

happiness is of a character to elevate and purify the mind that contemplates it as an object of desire, the contemplation of it can hardly be so separated from the true grounds upon which it becomes an object of hope, as not to excite strongly and to sustain the feelings of gratitude and love. So that if it were the design of the Bible to imprint gratitude to God, and the love of Him, upon the human heart, it would be plainly promoting powerfully such a design by calling us, as it does so often, to contemplate the happiness which He has in store for his children. But, you will remark, that this effect is not left to the natural tendencies of this hope, however strong they are; but that such references to the joys of heaven are continually, almost uniformly, so made as to direct the mind expressly to the consideration of the source of these unspeakable benefits,—to the mercy of the Father, to the sacrifice of the Son, to the work of the Spirit upon the heart: so as to secure an effect beyond the bare exercise of hope, and to show a purpose lying beyond the excitement of that emotion.

But no one will be disposed to question, that that love of God which is a duty both of natural and revealed religion, it must be the purpose of the Christian revelation to implant in the minds of Believers. The only question is, what place it was designed to hold there. And if that question be not decided by the nature of the principle, as compared with all others, it may, I think, be satisfactorily settled by considering—first, that in the portraiture of the Christian character given in the

apostolic writings, it sufficiently appears as the ruling principle. And secondly,—what I wish to secure attention particularly for, as in my apprehension establishing the point even more conclusively, though less directly,—that in addresses to the disciples, where the purpose is plainly a practical one,—where the manifest design of the writer is to urge those whom he addresses to painful sacrifices, to sustain them under severe trials, to animate them to arduous duties,—he directly and fearlessly appeals to gratitude and love, as real and influential principles of action; as the proper motives to unrepining submission to God's appointments, cheerful obedience to his will, and active zeal in his service.

With reference to the first, look at the life and ministry of the Apostles themselves. Look at the course of generous self-devotion of the Apostle of whose life we know most, from the moment that in humility and sincerity he asked, "Lord, what wilt thou have me to do?" till he disappears from the scene, *ready to be offered, and the time of his departure at hand*. See him encountering danger fearlessly; patiently sustaining toil, and privation, and suffering; *taking pleasure*, as he describes himself, in infirmities, in reproaches, in persecutions, in distresses, *for Christ's sake*; ready, not to be bound, but to die also for the name of the Lord Jesus. And not only animated with these devoted feelings upon great and spirit-stirring occasions; but, what every one knows to be so much harder—regulating by the same principles the common course of his

Acts ix. 6. 2 Tim. iv. 6. 2 Cor. xii. 10. Acts xxi. 13.

daily life;—giving none offence in any thing, *that the ministry be not blamed*—renouncing the clearest rights, when the assertion of them might impede the success of his preaching; and ready to forego the most legitimate indulgences, when they threatened to prejudice the spiritual welfare of the weakest soul that he had won. If you ask how he was quickened and sustained in this arduous course of exertion and endurance, you will find that it was not merely by looking to the recompence of reward, in the sure and steadfast hope of that *crown of glory which the Lord, the righteous Judge, shall give him at His appearing*; but that it was under the resistless influence of real, fervent, grateful love to Him to whose love he owed every thing—all his enjoyments, and privileges, and hopes;—“the love of Christ,” saith he, “*constraineth us.*”

Nor are you to suppose that in this he differed in any respect, except in degree, from the less distinguished followers of the Lord. For them he prays for this gift, as the consummation of God’s mercies to them; *that Christ might dwell in their hearts* BY FAITH, *that they, being rooted and grounded in love, might understand, with ALL SAINTS, what is the breadth, and length, and height, and to know the love of Christ, which passeth knowledge, that they might be filled with all the fulness of God; that their love might abound more and more, in knowledge, and in all judgment.* Nor only so; but he describes them as actually partaking of the princi-

1 Cor. ix. 2 Cor. xi. 1 Thess. ii. 6. 2 Thess. iii. 8. 1 Cor. viii. 13.
2 Cor. v. 14. Eph. iii. 17, &c.

ple, as having "the love of God shed abroad in their hearts by the Holy Ghost, which He had given them;" and even more strikingly conveys what a certain and leading characteristic of the Christian profession it is, by limiting his closing salutation to "all them that love the Lord Jesus Christ in sincerity;" or by denouncing, as objects of God's abhorrence, all in whom the principle is not found: "If any man love not the Lord Jesus, let him be anathema."

But, as I said, what is most striking and convincing is, the confidence with which, in practical cases, an appeal is made to an invigorated conscience, to renovated affections, to a jealous zeal for God's honour, to a real solicitude for the propagation of his truth;—to some form or result of gratitude and love, rather than to a dread of punishment, or the hope of reward. Thus an exhortation to the observance of the most arduous Christian duties, and to the cultivation of the highest Christian graces, is introduced with, "I therefore, the prisoner of the Lord, beseech you that ye walk *worthy of the vocation wherewith ye are called*." And he reminds them that his personal teaching was not only directed to the same high ends, but grounded upon the same pure and elevated motives: "Ye know how we exhorted, and comforted, and charged every one of you, as a father doth his children, that ye would walk *worthy of God, who hath called you to his kingdom and glory*:"—or, "Be ye imitators of God, *as dear children*, and walk in love,

Rom. v. 5.

Eph. vi. 24.

1 Cor. xvi. 22.

Eph. iv. 1.

as Christ also hath loved us, and hath given himself for us:”—or, “Put on, therefore, *as the elect of God, holy and beloved*, bowels of mercies, kindness, humbleness of mind, meekness, long-suffering, forbearing one another, and forgiving one another, if any man have a quarrel against any, *even as God for Christ’s sake hath also forgiven you, so also do ye.*”

But I omit any further citation of passages. The few that I have given will bring others of the same kind in abundance to your minds; or at least suggest the line of reading that will supply them in abundance. Look to the whole course of the apostolic teaching; you will see that, however much it deals in general principles, it descends upon proper occasions to the most minute directions for the conduct of Believers; for the regulation of their own hearts and lives, and for their demeanour to all, both within and without the church. And you will see throughout, that however other motives intermingle, this is the leading one relied upon. That whether the writers seek to promote personal purity, patience, humility, and self-denial; or to engage a benevolent concern for those who are still enemies to the truth; to secure for them the forbearance, tenderness, and compassion, which their awful condition calls for; or whether they are asking for the warmer and more peculiar affection with which *they* are to be regarded, who, serving the same Master, governed by the same laws, and sharing the same hopes, are journeying to the same home; they still appeal to the same principles, make every sacrifice that they

call for, and every virtue that they enjoin, rest upon the grateful and affectionate feelings which should fill and animate the Believer's heart.

And surely, no one can look at human nature, or human life, fairly, without seeing the wisdom of this,—without seeing that in choosing, out of all the principles of the human character, LOVE to bear the burthen, the one is chosen which is best able to bear it. Even those who deny its applicability to religion, or who deride such a use of it—even they must, I think, acknowledge, that if our hearts were filled with the LOVE OF GOD, our lives would be regulated by a principle more effective in securing obedience to His will, than any that the more selfish part of our nature can supply: a principle more wakeful, more active, more circumspect, more self-denying, more studious to please, and more vigilant to avoid offending: setting aside all its superiority in nature over the expectation of reward, or the dread of punishment, and looking merely to its effects,—a principle more prompt and more enduring than either; more powerfully stimulating to exertion, and stronger to sustain under suffering, those upon whom it exerts its real power.

For evidence of this, I might send you—and fairly too—to the very strongest forms under which human love ever manifests itself: because it is plain, that what we are concerned in, is in ascertaining the strength of which the principle is capable. But as, in some of its strongest forms, it is mingled with other parts of our nature—appetites or instincts, from which it would be necessary for

exactness here to separate it; and as I have no time for subtle distinctions, and no disposition to engage you in them, I prefer referring you to a case which requires none, and against which no exception lies. Of all the diversified forms, then, under which love is gracing and gladdening this troubled scene of existence, consider only the one to which the subject naturally leads us. Think only of all that it is doing every where around us, in the filial relation, to assuage sorrow, and to heighten joy. Think only of the power of genuine *filial love*; of its cheerful sacrifices to promote the comfort of parents, of its tender attentions to mitigate their sufferings; how it can tame down the buoyant spirits of the young, repress their ardour, abate their levity, and control all their natural love of enjoyment, that they may cheer the decline of those who watched over their helpless infancy,—how it can make giddy and headstrong youth sedate, thoughtful, and patient, that it may minister to unconscious imbecility, to revolting disease, to peevish and querulous age. Think only of this, I say, by no means the strongest form of human love, and such scenes must come to your minds, as I desire to bring to them; for such scenes all have witnessed, or shared in. Set beside them, fairly, any effects of the same kind that you have ever seen springing from fear or hope, and you must be satisfied of the superiority of love over both. I do not mean satisfied of its superiority, as in itself more elevated and generous; as exercised too in conjunction with every thing lofty and tender in human nature,

and giving strength and kindliness to all—for of that superiority no one can doubt, and with it I am not now directly concerned;—but I mean this, that, estimated simply in its power of producing a conformity of our conduct to the will of another, it is, in every form in which it exerts itself strongly upon man, the most effective of all the principles of his nature.

So that you see that if we were at liberty to consider the matter exclusively in this way; if we were to consider principles merely in their operation upon outward conduct; and if obedience to God were made up of the performance of outward acts, or abstinence from them, this principle would have a claim to the very highest place; and obedience would be more effectually provided for by implanting it in the heart, than any other whatever. But this is plainly a false view of the subject. We are not to regard the love of God as one out of several principles producing obedience to his will, which might be exchanged for any other, if one equally efficacious could be found, but as itself an essential part of obedience, and an essential element of every act of obedience.

Without spending time, then, in proving what has already sufficiently appeared,—that love is an essential part of the Believer's character, its ruling principle, and its crowning grace,—I shall proceed, according to my plan, to consider how faith is concerned in producing it: to look, as before, for the natural means which are in operation upon the believer's heart, to produce this affection; without excluding that agency to which, as in other cases,

these means owe all their efficacy, or meaning to intimate that it cannot, or that it does not, operate beyond, and independently of them, as well as in them, and by them. At these provisions I shall now look but briefly, as I have, in my former examination of the principle of faith, anticipated a good deal of what is necessary to be stated upon this head.

And, at the outset you must see what a clear superiority in *feasibility* (so to speak) this attempt of religion has over the one of philosophy with which we compared it; even in the single circumstance—that it is for God, and not for abstract notions of our own creation, that our love is demanded. To be an effective principle of action, love requires some support in reciprocal affection, some personal qualities to form the foundation of attachment, a being at least as its object, who can be interested, offended, or pleased. To any one who considers our nature, it cannot appear surprising that all attempts to fix human affections on the cold abstractions of philosophy should have so signally failed. The beauty of virtue, the deformity of vice, are not unreal—far from it; but the emotions which they excite, compared with our love of the virtuous or hatred of the vicious, are languid and ineffective; they are weak in all minds, compared with the personal feelings from which they are derived, and weakest in those in which they would have most to resist and most to subdue.

But though this advantage is real and obvious,

it does not secure the attainment of the end. On the contrary, the effect produced must depend upon the qualities of the object. God, it is true, commands us to love Him, and we know that upon obedience to His commands our eternal well-being depends. But powerful a motive as this is to sway the will, it has no direct influence over the affections, nor does its power over the will secure it any. We can no more determine our minds to love or hate, under a conviction that it is our interest to feel the emotion, than we could, by resolving to do so, hear or see without having our bodily organs affected. Some object, naturally fitted to excite the feeling, must be offered to our apprehension, an object endowed with the qualities which, by the constitution of our nature, are fitted to move the affection, or we should labour in vain. This is so obvious, and so well known, that a proof would be misspent upon it. I suppose, in fact, that the most untutored person—one who had never passed a moment of his life in reflecting upon his own mind—if he were satisfied that his interest required that he should feel real affection for any object, and, accordingly, if he desired strongly to do so, I suppose that he would instinctively feel where the limits of this sense of interest lay, that he would turn instinctively from a contemplation of himself and his own interests to a contemplation of the object; would endeavour to bring his mind under the influence of every thing in the object fitted to draw forth affection; to set its attractive qualities in the clearest and strongest light, and to keep out of

view every thing in it that was calculated to offend or repel: and this, as I said, not from any theory of the mind, true or false, but instinctively.

So far as our love to God is produced by natural means, it is plain that it too must depend upon the form under which He is present to our conceptions. But it would seem as if this were one which rendered the feeling irresistible—that when our love was asked for Him who, while He concentrates in himself every excellence of which we can form any imagination, and possesses all in a degree infinitely transcending our highest imaginings, is *not far from every one of us*; whom every thing that we behold or think of, all that we suffer or enjoy, is fitted to recal to our minds, and, rightly considered, with new evidence of his goodness; on whom we depend at every moment, and to whom we owe every thing—every object that ministers happiness to us, and even the constitution of mind that enables us to find in it a source of enjoyment;—it would seem, I say, that upon every principle of our nature the human affections should flow naturally to such a being, as to the centre that attracts them all. And such doubtless was the effect, upon unfallen man, of the manifestation which God then made of himself; such, even now, to a certain extent, would be the effect of His exhibition of himself in the course of his providence—in which, notwithstanding many awful demonstrations of wrath, benevolence so clearly predominates—if it were suffered to produce its natural effect upon the heart. But we have seen that though too far fallen to

have right apprehensions of our guilt and corruption, we have such apprehensions of them, as make us seek our happiness in averting our contemplations from our Creator. Viewing Him as a righteous governor, we look upon him with aversion and dismay and it is not more certain that love, when genuine, *casteth out all fear that hath torment*, than that this tormenting fear, while it has the mastery, effectually casteth out love. Nor is it possible that love to God should be naturally produced in the human heart, until this fear is dispelled, and so that alienation vanquished which prevents us from coming fairly under the operation of the qualities in the divine character which are fitted to secure our love.—How the Gospel effects this I need not point out in detail. In it God only convinces us of our danger, to show us his own provisions for our security; he but proves to us our guilt to take it away; establishes that we are his debtors, and that we have nothing to pay, only that he may frankly forgive us all!

If this only removed the obstacles to a free contemplation of God's character, it would be, as we have seen, doing a great deal to secure our love for Him. But, in fact, it can be easily shown that the mode of doing it presents him to us in a light that adds infinitely to his power of attracting our affection.—If it be doubted whether the human heart is so formed as to be unable to love strongly, except when we are strongly loved, it must be at least felt that bounty can only strongly draw forth our affection in the degree in which it is a measure of affection; that no amount of careless bounty can do

much more than raise transient feelings of gratitude. And revelation accordingly does not leave us in any perplexity, as to the source from which God's bounty springs. It is careful to inform us that we owe it to HIS LOVE; that it was to HIS LOVE while *we were yet his enemies* that this provision of mercy was due; that His love for the work of His hands survived all human ingratitude, rebellion, and crime; but that, in the perfections of the divine nature, and in the principles of the divine government, there existed obstacles to the manifestation of this love, until the law was satisfied by obedience, and sin expiated by suffering; and that for this *He spared not his only begotten Son, but delivered him up for us all!*

What a measure of the severity of the divine justice, this stupendous offering for sin furnishes, I have on another occasion called on you to consider; and it is plain that, in exactly the same degree, it supplies a measure of the strength of the divine love. But what I most desire attention for now, is the provision for moving us strongly and permanently, which the mode of presenting this evidence of God's love contains. His word abounds with the most affecting assurances of it. He descends there to borrow images from the strongest animal instincts—from the liveliest and warmest human feelings—from the strength of paternal affection—even from the tenderness of a mother's love,—to convey to His children such impressions as they are capable of receiving of that *love which passeth knowledge*. And when we consider from whom all

these assurances proceed, it is plain that nothing can add to the weight of such evidence. But there is an infirmity of our nature, for which a provision is made in the Gospel narrative, on which faith is grounded—an infirmity, which renders the peculiar mode of presenting this evidence there, more impressive than any other. Unless we have some distinct object of the imagination to connect our affections with, they are, as I said before, languid and wavering: and it not only is hard for us to find such an object in the infinite Jehovah, but in struggling with the natural difficulties of the subject, we are continually adding artificial ones, by a tendency to magnify his physical attributes and intellectual powers, at the expense of those moral qualities which are more natural objects of our love. Now this known imperfection of our nature is provided for, and this tendency guarded against, in that scheme of redemption, on which faith is grounded.—That scheme which presents to us GOD IN CHRIST, *reconciling the world to Himself*,—the glory of the everlasting God, veiled in our frail nature, submitting to all its wants, enduring its distresses, and sustaining even its temptations;—this is not merely to be regarded as supplying evidence the most conclusive of the divine love, but as presenting it in the way fitted to produce the most prevailing conviction of it;—furnishing the imagination with as distinct an object as any in the history of mankind, in the person of HIM who so long deigned himself to bear the weakness, the necessities, the appetites of our nature; to share for so long in

the common occupations, the common troubles and sorrows of man's daily life. The more you look at this provision, and at the nature for which it was designed, the more will you see its efficacy—that it is on a level with every capacity—supplying to all, proofs, that all can feel and understand, that we are objects, not of God's mercy, or of his bounty merely, but of his LOVE; and bringing back this evidence upon the mind in the most persuasive form; a single incident in the life of the blessed Lord, often doing more, I am sure, to dissipate passing distrust in the divine love, than the most laboured arguments or the strongest assurances could. Believers cannot doubt of the wakeful care, of the tender sympathy, of the fervent love of Him, who, though in nature infinitely raised above them, has descended to furnish us with evidence so affecting, that he is not thereby raised above a participation in our sorrows and our joys: they cannot doubt that *the man of sorrows and acquainted with grief*, feels for human afflictions, that He is touched with a feeling of infirmities that He has felt; of temptations by which He has been Himself assailed—that He will give to those whom He deigns to call *his brethren*, strength proportioned to every emergency, and suffer no trial to exceed their means of resistance.

It is in this last and highest effect of faith, that the superiority of the Gospel of Christ appears most conspicuously, when compared with every false representation of it. If God's design were to govern outward conduct merely, with an indifference to the principles by which it was regulated, then any of

these false systems, all of which, under minor differences, agree in presenting reconciliation with him, and acceptance with him, as a prize to human exertion ;—any of them might in some measure serve to promote his design : though even that design, as we have seen, is better secured by the true scheme. But it is when you regard it as the ultimate purpose of the gospel to implant in man's heart the love of God, and make that the ruling principle of his life, that the utter impotence of these degrading misrepresentations of the gospel is fully felt. No measure of reward thus offered as a price for human love could procure it—the heart recoils from such a barter of its affections. *If a man*, said the wise king, whose knowledge of human nature was derived from Him who formed man, and knew what was in him ; *if a man would give all the wealth of his house for love, it would utterly be contemned.*

I have already tried these systems, in another and a more regular way. I have shown them to be opposed to the direct testimony of God's word ; I have confirmed this refutation of them by showing them to fail in the representations which they make of the holiness of his nature, and the inviolability of his law. But I should be myself convinced of their falsehood, and should be satisfied with any fair mind to rest the proof of their falsehood, upon the ignorance which they exhibit of the nature for which they are professedly designed, and upon their consequent inefficacy to promote the highest and ultimate end of all God's dealings with man.

Strange however as it may sound, I believe it is to this inefficacy that they owe their origin and their currency. I believe that the uncompromising hostility with which the Gospel has always been assailed, and of which these schemes are but so many manifestations, is mainly to be ascribed to its uncompromising purity. It is different from our own mode of dealing with our enemies, and we believe reluctantly in a measure of magnanimity above our own. It is at war with all pride, and our proud nature struggles strenuously against it: we find it hard to cast off our intellectual pride, and to receive it in the humility of little children; and harder still to cast off our moral pride, and to receive it in the self-abasement of polluted sinners. But its hardest quality to the natural mind is, I am sure, its irreconcilableness with sin. We are never so degraded as not to feel that coming thus to Christ for every thing, infers the surrender of ourselves to him in every thing; we cannot acknowledge that *we are bought*, and with a price so costly, without feeling that *we are not our own, but His*.—And *we will not have this man to reign over us*; any scheme that secures us from His pure dominion will be preferred to that which consigns us to it. It is a comfortable thing to have the prospect of being reconciled to God, at the close of our career; and no hard thing to think of rendering to Him a full measure of gratitude and love in a future state of being; walking close to Him there, where, if there be temptations to wander from Him, they are such as we can frame no distinct notions of. But to be reconciled to Him *now*, that we may *now*

walk with Him *as dear children*, is comfortable only to those to whom his Spirit has made it so.

This subject might be dwelt on much longer. Besides manifold imperfections in the mode of handling those parts which have been most fully treated, many interesting points have been but glanced at, and many not adverted to at all. But much time has been already spent in this course; and more, though it might supply some defects and repair some faults, would leave still much to be corrected, and much to be supplied; and, as my proposed design ends naturally with this last and highest effect of faith in Christ, I shall end this protracted inquiry here.

For practical applications I have left but little space; but the surpassing mystery of redemption, in any mode of bringing it before the mind, can hardly fail itself to have prompted some solemn and profitable reflections;—and the simple appeal which a contemplation of it suggests to the Apostle, asks but little time, and surely could not be made more impressive by any additions,—“How can we escape if we neglect so great salvation?” If this stupendous manifestation of God’s boundless love fail to move us, what can turn us to him? And if we remain alienated from Him, what can save us? The sacrifice of the blessed Lord does not declare God’s goodness only, but *his severity too*. That he *spared not his own Son*, is indeed a sure foundation of the Believer’s hope, *that with him he will also freely give us all things*; but, rightly considered, is it not also an assurance to impenitent sinners of the certainty

of his wrath? Does it not tell the terrors of his anger? Does it not publish that *it is a fearful thing to fall into the hands of the living God,—that our God is a consuming fire?*

To those who have embraced the hopes of the Gospel, and have by faith fled to the sure refuge which it holds forth to sinners, all the manifestations of the mercy which they have received—of the love of which they are the objects, are but prevailing motives to genuine obedience—because the sure source of that genuine love which is the surest spring of obedience. They will seek to purify themselves, even as He who is the author and finisher of their faith is pure; they love him, and will keep his commandments; will cultivate the graces that he enjoins, and shun the vices that he abhors: feeling that upon them devolves the momentous duty of adorning the gospel of God their Saviour in all things, they will be circumspect and active; and above all, under a just sense of their weakness, they will seek for strength where it may be found.

Every congregation contains the two classes, to whom, upon such an occasion as the present, such reflections are fitly suggested. But there is in the congregation that I now address, another class of hearers, upon whom a weighty duty, in addition, is by their own seeking soon to devolve. Many of those who hear me now, design themselves for the ministry of this Gospel: to whom therefore it will belong, not only to obey their Master's commands, and to recommend his doctrine by their outward

walk, but faithfully to teach it to the souls committed to their charge. To teach it faithfully, you must learn it faithfully; you must seek it in the word which is its only pure depository, and seek it there in humility, in sincerity, in patience, and in prayer.

It is in such an inquiry as this that I have desired to engage you. I have endeavoured to present to you the fundamental doctrine of the Gospel of Christ, in scriptural simplicity; to expose some of the misrepresentations of it, on which you will have to decide for others and for yourselves; to show that they are distinctly denounced in God's word, and in the sound formularies of faith, which our church has derived from that word. And if I deceive myself in imagining that I have succeeded in attaining these objects, I am at least sure that I have presented the subject in a form which must clearly establish the duty of patiently investigating it. If I have not done so much as I desired, to aid or to abridge such investigations, I shall think that I have done what is still more important, if I have effectually promoted them.

And to those whom such inquiries shall, under God's blessing, conduct to a knowledge of His truth, —to those I would earnestly recommend, as above all other ministerial duties, the simple and faithful publication of it. I do not mean to dissuade from corruptions of the truth, which spring from party feelings or personal considerations; for I will not suppose any whom I address, at once so daring and so degraded, as to pollute his high calling by subserviency to such unworthy views. I speak

only of those reserves and qualifications, which, whatever be their source, rest professedly upon some calculation of human wisdom, concerning the moral effects of gospel truth when simply and distinctly preached. I have, I think, shown that such apprehensions are groundless; that they really spring from loose views of the nature of the doctrine, from false views of human nature, or from the prejudice, pride, and corruption of our hearts. But the duty of faithfulness in preaching the Gospel, rests upon higher grounds than our ability to show, or to see, that such apprehensions are unfounded. It is a message from God, which you undertake to deliver, and even they whose Gods were no Gods felt that the bearer of a divine message should not dare to alter it. It is a remedy prepared by the wisdom of God for the deadly diseases of our fallen nature, which you voluntarily engage to administer. Is not the folly of the empiricism that prompts you to adulterate it, lost in its awful presumption?

Combat strenuously Antinomian abuses of the Gospel of Christ, if you shall encounter such in your ministry. Combat no less strenuously Pharisaical cavils against it, which you undoubtedly will encounter. Above all, struggle with, mourn over, pray against the Antinomianism and the Pharisaism which you will find cleaving to your own slow hearts;—*but let no man take your crown.* Let neither abuses, nor cavils, nor scoffs, nor calumnies, nor the vain reasonings of your own minds, nor the sad experience of your own hearts, seduce or drive you to the presump-

tnous and perilous faithlessness, of qualifying God's message of mercy, or adulterating his remedy.

Trials are the lot of human life : and to the course that you have chosen for yourselves peculiar trials are assigned : trials in which you will be made to feel that God's servants must *cease from man*, and rest upon their Master alone for comfort and for strength ; and assuredly you must feel that you can enjoy this cheering sense of His guidance and support, only so long as you are preaching, not your own cunning devices, but His simple truth.—In death, when you recal the manifold imperfections of your stewardship, you will need all consolation ; do not voluntarily rob yourselves of the sure consolation that, however weakly you have discharged your important trust, you have in this discharged it honestly.—The trials of life and the pains of death, whatever they be, shall soon pass away : but there is an awful hour of trial to follow, for which life and death are both designed to prepare. In that awful hour you shall stand at the judgment-seat of Christ, and render there an account—not of your own souls only—but of the souls of the flock *over the which the Holy Ghost shall make you overseers*. As you would render that account *with joy and not with grief* ; as you would stand before that throne *pure from the blood of all men*, do not *shun to declare unto them* ALL THE COUNSEL OF GOD.

QUEMADMODUM A RESTITUTIONE HUIUS SUMMI LOCI DOCTRINÆ CHRISTIANÆ DE NOSTRI JUSTIFICATIONE, TOTA RELIGIONIS NOSTRÆ ET INCIPIENDA ET PETENDA EST RECONCINNATIO, ET RESTAURATIO; ET DEBENT PROPTEREA AD LOCI HUIUS ELUCIDATIONEM ET SOLIDAM EXPLICATIONEM CONFERRE QUICUNQUE CHRISTI SUNT, ET REGNUM EJUS VERE EXPETUNT; PRÆCIPUE VERO ECCLESiarUM MINISTRI, QUISQUE PRO SE QUICQUID OMNINO CONFERRE AD HANC REM DONO CHRISTI POTERUNT: CONFIDO HANC OB REM, ET MEUM HOC QUALECUNQUE MINISTERIUM, QUOD ECCLESIIIS DEI IN EXPLICANDO ET ADSERENDO HOC IPSO LOCO PRÆSTARE STUDIUM, AMANTIBUS REGNUM CHRISTI HAUD FORE INGRATUM.

BUCER. *Disputationes de Justificatione,*
Ratisbonæ habitæ, 1546. Ep. Dedic.

NOTES.

NOTE 1. PAGE 8.

Upon the Correspondence between the Romish and Sandemanian Notions of Faith.

The Council of Trent (Sess. 6, Can. 12.) anathematizes all who assert “fidem justificantem nihil aliud esse quam fiduciam divinæ misericordiæ peccata remittentis propter Christum.” Confidence in the divine mercy, in some sense, is made a part of *the preparation for Justification*, cap. 6; but it would not be easy to determine positively, whether it were allowed to be a part of justifying faith or not: as, whatever materials for collecting the views of the Romish Church upon the nature of faith may be supplied by the Decree and Canons of this Session (which are designed to declare the Catholic Doctrine of Justification, “quam nisi quisque fideliter firmiterque receperit, justificari non poterit”), no explicit definition of faith is to be found in either. Bellarmin, however, supplies the defect, and I suppose may be received as sufficient authority on the subject. Their divines, he tells us, “fidem historicam, et miraculorum, et promissionum, unam et eandem esse docent; atque illam unam non esse proprie notitiam aut fiduciam, sed assensum certum atque firmissimum, ob auctoritatem primæ veritatis, et hanc unam esse fidem justificantem.” *De Just.* l. 1. cap. 4.

It was a long time, I believe, before this view of faith was adopted by any Protestant Divines. When they erred about the nature of the principle, it was naturally in the opposite

direction. In fact, as the Romanists denied in terms, that *we are justified by faith only*, they had a manifest interest in robbing faith of every thing moral in its nature, as among the modes of vindicating their rejection of this truth : but a Protestant who ceased to hold the doctrine, in the sense of the early Reformers, was still probably bound to their assertion of it in express terms, by the confession of the church to which he belonged, and lay, therefore, under an obvious temptation to add to the meaning of faith, until it stood for all that he conceived essential to justification. Hence we were told, “*fidem cui justificatio a Paulo tribuitur, pro unica ac simplici virtute nequaquam sumendam esse, sed integram Fæderis Evangelici conditionem denotare, h. e. suo ambitu omnia Christianæ pietatis opera amplecti.*” *Bull, Harm. Apost. Diss. Post. cap. 4. § 4.*—That faith, “in the New Testament, stands generally for the complex of Christianity, in opposition to the law, which stands as generally for the complex of the whole Mosaical dispensation.”—That “our faith, which includes our hope, our love, our repentance, and our obedience, is the condition that makes us capable of receiving this redemption and free grace.” &c. *Burnet, XXXIX. Art., Art. XI.* And such a view of the nature of faith became a very common one among Protestants, both in England and upon the continent.

How far the palpable unfairness of this mode of neutralizing the doctrine of Justification by Faith only, contributed, by a reaction easily understood, to give rise to the opposite errors concerning the nature of faith, it would not be easy or important to decide. It seems likely, indeed, that the error originated in this way ; though those who have most signalized themselves in the support of it were far from setting any high value on the doctrine, and some of them, as we shall see, absolutely reject it.

Sandeman, his professed followers, and some smaller religious bodies, separated from them by views of church fellowship, but agreeing with them for the most part in doctrine, are the persons alluded to (p. 12.) as maintaining that faith is simply *a belief of the truth*. And the same view has been adopted and defended by individual members of almost all churches. I have, of these, pointed especially to Mr. Erskine, because his writings

were best known to my hearers, and most likely to influence them. He has adopted and maintained this view of the nature of faith in his "Internal Evidences," and his "Essay on Faith," (the only publications of his with which I was acquainted when I wrote this sermon): and if he does not support the view more ably than its earlier advocates, he certainly recommends it more strongly by manifesting every where marks of a catholic, cordial, and tender spirit, very advantageously contrasted with the narrowness and bitterness which distinguish all the writers of the Sandemanian school, with whom I have any acquaintance. And this recommendation was likely to be peculiarly felt by such a congregation as I was addressing. He has been very well answered by the Rev. Mr. Carlile, in his "Old Doctrine of Faith," in which students will find, in addition to a satisfactory refutation of Mr. Erskine, a great deal of important matter in support of the sounder doctrine.

NOTE 2. PAGE 16.

Upon the Scriptural Proof of the Meaning of Faith.

No one can, I think, reasonably doubt that *faith* means in the Bible, as it does elsewhere, *a state of mind*: and it seems evident that the real question to be determined here is this: when we are declared to be *justified before God by faith*, does that term stand for the state of mind in which *we believe* the truths contained in the word of God; or the state of mind in which we feel towards Him that *trust*, or *confidence*, which such belief ought to produce?

It will be seen that the mode of deciding this question in the Sermon is, to show:—that when the Lord reproves the want of *faith* of those whom he addresses, he means (as appears from the circumstances of the case) to reprove their want of *trust*; of *trust* or *confidence* in the Father or in Himself: that when he commends their *faith*, he means, as appears in the same way, to

commend their *trust*: and it would seem reasonable, if the matter ended here, to assume, that when his Apostles labour to produce *faith*, blame its weakness, pray for its increase, extol the benefits of it, they really mean by *faith* the same thing, unless they distinctly declare, or very clearly intimate, that they mean something different. And this fair presumption appears to receive all the confirmation which in a preliminary treatise it is capable of receiving, when it is shown, finally, p. 22, that the only Apostle who gives any thing approaching to an account of the meaning of the term, gives such a one as proves him to have used it in the sense in which it was used by the Lord.

This account is introduced by an exhortation which would of itself seem sufficiently to establish the true meaning of the word. The Apostle exhorts those to whom he is writing, having *boldness* to enter into the holiest by the blood of Jesus, to draw near with a true heart *in full assurance of faith..... to hold fast* the profession of *their hope without wavering* (for he is faithful that promised).....not to cast away *their confidence*, which hath great recompense of reward: and after more to the same purpose, he proceeds to give an account of the principle he there exhorts them to retain and exhibit, in which the predominant notion, under every explanation of his words, must be allowed to be the expectation of future good; and goes on to illustrate this account, by referring to well-known manifestations of *faith*, in which *trust in God*,—in His goodness generally, or in some special mark of it which He had promised,—is plainly the predominant feature.

This seems a reasonable mode of setting about the determination of the question: nor am I aware that the way of conducting it is exposed to any objection of real weight. It may possibly occur to some, as an objection, that it only professes to fix the meaning of the term *faith*; leaving without examination the more common and not less important phrases—*to believe, to believe in, on, or upon,—the Lord, His name, His blood, God, &c.* I was aware that this might occur to my hearers as an objection; but I thought the answer to it was also likely to occur to them at once; or at least that it would, upon consideration

present itself so easily that I might avoid embarrassing myself or them, by interrupting the course of my argument to supply it. No one, in fact, who is willing to take the reasonable trouble of comparing a few of the corresponding passages in which these different phrases are employed, or who considers the free interchange of the phrases in the course of the same passage, can doubt, that in all the cases where it is important to fix the sense of the forms in which *the verb* is used, it is fixed by determining the sense of the *noun*: that *to believe* is, in such cases, *to have faith*—*to believe in*, is *to have or put faith in*, &c.

This connexion of these phrases will be at once apparent to those who are acquainted with the original; and though it may be somewhat obscured to English readers, by the circumstance, that the verbs and noun are, in our translation, rendered, even where they evidently agree in sense, by words of different roots; yet, even to English readers, it will appear upon such a comparison of passages as I have indicated above.

Thus a man finds, Matt. xxi. 22: "And all things whatsoever ye ask in prayer, *believing*, ye shall receive." If he desire to know what is here meant by *believing* let him turn to the corresponding text, Mark xi. 24, where he will see, "What things soever ye desire when ye pray, *believe that ye have them*, and ye have them." So much for the sense of the phrase; and its connexion with the other form appears in the corresponding exhortation, James i. 6: "But let him ask *in faith*, nothing wavering." And if he allow himself to be referred further, to 1 John v. 13, 14, he will find this firm expectation of the fulfilment of our prayers connected with its true foundation, in a way that, rightly considered, explains at once this form, and the other, of *believing on*: "These things have I written unto you that ye may know that ye have eternal life, and that ye may *believe on the name of the Son of God*; and this is *the confidence that we have in Him* (or towards Him), that if we ask any thing according to His will He heareth us."

Indeed, both the meaning of *believing*, and its connexion with *faith*, would be sufficiently apparent from the introduction to the passages cited from the Gospels. "Verily I say unto you, if *ye have faith*, and *doubt not*, ye shall not only do this, &c." Matt.

xxi. 21; and Mark xi., "*Have faith in God.* For verily I say unto you, that whosoever shall say unto this mountain, be thou removed, &c., and *shall not doubt in his heart*, but shall *believe*," &c.

But it happens that we are able to fix the sense of all these phrases not only thus generally, but in the most important use of them, by the same process. Let any fair man only read with this view from Rom. iii. 20, to the end of chap. iv., and when he sees throughout, *believing in Jesus Christ, faith in his blood, believing in Jesus, faith, believing God* [i. e. *promising*; the same words, Gen. xv. 6, are rendered by *believing in God*], *believing on Him* that justifieth the ungodly; *believing on Him that raised up our Lord Jesus Christ from the dead*; when he sees, I say, all these phrases freely interchanged, he can hardly doubt their connexion. And I may add, as I have remarked, Sermon IV. p. 97, that when we find in the same passage the nature of Abraham's *faith* conveyed to us, by our being informed, that *he against hope believed in hope*, that being *not weak in faith, he staggered not at the promise of God through unbelief*; but that he was *strong in faith, giving the glory to God; being fully persuaded that what He had promised, He was also able to perform*; when we find, I say, the nature of Abraham's *faith* thus distinctly and fully set forth, we can hardly doubt what *it* was; and when we are told that Christians share in the blessings promised to Abraham and to his seed, by sharing in *his faith*, we can have but little doubt what *their faith* is also.

It cannot be thought that the force of this argument is impaired by the circumstance, that it is altogether adapted to our translation; for it manifestly depends on the sense of the passages to such an extent as to be little affected by the medium in which that sense is conveyed. Where the meaning of a word is employed to fix the sense of a passage, every thing of course depends upon the language; but very little where the sense of the passage is used to fix the meaning of the word. No conclusions arrived at in any tongue, but the original, can be relied on safely in the former case; but, in the latter, it is obviously of little consequence whether we employ the original or

a translation, unless the translation misrepresent the general sense of the passages in which the word is found.

This applies directly to the entire of the preceding part of this note, and to the part of the first sermon of which it is a continuation and explanation : that part, namely, in which the meaning of faith is attempted to be established, from a direct examination of Scripture. This is, doubtless, the most important part of the entire, and is complete, as a proof, without the preliminary remarks (pp. 14—16) on the phrases *faith—faith in a person or thing*. These remarks are only applicable upon the supposition that “faith” is a proper rendering of the word in the original for which it stands. English readers will, probably, in general, be satisfied that it is, from the fact, that the translation has, in that particular, never been impugned ;—but they may, without any assumption, connect the proof and the remarks together in this way :—the examination of the texts shows, that, where “faith” is used in the translation, the general sense of the passage requires some word expressing *trust* or *confidence* ; the preliminary remarks show, therefore, *faith* to be a fit word for the place that it occupies, and throw some light on its force and use. They have thus, on the whole, I think, the point satisfactorily proved, and sufficiently elucidated ; and lose very little by being unable to apprehend the few remarks, which, for the sake of others, I think it necessary to subjoin, on the original terms.

The meaning of the original terms is treated of incidentally in the works of all the first Reformers ; most regularly and fully, perhaps, in those of Bucer and Melancthon. It forms the subject of a distinct treatise (and a very able one) by the well-known Flacius Illyricus, entitled, “*De Re et Voce Fidei*,” and is handled also in his tract “*De Justificatione*,” and his “*Clavis*.” The excellent article on the subject in Melancthon’s *Loci Theologici*, is enlarged and confirmed in Chemnitz’s valuable commentary. And finally, in Gerhard’s *Loci Theologici* may be found a learned and satisfactory discussion of the point in full detail. It has lately been investigated very carefully

and judiciously by Mr. Carlile, in his Essay already spoken of, (Note 1); and in an appendix to a volume of sermons, to which the essay refers. I should, perhaps, be content with pointing out these sources of information, upon a subject on which, it is needless to add, I can hardly hope to say much that is not contained in them: but I have, upon consideration, thought it more satisfactory to subjoin a brief digest of what is most important in these, and other writers that I have consulted on the point, than to send my readers to glean it for themselves; premising, however, that what follows is not intended to supersede their own investigations, but in some degree to aid and direct them.

Πιστεύω and πίστις are the terms to be explained; and though our chief concern is with their signification in the New Testament, yet as that is in no small degree illustrated by the Greek version of the Old Testament, it may be convenient to begin with some remarks upon it.

The meaning of מְאִיץ (to which in the version of the LXX. πιστεύω corresponds) seems very satisfactorily fixed. It is a verb in *Hiphil*, the sense of which in *Kal* is known partly from the use of its participles (in which only it occurs in the Bible), and partly from analogy. In *Benoni* it means *nursing, a nurse*, Numbers xi. 12; Isaiah xlix. 3, &c. In *Pahul*, *nursed, or brought up*, Sam. iv. 5; *faithful*, Ps. xxxi. 24; so that the meaning of מְאִיץ would be directly fixed to be, *to nurse, to be faithful*. And from its derivatives, and from its use in *Niphal*, other meanings of it may be added, *to support, to prop, to be firm*.

In *Niphal* it means, from the first sense of *Kal*, given above, *to be carried in the arms, or to be nursed*. Isaiah lx. 4. [This is the only passage, I believe, in which it is supposed to be used in that meaning, and some difference of opinion exists, as to whether that is really its signification there. Gesenius, I perceive, thinks it is; as did Buxtorf, Calvin, our translators, and others. Simonis gives *stabilientur*; De Dieu has *permanebunt*; and other interpretations have been given, and even other readings proposed (vide Lowth in loc.); but it must be seen that such variations do not at all affect the main point.]—*To be*

firmly founded, 2 Sam. vii. 16; *to be permanent*, Deut. xxviii. 59; *to be faithful*, Ps. lxxviii. 8, 37; *to be*, or *to be proved, true*, Gen. xlii. 20; Hosea ix. 7.

From these senses, that of *Hiphil* follows easily; in fact, the first meaning of the verb in *Kal*, *to nurse*, gives, without any violence, the sense in *Hiphil*,—*to confide*: but were that mode of coming at it less certain, the other senses of both *Kal* and *Niphal* would show this to be among its regular meanings. It is known that *Hiphil* expresses to ascribe to any thing the qualities spoken of in *Kal* and *Niphal* as possessed by it; and, in the present case, it is plain that the notion of ascribing to an object, *firmness, stability, permanence, faithfulness, truth*, would easily yield the sense of the verb in *Hiphil*, *to lean upon*, (literally or figuratively,) *to trust, to believe*. Accordingly, the instances of its use, both in the senses of *trusting, and believing*, are too numerous to render any quotations necessary. The common rule, that it means *to trust*, when it is followed by ׀; *to believe*, when followed by ׃, seems sufficiently exact for a general rule. It is used absolutely in both senses. Once, in the sense of *trusting*, the object is in the accusative case (Jud. xi. 20); and *the thing believed* is often expressed as a proposition introduced by the conjunction ׀, or in the equivalent form, in which the infinitive mood is employed without the conjunction; to both of which there are forms corresponding in the Greek.

This seems all that it is necessary to say of the Hebrew verb; it is admitted by all commentators and lexicographers, so far as I am acquainted with them, to express properly both *trust* and *belief*; the general rule given above, for determining, by the form of expression, in which of these meanings it is used, is found in most of them, and will almost always serve: but that point is, of course, ultimately best determined by the sense of the passage.

The Alexandrian interpreters having to render this verb, chose naturally to express it by πιστεύω, which it is well known had, in classical Greek, both significations. Πιστεύομαι was used for *Niphal* in the senses *to be verified* or *to be credited*; πιστεύω for *Hiphil*, in the senses *to believe, to trust*; the person or thing

believed, or *trusted*, being used in the dative. This was in accordance with the established usage of the language; and the additional forms which they introduced, apparently from the Hebrew, πιστεύω ἐν τινί, ἐπὶ τινί, or τινά, and which occur so commonly in the New Testament, they employed very sparingly. Other strange forms are found so rarely as to require scarcely any notice, as π. κατὰ τινός; Job iv. 18; and xv. 15: π. τοῦ ἰδεῖν, Ps. xxvi. 13 (Heb. xxvii. 13); they do not occur at all in the New Testament; nor do the compounds ἐμπιστεύω, κατὰπιστεύω, used occasionally in the same sense by the LXX.

It has sometimes been attempted to be argued, that π. cannot properly signify *to trust*, as it is never used to render תָּמַן or תָּמַן, of which, undoubtedly, *to trust* is the proper signification. The answer to this is, that the word was unquestionably employed familiarly by profane authors, both before and after the date of this translation, to express *trust*; and that it is undoubtedly used by the LXX. to express *trust*, as any one may satisfy himself who will examine such passages as Deut. i. 32; Job iv. 18; xxxix. 12; Ps. lxxvii. 22, 32; Isaiah xxviii. 16. &c. Their avoiding to employ it in rendering these words, is certainly very marked; thus for תָּמַן we find ἐλπίζω, ἐπέλπίζω, ἔχω τὴν ἐλπίδα, πέποιθα, πέποιθως ἐμὶ, ἐπιπέιθόμαι, θαρσέω: for תָּמַן, most of those words, and, in addition, σκεπαζόμεαι, ὑποδύω, ὑφίστημι, &c. but not πιστεύω. This is, no doubt, very marked; but, whether we can account for it or not, it does not in the least affect the fitness of πιστεύω, to express *trust* as well as *belief*,—which is established by the clearest instances of its use in that sense by profane writers,—or overthrow the evidence which their own use of it supplies, that the LXX. interpreters understood it to have both senses. Mr. Carlile, who notices the circumstance, observes also the difference in this respect between the canonical and apocryphal books, and says,—“The cause of this I suspect to be, that the LXX. translators laid down a rule for themselves to render תָּמַן by πιστεύω; and תָּמַן by πέιθόμαι, or ἐλπίζω, whenever the sense would allow them; whereas the writers of the Apocrypha, being shackled by no such rule, use πιστεύω and πέιθόμαι, according to the common idiom; and the words, being nearly synonymous, were used indiscriminately, one writer making more use of the

one, and another of the other." This seems, I think, highly probable: and does not the correspondence of *πιστεύω*, in both its leading meanings, to those which we have shown to be the principal meanings of *יִימָן*, account sufficiently for the existence of such a rule?

I do not think it necessary to subjoin passages to prove that in classical Greek *π.* bore the sense *to trust*, as well as *to believe*, both before and after the date of this translation; as it is a point not only well established but very generally known. It seems also needless to say much in addition, of these words in the New Testament. As the verb is shown to bear the meanings of *trusting and believing*, it would be necessary to determine, by an examination of particular passages, which sense it bore in them; but the mode of examination would be, of course, the same as that pursued above for the translation; and, as the very same passages would serve for the purpose, it seems hardly necessary to go through it again.

This would be perhaps as far as we could go, if the verb occurred in the New Testament only in its classical construction; but it seems worth remarking that those biblical forms which we mentioned as rare in the LXX. are here very common, and seem much less (if at all in the New Testament) subject to the same ambiguity. *Πιστεύω τινί*, means indifferently, *I believe one*, or *I trust him*; but the proper sense of those other phrases *π. ἐπί* or *ἐν τινί*, *ἐπί* or *ἐς τινά*, seems to be, *I trust a person, I put faith in him*. This can only be established by an examination of the passages in which this form occurs; but, as that can be done by any one who possesses and will use a concordance and Testament, I shall not extend this long note by such an addition as the necessary adduction and examination of texts would produce; but, leaving it to my readers to pursue the investigation for themselves, I shall supply them with one or two remarks, to which I do not indeed attach much importance, but which I think may serve as a confirmation of the conclusion to which, I am confident, a fair examination will conduct them.

I. The variation of the phrase, in the same passage, confirms this conclusion, as it occurs just where upon these principles it ought: while the apparent sense is *I believe*, the classical form is used,

and when it becomes naturally *I trust*, the biblical form is substituted; not that the former is not fit to convey that meaning also, but that the latter does so more properly and decisively. Thus John xiv. 11: "Believe me (πιστεύετε μοι) that I am in the Father, and the Father in me. And if not, believe me (π. μοι) for my works' sake [i. e. if my words do not secure this belief for themselves, let my works obtain it for them]. Verily, verily, I say unto you, whosoever *believeth in me* (πιστευων εις εμε), the works which I do," &c.—i. e. when the trust in me, which is the proper result of the belief of this truth concerning me, is produced, then shall follow all that is promised to faith. Thus the Samaritans are said to *believe in Christ*: where it cannot be meant that they *believed him*, for they had neither seen nor heard him; but, upon the representation of the woman that Christ had told her every thing that she had ever done, they believe with her that he is the Messiah, in whom they expected (as it appears) the Saviour of the world. John iv. 39; *ix δὲ τῆς πόλεως ἐκείνης πολλοὶ ἐπίστευσαν εἰς αὐτὸν τῶν Σαμαρειτῶν διὰ τὸν λόγον τῆς γυναίκας*, &c.; and then they came and induced the Lord to go into their city; and there, we are told, many more became believers (*ἐπίστευσαν*), on account or by means of his own word. John iv. 42.

II. Inanimate things may either be employed to attest some assertion, or from some physical qualities may be objects of trust themselves, and therefore may fitly denote any objects of trust; in the former case, when they are believed, the classical form is used; in the latter, when they are objects of confidence, the biblical. "If I do not the works of my Father, believe me not [when I say that I am the Son of God], but if I do, though ye believe not me, *believe the works* (τοῖς ἔργοις πιστεύσατε). John x. 38. While ye have light *believe in the light* (π. εἰς τὸ φῶς). John xii. 36.

"Behold I lay in Sion a chief corner-stone, elect, precious: and he that *believeth on him* (ὁ π. ἐπ' αὐτῷ) shall not be ashamed." 1 Pet. ii. 6, Rom. ix. 35.

III. We find these forms of expression sometimes supplied by phrases, about the signification of which no doubt can be entertained. Thus the promise that the Gentiles should

believe in the Lord is expressed, Rom. x. 12, ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἔσθην ἐλπιοῦσιν; and Matt. xii. 21, καὶ ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι αὐτοῦ ἔσθην ἐλπιοῦσιν. Thus the faith of the women of old in God, is expressed by Peter — Αἱ ἐλπίζουσαι ἐπὶ τὸν θεόν, 1 Pet. iii. 5. And that of such a one as Paul recommends to Timothy, to be selected for the support of the church—ἡλπικεν ἐπὶ τὸν θεόν, 1 Tim. v. 5. And the faith in God, by which he was himself supported under persecution — ὅτι ἡλπίκαμεν ἐπὶ θεῷ ζῶντι, 1 Tim. iv. 10. And, lastly, Eph. i. 12, 13, seems to furnish a striking instance of the same kind: "That we should be to the praise of his glory, *who first trusted* (or hoped) in Christ. In whom ye also [trusted], after that ye heard the word of truth, the gospel of your salvation: *in whom also, after that ye believed*, ye were sealed with that Holy Spirit of promise." The second *trusted* is supplied by our translators as required by the sense; and their view of the construction of the passage appears to me the easiest and most probable: and under it the equivalence of the phrases *to trust in*, and *to believe in*, is apparent. The reader may look at the original—εἰς τὸ εἶναι ἡμᾶς εἰς ἔπαινον τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ, τοὺς προηλπικότας ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ. ἐν ᾧ καὶ ὑμεῖς ἀκούσαντες τὸν λόγον τῆς ἀληθείας, τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τῆς σωτηρίας ὑμῶν, ἐν ᾧ καὶ πιστεύσαντες σφραγίσθητε τῷ πνεύματι τῆς ἐπαγγελίας τοῦ ἁγίου.

IV. I do not know whether it will be considered a fanciful addition to the foregoing observations, but I think there are traces of a purpose in the writers of the New Testament to preserve this phrase (in which the verb or noun is followed by the dative or accusative, with a preposition), to express this particular state of mind,—the confidence in God or Christ, by which we are reconciled to God, or which reconciled sinners feel; for when confidence in any created person or thing is to be expressed, or confidence in God for something else, the phrase is usually varied. Thus the confidence of the Jews in Moses is expressed by *Moses in whom ye trust*—εἰς ὃν ὑμεῖς ἡλπίκατε, John v. 45; the confidence of the followers of Theudas in him, πάντες ὅσοι ἐπείθοτο αὐτῷ. Acts v. 36; again, v. 37. Trusting in riches, τοὺς πεποιθότας ἐπὶ τοῖς χρήμασιν, Mark x. 24. μηδὲ ἡλπικίναί ἐπὶ πλούτῳ

ἀδελότῃ, 1 Tim. vi. 17. Paul trusts in the Lord Jesus, that he shall soon send Timothy to the Philippians, and expresses it by ἐλπίζω δὲ ἐν κυρίῳ Ἰησοῦ—and that he will soon come himself, πέποιθα δὲ ἐν κυρίῳ, Phil. ii. 19, 24. This is what would be natural without system or design : by the use of a phrase to express so important a notion, and one so often recurring, it would not unnaturally become so appropriated to that notion, that, without any fixed rule, men would rather avoid employing it in other cases, for which in its strict and proper meaning it was perfectly fit.

I do not know that the noun *πίστις* requires any additional remarks. It is never used, so far as I know, to express *belief* simply, unless 2 Thess. ii. 13, be esteemed an instance, which is not worth discussing. The object of trust is often in the genitive case, as *πίστις Θεοῦ, π. Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ* ; sometimes the thing hoped for is also in the genitive, *ὅτι πιστὸν ἔχει τοῦ σωθῆναι*, Acts xiv. 9) ; the other forms are, ἡ π. or π. ἡ ἐν τινι, εἰς, ἐπὶ, or πρὸς τινά, which, after what has been said, can require no particular observation. It is very often used absolutely, as is the verb sometimes : but the sense of both, when employed in this way, is of course to be derived from that which they have when the object is expressed, and may frequently be determined by some passage in immediate connexion, in which the object appears. Πιστεύω often, in this use, means, to believe in Christ ; but sometimes only to profess such belief, or to become his disciple, or follower ; whereas *πίστις* always expresses real faith, unless the passage (as in James ii. 14 : and I should add, there only, so far as I know) intimate the contrary. When the article is used with the noun, its force is to be determined generally by the rules for interpreting the Greek article ; but sometimes ἡ *πίστις*, used absolutely, seems to have the peculiar signification of the body of truths professed to be believed ; in which sense we use *the faith* at times in English.

My readers will, I hope, remark that the proof of the main point is independent of all these latter remarks, and is contained in the examination of the passages of Scripture, in which the word occurs, given in the Sermon, and in the former part of

this note. If any thing else in the note, therefore, should seem to any one not well founded, he is to remember that the proper proof of the point remains unaffected, and is solicited to re-examine that, and extend it for himself.

NOTE 3. PAGE 22.

Upon the Meaning of ὑπόστασις, Heb. xi. 1.

It will be seen that I do not think it of much consequence in the argument, whether ὑπόστασις be translated *substance*, or *confident expectation*, in Heb. xi. 1. For the figurative sense in which *substance* must be taken, would make the passage serve my purpose in bringing it forward nearly as well, though not so directly, as it does when the word is rendered by *confidence* or *confident expectation*. One of the oldest and best known explanations of the passage, under this view of the meaning of the word, exhibits this so clearly, that, often as it has been cited, I shall subjoin it here. It is from Chrysostom, Hom. 21, in Ep. ad Heb. ἐπειδὴν γὰρ τὰ ἐν ἐλπίδι ἀνυπόστατα εἶναι δοκεῖ, ἡ πίστις ὑπόστασιν αὐτοῖς χαρίζεται. μᾶλλον δὲ οὐ χαρίζεται, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ ἐστὶν οὐσία αὐτῶν. οἷον, ἡ ἀνάστασις οὐ παραγέγονεν οὐδὲ ἔστιν ἐν ὑποστάσει, ἀλλ' ἡ ἐλπίς ὑπόστασιν αὐτῇ ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ψυχῇ. τοῦτο ἔστιν ὑπόστασις πραγμάτων ἐλπιομένων. If we translate ὑπόστασις *substance*, no better explanation of the passage can be desired.

That the word, however, is also used to express *confident expectation* cannot be doubted; and I believe that Paul intended that it should bear this sense in the passage before us. But as I have little to add, in support of this view, to the arguments which I find in the treatise of Flacius, *De Re et Voce Fidei*, of which I have spoken in a former note, I shall give his reasoning in his own words.

“Apostolus ad Heb. xi. clare affirmat fidem esse expecta-

tionem rerum sperandarum : expectare autem bona a Deo est idem quod fidere eo. Nam quod vox ὑποστάσις, quæ ibi est, significet *expectationem*, potest ex tertio capite ejusdem epistolæ probari : ubi etiam hortatur Paulus ad fidendum Deo, et a diffidentia debortatur Bis enim eandem rem diversis verbis exponit ; cum enim dicat *nos esse participes Christi*, addit conditionem, *si modo in inchoata fide aut fiducia perseveremus*. — Græcè sic, μέτοχοι γὰρ τοῦ χριστοῦ γενόμενοι ἰάντες τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς ὑποστάσεως μέχρι τέλους βεβαίαν κατὰσχωμεν. Heb. iii. 14. Eandem sententiam in eodem cap. repetit, dicens, nos esse domum aut familiam Christi si modo fiduciam et gloriationem Dei usque ad finem retineamus (v. 6). Χριστοῦ οἰκὸς ἡμεῖς ἰάντες ἰάσμεν τὴν κατῆσιν, καὶ τὸ καύχημα τῆς ἐλπίδος μέχρι τέλους βεβαίαν κατὰσχωμεν. Jam confer hasce duas sententias, reperiæ easdem prorsus res iisdem pene verbis Apostolum repetere, et tantum pro voce, ἀρχὴ τῆς ὑποστάσεως, inchoata fiducia, κατῆσιν καὶ τὸ καύχημα τῆς ἐλπίδος, ponere : quæ proprie ingentem aut ardentem quandam fiduciam, et veluti audaciam accedendi et aggrediendi aliquem indicat..... Sic et 2 Cor. ix. et xi. dicit ne si diversum deprehensum fuerit pudeamus in hac ὑποστάσει, id est fiducia seu audacia gloriationis, quod videlicet audebat gloriari de Corinthiorum promptitudine in conferenda eleemosyna. Testantur igitur et hæc exempla vocem ὑποστάσις significare fiduciam vel audaciam aliquid agendi conandire. Probat quodque eadem hujus vocis significatio ex Psalmo xxxix. [xxxviii. in LXX.] ubi LXX. pro ῥῆγη quod *spem* et *expectationem* significat, voce ὑποστάσις utuntur. Quamquam et Polybius, probatus auctor Græcæ linguæ, vocem hanc pro *confidentia* accipit cum scribit Hetruscos *confidentia* et *audacia* Coclitis esse percussos. Sunt autem hæc inter se conjunctissima, certo expectare aliquod bonum et illo fidere. Potest etiam ex ipsius verbi ὑπόστασις etymologia hæc significatio perpulchre erui. Videtur autem proprie et primarie significare audere sub gravi aliquo pondere stare, aut irruentem in te molem audere humeris excipere et expectare : ut Plutarchus in Dem. inquit, Nemine hostium ὑφισταμένου expectante, sed fugientibus et deserentibus civitatis. Et alioqui Græci ὑποστατικὸν eum militem nominant qui audet irruentem impetum expectare

et in se excipere....Eadem significationis origine et Græcum *ὑπομένω* est compositum (quod etiam sæpe *confidenter expecto* significat, veluti si dicas *audeo manere sub advenienti pondere*) ac sæpe admodum *ὑπομονή* pro spe et expectatione in Bibliis ponitur ut Ps. xxxix ubi in eodem versu tanquam idem significans cum *ὑποστάσις* conjungitur *Καὶ νῦν τίς ἡ ὑπομονή μου; ὁ θυγὼς ὁ Κύριος; καὶ ἡ ὑποστάσις μου παρὰ σοὶ ἔστι.* v. 7."

This seems to me sufficient: having once the sense of a *resolute abiding* or *awaiting*, the transition to *confident expectation*, or to *confidence* generally, is too easy to render it necessary to vindicate it, even if the authorities for it were less express. But they are, in fact, direct and conclusive: for besides the quotation from the LXX. given above, in which *ὑ* stands for *תחילת*; it is found in their translation for *תקח*, Ruth i. 12, and Ezek. xix. 5. And I think Flacius further shows conclusively that, in the other passage in this epistle (iii. 14), to which he refers, the word is actually used in this sense of *hope* or *expectation*. In the remaining passages (from 2 Cor. ix. and xi.), it is not employed in precisely the same sense, but in one so far connected with it as to make the quotations pertinent to his purpose,—in the sense of *confidence* generally; in the first passage, *confidence* in the liberality of the Corinthians; in the second, *confidence* in the justice of the claims, which the Apostle felt obliged to put forward on his own behalf. On the whole, I feel little doubt of the soundness of the interpretation; and I think the preponderance of authorities is in favour of it, though some eminent names are found among the dissentients. As I said before, I felt it to be of no great importance to my purpose to settle the question, and my own mind was convinced by the reasoning which I have given from Flacius; but I was led, as a matter of curiosity, to look after other opinions pretty extensively, and I shall give my readers a part of the result of the inquiry, which, if it be of no other service to them, may spare them the trouble of consulting the same authorities. They are to remember throughout what follows, that the texts in which the word occurs, are Heb. xi. 1, Heb. iii. 14, 2 Cor. ix. 4, and 2 Cor. xi. 17. LUTHER varies in his translation of the word in these passages,

agreeing however with Flacius in the most important one, Heb. xi. 1. Es ist aber der Glaube eine gewisse Zuversicht [*firm assurance*] dees das man hoffet. Heb. iii. 14, he renders τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς ὑπόστασις by angefangene Wesen, *the original or first substance*. 2 Cor. ix. 4, is, mit solchem Rühmen, *by such boasting*, [his text probably omitted καυχήσεως]. And the last passage is so translated as to leave it doubtful what sense ὑπόστασις was intended to have in it: dieweil wir in das Rühmen gekommen sind, *since we have come to boasting*.

MELANCTHON is very decided as to the signification of the word, in the most important passage: "Postremo definitio fidei in Epistola ad Hebræos testatur fidem significare fiduciam; cum inquit, fides est ὑπόστασις rerum sperandarum: constat enim iis quibus phrasis nota est ὑπόστασιν significare *expectationem* hoc est *fiduciam expectantem*."—*Loci Theolog. de Voce Fidei*. And again, in his *Prolegomena in Ep. ad Rom.* "Descriptio fidei ad Ebræos xi. ostendit et ibi *fide* significari *fiduciam*; quia inquit fides est ὑπόστασις, id est, *expectatio* rerum sperandarum. Hæc est vere grammatica vocis enarratio ut omnes eruditi norunt."

BUCKER, on the other hand, (Enar. in Matt. cap. 8, De Fide) renders it, "earum rerum quæ sperantur *substantia*, argumentum eorum quæ non videntur. Utique quæ a Domino speramus, liberationem ab omni malo et vitam æternam, hac ipsa de qua agimus persuasionem Spiritus Dei qua verbis ipsius credimus, nititur et subsistit: idque ideo quod eas ipsas res quas speramus atque ideo non videmus qualibet ratione et experimento certius animo ostendit ac præsentem statuit."

ZUINGLIUS, in Ep. ad Heb. cap. xi., translates it by *substantia*, and explains it by *fiducia*. "Fidem hic Paulus ὑπόστασιν, *substantiam* vel *subsistentiam* dicit, hoc est, vividam, certam, inconcussam, indubiam et minime trepidantem fiduciam earum rerum quæ sperantur jugiter, ac minime videntur."

CALVIN, like Luther, wavers in his translation of the word in the different places in which it occurs. Heb. xi. he translates *rerum sperandarum substantia*, and in his commentary on the passage: "Fides, inquit, est hypostasis, hoc est, *futura vel possessio* in qua pedem figimus. Sed quarum rerum? Absentium, quæ adeo

pedibus nostris non subjacent, ut longe superent ingenii nostri captum. Eadem est ratio secundi membri, &c." In his Institutes, l. 3. c. 2, § 41, he says, referring to the same text, "Nam per ὑπόστασιν quo vocabulo utitur, quasi *fulcrum* intelligit cui pia meus innitatur, et incumbat; ac si diceret fidem ipsam *certam quandam esse et securam possessionem* eorum quæ nobis a Deo promissa sunt, nisi quis ὅ. pro *fiducia* accipere malit, quod non displicet: quanquam illud quod receptius est amplector."

Heb. iii. 14. he translates, "Si quidem initium *fiduciæ* [marg. vel *subsistentiæ*], ad finem usque firmum tenuerimus." And in his note: "quum hypostasis, *fiduciam* interdum significet, posset hic in eo sensu accipi. Non tamen displicet nomen *substantiæ*, quod alii reddiderunt, quanquam paulò secus interpretor. Illi enim sic dici fidem putant, quia totum esse hominis absque ea nihil aliud sit quam vanitas. Ego autem quia *in ea recumbamus*: sicuti nulla est alia fultura in qua possimus stare."

Upon the remaining passages he is quite positive. 2 Cor. ix. 4, *In hac fiducia gloriationis*. Note: Quum Græcè sit ὅ. Vetus interpretes *substantiam* transtulerat. Erasmus *argumentum*. Sed neutrum convenit. And xi. 17. *In hac audacia gloriationis*. Note: *Argumentum* certe aut *substantia* hic minime quadrant.

BEZA renders Heb. xi. 1. *Illud quo subsistunt quæ sperantur*. And in his note, he says, "Tantum dicam Græcum scholiastem mihi paucis videri rem omnem felicissime exposuisse. Πίστις ἐστὶν αὐτῇ ἡ ὑπόστασις καὶ οὐσία τῶν ἐλπιζομένων πραγμάτων: ἐπειδὴ γὰρ τὰ ἐν ἐλπίσιν ἀνυπόστατα ἐστὶν, ὡς τίς μὴ παρόντα, ἢ πίστις οὐσία τις αὐτῶν καὶ ὑπόστασις γίνεται, εἶναι αὐτοῖς καὶ παρελθόντων τροπὴν τινὰ παρασκευάζουσα, διὰ τοῦ πιστεῦναι ἵνα. ἐστὶ δὲ ἡ πίστις ἔλεγχος καὶ ἀπόδειξις τῶν οὐ βλεπομένων. ἀποδείκνυσσι δὲ ὁρατὰ τὰ ἀόρατα ἡ πίστις· πῶς; τῷ νῷ καὶ ταῖς ἐλπίσιν ὁρῶσα τὰ μὴ φαινόμενα." [This occurs in the collection of commentaries, on the Acts and Epistles, which passes under the name of Œcumenius; and it is evidently fabricated from the passage already given from Chrysostom. It is, like the comment from which it is borrowed, a clear and excellent explanation of the text in this mode of understanding ὑπόστασις.]

Heb. iii. 14. *Principium illud quo sustentamur*. Note: *Vel*

principium illud *fiduciæ* ; sive inchoatum illud in nobis quo fulcimur.

2 Cor. ix. 4. *In hoc fundamento gloriationis.* There is added in the text, in Italics, *in præfidente ista gloriatione*, which was the translation of the first edition of his Testament. And in the note, he says, *Id est in quo nititur hæc mea de vobis gloriatio, nempe illa insigni in conferendis eleemosynis alacritate et animi promptitudine, quam ut mirificam apostolus apud alias ecclesias prædicaret, &c. . . . Vulgata in hac substantia prætermisso quoque gloriationis nomine, ut vix ullus hinc possit sensus elici.* [N. B. Though this translation yields no intelligible meaning, yet it seems to have been made from the true text; for the authority for omitting *τῆς καυχήσεως* in the passage appears nearly conclusive; which, however, is only a further proof of the proper meaning of *ὁ* there.] Erasmus, *in hoc argumento gloriationis*, non multo melius. Doctissimus autem interpres *ὁ* maluit *fiduciam* interpretari, quod interdum hac voce significatur animi præsentia in periculis minime dejecti sed subsistentis. Hoc olim secutus verti hunc locum et alterum infra xi. 17. *in præfidenti ista gloriatione*, sed nunc attentius hunc locum consideranti, etsi istud non displicet, tamen longius petatum videtur.

GROTIUS in 2 Cor. ix. 4. *In hoc fundamento meæ jactationis* vi. 17. *in hoc firmamento gaudii mei*, Heb. iii. 14. ; dixit *ἀρχὴν τῆς ὑποστάσεως* [*initium substantiæ*] per *ὑπαλλαγὴν* [Immutationem] nostris his libris non infrequentem, pro *τὴν ὑπόστασιν τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς*, *spem illam quam ab initio habuimus.*

Grotius gives however Heb. xi. 1. *Rerum sperandarum firmæ quædam expectatio.* And Gerhard and Chemnitz defend the same sense, in the essays upon faith in their *Loci Theologici*, in which this text comes naturally under discussion.

Our own translations vary in the same way between the primitive and derived meanings of the word. Coverdale's (Zurich, 1535) "being faithfully and truly translated out of *Douche* and Latyn into English," of course, follows Luther. Heb. xi. : A sure confidence of things which are hoped for, and a certaynte of things which are not sene.

Heb. iii. The begynnyng of the substance.

2 Cor. ix. Presumcion of boasting.

2 Cor. xi. We are now come to boasting.

Matthews, London, 1537 (2nd Ed.). Heb. xi. A sure confidence of thinges which are hoped for, and a certayntie of thinges whych are not sene.

Heb. iii. 17. The first substance.

2 Cor. ix. The boost that I made in this matter.

2 Cor. xi. 17. While we are now come to bostyng.

Cranmer's, 1540, agrees in Heb. xi. 1, with both the preceding. And in iii. 17. gives, with Coverdale, the begynnyng of the substaunce. But in both the passages in 2 Cor. has, *this matter* of bostyng.

Parker, 1572. Heb. xi. 1. *The ground* [marg. *expectation*] of things hoped for, the evidence, &c.

Heb. iii. 17. The beginning of the substance.

2 Cor. ix. and xi. This boldnesse of boastyng.

Geneva Bible, 1583, Heb. xi. 1. *The ground* of things which are hoped for, and the evidence of, &c.

Heb. iii. 17. The beginning *wherewith we are upholden*. [marg. the foundation of our assurance.]

2 Cor. ix. In this my constant boasting.

2 Cor. xi. In this my great boasting.

Hammond's correction of our translation of Heb. xi. 1: 'is, "Now faith is the *confident expectation* of things hoped for, the *conviction* of things not seen." And the note in which he supports it appears to contain a good deal of what is to be said upon the question; though Clericus takes exception to parts of it.

More modern commentators have brought much learning to bear on the passage, without throwing any additional light upon it; they admit variations in the same way, without materially affecting the sense. I looked at all within my reach, and subjoin the principal ones; more, as before, with the hope of sparing my readers trouble, than of supplying them with any important information.

Carpzovius, *Sacræ Exercitatt.* in Ep. ad Heb. gives, *Fides cujus ò δικαιος ζήσεις*, i. e. *Salvifica est eorum quæ futura speramus proposita in antecessum quasi præsentia atque certitudo*;

est rerum quæ oculis cernuntur nullis, cognitio demonstrata et longe verissima.

And his account of the matter is that *ὅ* is *vox ontologica*, meaning, 1. *Actual existence* as contrasted with *apparent, imaginary*, or *in conception*; as he proves from Philo, Artemidorus, and Aristotle. 2. *Actual existence* as contrasted with *past or future*. Quicquid autem existit quia rerum naturæ aut nobis præsens est, philosophi *præsentia* dicunt *ἐν ὅ*. εἶναι. So Lactantius, de Orig. Erroris, l. 2. "Præteriti est origo, PRÆSENTIS SUBSTANTIA, futuri dissolutio." And Philo, speaking of the knowledge of God, describes all things as in the divine conception ἀρχόντως γινόμενα καὶ ὑφίστηντα. When faith then is called *ὅ*, it intimates *present existence*. Isaac Casaubon, he tells us, regards it as expressing *real existence*; and he allows that they are not in error who receive it *de constanti ac certa fiducia*; and that Symmachus may be right in translating the corresponding Hebrew word by ἀναμνη; and Aquila, when he renders it παραδοκία, Jerome præstolatio; his own view, however, is somewhat distinct from all, but the reader must take it in his own words: "Mallet tamen inhærere notioni metaphysicæ quatenus enti fulcitur aliquid ac innititur. Chrysostomus ὁυσίαν interpretatur. Essentiam ne an existentiam? Utrumque scias jungendum. Pro quo alii eadem significatione *substantiam*."

Ἐλεγχος, lexicographers explain of *undoubted conviction*. Aristotle applies it to *mathematical demonstration*, Theophylactus to the *manifestation* of what is hidden, Prosper, *conviction*; but Carpzovius himself understands it of *demonstrative knowledge*, by which, however, it would seem that he cannot mean any thing more than a high degree of certainty.

His final explanation is this: The object of faith is *things hoped for*; but these are ordinarily *things not seen*, and are therefore in the passage so styled; but, weighing the reasons for believing their existence, we find that they are *ἐλεγχω*, and cannot be otherwise, that they must be, and this renders them as if they had ὑπόστασιν.

Ernesti, *Lectiones Academicæ in Ep. ad Heb.* Est autem fides rerum promissarum *expectatio* et *spes* rerum absentium

et futurarum. This is very express; and in a note, not equally clear, his translation of ὑποστάσις, *expectatio*, is justified principally by the authority of the LXX. Heb. iii. 14, he renders, Si quam ab initio habuistis *fidem* perpetuo retineamus seu retineamus.

Dindorf, his editor, traces the sense of the word, through the literal meaning of *foundation* or *base*, to the figurative sense, *stability, firmness, resolution*, and quotes *Diodorus Siculus* and *Polybius* for this use of it; but prefers the sense which *Heinrichs*, one of the many continuators of *Koppe's New Testament*, proposes, in commenting upon the passage, and which agrees pretty nearly with the meaning in *Beza's Greek Scholiast*.

Heinrichs, to whom *Dindorf* refers, says, ὑποστάσις, quod vere et ὄντως subsistit, eine reelle substantz, oppos. ἐλπιζόμενα quæ nondum existunt sed in phantasia tantummodo nostra sita sunt. Est ergo ὁ τῶν ἐλπιζομένων, illud quod eis quæ nondum apparent, quorum non nisi umbram videmus, verum corpus indit. But on chap. iii. 14, he thinks that a better meaning (for this place) than the common one, may be deduced from the sense of ὑφίσταμαι, to *engage, undertake, promise*; whence ὑποστάσις would mean, first, *confession* or *profession*, and then, by an easy metonymy, the thing *confessed* or *professed*,—the Christian faith. *Dindorf* is highly pleased with this mode of interpreting the word, which he says, *mira se facilitate commendat*.

Elsner, *Observatt. Sacræ* in Nov. Fæd. libros, ὑποστάσις, hic est vera errorisque expers *fiducia*, cui res speratæ quasi præsentia sistuntur, quæ spe sua non excidit, quæ a proposito suo scopoque non dimovetur. This seems to be taking more than one meaning of the word; and, accordingly, he gives quotations for at least two very different senses of it. The first, from *Josephus, Antiq. Jud.* l. xviii. c. 2 [c. 1.], who, speaking of the immoveable *resolution* with which the followers of *Judas*, the Galilæan, met tortures and death, uses the phrase, το ἀμεταλλακτον τῆς ὑποστάσεως. Then *Artemidorus, Oneirocrit*, cap. xiv. lib. 1, ὥστε φαντασίαν μὲν ἔχειν πλουτοῦ, ὑποστάσιν δὲ μὴ. Where it means *real existence*, as contrasted with

imaginary. And, lastly, he gives the often cited passage from Polybius, Οἱ δὲ Πόδιοι θεωροῦντες τὴν τῶν Βυζαντίων ὑποστάσιν, where it means *resolution* again.

Kypke's objections to interpreting ὑποστάσις (in 2 Cor. ix. 4, and xi. 17), by *confidence*, are worth looking at. "Quod ὁ multi h. l. ut et infra c. xi. 17, *per firmam fiduciam, confidentiam*, explicant, neutro loco nexus satis ferre videtur: h. l. apostolus *metuebat* ne inanis redderetur sua gloriatio, et ne id sibi *pudorem* adferret; c. xi. 17, vero gloriatio apostoli quanquam haud inanis non tamen cum *fiducia* juncta erat, cum perquam *invitus* ad gloriandum se conferret." By which precious reasoning it would seem, that when a man boasts of others, he may be shown not to have boasted *confidently*, if it appear that *at some subsequent period* he feels doubts whether his boast would be justified by their conduct: and that, when he boasts of himself, it may in like manner be proved that he cannot state his own merits *confidently*, provided it appears that he has been driven into this vindication of himself, by the unfairness or ignorance of others! I observe, by the way, that in Mr. Bloomfield's laborious and useful *Synopsis*, Kypke is represented as agreeing in Beza's view of the meaning of ὑποστάσις: he does not however; he mentions it as admissible, but gives his own as preferable: "Vertere igitur potes cum Beza: *In hoc fundamento gloriationis*. Hoc sensu vocem habet Themistius, *Orat.* 9, ad *Valentin*.....Aut quod magis placet verte: *in hac materia sc. negotio laudis*. Videtur enim phrasis ἐν τῇ ὑποστάσει ταύτῃ τῆς καυχήσεως, idem significare ac illa: ἡ καύχησις ἐν τούτῳ τῷ μέρει, v. 3. He understands by it therefore, "in this matter or *affair* of the praise which I bestowed upon you." Grotius probably uses *fundamentum* in this sense, but Beza (as he explains himself) means by it, the *foundation* of this praise, namely, the prompt liberality of the Corinthians, which Paul describes himself as having so confidently extolled. I must add, though I have said quite too much on this strange note of Kypke already, that I am perfectly at a loss to discover what there is in it that induces Mr. B. to qualify it as *a learned annotation*. It is certainly safer to praise the learning than the reasoning of it; but it seems too much indulgence to commend either. Of the three quota-

tions which it contains, the first, from *Themistius*, is in support of Beza's translation: the second, from *Artemidorus*, is, as Kypke acknowledges, taken from *Elsner* (who perhaps took it from Carpozovius, at least he gives it with many others;) and the third, from *Aristotle*, is given in Budæus and Stephens *in verb.*; and when it is added, that neither has any more application to Kypke's purpose than the first, the extent of Mr. Bloomfield's liberality will be fully appreciated. The passage from *Artemidorus* is given above, under the head of *Elsner*; that from *Aristotle* is, τῶν ἐν ἀέρι φαντασμάτων, τὰ μὲν ἴσιν καὶ ἡμῶν τὰ δὲ καθ' ὑπόστασιν; in both the meaning of ὑπόστασις is pretty nearly the same, *reality, real existence, or perhaps substance*. The translation which Kypke gives of the latter passage seems to have misled him into thinking that the quotation bore upon his view of the meaning of the words: "quæ in aere apparent, quædam specie tenus existunt, quædam vero è materia quadam consistunt;" but it is unnecessary to remark that, supposing Aristotle to say, as this translation makes him, that "some of these atmospheric phenomena are composed of a kind of matter;" still it would be no *proof* that, because ὑπόστασις stands for *matter* in this sense, it might also be used for *matter* in the sense of *business or affair*.

Leun, one of the continuators of Koppe's New Testament, furnishes even a more extraordinary example of this rage for authorities, which leads commentators of a certain class rather to borrow or steal the most indirect ones than want the proper number. He explains 2 Cor. ix. 4, by "*cum absque omni dubitatione, tam firma fiducia, vestros laudavimus apparatus;*" and, in his note on the passage, says that ὑπόστασις, which is, literally, a *prop* (from the sense of ὑποστέλλαι, to bear or support), means metaphorically, *firm confidence and certain hope*. And he supports this sense by quotations from Polybius, often given before, but pertinent; but he then subjoins two quotations from Philo-Judæus, which any one who can connect with his translation shall be my Great Apollo. The first is from *De Confusione Linguarum*, p. 348, A. (Frankfort edition, 1691), τὰ μὲν ἐν τῶν χρησμῶν σιμῶς τινὰς ὡς ἀνὴρ σιμῶντων εἶναι τὰς δ' ἐμφαινόμενας δυνάμεις τὰ ὑποστοτά [ὑποστῶτα] ἀληθεία πράγματα.

Where I suppose the meaning of the participle is *actual, real, really existing*, or something to that effect. The second is from *De Josepho*, p. 544. Philo is speaking of Joseph's sudden elevation, and says that such things have happened, and will again, when God pleases, *μόνον ἰν τι ὑφίστάθω καλοκαγαθίας ἐμπόρευμα ταῖς ψυχαῖς*, where the verb may be used in the rare sense, of *to lie hid* (which Stephens notices as given by Budæus, without any example, and refers to Tho. Magister for examples from Lucian); *to exist*, simply, would give sufficient meaning to the passage; but what bearing this or the other has upon Leun's own view of the meaning of the word, or his mode of arriving at it, would not be easy to guess. How he came by them is more easily told. He found them in *Loesner (Obs. in Nov. T. à Philone Alex.)* as appears not only by his copying *ὑφίστορα*, as it is misprinted in Loesner, but by the mode in which he introduces the quotations.

LEUN.

Auctor Ep. ad Hebræos cap. xi. 1, fiduciam in constanti et immota rerum sperandarum expectatione cerni contendit Philo de Conf. Ling. p. 348, A. ubi monet in oraculis divinis putari debere τὰ μὲν κ. τ. λ.

LOESNER.

Cernitur autem fiducia in constanti et immota rerum sperandarum expectatione, Heb. xi. 1. Quod si ὅ. ad certitudinem referas præsidium habebis loci de Conf. Ling. p. 348, A. ubi monet auctor in interpretandis oraculis divinis putari debere τὰ μὲν κ. τ. λ.

Loesner makes some preparation for the quotations, and in translating the passage from *De Confus. Ling.*, renders *τα ὑφίστορα ἀληθῆα πρᾶγματα*, by *res certissimas*, to supply some reason for citing it in the connexion, but it is apparent that the quotations are nearly as much out of place in him as in Leun. One can account for his adducing the first passage as an example of ὅ. used to express certainty, though it would not be easy to justify it. But as *reality* is a fit foundation for *certainty*,—a passage in which the word seems used to express the former emphatically, when a man was looking for authorities for the latter use, might doubtless appear to him something like one; and that it is only in this indirect way that it serves Loesner's purpose, appears elsewhere to be his own judgment, for when he comes to Heb. xi. 1, (which he translates, *rerum sperandarum fiducia*) he says,

in the note, *ὑπόστασις*; ab *ὑφίστασθαι* ducitur, quod verbum sensu philosophico et ontologico significat id quod *naturam ac essentiam rei ingreditur*; and, as an example of this sense, gives this passage from *De Confus. Ling.*, which served before as an example of a sense not easily understood, but of which *certainly* is meant to be the distinguishing part. But how he could conceive that the passage from *De Josepho* gives any support to the meaning, is not easy to understand.

I have been led a little out of my way by these more remarkable cases, and shall give briefly a few more authorities, which ought to have appeared earlier.

Abresch's Paraph. et Annotatt. in Ep. ad Heb. Specimen does not extend to chap. xi. (at least I have never seen beyond the 6th), but upon iii. 14, he renders *ὑ*. by *spem, firmam expectationem, fiduciam*.

Rosenmuller, 2 Cor. ix. Ob confidentem illam gloriationem, nam ὑπόστασις est fiducia.

2 Cor. xi. 17. *Quoniam nunc cum tanta confidentia incipio me laudare.*

Heb. iii. 14. *Si quem cœpimus professioni Christianæ dare assensum, ad finem firmum tenemus ὑπόστασις hic est quæ supra, v. 6, ἐλπὶς dicitur, spes firma, fiducia.*

Heb. xi. 1. Est autem fides rerum sperandarum, *firma quædam expectatio*, convictio indubitata de existentia rerum quæ sub aspectu non cadunt.

Semler, Paraph. Epistol. ad Corinthios. 2 Cor. ix. 4. Cum inde a tanto jam tempore confidentissime gloriatum sim de vestra liberalitate. His note is ὑ. apud LXX. sæpius occurrit ea notione ut sit fiducia sicut et Heb. xi. 1. Non male Beza reddiderat in præfidente ista gloriatione quod postea quasi exprobravit.

This note has swelled to a very unreasonable size; but I expect it may interest those for whom I chiefly write, or at least for whom I chiefly annotate; and that it may spare them some unprofitable labour. They will see, I think, upon a review of the authorities, ancient and modern, that the preponderance in learning and reasoning lies very decidedly on the side of that interpretation of the Apostle's meaning which I have ventured to adopt.

NOTE 4. PAGE 24.

Upon the Examples in Heb. xi. 1.

To avoid misconception, I think it necessary to remind my readers that there is here no question raised, whether the persons commemorated in Heb. xi. were all Believers in Christ; and no attempt made to settle in what way they were so: but that the inquiry merely respects the particular incidents in their lives to which the apostle refers. And when this is recollected, and these incidents carefully considered, it will be felt, I trust, that the question is rightly answered.

I do not know that these examples require any observations, for my purpose, beyond those already made upon them in the Sermon. Upon one of them, however, I must say something, as it may perhaps be thought to furnish some objection to the explanation which I have given of the first verse. Our belief of the revealed account of the origin of the world is alleged, v. 3, as an exercise of *faith*; and may be thought not to accommodate itself easily, either to my general account of the principle, or to my representation of the meaning of the particular passage.

I do not think that the instance, fairly considered, will be found in any way inconsistent with either. It will be remembered that I have maintained that the design of the Apostle, in the opening statement, is to convey to us a notion of the principle *in general*; and, in the examples, to acquaint us further with its *general* nature, by exhibiting it to us in actual operation, in different ways and under different circumstances. As to the account which he gives, I may add, by the way, that I agree with Erasmus and Calvin, in thinking it unreasonable to treat it as a formal and complete definition of *faith*; and in regarding it rather as designed to give essential parts of that principle, leading and prominent characteristics of it. The two characteristics of faith which he selects, as suited to his purpose,

are, the confident expectation of good, and the firm conviction of the reality of what is unseen [when we are assured of it by Him in whom we put faith] : and every instance of either would of course be pertinent to his main design. The general character of the examples which he brings sufficiently shows that by *the unseen things*, of which he describes faith as assuring us, he meant *principally, the things hoped for*, which we firmly expect. But as the reliance upon God, which he designed to illustrate, leads necessarily to an assurance of all that He declares to us,—as one confiding in His power, His goodness, and His truth, must firmly believe all that He reveals concerning what is unseen, whether past, present, or future,—it is not strange that the Apostle should take occasion to intimate this more comprehensive range of *faith*, though it did not suit his purpose to dwell upon it. He therefore gives a single and well-chosen instance of this operation of faith, in which reliance upon God's truth emancipates Believers as remarkably from the thralldom of sense, concerning the past, as it does concerning the future in all the other examples which he gives,—where, in the midst of sufferings and trials, it assures them of the glory which shall be revealed. It may be alleged, it is true, that this belief in the origin of all things is not necessarily a result of faith in God ; for that a man may be convinced, upon principles of natural reason, that the world is not eternal, and that the course of natural reproduction by which the existence of all that it contains is now continued, cannot have gone on always ; but that both it and they must have had their origin ultimately in some act of the power of its ruler, essentially different from any we now witness, and so forth ; that, therefore, this *may* be a result of rational conviction in one who disbelieves revelation, or a result of such a belief of the truth of revelation as I make distinct from faith—from the faith intended to be explained and exemplified by the apostle. This is, no doubt, true ; but it is true of every example given by the Apostle as well as this one, and makes as much against every account of the meaning of faith as against mine. There is no act which the apostle refers to, as a result of faith, which *might* not have been the result of some other principle. I mean of some principle distinct from faith,

under every notion of its nature. But they are also natural and striking results of faith; and so is this: when they are known to be its effects, they serve to throw light upon its nature; and so does this. In the same way in which a belief in the true account of the creation *might be* but an example of the force of reason, Abraham's offering of his son Isaac *might be* an example of the awful delusion under which some *made their children to pass through the fire, and offered their sons and their daughters to devils*. When we know, however, that it was in Abraham the result of faith in God, we recognize in it a striking example of the effects of this principle. In like manner, this belief of the real origin of all things might be the result of reasoning upon the phenomena; but, when we know that it is, in Believers, the result of their faith, we see in it an exemplification of one of the leading characteristics of the principle. And that seems enough.

The occurrence of the instance seems, therefore, sufficiently accounted for; while the fact that it is but a single instance, and the very different character of the remaining ones, form a strong confirmation of the account already given of the meaning of the Apostle in this remarkable passage.

NOTE 5, PAGE 27.

Upon the Declarations of the Nature of Justifying Faith in the Confessions of Protestant Churches, and the Writings of the earliest Protestant Divines.

The declarations of the nature of faith in the sermon are from the third Homily, *Of the Salvation of Mankind*, and from the first part of the following Homily, intitled, *A Short Declaration of the true, lively, and Christian Faith*. They, I suppose, are sufficient to establish the views of our Church upon this point;

but, if the reader should desire further evidence or explanation of these views, he will find both in abundance in the Homilies referred to.

The assertion, that equally express declarations of the same views are to be found in the public acts of all protestant churches, and in the writings of all the early protestant divines of real weight,* may be, I think, satisfactorily established. And the point is one of so much importance, that I hope my readers will not decline the trouble of reading and weighing the quotations by which I proceed to prove it. Numerous as they are, I think they will be found not to have been multiplied inconsiderately.

The general accordance of the Reformers upon the question is, indeed, stated strongly by Bellarmin: "Nam *fidem* Lutherani fere omnes non tam *notitiam*, vel *assensum*, quam *fiduciam* esse definiunt. Atque eam demum *fiduciam* specialis misericordiæ *fidem* justificantem esse docent." *De Just.* lib. 1. cap. 4. But, if no better evidence of their agreement were required, it would be desirable to allow them to explain their principles for themselves, as there is, in Bellarmin's account of them, some direct misrepresentation, and something which, without amounting to actual misstatement, is no less likely to mislead. The Reformers did not, as the reader will see, insist upon *confidence*, to the exclusion of *knowledge* and *assent*, or independently of them, but founded upon them. As to the statement, *that they regarded justifying faith as confidence in special mercy*, it is so far true, that they taught that the faith of the Believer was his trust in God through Christ; his confidence in God as a reconciled Father, and his hope of all good things at His hands; and that they denied that any general belief in God's purpose of saving Believers in Christ, of rewarding the good, &c., was

* *Bucer* and *Beza* may seem exceptions to the general concurrence of the eminent Reformers upon this point; both certainly speak of *fiducia*, as distinct from *fides*, and properly its effect. But the reader will see, by the statement of their views given below, that their difference from the rest is rather verbal than real: at all events, he will have the means of judging for himself of its amount.

faith in *Him*: but, on the other hand, they neither taught nor countenanced, under the name of *faith*, any fanatical impressions of peculiar personal favour; or allowed, as *faith*, any confidence towards God which was not grounded upon a believing and intelligent application *to ourselves*, of the offers of mercy which his word makes alike *to all*. But I am well satisfied upon this to allow them to speak for themselves. And I shall begin with the public documents.

CONFESSIO AUGUSTANA, 1530. Art. *De Bonis Operibus*.

Admonetur etiam homines quod hic nomen *fidei* non significet tantum historię notitiam, qualis est in impiis et diabolo, sed significet fidem, quę credit non tantum historiam, sed etiam effectum historię, videlicet, hunc articulum, remissionem peccatorum, quod videlicet per Christum habeamus gratiam, justitiam, et remissionem peccatorum . . . Augustinus etiam de *fidei* nomine hoc modo admonet lectorem, et docet, in scripturis nomen *fidei* accipi, non pro *notitia*, qualis est in impiis, sed *fiducia* quę consolatur et erigit perterrefactas mentes.

CONFESSIO AUGUSTANA, 1540. *De Fide*.

Sed *fide* hoc beneficium accipiendum est, qua credere nos oportet quod propter Christum donetur remissio peccatorum, et justificatio . . . Verum hæc misericordia non potest accipi nisi *fide*; et *fides* hic non tantum historię notitiam significat, sed significat credere promissioni misericordię quę nobis propter mediatorem Christum contingit. Et cum hoc modo *fides* intelligitur de fiducia misericordię non dissentiant inter se Jacobus et Paulus. Quod enim inquit Jacobus, *Dæmones credunt et contremiscunt*, intelligit fidem de notitia historię, hæc non justificat. Norunt enim historiam etiam impii ac diaboli. Paulus vero, cum inquit, *fides reputatur ad justitiam*, &c. loquitur de fiducia misericordię promissę propter Christum.

APOLOGIA CONFSSIONIS AUGUSTANÆ.

Sed illa *fides* quę justificat non est tantum notitia historię, sed est assentiri promissioni Dei, in qua gratis propter Christum offertur remissio peccatorum et justificatio. Et ne quis suspicetur tantum notitiam esse, addimus amplius est velle et accipere oblatam promissionem remissionis peccatorum et justificationis.

CONFESSIO SAXONICA. 1551. *De Rem. Pecc. et Just.*

Sunt autem nota vocabula. Fides significat non tantum historiæ notitiam qualis et in diabolis est, de quibus dicitur *dæmones credunt et contremiscunt*: sed significat amplecti omnes articulos fidei et in his hunc articulum, *credo remissionem peccatorum*. Nec tantum aliis eam dari credo, sed mihi quoque.

Hæc fides simul est fiducia acquiescens in mediatore, juxta illud: *justificati ex fide pacem habemus*. Ita loquitur Paulus de fide, quæ adsentienti omnibus articulis fidei, promissionem intuetur et amplectitur, copulat enim fidem et promissionem. Rom. iv. *Ideo ex fide, ut sit firma promissio*.

CONFESSIO HELVETICA. 1566.

Fides enim Christiana, non est opinio ac humana persuasio, sed firmissima fiducia et evidens ac constans animi assensus, denique certissima comprehensio veritatis Dei propositæ in scripturis et symbolo apostolico, atque adeo Dei ipsius summi boni, et præcipue promissionis divinæ, et Christi, qui omnium promissionum est colophon.

CONFESSIO BELGICA. Gallicè, 1561. Latinè, 1581. Art. XXII.

Credimus Spiritum Sanctum in cordibus nostris habitantem veram nobis fidem impartiri, ut hujus tanti mysterii veram cognitionem adipiscamur. Quæ fides Jesum Christum cum omnibus suis meritis amplectitur, illumque sibi ceu proprium effectum vindicat, nihil que deinceps extra illum quærit.

CONFESSIO BOHEMICA, 1535. Latinè auctior, 1572.

Atque hæc fides proprie est cordis prompti assensio erga universam in Evangelio annunciatam veritatem, qua homo mente et animo illustratur, ut Deum suum et Dominum Jesum Christum rectè agnoscat, et pro unico salvatore suo accipiat, supraque hunc, ut veram petram suam prorsus salutem collocet, eum diligit et sequatur ipsoque fruatur, omnemque spem et fiduciam in eo reponat, et se hac erigat et animosa fiducia confidat quod propter ipsum et solum meritum ipsius propitium placidum et benignum Deum habeat, atque etiam in ipso et per eum certo vitam æternam habeat, et in æternum habiturus sit, secundum veram promissionem ipsius quam jurejurando confirmavit, &c.

CATECHESIS HEIDELBERGENSIS, 1563.

21. *Quid est Fides?* Est non tantum notitia qua firmiter assentior omnibus quæ Deus nobis in verbo suo patefacit, sed etiam certa fiducia a Spiritu Sancto per evangelium in corde meo accensa, qua in Deo acquiesco, certo statuens non solum aliis sed mihi quoque remissionem peccatorum, æternam justitiam, et vitam donatam esse, idque gratis ex Dei misericordia, propter unius Christi meritum.

It may be needless to add any evidence of the views of the earliest continental Reformers, as these confessions were drawn up by the most eminent of them, and approved by all. I shall subjoin a few however.

LUTHER. *Disputationes*, 1535.

Fides acquisita seu sophistarum de Christo dicit, *Credo filium Dei passum et resuscitatum* : atque hic desinit. Sed vera fides dicit, credo quidem filium Dei passum et resuscitatum, sed hoc totum pro me pro peccatis meis, de quo certus sum. Est enim pro totius mundi peccatis mortuus. At certissimum est me esse partem aliquam mundi, ergo certissimum est pro meis quoque peccatis mortuum esse.

In Genesin, cap. 15.

Hic aperte dic quid faciat sola fides, non cum quibus virtutibus conjuncta sit. Sola autem fides apprehendit promissionem, credit promittenti Deo, Deo porrigenti aliquid, admovet manum et id accipit. Hoc proprium solius fidei opus est; charitas, spes, patientia habent alias materias circa quas versantur, habent alios limites intra quos consistunt. Non enim amplectuntur promissionem sed mandata exequentur. . . . Retinenda igitur distinctio hæc est, quod fides quæ agit cum Deo promittente et ejus promissiones accipit, hæc sola justificat.

In Ep. ad Galatas (1536, the enlarged commentary).

Quando fide in verbum Dei edoctus apprehendo Christum, et tota fiducia cordis (quod tamen sine voluntate fieri non potest) credo in eum, hac noticia justus sum.

MELANCTHON.

As it is known that the Augsburg and Saxon Confessions, and the Apology, were drawn up by Melancthon, it seems needless to give any proof of his views beyond the quotations already

made from these documents. I shall give but two brief ones from his last revisions of two of his works.

Loci Theologici, 1543. De Gratia et de Justificatione.

De remissione peccatorum vociferantur [Monachi] non recte doceri quod fide gratis propter Christum accipiatur remissio peccatorum; nec admittent fide significari fiduciam misericordiæ Dei. . . . Quare cum dicit [Paulus] *fide justificamur*, vult te intueri Filium Dei sedentem ad dextram Patris, mediatorem interpellantem pro nobis; et statuere quod tibi remittantur peccata, quod justus id est acceptus reputeris seu pronuntieris propter illum ipsum Filium Dei qui fuit victima. Ut igitur vocabulum fides monstrat illum mediatorem, et nobis applicet, significat fides non tantum historiæ notitiam, sed fiduciam misericordiæ promissæ propter Filium Dei.

Enarratio Symboli Niceni Ultima, 1557.

Fides est assentiri universo verbo Dei, atque ita et promissioni gratiæ; et est fiducia acquiescens in Deo propter mediatorem, accedens ad eum, vere invocans eum, et clamans Abba Pater.

BUCER. *Disputatio de Fide* (Explanatio Fam. in Psal. viii. Genevæ, 1554).

Proinde fidem in Deum recte definimus, si dicamus indubitatum esse persuasionem, Deum esse, ut omnium rerum authorem, bonorumque fontem; ita et nostrum conditorem, servatorem, æternumque beatorem: sic fidem Christi certam persuasionem eum nostrum esse redemptorem ac instauratorem.

Enarratio in Mathæum, cap. vii. v. 10.

Ex his jam abunde liquere existimo, quidnam sit virtus ista vere divina, quæ Hebræis אֱמוּנָה, Græcis πίστις, Latinis *persuasio*, vulgo *fides* dicitur; est enim constans firmaque animi per Spiritum sanctum de Dei bonitate atque promissis persuasio; qua is, ut verbis ejus certam fidem habet, ita et de ejus erga se bonitate omnia sibi indubitato pollicetur tum demerendo quoslibet tam ipsi gratificari quam referre hoc bonitatis studio inpensissime studet.

De Justificatione et Locis Evangelicæ Doctrinæ Disputatt. Ratisbonæ habitæ.

Nos autem in articulo nostro [Art. 4. Conf. Aug.] loquimur

de ea fide de qua Apostolus et Dominus ipse in locis jam adductis Quæ fides ut docemur, 2 Cor. iv., et aliis in locis, utque ecclesia semper credidit, donum est et testimonium Spiritus Sancti, quod largitur et præbet spiritui nostro, ut certum et indubitatum præbeamus assensum Evangelio et firmiter credamus Deum nobis peccata condonare, et habere nos filiorum loco propter Christum filium suum, ita ut sine hæsitatione invocemus eum patrem, et sciamus quod quæ ab eo in nomine filii sui petemus, daturus est nobis.

[I have given such copious citations from Bucer, for various reasons; but chiefly because he sometimes, as in the Strasburg Confession and elsewhere, appears to make *confidence* a result of faith, and not a part of it; which, to any one that reads the foregoing accounts of faith by him, may appear strange, but cannot appear very important.]

BULLINGER. *De Gratia Dei*, 1553.

Dico fidem esse certam veritatis cognitionem atque adeo constantem ac firmam fiduciam, et indubitatum ex Spiritu Sancto mentis humanæ assensum verbo Dei, omnem veritatem credendam, imprimis autem Dei promissiones, ac in his, ipsum Christum, in quo est omnis plenitudo vitæ et salutis, proponenti.

CALVIN. *Inst. lib. 3, cap. 2, § 7.*

Nunc justa fidei definitio nobis constabit, si dicamus, esse divinæ erga nos benevolentiae firmam certamque cognitionem, quæ gratuitæ in Christo promissionis veritati fundata, per Spiritum Sanctum et revelatur mentibus nostris et cordibus obsignatur.

Sextæ Sessionis Conc. Trid. Antidoton, in Can. 12.

Non placet venerandis patribus *fidem justificantem* esse *fiduciam*, qua misericordiam Dei propter Christum peccata remittentis, amplectimur. At placet Spiritui Sancto qui per os Pauli sic loquitur nos gratis justificatos esse Dei gratia per redemptionem quæ est in Christo, &c. Rom. iii. 4.

BEZA, as I mentioned above, dissents from this general view of the Reformers, but so, it will be seen, as to make a *belief in the promises of God, with a personal application of them*, an essential part of justifying faith.—In Ephes. iii. 12. Ex hoc autem loco apparet manifestè, *πιστοῖσιν*, id est, fiduciam, a fide, nempe ut effectum a causa, differre: ac proinde a nonnullis

perperam pro Fide substitui Fiduciæ nomen, quamvis ista duo semper cohæreant, quum de vera illa fide agitur. Vide 2 Cor. iv. 16.—His own definition of justifying faith is given on Rom. i. 17. Fidem igitur de qua hic quæritur, esse definimus firmam illam et constantem animi *πληροφορίαν*, id est, certiorationem qua certus est apud se unusquisque fidelium non modo verum ac firmum esse omne verbum Dei, ac præsertim promissiones Dei de gratuita per Christum reconciliatione: sed etiam istas per prædicationem et Sacramenta sibi oblatas credit ad se proprie ac peculiariter pertinere: qua, inquam, illam promissionem vitæ æternæ per sanguinem Christ quibusvis credentibus acquisitæ, sigillatim amplectitur, ac sibi ipsi applicat.

I may be more sparing of quotations to establish the views of the early English Reformers, because evidence of their principles has been lately placed within the reach of every one, by a republication of their most important works, in the Series of the **BRITISH REFORMERS**, just completed, by the Religious Tract Society. I should be glad to believe that this timely and valuable publication was in the hands of all my readers: it is not too much to hope, at least, that those who design themselves for the office of ministers of the Church of England will thankfully avail themselves of the opportunity which is thus afforded to all, of becoming acquainted with the true principles of her immediate founders and their predecessors. Though it would plainly be improper to multiply citations to the extent for which I had made preparation, I cannot omit them altogether; and I shall begin with him of whom Fox speaks as that "true servant and martyr of God, William Tyndall, who for his notable pains and travail may well be called the Apostle of England, in this our latter age." I have already prefixed to this Sermon his view of the nature of faith, with the passage from Luther from which it seems taken. I had noted other passages in his writings, which it might have been useful to give, had they continued locked up in what must have been rather a scarce book, the Works of Tyndal, Frith, and Barnes, published by Fox, 1573. But I rejoice to find that the most important parts of that very important collection form one number of the series before-mentioned; and I willingly refer my readers to that admirable volume, for a

declaration of the principles of the earliest maintainers of the truth in England, not surpassed, in fervency, soundness, and plainness of speech, by any thing with which I am acquainted in the writings of their most illustrious successors. "For albeit increasing of learning of tongues and sciences, wyth quicknes of wit, in youth and others, doth marvailously shut up, as is to be seene, to the sufficient furnishyng of Christes church: yet so it happeneth, I can not tell how, the further I look backe into those former tymes of *Tyndall*, *Frith*, and others lyke, more simplicitie, wyth true zeale and humble modestie, I see, wyth lesse corruption of affections in them. And yet wyth these dayes of ours I finde no fault."—*Fox's Preface*. Such is the testimony of one, who was himself largely endowed with the qualities which he commends, and who wrote when such gifts were more common than they are *in these days of ours*. I trust, however, that the causes, whatever they be, which have made such excellencies rare among us, have not in the same measure disabled us from discerning and admiring them.

TYNDALL. *Prologues made upon the Five Bookes of Moses*. Gen.

Fayth is the belevying of God's promises, and a sure trust in the goodnes and truth of God; which fayth justified Abraham, Gen. xv., and was the mother of all his good workes.

Answer unto Mr. More's 4th Booke.

Note now the order: 1st. God giveth me light to see the goodnesse and righteousnesse of the law, and myne own sinne and unrighteousnesse. Out of whiche knowledge spryngeth repentance. Now repentance teacheth me not that the law is good, and I evill, but* a light that the Spirit of God hath given me,

* Misprinted in the Society's edition, "but is a light," which plainly misrepresents Tyndall's meaning; he intends to say, that we owe our perception of the goodness of the law and of our own vileness, not to repentance, but to a light bestowed by the Spirit of God, distinct from repentance, and properly its cause. As I am upon the subject of mistakes, I may notice another in a note in the same volume, at p. 118 of Barnes's *Treatise of Justification*.—B., in maintaining the truth against "the lies" by which it was assailed, says, "But such a lie must St. Paul needs suffer, when he had proved that faith only did justify. Then came your overthrow fathers, and said, 'Therefore thou destroyest the law.'" &c.—Here, by a strange inadvertence, a note is

out of which light repentaunce spryngeth. Then the same Spirit woorketh in myne hart trust and confidence to beleve the mercy of God, and his truth, that he will do as hee hath promised, which beleffe saveth me. And immediately out of that trust spryngeth love toward the law of God agayne.

CRANMER. *Catechismus*, 1548.

This [the apostle's creed] is the summe of our Christian faith, wherein God hath shewed unto us what he is, and how great benefites he hath gyven, and daily doth gyve, unto us, to thentent that we should cast the ancore of our faith upon him, and take sure hold of his mercie and goodnes, and comfort ourselves with the same both in our life time, and also at our death. *Gen.*

Preface to the Crede.

Where note, good children, that this word (I beleve) signifieth as much, in this place, as I trust: so that this sentence,—I believe in God the Father, is as muche to saye, as I trust in God the Father, and loke assuredly to receave all good thinges at his hande. . . . Therefore we ought to put our trust in God only, sticke fast to him, hang upon him, and to loke for all good thinges at his hande. . . . And this is the fatherly love which he bereth toward us, to do all goodnes toward us, without oure merites or deservinges. Wherefore we ought to trust in him, yelde ourselves holly into his protection, to loke for all good thynges at his handes, and with a mery harte and constant faythe to cleave to his goodnes in all thynges.—*First Sermon.*

Therefore, when we beleve in Christ, and stedfastly clevyng to the worde of God, suerly perswade ourselves in oure hartes that we be thus redeemed by Christ, then God is no more angry or displeased with us for our synnes, but freely and mercifully he forgyveth us all our offences for the death and passion of his Son. . . . Wherefore, good children, beleve ye with all your heart in thys Jesus Christ, the only sonne of God, oure Lord, and doubte not but that he hath suffered for our synnes,

given, explaining "your overthwart fathers" by "the fathers of the church who contradict you." Whereas it manifestly means your *perverse predecessors* in this work of gainsaying, and misrepresenting the truth; the cavillers of St. Paul's days, whom Barnes styles *the fathers* of the cavillers of his own days.

and contented the justice of his Father for the same, and hath brought us again into his favour, and made us his wel beloved children, and heyres of hys kingdome.—*Second Sermon.*

[I quote from the reprint of this Ed., Oxford, 1829; having never seen the original. As the object for which I make the quotations is to show the leading notion attached to *faith* by Cranmer at this time, the book would equally serve my purpose whether it be believed to have been actually translated by himself from the Latin of Jonas, or by his orders, and under his inspection. I cannot avoid adding, however, that I consider the reasons put forward by Dr. Burton (in his preface to this reprint), for disbelieving this translation to have been executed by the archbishop himself, in the highest degree unsatisfactory. They seem to amount, so far as I can collect them, to the following:—that Gardiner, in attacking this catechism, speaks of it as *set forth in Cranmer's name, as set forth in the archbishoppe of Cantorburies name, as translate into English in this auctor's name*, and so forth: that he says, that *one in communication would have made him* [Gardiner] *believe that this translation had been his* [Cranmer's] *mannes doynge and not his*. And, what is more important, that Rowland Taylor in his examination, when asked by Mayster Secretary Bourne, whether he would stick to the religion *set forth in a catechisme by my Lord of Canterbury*, answers: “My Lorde of Canterbury made a catechisme to be translated into English, which booke *was not of his owne making*; yet he set it foorth in his own name, and, truly, that booke, for the time, did much good.”

These seem the entire grounds upon which Dr. B. pronounces that “Upon the whole, it seems evident that Cranmer was not himself the translator, though the work may have been ‘overseen and corrected’ by him.” How evident it is will be better understood when it is stated on the opposite side:—that Cranmer, as Gardiner mentions, *confessed the translation of the catechisme*:—that he speaks of it as *my catechisme* repeatedly in his Answer to Gardiner; as “a catechisme by *me translated* and set forth;” as “the catechisme of Germany by *me translated* into English:”—and that, when Gardiner founds an argument upon a print in the Latin, which did not appear in the

English, Cranmer complains of this unfairness, that "would gather my mynd, and make an argument here of a picture neyther put *in my booke*, nor by me devised, but invented by some fond paynter or carver, which paynt and grave whatsoever theyr idle heades can fancy. You should rather have gathered your argument upon the other side; that I mislike the matter, because *I left out of my booke* the picture that was in the original before. And I mervayle you be not ashamed to alleadge so wayne a matter against me, which indede is not *in my booke*, and if it were, yet were it nothing to the purpose. And in that catechisme *I teach* not," &c. And in his answer to Smith's confutation of his defence, "But this I confesse of myself, that not long before *I wrot* this sayd catechisme." And finally, that in his examination at Oxford, 1556, when Martin asks, "Did you not translate Justus Jonas booke?" he replied, "*I did so.*"*

Now, after all, Cranmer may not have been the translator of this catechism; but I certainly greatly misconceive the state of the case, if it do not establish that he was, by as strong direct proof as such a point admits of. As to Taylor's words, that *it was not of his own making*; if I were obliged to understand by them, that he meant to deny the archbishop to be the *translator* of it, I would find it infinitely more easy to suppose him mistaken, than to disbelieve Cranmer's own reiterated admissions and avowals of the fact, and, above all, his express assertion of it (just cited) in answer to a direct question. But is not Taylor's language easily accounted for without any such supposition? Martin speaks of the catechism, as *by my Lord of Canterbury*, without intimating that it was a translation. Taylor, who is only prepared to give the book the qualified testimony, that it "*for the time did much good*," is anxious to mark, in his answer, that Cranmer was not the original author of it, and so reminds

* This express admission re-appears in this form in the Notary's Report of the Interrogatories. Answer to Inter. 7:—"Whereunto, when the names of the books were repeated unto him, he denied not such books which he was the author of. As touching the treatise of Peter Martyr upon the Sacrament, he denied that he ever saw it before it was abroad, yet did approve and well like of the same. As for the Catechisme, the Booke of Articles, with the other booke against Winchester, he granted the same to be his doings."—*For.*

Martin that, *though he had set it forth in his own name*, it was not *of his own making*, but that he had made it to be translated into English.* I do not say that this is the most obvious meaning of the words; but when we are led to look for a meaning in them which may be consistent with such strong evidence in favour of the opinion that the translation was really executed by Cranmer, I think this way of considering them furnishes one which does no great violence to them. But, as I said, I am equally at liberty to use the citations that I have made from the book, however this question about it be settled; and, even if I were not, the passage which I am about to give from an undoubted work of Cranmer's, makes me very independent of them. That passage is taken from a very interesting MS. still preserved in the library of C. C. College, Cambridge. It is in Cranmer's hand, and must be regarded as containing his deliberate and corrected opinions on the important subjects on which it treats; as it is a detailed revision of *The Necessary Erudition of a Christian Man*, commonly called "*The King's Book*." Parts of this MS. were published by Strype in his Appendix to Memorials of Cranmer; and the most important parts are given in the Tract Society's publication before referred to. The entire is to be found in Richmond's *Fathers of the English Church*. It seems to afford an easy way of determining some questions that have been raised, with respect to the share of Cranmer in the doctrinal part of the King's Book; or, at least, of settling—what is the point of real importance in that discussion—the real views finally held by him upon the doctrine of Justification.

* The reader ought to be informed, or reminded, that the fact that Cranmer was only the translator of the catechism, was one not to be collected from the book itself; no intimation that it was a translation was given either in the title-page, or in the body of the work; or even in the prefatory dedication to King Edward, in which Cranmer speaks of the nature and design of the *lytle treatysse* and the motives that led to his undertaking it, in a way which does not suggest that he was only the translator of it, but which, I cannot help adding, seems wholly irreconcilable with the notion that he had not even that share in it: "I knowyng myself as a subiecte greatly bounden (and much the more by reason of my vocation) to set forward the same [the king's plans of reformation, &c.] am persuaded that thys my smal travayll in thys behalfe taken, shall not a lytle helpe the sooner to brynge to passe your godly purpose."

MS. Notes upon the King's Book.

87. *Having assured hope and confidence in Christ's mercy, willing to enter into the perfect faith.*

He that hath assured hope and confidence in Christ's mercy hath already entered into a perfect faith, and not only hath a will to enter into it. For perfect faith is nothing else but assured hope and confidence in Christ's mercy: and after it followeth, *That he shall enter into perfect faith by undoubted trust in God, in his words and promises*, which also be both one thing: for these three be all one, *perfect faith,—assured hope and confidence in Christ's mercy,—and, undoubted trust in God, in his words and promises.*

BECON. *The Demands of Holy Scripture.*

What is faith? It is a full and perfect confidence and trust in God through Christ, engendered in our hearts by hearing the word of God; and as Paul defines faith,—Faith is a sure confidence of things which we look for, and the certainty of promises.—Rom. x. ; Heb. xi.

HOOPER. *An Hundred Articles according to the Order of the Apostles' Creed.*

Art. XC. I believe that this justifying faith is a mere and singular gift of God, which is commonly given by the hearing of God's word; whereupon alone it is built, and not upon the doctrines and traditions of men. I call a justifying faith, a certain assurance and earnest persuasion of the good will, love, grace, bounteousness, and mercy of God towards us, whereby we are assured, and verily persuaded in our hearts, of the mercy, favour, and good will of God the Father; that he is on our side, and for us, against all that are against us; and that he will be a merciful Father unto us, pardoning our sins; and will give us his grace, make us his children by adoption, and admit us for heirs unto eternal life; and all this freely in his Son, and by his only Son, Jesus Christ our Lord, and not for our merits or good works.

It would be very easy to add to these passages many such testimonies, both from the same writers and others; but I should hope that a fair consideration of those given will show them abundantly sufficient to establish the point which they are

intended to establish ; namely, that the meaning of faith—of justifying faith—which the Continental and British Reformers held and maintained, agrees with that assigned to the term in the sermon : that they held it to be *trust in Christ*, or *in God through Christ*, grounded upon a belief of God's testimony in his word concerning Christ, and wrought by His Spirit in the hearts of those whom that Spirit had convinced of sin, of danger, and of helplessness ; and, through such convictions, brought to take refuge in Him, in whom sinners find innocence, security, and strength.

NOTE 6. PAGE 32.

Upon the Difference between Faith and Hope.

THE Reformers were often pressed by their opponents with the difficulty :—Scripture plainly distinguishes faith and hope, but your account of the former confounds them. Luther treats this point as a very serious one ; and gives a regular answer to it. His mode of introducing the subject is highly characteristic (in Ep. ad Gal. cap. v.) : *Hic quæstio oritur, quid intersit inter Fidem et Spem? Hac in re valde sudaverunt sophistæ, sed nil certi ostendere potuerunt. Nobis, qui tamen diligentissime versamur in sacris literis, et longe majori (absit verbi invidia) spiritu et intelligentia illas tractamus, difficile est aliquod discrimen invenire. Tantam enim cognationem inter se habent fides et spes, ut hæc ab illa divelli non possit.* He shows that they differ in five respects—1. in subjecto ; 2. in officio ; 3. in objecto ; 4. in ordine ; 5. a contrariis ; but his answer, though it is so elaborate, does not seem to deserve to be quoted at length. Melancthon touches upon the subject with more effect in his *Examen eorum qui audiuntur ante ritum publicæ ordinationis Wittebergæ*, 1554. Et est [fides] fiducia acquiescens in Deo propter mediatorem accedens ad Deum et accendens invocationem, et clamans Abba Pater. Et quia fides in præsentia accipit remissionem peccatorum et

reconciliationem, est fiducia præsentis beneficii : sed spes est certa expectatio. The same view of the difference is much more fully stated, in Davenant's *Determinationes Quæstionum. Quæst. 37, Fides justificans est fiducia in Christo Mediatore.* In the course of which, he explains that Faith is not confounded with Hope in the Protestant doctrine, but distinguished from it in this:—That faith does not tend to its object as a future, but as a present good. It conceives and apprehends the Mediator, as now present to the sinner, and reconciling him to God the Father. It cleaves to the truth of the gospel promises; not as an expectant, but a possessor, according to the word of the Saviour, He that believeth on the Son *hath* everlasting life. The most important distinction between these states of mind is certainly given in this answer of Bishop Davenant; but it seems to require some explanation and addition. He who simply hopes for a fulfilment of gospel promises (of which assuredly a most important part is happiness in a future life) is not more an expectant, or less a possessor, with respect to this part of the promises, than he who trusts in Christ for the fulfilment of them. They both have the present enjoyment which such hopes are fitted to supply, and both have equally to wait for the perfect fruition of them. But the two states of mind differ very intelligibly and importantly, though they have so much in common. That faith includes feelings, with respect to the Being whose sufferings secured those benefits, and to the Being whose bounty will bestow them, which do not enter into a mere hope of the blessings themselves, is, as I have remarked, p. 16, immediately apparent from the true account of the nature of faith. And here, what the bishop says, *of faith conceiving and apprehending the Mediator, &c.*, is well grounded and most important. So that it may be seen—and that is a sufficient answer to the difficulty, though, perhaps, not a perfect account of the whole difference—that, though faith cannot exist without some degree of hope, it does not depend for its life and energy upon the same causes, and may be strong and cordial, while our hopes are not powerfully raised, for want of the distinct knowledge which is essential to their liveliness; and, moreover, that the liveliest hopes may exist without any faith

whatever.—But it may be said, though this distinction is well founded in the abstract, what application can it have to the particular case for which it is intended? For, assuredly, the hope of which the Scriptures speak is that, and that only, which believers in the Lord feel. I answer, that the distinction holds not less in the particular case than in the abstract. For, though the believer entertains no hopes which are not founded on the Redeemer's work, this does not hinder that, at certain seasons, the objects of his hopes may be present to his mind, apart from their true foundation. He may form vivid pictures of future happiness, may indulge ardent longings for it, and enjoy a lively expectation of it, without adverting, at the moment, to what forms the sole foundation of such hopes. Nor does he, by so doing, cease to be a believer, but he certainly is not at the time exercising *faith*. On the other hand, he may, while he meditates upon joys in store for him, think even more of Him to whom he owes them, and think of Him in assurance that through Him he shall obtain them: he is, in the former state, hoping; in the latter, confiding—trusting in *the God of hope*, and in Christ, *who is our hope*.

NOTE 7. PAGE 35.

An Objection obviated.

SOME persons will be ready to think that all this may be retorted; and that it may as reasonably be said—That faith in its full meaning includes Christian obedience, but that the term is sometimes, according to these principles, used for a part of its entire signification, to express *trust*; and that sometimes, perhaps, *trust* may be used for *it*, reversing the synecdoche; and that really the appearance of conclusiveness, in the arguments of those who hold it to mean *trust*, arises from their errors being *in defect*: and so forth. It is very likely that all this may be said; but there are important and decisive differences in the two cases, which will show that, however specious the

point may be, it does not apply. In the first place, it is not true that *faith*, either in its common or scriptural sense, includes *obedience*, and it is true that it does include *trust*; both those points, I think, I have established in the investigation of its meaning, in Sermon I. and Note 2. And this, surely, must be felt to be an important distinction between the cases. But, secondly, though *faith* does not include *obedience* in its proper meaning, yet, as obedience is a result of the principle, and is so described in the Bible, I readily grant that *faith* might be employed, according to a very common use of language, to express both the principle and its effects. But that it is not so used in the scriptural statements of the doctrine of Justification (and this is the only point at issue), is, I think, fully proved, when it is shown, as it is hereafter, that this obedience *follows after justification*; that it is only rendered by those whom *faith has actually justified*; that, *before we believe*, we cannot do any thing well pleasing in God's sight, or render to him any obedience; that, *when we believe*, we are justified; and that *then, and not till then*, does faith bring forth its fruits of love and obedience. And this, I hope, is enough to show that, though these remarks may seem to furnish an opportunity for a retort, they really are not exposed to one.

NOTE 8. PAGE 45.

Upon Desire, as an Element of Faith.

THE importance of insisting upon a desire of the blessings of salvation, as an essential part of faith, was felt by Melancthon, when he writes, in the *Apology*, "Et ne quis suspicetur tantum notitiam esse [fidem] addimus amplius, est *velle* et accipere oblatam promissionem." And the peculiar necessity, hence arising, for divine influences to produce faith, is extremely well explained in an anonymous *Essay on the Extent of Human and Divine Agency in the Production of Saving Faith*. Edinburgh, 1828.

NOTE 9. PAGE 49.

The Repentance essential to Faith.

THE Reformers taught that faith was only wrought in a mind which the Spirit of God had alarmed and humbled, had softened and subdued to receive it. But they discouraged, wisely, a curious scrutiny into the quality and amount of the emotions of remorse, and sorrow, and fear, which preceded the consolations of the gospel: well knowing how fitted such inquiries were to delay and impede such consolation, and to mislead as to its proper source. I have prefixed, to this second Sermon, a passage, expressing their views on this subject; which are given elsewhere with great clearness. For example, in the second Augsburg Confession, Art. iv.: “Cum Evangelium arguit peccata nostra, corda perterrefacta statuere debent, quod gratis nobis propter Christum donentur remissio peccatorum et justificatio per fidem. Quanquam igitur Evangelium requirit pœnitentiam tamen ut remissio peccatorum certa sit, docet eam gratis donari fieret enim incerta remissio, si ita sentiendum esset, tum demum contingere remissionem peccatorum postquam eam præcedentibus operibus meriti essemus, aut satis digna esset pœnitentia.” And, again, in the Art. *De Fide*: “Quanquam igitur contritio aliqua seu pœnitentia necessaria est tamen sentiendum est donari nobis remissionem peccatorum et fieri nos ex injustis justos, id est reconciliatos seu acceptos et filios Dei gratis, propter Christum, non propter dignitatem contritionis, aut eorum operum præcedentium aut sequentium. Sed fide hoc beneficium accipiendum est,” &c. And in the Saxon Confession, Art. xvi. *De Pœnitentia*: “Et dicimus partem pœnitentiæ seu conversionis primam esse contritionem, quæ est vere expavescere agnitione iræ Dei adversus peccata et dolere quod Deum offenderis: et dicimus in his qui convertuntur aliquos tales veros pavores et dolores esse oportere, nec agere pœnitentiam eos qui manent securi et sine dolore Hic autem taxamus adversarios, qui fingunt contritionem mereri remissionem peccatorum, et oportere contritionem sufficientem esse. In utroque errore magnæ tenebræ sunt. Nam remissio datur propter

Mediatorem gratis. Et quæ potest esse contritio sufficiens? Imo quo magis crescit dolor sine fiducia misericordiæ eo magis corda fugiunt Deum," &c.

As the point is one of much importance, I must add another remarkable quotation. The Articles from the University of Louvain, 1544, declaring the Romish doctrine, drew a bitter reply from Luther, which was weakened, however, by unbecoming buffoonery. A work by Melancthon [1546] refers to these Articles, and supplies the following valuable testimony of the principles of the Reformers upon this question: "De contritione nos quoque docemus *omnino oportere aliquam, in iis qui convertuntur, contritionem existere*; quia Deus damnat carnalem securitatem, et vult aliquo modo agnosci iram suam adversus peccatum. Ideo Paulus sic orditur suam concionem, *Revelatur ira Dei, &c.* Et contritio est vere expavescere agnitione iræ Dei adversus peccata, et dolere propter Deum, et Filium ejus Dom. nostrum J. Christum. *Sit verus dolor et pavor, nec disputetur an sit sufficiens*, quia nostra contritio non meretur remissionem, et si cresceret pro magnitudine peccatorum extinguerentur homines.....*Sit igitur contritio, sed accedat fides*, qua unus quisque vere credat et statuatur sibi ipsi remitti peccata gratis propter Filium Dei, non propter propria ulla merita. Hac fide consequitur homo remissionem peccatorum certò, et rursus erigitur cor, et vivificatur, id est, mitigantur pavores, et concipitur Spiritus Sanctus, et nova vita et lætitia ut Rom. v. dicitur, *Justificati fide pacem habemus.*"—*Disp. de tota Evang. Doct.*

More cannot be needed to show the views entertained by the early Reformers of the right use of this doctrine of repentance, and their apprehensions of the abuse of it; that they held that its use was to lead the sinner to the consolations of the gospel; and that they feared that it might be abused, to drive him from them into despair; to keep him in affliction and alarm notwithstanding them; or to direct him to other and self-righteous consolations for relief. What just grounds for such apprehensions the Romish doctrine of Repentance furnished cannot be unknown to my readers; but to many of them, I should suppose, there will be something

new in the specimen of Protestant divinity which I am about to subjoin. Bishop Bull, having proved that repentance is no less required to Justification than Faith, proceeds thus to settle what Repentance is: "Id porro notandum est, resipiscentiam non esse opus unicum, aut simplex, sed multorum aliorum operum quasi complexionem. Suo enim ambitu comprehendit sequentia opera nec pauca neque ignobilia." Of these *opera pœnitentiæ* he enumerates *eleven*, making the last, "*Opera beneficentiæ sive eleemosynas. Quæ quanti valeant ad remissionem peccatorum a Deo impetrandam, satis liquet ex celebri loco Dan. iv. 27. [24.] Ubi sanctus Propheta Regi Nebuchadnezzari adhuc in peccatis hærenti hoc consilium suggerit: Peccata tua eleemosynis redime,* et iniquitates tuas misericordiis pauperum.....*

* How far the Bishop's strange theology has the appearance of any support in this passage from Daniel, depends, of course, on the correctness of this translation of פָּרַק. Our translators, with many high authorities, prefer *break off*. But I do not give this note with any design of attempting to settle whether *redime* or *abrumpe* is the proper rendering; but to inform any readers who feel an interest in the question, that they will find a satisfactory vindication of the latter sense in Buxtorf. Lex. Chald. Tal. Rab. in *verb.*, and in Michaelis upon Daniel, in loc.

As I am upon the subject, I think a curious point of Bull's worth adding. Grotius in *locum* cries, *Optime vertit Theodotion, λύτρωσαι*; and Bull echoes, *Recte vertit Theodotion, λυτρωσαι*. Why these learned men agree in commending so emphatically this very questionable (to speak safely) translation of פָּרַק, is intelligible enough; but common readers may be puzzled at seeing it treated as a discovery of Theodotion's, when they find the very same word employed in the earlier version of the LXX.; which would seem fairly entitled to all the credit of the rendering, whatever it be. The explanation, I suppose, is that, as Jerome informs us, Theodotion's translation of Daniel was universally preferred to that of the LXX. by the churches; the consequence of which has been that the latter was superseded, and gradually disappeared; while the former was adopted in the copies of the Septuagint, and actually stands there in the place of the original translation. A man, therefore, ambitious of great accuracy, ought, I presume, to cite the Greek version of Daniel under the name of Theodotion. And this gives an account of a form of citation which will, doubtless, appear strange to all who are ignorant of the above fact; and will, perhaps, appear affected to some after they have learned it. But, however that be, what shall we say when we find Bull proceeding thus: "Sic versio vulgata secuta LXX. interpretes, qui vocem Hebraicam צָרַק per ἐλεημοσύνη (ex orientali nimirum idiomate) reddiderunt." What is the meaning of referring to the Septuagint version for one word, and

Vides quam late se diffundant pœnitentiæ opera ; vides ea omnia ad veniam peccatorum consequendam a Spiritu Sancto omnino necessaria statui.”—*Har. Ap. Diss. prios Cap. II. § 7.*

This note is already too long; but I cannot refrain from further extending it, by appending to Bull’s exposition of his principles a striking and, on various grounds, most interesting exhibition of their genuine effects. It will be easily conceived that I must feel, at times, tempted to give examples of the views that I maintain, and those that I oppose, in actual operation ; but I certainly cannot be accused of yielding often to the temptation. I have, on the contrary, avoided carefully the introduction of any matter of that kind hitherto, for reasons which, I dare say, will readily occur to every one. But, I think, most readers who have gone so far will feel pleased at the deviation from my plan that makes them acquainted with the passage subjoined, or brings it back to their recollection.

It is from Boswell’s *Life of Johnson*, and will be found (to take the only mode of referring to a book which is published in such a variety of forms) in his account of a day at Dilly’s in April, 1778.

to Theodotion for the next? Both words appear in Theodotion. Is there any point in describing the Vulgate as following the LXX. in preference to Theodotion? Bull could scarcely have intended this; for he must have known that Jerome did not, and that those who have since mended or marred his translation could not, follow the LXX. in *Daniel*. Even had Bull been quoting the early Italic version (he was not) the point would not have been a good one to make. For, though that version was made from the LXX., and was, probably, too early to have followed Theodotion; yet its general agreement with the Vulgate (where it is preserved) in *Daniel*, would make it very unlikely that it had there followed the Septuagint; which, we are told, was so unfaithful. That it must have taken some other guide in *Daniel* would have appeared, therefore, highly probable in Bull’s time; and has since been put beyond doubt by the publication of the true LXX. version of *Daniel*, from Origen’s *Tetrapla e singulari Chisiano codice annorum supra 10000*. Romæ Typis Propagandæ Fidei, 1772. The curious departures from the Hebrew text which this contains (remarkable ones even in this very verse) show, sufficiently, that it never could have been followed by any existing translation. Perhaps, after all, the true account of what seems a point in Bull, is, that he took Grotius’s mode of citing the Greek of *Daniel*, without thinking; and that, having to refer to it himself, he did it naturally in the form that minor men still usually do.

"I expressed a horror at the thought of death.

"MRS. KNOWLES.—'Nay, thou should'st not have a horror for what is the gate of life.'

"JOHNSON.—(Standing upon the hearth, rolling about, with a serious, solemn, and somewhat gloomy air.) 'No rational man can die without uneasy apprehension.'

"MRS. K.—'The Scriptures tell us, *The righteous shall have hope in his death.*'

"J.—'Yes, Madam, that is, he shall not have *despair*. But, consider, the hope of salvation must be founded on the terms on which it is promised that the mediation of our SAVIOUR shall be applied to us, namely obedience, and when obedience has failed, then, as suppletory to it, repentance. But, what man can say that his obedience has been such as he would approve of in another, or even in himself upon close examination; or that his repentance has not been such as to require being repented of? No man can be sure that his obedience and repentance will obtain salvation.'

"MRS. K.—'But divine intimation of acceptance may be made to the soul.'

"J.—'Madam, it may; but I should not think the better of a man who should tell me on his death-bed he was sure of salvation. A man cannot be sure himself that he has divine intimation of acceptance; much less can he make others sure that he has it.'

"BOSWELL.—'Then, Sir, we must be contented to acknowledge that death is a terrible thing.'

"J.—'Yes, Sir, I have made no approaches to a state which can look on it as not terrible.'"

Being justified BY FAITH, we have peace with God, is not more certain than that, while we seek to be justified in any other way, we shall want peace, unless we be given over to utter darkness concerning God's nature and our own. "Our great moralist" was never delivered over to this delusion; and, in consequence, while he seems to have entertained no doubts that this religious system, which sent him first to his own obedience to obtain the application of the SAVIOUR's mediation to himself, and then to repentance as suppletory to obedience, was really THE GOSPEL OF CHRIST,

yet he never found, or professed to find, a ray of comfort in it. Although it is likely that his obedience was as exact as most men's, and that, when it came to reckoning up the *opera pœnitentiæ*, he could come as near as most to the *just tale*. The mercy, which was shown in keeping him ever alive to the utter inefficacy of the gospel which he professed, was, we have reason to believe, accomplished at the last in teaching him a better; and we may hope that it was through the Spirit, the Comforter, that he attained that tranquillity in death which, in the progress of the conversation from which I make the above extract, he treats as always the result of want of thought, or of the dogged resolution with which men meet what they feel to be inevitable. In the midst of much that is painful and perplexing in the closing scene of his life, Boswell has preserved one comfortable testimony from Dr. Brocklesby (for whose freedom from *fanaticism* B. answers), which gives good ground for hope that the God of hope gave to this eminent man *the peace*, if not the *joy*, in *believing* which is the portion of those who are reconciled to Him by faith in His Son. "For some time before his death all his fears were calmed, and absorbed by the prevalence of his faith and his trust in the merits and propitiation of JESUS CHRIST."

NOTE 10. PAGE 150.

On Prayer for Faith.

THE error adverted to here is very clearly and forcibly expressed in Mr. Carlile's "Old Doctrine of Faith;" and the general question glanced at—of the state of mind which prayer to God supposes and requires—is excellently handled in the anonymous Essay on Faith, already referred to, Note 8. I do not recur to that question with any intention of treating it at large. The decision in the Sermon is enough for my immediate purpose; and I am persuaded that it must be assented to by all who have followed, and who adopt, the preceding account of the nature of Faith, and of the mode of producing it in the

mind. That account not only renders it probable that the principle may often *gradually* develope itself in the mind, under the teaching of God's Spirit ; but it suggests, as a very probable stage of the progress of the change through which faith is established in the heart, the one referred to in the Sermon ; in which a man sees, and even feels, the value and necessity of faith in the Lord, and sees and feels that he possesses it but imperfectly, if at all ; that he is far, very far, from *feeling* that deep, cordial, and undoubting confidence in the Redeemer, which he must *perceive* is the proper result of the truths that he believes concerning Him : and if this be admitted, nothing more can, I suppose, be needed to show the presumption of discouraging one who feels this want from applying to God to supply it ; or the weakness of hesitating to exhort him to do so. And with this determination of this particular question, which is all that my immediate purpose required, I must be for the present content.

NOTE 11. PAGE 62.

Upon the Meaning of Justification in the Original Tongues.

WHATEVER be the assistance that might be hoped from etymology here, the Romanists must be acknowledged to have looked for it rather perversely, when they proceeded to settle the meaning of this Scripture term by the composition of the Latin verb *justifico* ! It was certainly conceding too much to their outrageous claims of authority for their translation, to discuss the meaning of any word in the Vulgate, as if it could decide a question concerning the meaning of the original term for which it stands. But it seems to have been a rule with the early Reformers—rather a bold than a wise one certainly—to take every adversary upon his own ground. And they appear to have followed that rule here ; so far, that is, as to attempt to show that the Romanists were wrong in the point which they endeavoured to make ; without admitting that, if they had succeeded, it could decide the real point at issue. So far as etymology was concerned, the answer was a very happy one.

When the Romish writers triumphantly put forward the composition of the word—*justum facere*—as establishing the sense to *make just* of the compound, it seemed a very sufficient exposure of the value of the argument, to ask whether, when we *glorify* God, or *sanctify* Him, as we are commanded, we really *make Him glorious*, or *holy*? Whether, when Mary *magnified* God, she really *made Him great*? &c. *Affelmanni Syntag. Exercitat.* part i. p. 530. As to authority, however, the case was not so clear. It is true that Chemnitz tells us that he challenged Andradius to produce any instance, from an approved Latin writer, of the use of *justificare*, in the sense of *making just*; and that the challenge was never answered. *Exam. Conc. Trid. de Decreto* 6to. Bellarmin, however, not unfairly remarks, that as the word was not used by classical authors, his party could not be reasonably required to produce any ancient authorities for the meaning which they assigned it; but that he will give some instances from the Fathers. Whether the instances which he does produce are unexceptionable or not, it would be trifling to inquire; as it is unquestionable that he could have found good instances there of the use of the word for which he contends; while, I believe, it is equally certain, that instances could be brought from the same sources of the use which the Reformers maintained.

The mistake seems to be in answering such a point at all; for, even if there were no hazard of being defeated upon it, the contest served to divert attention from the arguments of real importance. It was not easy, indeed, to bring the Romish controversialists to the discussion of the original terms; nor is it very surprising, as they must have felt themselves very weak there. Bellarmin, however, who seldom wants courage, expresses himself with the utmost confidence on the meaning of the Hebrew verb: “*Dico verbum צַדִּיק et הצִּדִּיק proprie nihil esse aliud quam justum facere; sed quia potest aliquis fieri justus tum intrinsece per adeptionem justitiæ, tum extrinsece per declarationem, inde eandem vocem ad varia significanda traduci.*” This bold assertion might be admitted without involving any very important consequences; but it certainly seems very insufficiently supported, when Bellarmin is able, out of all the instances of the use of

the verb in the Hebrew Scriptures, to bring forward but two (Is. liii. 11. and Dan. xii. 3.), of what he maintains to be its *only proper signification*. I do not think either of them an instance of the sense of *making just*; but I am content, for the present, to admit that they both are; and I would ask, is it not a *proof* that this cannot be *the usual meaning*, and a *strong presumption* that it cannot be *the proper meaning* of the word, that none others can be produced?

As to the texts referred to, however, it is evident that neither can be reasonably held to *determine* the sense of the word in question. In Isaiah liii. 11. the Lord seems described as *justifying* many, by a *knowledge of himself*, in the same way that he is in the New Testament described as *justifying them by faith in himself*. And the verb is, therefore, used for *to justify* in its common sense, whatever that be. In Dan. xii. 3., those who convert sinners, or lead them to justification, are described as *justifying* them, by a figure not unusual in the Bible and elsewhere. Our own excellent version has, *they that turn many to righteousness*: and, for the sense of the passage, no exception can be taken to this translation; for it is doubtless of those who convert sinners that the prophet is speaking; but what he actually says, is, “they that *justify* many;” using the word figuratively of those who can be said to *justify* only as instruments in God’s hands in bringing others to that state in which they are *justified* by Him. Dan. viii. 14, indeed, seems to me a much more plausible text for Bellarmin’s purpose than either of those to which he has referred. In it the verb seems to be used directly to express *cleansing*, or *making pure*: Grotius, I find, is not content with taking it as a single example of this sense, but says, in commenting on it, “Nota, צַרַק [*justificare*] sæpe poni pro *mundare*.” Of this positive assertion he gives here no proof whatever; and when he does attempt a proof of it, Acts xiii. 39, he takes care to qualify it very considerably; but even in its reduced form he entirely fails to establish it. “Nam הַצַּרִיק quod plerumque Græcè est διαισῶν (*justificare*) significat et *purgare*: vertiturque צַרַק καθαρὸς εἶσθαι (*purus erit*), Job iv. 17. καθαρῶσθαι (*purificabitur*) Dan. viii. 14.” And in the introduction to his Annotatt. in Rom. he says that the

conjugations *Pihel* and *Hiphil* signify *nativo sensu*, a *vitiis purgare*, *mundare*, *liberare*; and gives, in addition to Bellarmin's two examples (of which I have spoken already), Ps. lxxiii. 13. As to what he says of the *proper sense* of the conjugations, *Pihel* and *Hiphil*, it must have been known to him how far that is from deciding the question. It is known to every tyro in the language that these conjugations have, in some verbs, properly, a declarative sense, and express properly, *to ascribe to* an object the qualities, acts, &c., which Kal asserts it to possess, exercise, &c. We saw an instance of this, Note 2. p. 289, *האמין*, *אמן*; *רשע*, *to be wicked*, *הרשיע*, *to declare wicked, to condemn*; *כזב*, *to lie*, *הכזיב*, *to convict of falsehood*, are other examples of the same kind for *Hiphil*; and for *Pihel*, which is much less important in the case, we are not without similar examples; *טמא* and *טהר* are well-known ones: from all which it appears, that when the question is raised about any particular verb, it cannot be decided merely upon grammatical principles; but that it is to be determined finally by use. This Grotius indeed seems to admit, by subjoining examples of the meaning for which he contends; but how little they contribute to establish it, any one will see who examines them. Of two of them I have already spoken; and, of the additional pair, a glance will serve to show that they could only have been adduced upon the occasion through egregious carelessness. Grotius, in fact, himself actually translates the first (Job. iv. 17) so as to make it evident that he knew that it was not an instance of *צדק*, in the sense of *to make pure*, but in the sense *to be pure*; and that, therefore, it was not an instance for his purpose. As to the second, from Ps. lxxiii. 13, the reference to it must certainly be also a signal lapse; for, though it is a clear instance of the use of *καθαίρειν*, in the version of the LXX. (where it is Ps. lxxii. 13) to express *making clean*, the original word in the passage is not *צדק*, but *זכה*; so that it has no bearing upon the point at all. Even if his examples were more unexceptionable, his adducing so few would amount to a confession that he was wrong in asserting that *צדק* often signifies *to purify*; but I have more direct reason for believing him wrong than his failure in proving himself right; for I have myself examined almost all, if not all, the texts

in the Bible in which the verb occurs, and can be quite sure that צַדִּיק is *not often* taken for *mundare*: I can even say that I do not know *a single text* in which it is so used; and scarcely one in which such a meaning could be thought of for it. With respect to this text, Dan. viii. 14, in which it is so rendered in our own translation and others; instead of taking it as a solitary instance of the use of the word in the sense of *making clean*, I greatly prefer, with Calvin, receiving it in its ordinary meaning there, and regarding it as used by a figure, which he thus excellently explains: “Quod dicit hic *sanctuarium justificabitur*, quidam vertunt, *expiabitur tunc S.* Sed libenter retineo verbi proprietatem. Scimus enim Hebræos *justificandi* verbo uti quoties de jure loquuntur. Ubi ergo restituitur jus suum spoliatis, ubi asseritur in libertatem qui servus fuerat, ubi causam obtinet qui fuit injuste gravatus, hoc totum est *justificari* Hebræis. Quum ergo Dei sanctuarium infamiae esset subjectum quantisper illic conspectum fuit simulachrum Jovis Olympii et ita nulla esset amplius ejus dignitas quum ergo tanto dedecore oppressum esset templum, tunc justificatum fuit, ubi Deus iterum erexit sua sacrificia, voluit restitui purum cultum quem lege sua præscripserat. *Justificabitur* ergo sanctuarium, hoc est, vindicabitur ab illo probro cui ad tempus obnoxium erit.”—Calv. in loc. I think this offers an easy explanation of the text, consistently with the established meaning of the word; and I think, also, that what I have said of the two passages given by Bellarmin shows that they are not examples of the sense which he wishes to establish. But I am well content, as I said, that all three should be esteemed clear instances of צַדִּיק in the sense of *making righteous*; and, I ask, is it credible that, if this were the proper sense of the verb, but three, out of nearly forty instances of its use in the Bible, could be found to favour it?

The common significations of the word in the Bible are, *to be innocent or righteous*; *to declare or account one innocent, &c.*; *to be declared or accounted innocent, &c.*: the rarer senses, in evident connexion with the foregoing, are, *to prove or to be proved righteous, &c.*; *to prove or to seek to prove one's-self righteous, &c.*; *to do justice or to redress*. The reader, who

should wish to investigate the point, will, I think, find himself assisted by the following arrangement of texts, according to this view of the meanings of the verb; where I have also marked the different conjugations in which it occurs, as a further aid to forming a correct notion of its proper meaning:—*To be innocent or righteous*; *Kal*, Gen. xxxviii. 26; Job iv. 17; ix. 15; x. 15; xv. 14? xxii. 3; xxxiii. 12; xxxiv. 5; xxxv. 7; xl. 8? Ps. xix. 10; Is. xlv. 25? Ezek. xvi. 52. *To be declared or accounted innocent or righteous*; *Kal*, Job ix. 2; xi. 2; xiii. 18; xxv. 4; Ps. li. 6; cxliii. 2. *To declare or account innocent or righteous*; *Pihel*, Job xxxii. 2? xxxiii. 32.—*Hiphil*, Deut. xxv. 1; Exod. xxiii. 7; 1 Kings viii. 32; 2 Chron. vi. 23; Prov. xvii. 15; Is. v. 23; l. 8. *To prove righteous, &c.*; *Pihel*, Jer. iii. 11; Ezek. xvi. 51, 52. *Hiphil*, Job. xxvii. 5. *To be proved righteous, &c.*; *Kal*, Is. xliii. 9, 26. *To justify one's-self*? *Kal*, Job ix. 20. *Hithpahel*, Gen. xlv. 16. *To do justice to, or redress, or decide in favour of*? *Hiphil*, 2 Sam. xv. 4; Ps. lxxxii. 3. These, with the three spoken of above, comprehend almost all, if not altogether all, the passages in which the verb is found. I have marked interrogatively a few texts under the first head, which should perhaps be under the second; but the reader will, in all cases, of course, judge for himself. He will see what ample materials there are for determining the meaning of the word. And an inspection of these references seems to show that its proper sense in *Kal* is *to be righteous, &c.*; in *Hiphil*, *to declare righteous, &c.*; but it appears from the list that instances of this declaratory sense occur both in *Kal* and *Pihel*. The connexion of the other meanings with these principal ones is too manifest to need pointing out. To fix in which of the two principal senses the verb is used in a particular case, it is, of course, necessary to examine the passage; except that, from its use in the Bible, it would not seem that the verb in *Hiphil* admitted the sense, *to be just*.

The case is even clearer in Greek, where it is of most importance to us to be certain about the meaning of the word. For, whatever may be said of the use of *δικαίω* and *δικαιοσύνη* in the Old Testament and the Apocrypha, they never admit the senses *to be righteous, or to be made righteous*, in the New Testament.

And the Protestant divines, who held that the verb has the former meaning, and the Romanists, who contended for the latter, were, curiously enough, both driven to the same text, Rev. xxii. 11, ὁ δίκαιος δικαιοθήτω ἔτι; the Protestants understanding it, with our translators, "he that is righteous *let him be righteous still*;" and the Romanists rendering it, "*let him be made righteous yet more*;" in support of their doctrine of a second justification. It would be hardly spending time well, to discuss the meaning of a solitary text, when the true sense of the word may be established from the concurrence of such a number. But the fact is, that δικαιοθήτω was always a suspected reading; and that it has been rejected absolutely by Griesbach, upon what appear to be conclusive grounds, and δικαιούσθην ποιησάτω substituted for it; the same substitution is made in Mathäi's valuable edition; it also appears in Alter's; and Vater, whose text, in general, seems carefully considered, follows both. On that point, therefore, I presume it is unnecessary to say more.

Omitting all passages involving the doctrine of Justification, the forensic sense of the verb in the New Testament appears sufficiently from the well-known texts, Matt. xi. 19; xii. 37; Luke vii. 29; Rom. ii. 13: Matt. xii. 37, and Rom. ii. 13, being plain examples of that sense strictly; the two others of a sense naturally derived from it. That its use in the doctrinal passages is in this forensic meaning, I think I have shown conclusively in Sermon V. p. 133. And if the point were one about which reasonable doubt could be entertained, there would be no difficulty in putting it beyond question by other arguments. But, in fact, it is so clear, that some of the most determined and able opponents of the doctrine of justification by faith only, have felt it much easier to assail that doctrine by enlarging the meaning of *faith*, than by restricting or altering that of *justification*, so that, upon this point, we have the advantage of their testimony. Thus Bull writes: "Pro certo igitur statuatur vocabulum *justificationis* in hac materia *forensem* significationem obtinere; atque actionem designare Dei more judicis, ex lege Christi gratiosa absolventis accusatum, justum pronuntiantis, atque ad præmium justitiæ h. e. vitam æternam acceptantis." —*Har. Ap. Dis. Prior*, cap. 1, § 6. And he asserts, § 2, that a

man must be blind not to see that this forensic signification, of *accounting or declaring righteous*, is the most obvious and common meaning of the word in the Bible generally, but especially in the New Testament. If the reader should desire to prosecute the investigation farther, for himself, he may recollect that, although *to count or declare a person just*, &c. is not one of the classical senses of *δικαιω*, yet no doubt can be made that it is among its scriptural meanings. The question really is, whether, in the statements of the doctrine of justification by faith, *to justify*, is to be taken in this sense or not. The texts to be examined are so easily made out, and have been, either in the Sermons or in this Note, referred to to such an extent already, that I shall not subjoin a list of them; but, instead of it, give a list of references from Gerhard, to show that the proceeding of the justification of a sinner is, throughout, a judicial one; which is one of his modes of fixing the true sense of the term. "Expri-mitur per *judicium*, Ps. cxliii. 2. *Judex*, John v. 27. *Tribunal*, Rom. xiv. 10. *Accusator*, John v. 45. *Testis*, Rom. ii. 15. *Chirographum*, Col. ii. 14. *Debitum*, Matt. xviii. 24. *Advocatus*, 1 John ii. 1. *Absolutio*, Ps. xxxiii. 1."

NOTE 12. PAGE 64.

Protestant Declarations of the Meaning of Justification.

Most Protestant authorities, of any real weight, are very decided upon this sense of Justification; and some, who differ somewhat in their statements of the meaning of the word, so explain their ideas upon the doctrine as to show that the difference is of no real importance.

Our own Eleventh Article shows that, by the founders of our church, Justification was understood to mean *being counted righteous before God*. And this further appears from the Homily of Justification. The views of the German Reformers are equally clear.

Confessio Augustana.

Significat autem Justificatio in his Pauli sententiis remissionem

peccatorum seu reconciliationem, seu imputationem justitiæ hoc est acceptationem personæ.

Confessio Saxonica.

In declaratione vocabuli *justificari* usitate dicitur, justificari significat ex injusto justum fieri; quòd recte intellectum huc quoque quadrat. Ex injusto, id est, reo et inobediente, et non habente Christum, fieri justum, id est absolutum a reatu propter Filium Dei; et apprehendentem fide ipsum Christum qui est justitia nostra, ut docuit Hieremias et Paulus: quia ejus justitia nobis imputatur; et quia dato Spiritu Sancto nos vivificat et regenerat sicut et Johan. 5 dicitur. . . .

Confessio Helvetica.

Justificare significat apostolo, in disputatione de justificatione, peccata remittere, a culpa et pœna absolvere, in gratiam recipere, et justum pronunciare.

Confessio Wittembergica.

Homo enim fit Deo acceptus, et reputatur coram eo justus propter solum filium Dei, Dominum nostrum Jesus Christum per fidem: et in judicio Dei non est ullo earum virtutum quas nos habemus merito sed solo merito Domini nostri Jesu Christi, quod fit nostrum per fidem, confidendum.

Confessio Bohemica, 1535, Latine Auctor, 1572.

Et hæc justitia seu justificatio est remissio peccatorum, sublatio pœnæ æternæ quam Dei severa justitia deposcit, et Christi justitia seu imputatione hujus convestiri, cumque Deo reconciliatio, in gratiam receptio per quam *gratiosi facti sumus in dilecto, et cohæredes vitæ æternæ, &c.*

LUTHER. *Disputationes, 1535.*

Justificari enim hominem, sentimus, hominem nondum esse justum, sed esse in ipso motu seu cursu ad justitiam. Ideo et peccator est adhuc quisquis justificatur; et tamen velut plene et perfecto justus reputatur ignoscente et miserente Deo. . . . Recte igitur dicitur justificari nos ex fide sine operibus legis. Quod *justificari* ista includit: fide, scilicet propter Christum, reputari nos justos, nec peccatum ullum, sive præteritum sive reliquum in carne manens imputari. Sed velut nullum sit remissione interea tolli.

In Ep. ad Galat. cap. 2.

Justificat ergo Fides quia apprehendit et possidet istum thesaurum scil. Christum præsentem; ubi enim vera fiducia cordis est ibi adest Christus in ipsa nebula et fide. Ergo fide apprehensus et in corde habitans Christus est justitia Christiana propter quam nos reputat justos et donet vitam æternam.

MELANTHON. *Loci Theologici*, 1543.

Justificatio significat remissionem peccatorum, et reconciliationem, seu acceptationem personæ ad vitam æternam. Nam Hebræis justificare est forense verbum, ut si dicam, *Populus Romanus justificavit Scipionem accusatum a tribunis*, id est, *absolvit seu justum pronuntiavit*. Sumpsit ergo Paulus verbum justificandi ex consuetudine Hebræi sermonis pro remissione peccatorum et reconciliatione, seu acceptatione.

Propositiones complectentes præcipuos articulos doctrinæ cælestis traditæ in schola Wittembergensi.

Comprehendi remissionem peccatorum in vocabulo justificationis etiam ex illo dicto Pauli, Rom. iv. manifestum est; ubi Paulus expressè inquit, sicut et David inquit, *Beatitudinem esse hominis cui Deus imputat justitiam sine operibus. Beati quorum tecta sunt peccata*. Ibi enim nominat imputationem justitiæ ut ostendat non solum remitti peccata, sed etiam recipi personam propter alienam justitiam imputatam scil. Mediatoris Dei et hominis.

In Ep. ad Romanos, 1529.

Cap. 3. Sit autem nota phrasis, *justificamur*, id est, ex reis pronunciamur non rei, donamur remissione peccatorum, reconciliatione, seu imputatione justitiæ cum qua conjuncta est vivificatio quæ fit per ipsum filium Dei cum fide verbum vocale accipimus cum quo vere est efficax filius Dei Quamquam sunt in conversione plures motus tamen vocabulum *justificari* significat haud dubiè accipere remissionem peccatorum reconciliationem ac imputationem justitiæ. Hanc autem cum accipimus simul vivificamur.

BUCER.

[Bucer's view of justification is, especially in his earlier writings, embarrassed not a little by his desire to repel the calumnies by which the doctrine of *Justification by Faith only* was assailed, and to obviate some abuses of it. He endeavours, for this pur-

pose, to combine, in the signification of the term, both the effects of faith :—its effects upon our state before God, and its effects upon our character,—or, to make it include our justification both before God and men. His view does not affect his conformity in doctrine with the other Reformers, as he labours very anxiously to show in his *Præfata in Enar. Epistt. D. Pauli*, cap. 8 ; his statement being that we are pardoned and accepted by God by faith ; and that thus we are *justified before God* by faith ; but that this is a faith which is fruitful in works, so that they who possess it are acknowledged by men to be righteous, and that therefore we are *justified before men* also by faith. So far there is no difference between him and the other Reformers. But he thinks that in using the word *justification*, though St. Paul chiefly regards the first, he has also respect to the second. In this last point, then, he differed from the other Reformers at this period ; but he is very anxious to show that the difference is only verbal, and that, so far from overthrowing *free Justification before God by Faith only*, he only more fully established it by his statement of the doctrine.—“ Adeo non negamus justificationis primum caput et substantiam esse gratuitam peccatorum remissionem, nostrique apud Deum, propter Dominum nostrum Jesu Christum, acceptationem, qua fides tota nititur, ut istuc etiam confirmemus. Etenim illa justitia et bona opera, quæ in nobis Spiritus Christi operatur, testimonium sunt illius nostræ apud Deum gratuitæ acceptationis. Nam nisi nos ipsos Deus bonos justosque habeat, nihil nostri bonum aut justum censi potest. Mala arbor edit fructus malos. Proinde dum dicimus, justitiam et bona opera nobis fide constare, simul dicimus fide nos Deo acceptos, gratosque reddi Ita quum dicimus fide percipi justitiam quam Deus nemini nisi apud se justificato donat, ostendimus et ipsam nostri apud Deum justificationem fide nobis contingere.” This would make the point, which Bucer endeavours here to establish, innocent as far as the doctrine is concerned. I need not say, however, that I think he was in error in it ; for, though the apostle is careful to show that faith produces that obedience which secures the justification of believers in this latter sense, he does not include this effect in the meaning of justification in any statement of the doctrine. This, however,

is no place for discussing this point. And I mention Bucer's early difference from his brethren partly to settle the amount of it—which is, I believe, misunderstood; but chiefly because I think it right to notice it, before I give from his last work his final views upon the subject, which, my readers will see, agree perfectly with those quoted from other authorities.]

Scripta Anglicana. Disputatio publica Cantabrigiæ, 1550.

Justificari, ut hoc verbo Spiritus Sanctus in Scripturis suis utitur, opponitur, ei quod dicimus *condemnari*; et significat condonari homini peccata recipique eum in gratiam Dei; cum nimirum agitur de justificatione vitæ, id est, qua homini vita æterna adjudicatur Hoc intellectu utuntur verbo justificationis Scripturæ cum loquuntur de justificatione qua reconciliamur Deo et recipimur in gratiam vitæ æternæ. *Justificari* quidem prædicant Scripturæ et factores legis bona scil. operantes, sicut Jacobus scripsit justificatum fuisse Abraham ex voluntate immolandi filium; et Rachab, &c. Sed in his locis *justificari* hominem nihil aliud significat quam laudari et remunerari hominem propter bona opera. Porro plerique scriptorum ecclesiasticorum sequentes etymon verbi Græci *δικαιοῦσθαι* et Latini *justificari*, intellexerunt per hæc verba hominem donari inhærenti justitia, quæ constat fide, spe, charitate, quæ nunquam quidem deest remissioni peccatorum; tamen Scripturæ non hoc, dari donum justitiæ, significant per verbum *justificari*, sed, sicut dictum est, vel condonari peccata et recipi in gratiam Dei; vel benefacta comprobari a Deo et remunerari. Ex hac vero varia significatione horum verborum *justificari* et *justificationis*, dum Scripturæ per hæc intelligunt peccatorum remissionem atque vitæ æternæ, ex penitus gratuita Dei misericordia et gratia, adjudicationem; Sancti Patres vero inhærentis justitiæ, id est, virtutum omnium, pie rectique vivendi donationem et infusionem, multi sibi periculosas accersunt tenebras.

It would be very easy to extend these quotations; but I am sure my readers will think that enough has been done to show the sense in which the first Reformers understood the term *Justification*; and I dare say they will be as much at a loss as I am

to discover how an author so well acquainted with the controversial writings of these men as Archbishop Lawrence is, could have fallen into the strange mistake that the word was used by them as simply equivalent to *remission of sin*. He says (Bampton Lectures, Sermon 6)—“But here, to avoid a misconception of the argument, it seems necessary previously to state in what sense the word Justification, which comprehends the sole ground of contention, was used by the opposing parties. Upon both sides it was supposed *entirely to consist in the remission of sin*.”

This is, certainly, a most extraordinary statement from one who is professedly aiming at exactness; and who shows, elsewhere, considerable acquaintance with works which prove its great inaccuracy. The fact is, that the early Romish and Protestant divines could not be truly represented as concurring in any view of the *entire* meaning of Justification; but it seems a curious infelicity, that the sense of the term which the Archbishop describes as agreed upon by both, was, in fact, admitted by neither. How far it is from a fair statement of the meaning assigned to this important word by *one* of “the contending parties” the foregoing extracts afford ample materials for judging. And how strangely it misrepresents the views of the *other*, will appear by referring to the canons and decrees of the Council of Trent. It will be found, not only that the Council expressly decrees (Sess. vi. cap. 7) thus—“*Non est [Justificatio] sola peccatorum remissio, sed et sanctificatio et renovatio interioris hominis, per voluntariam susceptionem gratiæ et donorum;*” but also, that in what Chemnitz happily calls its *profusa anathematum liberalitas*, it confers a distinct anathema upon every one who shall venture to assert that men are justified *sola peccatorum remissione*.—Sess. vi. can. 1. If ever, then, Romanists speak of Justification as *consisting entirely in the remission of sins*, it is, certainly, only in opposition to the reformed doctrine that it includes also, *imputation of righteousness*; and, on the other hand, whenever the reformed writers speak of it in the same terms, they are to be understood as meaning to reject the Romish addition of *the infusion of righteousness*. From Calvin, for example, very strong declarations that Justification *consists entirely in the remission of sins*, might, doubtless, be produced. But, as Bellarmin (De

Just. lib. ii. cap. 1) very truly remarks, other and neighbouring parts of his writings do not allow us to fall into any mistake concerning the sense in which such declarations are to be received. "Igitur cum idem Calvinus in eodem capite [cap. ii. lib. iii.] sect. 21 et 22. et in Antidoto Concilii ad Sessionem 6., contendit justificationem non esse positam nisi in peccatorum remissione, non excludit imputationem Justitiæ Christi, sed internam renovationem et sanctificationem."—*De Just.* 1. 2. cap. 1. . . . And the same is true of all the rest, as a review of the foregoing extracts from their writings will abundantly prove. Indeed, the Archbishop quotes, in support of his assertion, Melancthon's declaration, given above, that Justification signifies "*remissionem peccatorum et reconciliationem seu acceptationem ad vitam æternam.*" And, had Melancthon written nothing else upon the subject, I cannot conjecture how this express addition, *et reconciliationem seu acceptationem ad vitam æternam*, could be considered so insignificant, that he might be described as supposing Justification *entirely* to consist in the remission of sin. But, if his language here left his view of the nature and amount of the addition doubtful, I have given above ample materials for determining it. As evidence of the opinion on the other side, the Archbishop quotes, from Aquinas, *Questiones disputatæ*, the determination, *ergo remissio peccatorum est justificatio*, quæst. xxviii. art. 1.; which certainly seems to exhibit an unhappy difference between the Oecumenical Council and the Angelical Doctor. If any one, however, be anxious to accommodate the difference, he will, I think, find it a very easy matter to effect: for it is sufficiently evident that Thomas did not intend the above for a perfect definition of Justification. Vasquez tells us that the proposition is to be understood "*non identice, neque formaliter, sed ut aiant causaliter.*" And Montesino, that it is meant that "*Justificatio impii est remissio peccatorum concomitanter;*" but, in fact, it seems intended chiefly to determine from what the act *ought to receive its denomination*. The question appears again in the *Summa*, and is the 113d. 1mæ. 2dæ. And, in the discussion of the various Articles, he appears to lay down that, in the *motus de contrario in contrarium* by which the Justification of a sinner is effected, the remission of his sins is the *termination* or *consummation* of the whole,

and, for this reason, is employed as equivalent to it. “Et quia motus *denominatur* magis a termino ad quem quam a termino a quo, ideo hujusmodi transmutatio qua aliquis transmutatur a statu injustitiæ per remissionem peccatorum *sortitur nomen* a termino ad quem et vocatur justificatio impii.” And the Cardinal de Vio Cajetan, in commenting upon Art. 6, (in which it is wisely inquired *whether remission of sins ought to be enumerated among the things required to Justification*; one of the objections being that it is the thing itself)—says, “Justificatio impii dicitur esse ipsa remissio peccatorum secundum quod omnis motus *accipit speciem* a termino: tamen ad terminum consequendum multa alia requiruntur.” And, in the edition of the Summa, Paris, 1639, *post Lovanensium atque Duacensium theologorum insignem operam*, in which there is annexed to each article an abstract of the point established in it, it will be seen, by the conclusion of Art. 1, how far the editors were from imagining that Thomas's determination went to decide that Justification *entirely* consisted in *remission of sins*. *Conclusio*. Ea justificatio quæ fit per modum simplicis mutationis non est remissio peccatorum sed solum justitiæ acquisitio; quæ vero dicitur *impii justificatio* (de qua hic solum sermo est) cum per modum motus de contrario in contrarium fiat, est remissio peccatorum *cum acquisitione justitiæ*. Thomas himself, indeed, says expressly, upon Art. 7, that “*tota Justificatio impii originaliter consistit in gratiæ infusione*; per eam enim et liberum arbitrium movetur, et culpa remittitur.” *Justification*, in its general sense, might, according to him, apply to angels or to un-fallen man; and would, in such an application of it, express *merely* the infusion or ingeneration of righteousness; but, when it is applied to fallen man, it not only necessarily includes, *in addition*, the new operation of a remission of sins, but this latter being the end, or consummation of the whole, is rightly employed to describe it, or properly expressed by it.

I do not subjoin any extracts from our own divines, to establish their concurrence with the German Reformers upon this point; partly because this note has already extended unreasonably far; and partly because I think their views of the nature of Justification appear with sufficient clearness, in citations made or to be made from them on other occasions.

NOTE 13. PAGE 77.

On Imputed Righteousness.

As some divines hold that the doctrine of IMPUTED RIGHTEOUSNESS, in every form, is to be abjured as part and parcel of CALVINISM, I have prefixed to this sermon a quotation* which may serve to show them that they are in this, as in other matters, *Arminio ipso Arminianiores*. That questions should be raised concerning details in that doctrine seems perfectly natural; that, after the fullest discussion, differences should remain upon minor points connected with it, is not strange; but that any doubt should be made of the general principle—that *the imputation of righteousness to the sinners whom God justifies, is as much a part of their justification as the remission of their sins*, has always appeared to me truly amazing. In this third sermon I have occupied myself very much with the establishment of this general principle; attempting chiefly to show that it follows from the proper meaning of *justification*, and from the nature of the divine law; to remove some of the most common difficulties connected with it; and to answer a few of the most popular objections against it. And in these objects I trust I have, to some extent, succeeded. But I perceive, upon reviewing the sermon, that I do not show, with sufficient distinctness, that the conclusion concerning the nature and extent of God's justification of sinners, to which such reasoning leads (p. 65), is fully confirmed by St. Paul's detailed statement of the doctrine. I supply, indeed, materials for this proof (p. 76), but I do not point out with sufficient clearness the entire concurrence of these two modes of learning the true meaning of justification. What follows will, I hope, in some measure supply this defect, and perhaps some others, in what I have already said on the subject.

It will be convenient, however, before I enter upon a consideration of the doctrine as stated by St. Paul, to fix what is meant by the phrase, *to impute righteousness*.

* As the typography of the extract from Arminius is somewhat strange, I add, that it is exactly copied from his *Orationes itemque Tractatus, &c.* Lugduni Batavorum, 1613.

The word translated to *impute* is, in the original, λογίζομαι: and the most important forms in which it is used are, ἐλογίσθη αὐτῷ εἰς δικαιοσύνην, Rom. iv. 3, &c. λογίζεται ἡ πίστις αὐτοῦ εἰς δικαιοσύνην, 5. ὃ ὁ θεὸς λογίζεται δικαιοσύνην χωρὶς ἔργων, 6. ὃ οὐ μὴ λογίσσεται κύριος ἀμαρτίαν, 8. And, in all, its meaning appears to be simply *to count to, to be counted to; to set down to the account of, or to be so set down*, or something to the same effect. Davenant, *de justitia habituali et actuali*, says “*Imputare aliquid alicui idem est in hac questione atque, inter ea quæ sunt ipsius et ad eum pertinent illud connumerare ac recensere.*” And this, which seems the simple meaning of the Latin verb, *imputare*, would, of course, be a good explanation of the English verb directly derived from it, *to impute*; except that use appears to confine this latter to cases in which something morally good or evil, deserving praise or blame, is ascribed. Indeed, the noun, *imputation*, is only capable of even so extensive a use, when employed by ethical writers, as a technical term; for, in common parlance, it is confined to cases in which something *blame-worthy* is attributed to one, and is nearly equivalent to *charge* or *accusation*. It appears likely that our translators, who render the original verb very variously, chose here, of the different words which would suit the place, *to impute*, from its appropriation to cases of morals. And it seems a very fit rendering. But English readers will probably have a more correct conception of the meaning of the entire passage, when they are informed that the word translated so often in Rom. iv. *to impute*, is, in the original, the same as that which, in other parts of the same chapter, is rendered by *to count*, and *to reckon*. So that, though the phrase, *imputed righteousness*, is generally understood to mean, righteousness ascribed to a man *which is not his own* (I have myself used it in that sense, p. 77), it will be seen that this is not properly conveyed by the word *imputed*; that it simply expresses that the righteousness spoken of is *counted to a man, or set down to his account*, without intimating whether it be his own or another's. But, as this plain point has been curiously misunderstood, I shall dwell a little longer upon it. The notion, indeed, that λογίζομαι, *imputare*, had some more occult meaning seems to have been a very early one. Chemnitz tells us that in the well-known controversy raised by Osiander, a

divine, whom he leaves anonymous, unintentionally caused no little mirth by maintaining that *imputare* was *verbum hortense*; and that, as *putare* meant *to prune, to lop off*, so *imputare* meant *to ingraft, to implant*! The eminent persons who have since been looking for some recondite sense in this simple word, would probably have joined cordially in the laugh at their too ingenious predecessor: but though their own researches have led to nothing quite so ludicrous as this discovery of a horticultural metaphor in the term, I do not think the result of their labours has been much sounder, or more valuable.

Erasmus holds *imputatio* to be equivalent to the legal term, *acceptilatio*. Piscator, *de Justificatione hominis coram Deo*, says, "Proprie autem loquendo dicitur aliquid alicui imputari quod ipse non fecit, quodve in ipso non est; et contra non imputari dicitur id quod aliquis fecit quodve in ipso est." I should have thought that the second member of this sentence sufficiently exposed the unsoundness of the first; but Arminius, *Responsio ad xxxi. Artt.*, adopts the explanation as one which Piscator, he says, *bene observavit et probavit*, Art. 4. (i. e. 4, of the eleven last Artt., the 21st from the beginning.) Notwithstanding this emphatic commendation, however, I do not think they agree exactly as to the meaning of the word. They both hold that the word conveys that there is some impropriety or irregularity in the ascription to us of the act or quality spoken of; but Piscator conceives that this properly lies in taking that for ours which is not ours; so that, though the term is used properly when it is said that *righteousness is imputed to a sinner* (because he has not righteousness himself), it is used improperly when it is said that *faith is imputed to him for righteousness* (because he really has faith). And this latter phrase, therefore, is to be interpreted in accommodation to the former. Arminius, on the other hand, while he thinks also that *imputatio est gratiosa æstimatio*, seems to think (*Theses de Just. Thes.* 10) that the grace of the act may lie either in ascribing to us what is not ours, or in ascribing to us as righteousness what is not really righteousness. And this is also, so far as I can collect, the notion which Jonathan Edwards (a strange conjunction!) puts forward in his able sermon on Justification. He says that the phrase, *it is counted or imputed to him for right-*

tenness, imports that "God of his sovereign grace is pleased to take and regard that which indeed is not righteousness, and in one that has no righteousness, so that the consequence shall be the same as if he had righteousness;" which is certainly very true; but he adds that "it is manifest that the apostle lays the stress of his argument for the free grace of God, from that text which he cites out of the Old Testament about Abraham, on that word *counted or imputed*." And again: "The Scripture uses the word *impute* in this sense, viz., for reckoning any thing belonging to any person, to another person's account." In this view of the meaning of the word he seems to me to fall into a curious though perhaps no very important error; and he certainly supports his view by very strange reasoning. He derives this force of the verb partly from the force of the kindred verb *ἐλλογέω*, and partly from the apostle's reasoning upon the passage given above from Romans iv. 3. The verb *ἐλλογέω* has plainly, he thinks, some such force in Philemon 18, where Paul, taking on himself the debt of Onesimus, says, *ταῦτο ἐμοὶ ἐλλογῇ*: whereas, it is plain, on the contrary, I think, that it has in that passage no such force; nor any meaning beyond *count or charge*; and that, accordingly, it is rightly translated in our version, *set that down to my account*. There seems, indeed, a curious confusion of ideas in what Edwards says about this simple passage. We know, it is true, that the effect of what Paul desired Philemon to do would be, the substitution for the real debtor of one who, in fact, owed nothing, except by his voluntary engagement to discharge the debt contracted by the former; but we manifestly know this from the circumstances of the case, and not from the phrase; to find all this in *the phrase* is a mode of proceeding which would introduce us to strange meanings of words. In fact, not to go beyond the case before us, any reasoning which would enable us to conclude that *ἐλλογέω* meant, properly, *to charge a man with what another owed*, because Paul, in engaging to discharge the debts of Onesimus, says, *ταῦτο ἐμοὶ ἐλλογῇ*, would serve to prove that *ἀπορίω* means, properly, *to pay another man's debts*, because he adds, on the same occasion, *ὑπὸ ἀπορίω*. The only other text in which the verb occurs in the New Testament is *ἀμαρτία θεὸν ἐλλογᾷται μὴ ὄντος νόμου*,

Romans v. 13. And it seems strange that Edwards could have referred to that text (as he does) without seeing how little such a force as he ascribes to the verb can properly belong to it; for assuredly assigning any such meaning to it there would destroy altogether the sense of the passage. But I suppose too much has been said upon a point so manifestly untenable.

Something of the same confusion appears in what he says about the reasoning of the apostle on the text, *ἐλογίσθη ἑντῷ εἰς δικαιοσύνην*, Romans iv. 3. He thinks that, in what follows, the apostle plainly assumes that there is here conveyed some substitution of one thing for another, or setting down to a man what properly does not belong to him, or something of that kind. And so he manifestly does; but by no means, as Edwards strangely supposes, that this is conveyed *principally* by the word *ἐλογίσθη*. It is not, as I have said, conveyed by that word at all. And of this he might have been satisfied, if he had considered that the apostle's reasoning is just as good in English as in Greek; yet no one, I suppose, imagines that the English word, *counted*, has any thing of this pregnant sense which Edwards attributes to the Greek word for which it stands. Indeed, a glance at the passage in the original which furnishes him with his argument would show any one how little foundation there is for it—*τῷ δὲ ἐργαζομένῳ ὁ μισθὸς οὐ λογίζεται κατὰ χάριν ἀλλὰ κατὰ ὀφείλημα*:—Moses says nothing of *κατὰ χάριν*, Edwards reasons, unless by using the word *ἐλογίσθη*; and hence he concludes that the verb conveys something of this kind naturally and of itself. But (not to insist upon the point that, if this were the case, it would seem that St. Paul needed not have added *κατὰ χάριν*; for *ὁ μισθὸς οὐ λογίζεται* would then express all that he wanted) the remaining part of the sentence shows that the word is equally fit to be employed when the reward set down is a strict and proper debt, *κατὰ ὀφείλημα*: as would, indeed, further appear conclusively in verse 8, from *μακάριος ἄνθρωπος ὃς οὐ μὴ λογισθῇ πύριος ἀμαρτίαν*; where no impropriety in the ascription can be imagined to be intended by the word. But where, then, does St. Paul find *κατὰ χάριν* in the original record which he quotes? Evidently in *εἰς δικαιοσύνην*. What is told of Abraham was clearly not righteousness;

and when Moses records that *it was counted to him for righteousness*, it must manifestly have been by an act of God's grace, and not in the way of strict dealing. And so Paul most legitimately assumes in reasoning upon it. But all this will, I doubt not, appear evident without further explanation. And there seems, indeed, so little ground for giving λογίζεσθαι in the original passage any other meaning than the simple one which it so often bears, and which our translators give it in rendering the text, *to be counted to*; that I may be thought to have misspent time in combating, at such length, such feeble reasoning in support of so manifest an error. But, finding it in an author of such deserved reputation as Edwards, I thought it worth noticing at greater length than I should if I had met it elsewhere. Besides, it is of great importance in every doctrine to fix how much of it is expressly revealed, and how much made up by our own inferences from express revelation. I do not mean that the latter part is to be rejected; it may, on the contrary, be an essential part of the truth: but our own views are much more likely to be sound and exact, and our judgments of the views of those who differ from us temperate and fair, when we are able to separate with certainty the two portions; and this can manifestly be done only when we have fixed the exact meaning of the Scripture declarations which we use.

To reckon, then, to count, to impute, righteousness to a man, all mean the same thing. And if reference be made to Romans iv., in which Paul is led to give a full account of the nature and extent of *Justification*, in vindicating and explaining his statement of the doctrine of Justification by faith in the preceding chapter, it will be found that he infers from the Scripture record of Abraham's justification, viz., that *Abraham believed God, and it was counted to him for righteousness*, that he could not have been justified by works; that, had he been, the record would not thus represent him as rewarded gratuitously, but as paid his due; that the statement that *his faith was counted to him for righteousness* conveys distinctly that the case was of one *who worked not, but believed on that God who justifieth the ungodly*; and that this blessedness, the blessedness of the man to whom God thus *imputeth righteousness without works*, is that which David

extols when he says, "*Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven, whose sins are covered. Blessed is the man to whom the Lord doth not impute sin.*" He then enters into a proof that this blessedness extends to all who believe, as Abraham did, whether they be Jews or Gentiles; and that *righteousness shall be imputed to them also*; and adds that the main purpose of this record about which he has been reasoning was to establish this: that *it* [righteousness, or faith for righteousness] *shall be imputed to us also if we believe on him that raised up Jesus our Lord from the dead.*

Here, then, is a distinct and full statement of the nature of the Justification of sinners, which perfectly coincides with the account arrived at in a different way (page 65). I showed there that when we are *justified* we are *declared innocent*; that innocence, under either divine law, whether natural or revealed, requires an abstinence from acts forbidden by the law, and a performance of those enjoined by it; that therefore, in *justifying* us, God must not only obliterate altogether the sins which we have committed, but that He must ascribe to us the obedience which we have not rendered. I grant that such an account as this of Justification, however strongly supported it be by reasoning, requires some direct confirmation from Scripture: but is there not here a complete and literal confirmation of it? Here the apostle not only distinctly informs us that God *justifies the ungodly, those who have not worked, but who have believed upon Him*; but he tells us that when they are so justified *their iniquities are forgiven, their sins are covered; that God doth not impute sin unto them, and that He doth impute righteousness unto them.* The coincidence is perfect, and, as appears to me, irresistible.

Here are two modes of arriving at a knowledge of the nature of Justification, perfectly distinct, and leading precisely to the same conclusion: and can any reasonable doubts remain of the correctness of this result? Whatever doubts might fairly be entertained about it while the statement rested almost or altogether upon reasoning, are they not wholly taken away by this direct, express, and unequivocal testimony of the Apostle? I speak thus of the testimony of the Apostle, in the passage to which I have

the man whom God justifies; then, according to the apostle, justification and forgiveness of sin are all one; but those propositions are equivalent, if the apostle cite the text pertinently.*

Every one will be ready to admit, as the Archbishop expects, that the Apostle has cited the passage from the Psalms pertinently; the question with most persons will be, is it necessary, in order to vindicate the pertinence of the citation, that we should hold that the two descriptions of the man whom God justifies are precisely equivalent? Let us, therefore, consider this. Tillotson cannot, of course, mean that, if there were an hundred distinct felicities of the justified man recorded in Scripture, it might not be pertinent to the Apostle's purpose to quote them all. What he must mean, is, that Paul's mode of introducing the quotation (*even as*) intimates, naturally, that what he is about to cite from the Psalms, concerning this character, is equivalent to what he has already cited from Genesis. And, no doubt, the form of expression does fairly intimate,—not the equivalence of the two passages—but that they both bear upon the same point; and that the latter confirms the conclusion to which the former led. Any one who considers the place fairly will see, not only that this is actually the case, but that it renders a sufficient account of the purpose of the second citation, and of the form in which it is made. He will see that the first quotation,

* In his *Apologia Disputationis de causa meritoria Justif. hom. coram Deo*, Piscator not only maintains the same view as Tillotson's, but supports it by precisely the same reasoning; with the difference that he states the argument more formally. Quod autem in loco illo Paulino imputari homini justitiam idem sit quod peccata ei remitti, quivis non contentiosus et præjudicio occupatus facile ex ipsa sententiarum cohærentia, videre potest. Verba apostoli hæc sunt, Rom. iv. 6, 7, *Sicut etiam David, &c.* Hic probaturus apostolus hominem illam beatum esse cui Deus imputat justitiam, adducit testimonium ex Psal. 32. At in illo dicto sententia probanda (nempe beatus est homo cui Deus imputat justitiam) non habetur. Ergo aut nihil probat, aut probat vi æquipollentiæ. Dicere autem quod nihil probet blasphemum esset. Necesse est igitur fateri quod probet vi æquipollentiæ.—*Consideratio, Thes. xxxv.* The only equivalence, however, established by this argument, as I remark hereafter, is that the person described as having his sins pardoned is the same as the person before described as having righteousness imputed to him; not that the meaning of the different phrases thus employed to designate him is precisely the same; which is the equivalence plainly that Piscator wants.

from Genesis, was designed to prove the gratuitous character of justification, and its total independence upon works; and that the quotation from the Psalms establishes the same points, even more distinctly to common apprehensions: the former passage declaring, as the Apostle explains it, that this object of God's favour has no righteousness of his own which can be set down to his account, and that he is accepted by having his faith set down for righteousness; the latter, that he (for it is the same character to which it relates, as the Apostle declares,) has *iniquities to be pardoned, and sins to be covered*. Does not this give a satisfactory reason for the *even as* of the Apostle? And, when a reasonable account is given of this form of expression, I cannot believe that there is any thing in the argument of Tillotson which would justify me in dwelling longer upon it. Assuredly, no one can require to be guarded against the coarse sophism which infers the identity of the imputation of righteousness, and the pardon of sin, because each is used to describe God's justification of sinners. If we were at liberty to take two assertions about the same thing, and infer that, because they *mean the same thing*, in the sense of *designating, or being applied to, the same thing*, they must *mean the same thing*, in the very different sense of *being equivalent propositions*, there are scarcely any propositions so diverse that we might not prove identical. Yet this is plainly what is done here; with the additional unfairness that, in fixing the common sense of the assertions, it is derived, not from the one which expresses most, but from that which expresses least.

It cannot be necessary to say any thing more upon this attempt to defend so plain an evasion of Scripture. Indeed, in a case in which Scripture speaks distinctly, perhaps the best mode of answering such attempts to misrepresent its testimony is simply to transcribe the passage misrepresented, and to leave it to have its fair weight with fair minds. In the present case, the testimony is so explicit that, when I want to express that *the imputation of righteousness to believers forms an essential part of their justification*, I find myself continually led to use the language of the Apostle; not merely for the authority which it lends the declaration, but for the clearness with which it

expresses my meaning. And, if such language do not set at rest the question, I am unable to conceive what can or could. If such reiterated and explicit declarations of the fact, from such authority, do not compel belief of it, it seems vain to seek to secure assent to it in any other way. I desire, however, once more to remind the reader, that the fact to which this testimony is given is not one requiring any extraordinary testimony from its own nature, but that it is, on the contrary, one which, as I have shown pp. 64, 68, we could have anticipated from the nature of justification, and from the nature of the divine law; that we could be sure that, if God justifies sinners, he declares them innocent; and that, if they are counted innocent, they must not merely be pardoned their offences against his law, but regarded, too, as having performed what it requires.

After what I have said, p. 68, it cannot be necessary for me to add any thing in the way of precaution against the misconception, that, in labouring at this point, I am dividing justification into distinct or successive acts; or, that I suppose that God can pardon any to whom he does not, at the same time, impute righteousness, or impute righteousness to any whom He does not pardon. I am sure that, in the justification of sinners, these gracious acts are not only in fact, but, necessarily, united; and I have so said distinctly in the place referred to, and elsewhere. By one, therefore, who had right notions of Justification, *pardon* might be used to express it: it is actually so used, not only in the Bible, but in various Protestant writers, who yet assert, in the most distinct terms, the concomitance of the imputation of righteousness with the pardon of sin in the justification of sinners. I am, of course, therefore, not labouring against any such interchange of the words, but seeking to guard against the inadequate notions of justification to which it is calculated to lead.

The express testimony of Scripture, then, concerning the nature of God's justification of sinners, is that, besides *the pardon of their iniquities, the covering of their sins*, it includes also *the imputation of righteousness* unto them: that to those whom He justifies *He does not impute sin*; and that *He does impute righteousness to them*. We are further informed, not only that those who are so justified are *believers* in Jesus, but

NOTE 14. PAGE 101.

The Reformers' Declarations of the Doctrine of Justification by Faith only.

THE universal concurrence of the early Reformers in this doctrine of Justification by Faith only, must have already appeared, to a great extent, in the quotations which I have given from their writings. It was impossible, unless I had mutilated the extracts to a degree that would have rendered them unintelligible, to have given the Reformers' definitions of Faith and of Justification, without also giving the views of the writers concerning their connexion. This will abridge the extracts which I should subjoin in support of the strong assertion in this Sermon ; but I shall not be prevented from making so important a point perfectly clear, even by the apprehension of being led into a little repetition.

The question is not, whether all the first Reformers professed the doctrine that *we are justified by Faith only* ; for every one knows that they all did ; but what they meant by the declaration ? I shall endeavour, in the quotations that follow, to put that point beyond doubt ; but I desire to remind the reader that I have already supplied quotations in abundance to show what they meant both by *Faith* and by *Justification* ; and that he should not expect generally to find that those who have so fully explained the meaning of these terms, should always accompany their statements of the doctrine by a repetition of definitions already given in the same documents, or just about to be subjoined. Such, however, was their sense of the great importance of the doctrine, its great liability to evasion, misconception, and abuse, that they frequently do take this additional precaution, to render a mistake of their meaning impossible,—as will appear by the citations which I am about to give ; but, when they do not, reference should be made to their definitions contained in the former quotations. As before, I shall begin with the Confessions.

Confessio Augustana. 1530. Art. 4.

Item docent [ecclesiæ apud nos] quod homines non possunt justificari coram Deo propriis viribus meritis aut operibus, sed

gratis justificentur propter Christum per fidem, cum credunt se in gratiam recipi et peccata remitti propter Christum qui sua morte pro peccatis nostris satisfecit. Hanc fidem imputat Deus pro justitia coram ipso. Rom. iii. iv.

Confessio Saxonica. 1551.

Cum autem hac voce arguente peccata mens perterrefacta est, audiat promissionem Evangelii propriam de Filio Dei, et statuatur sibi remitti peccata gratis propter Filium Dei, Dominum nostrum Jesum Christum propitiatorem, per misericordiam, non propter contritionem aut dilectionem nostram; hac fide cum erigitur, certum est donari remissionem peccatorum, reconciliationem, et imputationem justitiæ, propter ipsius Christi meritum; et Christum in nobis efficacem esse et Spiritu suo vivificare credentes, et ex æterna morte nos liberare et facere nos simul hæredes vitæ æternæ.

Confessio Bohemica. 1535. *Latine Auctior.* 1572.

Hæc sola fides et hæc intimi cordis in Jesu Christum fiducia justificat, seu justum facit hominem coram Deo absque ullis operibus quæ ipse addat conferendo aut ullo merito ipsius; de qua Sanctus Paulus dicit *ei vero*, &c. Rom. iv.

Confessio Tigurina. 1545.

Qua propter hoc et solido hujus nostræ veræ, indubitatæ et Christianæ fidei argumento instructi, nullis humanis vel operibus vel meritis sed per solam Dei gratiam, id est per sanctam illam crucifixi Filii Dei passionem et innocentem mortem homines justitiam consequi, a peccatis mundari, vel eorundem satisfactionem aut expiationem impetrare posse, docemus. Et quod mortis Christi innocentiae et meriti tunc participes reddamur cum Dei Filium nostrum esse, et propter peccata nostra, ut nos nimirum justos et beatos redderet, mortem subiisse, vera et constanti fide credimus.

Confessio Helvetica. 1536. *Auctior.* 1566.

Proprie igitur loquendo Deus solus nos justificat, et duntaxat propter Christum justificat non imputans nobis peccata sed imputans ejus nobis justitiam Quoniam vero nos justificationem hanc recipimus non per ulla opera sed per fidem in Dei misericordiam et Christum, ideo docemus et credimus cum apostolo hominem peccatorem justificari sola fide in Christum non lege aut ullis operibus.

Confessio Belgica. 1561. Latinè reddita, 1581.

Merito igitur jureque dicimus cum D. Paulo, nos sola fide justificari, seu fide absque operibus legis. Cæterum proprie loquendo nequaquam intelligimus ipsam fidem per se seu ex se nos justificare, ut quæ sit duntaxat velut instrumentum quo Christi justitiam nostram apprehendimus. Christus ergo ipse est nostra justitia qui omnia sua merita nobis imputat, fides vero est instrumentum, quo illi in societatem seu communionem omnium bonorum ipsius copulamur atque in ea retinemur.

Confessio Gallica. 1559. Latinè reddita. 1566.

Credimus totam nostram justitiam positam esse in peccatorum remissione, quæ sit etiam, ut testatur David, unica nostra felicitas. Igitur cæteras omnes rationes quibus homines existimant se coram Deo posse justificari plane repudiamus, omnique virtutum et meritorum opinione abjecta, in sola Jesu Christi obedientia prorsus acquiescimus, quæ quidem nobis imputatur tum ut tegantur nostra peccata tum etiam ut gratiam coram Deo nanciscamur.

Art. 20. Credimus nos sola fide fieri hujus justitiæ participes.

Apologia Conf. Augustanæ.

Utrumque enim damnant [adversarii nostri] et quod negamus homines propter sua merita consequi remissionem peccatorum; et quod affirmamus homines fide consequi remissionem peccatorum, et fide in Christum justificari.

Sola fide non per dilectionem non propter dilectionem consequimur remissionem peccatorum, etsi dilectio sequitur fidem.

Cum autem sola fide accipiamus remissionem peccatorum et reconciliationem, propterea sola fides justificat; quia reconciliati reputantur justi et Filii Dei non propter suam munditiam sed per misericordiam propter Christum, si tamen hanc misericordiam fide apprehendant. Ideoque Scriptura testatur quod fide justi reputamur.

LUTHER. *In Ep. ad Galat.* Cap. 2.

Hic observandum est, ista tria, fidem, Christum, acceptionem seu reputationem, conjungenda esse. Fides apprehendit Christum, et habet eum præsentem, inclusumque tenet, ut annulus gemmam. Et qui fuerit inventus hac fiducia apprehensi Christi in corde, illum reputat Deus justum. Hæc ratio est et meritum quo

propositum habuerunt perferre et justitiam : qui
operibus non, sed fide non apprehendit Christum quod
tenet, et non habuit et Propter hoc, idem so-
lus Deus acceptat non reputat nos justos solum
operibus Christi.

Concedimus, cum Paulus, sola fide, non fide
operibus, non justitiam. Quare non est firmæ gra-
tificationis et non justitiam sed fide, quæ apprehendit
et non operibus Christi satisfactionem. Ista fides sine
operibus justitiam.

In Galatas, Cap. 2.

Quæ veritas manifeste aperte veritati contradicunt
propositum et negantem et adversativam nos-
træ sententiæ non operibus, sed sola nova gloria quam rece-
deret non ad justitiam non errem. Non enim sin-
gulis justitiam tribuit sed operibus conjunctis cu-
jus videtur et manifeste et turpi errore deprehensum
operibus habere et non fide, et quidem traditionum hum-
iliter. Ita ergo justitiam esse adhibent et pro tra-
ditio quæ opera et justitiam legi ad justificationem e-
st. Vnde non ad quidem ad declarationem justam ignor-
antibus, sed operibus et dicant fidem operibus et dicant
operibus et non solum fidem justificare, sed fidem cum op-
eribus non operibus iustitia est. At hu-
jusmodi nullam declarationem aut limitationem addunt
operibus quæ inquam necessaria ad salutem, inquam,
non dicimus substandum operibus. Est satis astutus dis-
cussus ubi legi tantis bene impensis et rationi facit. . . .
Non negamus non dicimus esse opera sed hoc improbum
adversum committent fidem justificantem et opera justifi-
cantem. Bene quidem conveniunt, et sunt connexa in-
trinsèque fides et opera. Sed sola fides est quæ appre-
hendit gratiam. Ideo solum fidem justificantem prædi-
cant sola beneficiaria, opera non habent gloriam quod bene-
ficiaria sunt fructus beneficiarie persone.

Matthæus. Responsio ad Barur. Articulus. 1559

Est autem verum est cum in conversione sit vera cons-
titutio per Spiritum Sanctum, habitare Deum in cordibus

choari novam obedientiam. Tamen semper statuendum est in hac vita personam justam esse coram Deo, sola fide, id est habere remissionem peccatorum et reconciliationem seu imputationem justitiæ, placere seu acceptam esse personam Deo ad vitam æternam et hæreditatem vitæ æternæ, solâ fide, id est fiducia mediatoris. Ut quamquam in Paulo renato habitat Deus, ut sunt excellentes virtutes, tamen quia adhuc in eo peccatum est, in hac vita persona habet remissionem peccatorum reconciliationem et imputationem justitiæ, et est justa, placens Deo, et accepta ad vitam æternam, sola fide, id est propter solum mediatorem.

Enarratio Symboli Nicæni ultima. 1557.

Conclusio. Recte explicatis vocabulis recito propositionem quæ est summa evangelii recitata a Paulo, Rom. iii. et deinceps, propter Filium Dei Mediatorem, et quidem propter ejus obedientiam, gratis non propter ulla nostra merita, recipimus in veris pavoribus sola fide remissionem peccatorum et reconciliationem, et in ea consolationem cum Fide sustentamur, Filius Dei ipse in nobis est efficax, dicit consolationem, voce evangelii ostendit misericordiam Patris, et liberat nos ex doloribus inferorum, et dat Spiritum Sanctum; ac reputamur justi coram Deo propter obedientiam Mediatoris, et simul sumus hæredes vitæ æternæ propter Mediatorem, non propter nostram dignitatem aut nostras virtutis seu opera.

Acta Wormacensia. 1557.

De justificatione retinemus doctrinam quæ pio consensu in ecclesiis nostris juxta Confessionem et Apologiam proponitur; ac pie et constanter retinemus propositionem; *sola fide coram Deo justificamur.* Et hanc propositionem intelligimus et declaramus juxta consensum perpetuum traditum in Prophetis et Apostolicis Scriptis; quod homo in conversione ex injusto fiat justus, id est, ex reo habens remissionem peccatorum, reconciliatus et acceptus Deo ad vitam æternam, per misericordiam gratis propter solum Mediatorem filium Dei, sola fide, id est, fiducia Mediatoris, juxta promissionem; quæ fides nititur obedientia Mediatoris propter quam persona credens jam est justa, id est habens remissionem peccatorum, et reconciliata et accepta Deo justitia imputata. Cum igitur de justitia coram Deo

dicitur, semper fides nitatur obedientia Mediatoris. Hac fide persona justa est coram Deo etiam post regenerationem. Nec recipimus Synechdochen Origenis, Monachorum, Papistarum, libri Interim, Stencfeldii, Osiandri, Funcii, et aliorum, qui sic interpretantur propositionem, fide justificamur scil. præparatione, ut simus deinde alia re justa id est accepti coram Deo, scil. novitate seu dilectione, seu inhærenti justitia essentiali. Nam hi modi loquendi idem significant. Nec volumus abjici justitiam imputatam de qua Paulus expresse inquit, *Fides imputatur credenti ad justitiam*.

Instead of multiplying extracts to the extent that I easily could without giving any of a less equivocal character, I shall be content with subjoining two—to which, however, I invite particular attention; as I think they are peculiarly calculated to show how decided and cordial was the concurrence, upon the main points of this fundamental doctrine, even of those who differed widely upon some points of minor importance directly connected with it, and very widely upon some collateral questions. The first is taken from the proceedings of the Altenburg Conference, held 1568—1569, between the Divines of the Elector of Saxony, and those of the Duke, to arrange some differences connected with this doctrine, which belong to a class that I have upon system avoided in these Sermons and Notes. They were of a kind, however, which, though they admitted a good deal of subtlety and trifling, led necessarily to explicit statements of the views of the conferring divines upon the most important questions, and to very full discussions of them. The following are among the positions laid down by one side, and admitted by the other as not controverted:—

Passionem et obedientiam ipsius [Christi] pro nobis esse satisfactum. Impletionem legis per Christum nostra vice præstitam, fieri et esse nostram fide. Justiciam qua peccatores fide coram Deo justificantur esse obedientiam Christi pro nobis exhibitam. Justitia imputata nos coram Deo justos et acceptos et reconciliatos esse. Fidem esse organon quo Justiciam Christi apprehendimus, esseque donum Dei quod per vocem evangelii datur. Gratis ex sua misericordia, et dilectione Dei, imputari justiciam credentibus. Donari ei qui sic justificatur Spiritum

Sanctum qui novitatem inchoat in hac vita, quæ perficietur in altera vita.

It is true that these Articles are stated by the divines of the Duchy, whom Bellarmin calls *Lutherani rigidi*; but they are assented to, thus warmly, by those of the Electorate (Bellarmin's *Lutherani molles*). "Has formas recipimus et nos cum collocutoribus, et sic nos docentes sentire testamur; semperque ita nos docuisse ac sensisse libri testantur in corpore doctrinæ comprehensi, quos ut normam nos sequi sæpe affirmavimus." *Epilogus* iii. *Collationis Electoral. Theolog.*

The other quotation which I shall give is from the *Disputationes Privatae* of Arminius; it will show no less clearly how little the widest differences upon points of doctrine, which later discussions have forced into an artificial connexion with this doctrine of Justification, affected the concurrence of the earlier Protestant divines upon this emphatically Protestant principle.

Thesis 48. *De Justificatione.*

II. Justificatio est actio Dei Judicis justa et gratiosa, qua de throno gratiæ et misericordiæ hominem peccatorem sed fidelem, propter Christum, Christique obedientiam et justitiam, a peccatis absolvit, et justum censet, ad justificati salutem et justitiæ gratiæque divinæ gloriam.

III. Actionem Dei Judicis esse dicimus, qui licet ut supremus legislator de lege sua dispensare potuerit et reipsa dispensaverit, tamen non ex absoluta infinitæ potestatis plenitudine dispensationem administravit, verum inter justitiæ limites sese continuit, quam duplici modo demonstravit. Primo, quod non nisi præeunte reconciliatione et satisfactione per Christum in sanguine ejus peracta; secundo, quod non nisi peccata sua agnoscentes et in Christum credentes justificare voluit.

IV. Gratosam et misericordem actionem dicimus non respectu Christi, ac si Pater ex gratia contra strictam et rigidam justitiam distincta Christi obedientiam acceptasset pro justitia, sed nostri respectu, tum quia Deus ex gratiosa misericordia erga nos Christum pro nobis peccatum, et nobis justitiam fecit, ut nos essemus Dei justitia in illo; tum quia in fide Evangelii communionem Christi, illumque per fidem propitiatorem posuit.

VI. Objectum justificationis est homo peccator, talem se cum

dolore agnoscens, et fidelis, credens nempe in Deum qui justificat impium, et in Christum traditum propter peccata nostra, et resuscitatum propter justificationem nostri. Qua peccator justificatione ex gratia indiget, qua [quam?] fidelis justificationem ex gratia obtinet.

VII. Fides est causa vel actio instrumentalis qua Christum nobis in propitiationem et justitiam a Deo propositum apprehendimus, juxta præscriptum et promissum evangelii, quo dicitur *qui crediderit justificabitur et servabitur; qui non crediderit, condemnabitur.*

VIII. Forma est ipsa gratiosa æstimatio Dei, qua Christi justitiam nobis imputat, hoc est, peccata nostra nobis fidelibus, propter Christum fide apprehensum, remittit justosque in illo censet; quæ æstimatio junctam habet adoptionem in filios et collationem juris in hæreditatem vitæ æternæ.

The omitted and remaining Articles relate to less contested or less important points; or are included in the foregoing: and, to the whole, three Corollaries are appended; the first of which is, *Fidem et opera ad justificationem concurrere est impossibile.* It is right to add his account of evangelical Faith:—

Thesis 44. *De Fide in Deum et Christum.*

III. Fides Evangelica est adsensus animi a Spiritu Sancto per Evangelium in peccatoribus, et peccata per legem agnoscantibus, deque iisdem pœnitentibus productus, quo tum certo sibi persuasum habent, Jesum Christum a Deo constitutum esse auctorem salutis obtemperantibus ipsi, et suum quoque si in ipsum crediderint, *tum in illum tanquam talem credunt, et per eum in Deum tanquam Patrem benevolum in ipso ad salutem credentium et gloriam Christi et Dei.* This is not so expressed as to remove all doubt about his views upon the point; but, as he makes *a belief in Christ* as our Saviour an essential part of evangelical faith, and also describes this as founded upon a belief that Christ is the author of salvation *to all who obey him*, this would seem to infer that a part of the work of the Spirit upon the heart, in producing faith there, is the establishing a full confidence that we shall be enabled by the Lord to render to him all the obedience which he requires of his followers; and, if this be his meaning, his account of the principle does not perhaps differ

so much in substance as in form from the more simple statements of the earlier Reformers. That in his view of the state of mind of a believer it includes this confidence would appear from his account, of a believer in Art. VI. Thes. 48, quoted above; but it would appear also that he does not conceive it to be a part of evangelical faith from Art. V. of this 44th Thesis, in which he makes knowledge the antecedent of faith, and confidence its consequence:—"Fiducia autem consequens: per fidem enim fiducia collocatur in Christum, et per eum in Deum." But in a letter to Uytenbogaert (*Præstantiam ac erudit. Virorum Epistola*: Ep. 79) he declares more distinctly the necessity of their connexion, and their close conjunction in point of time. "Fieri autem nequit ut fides vera, qualem Deus in se postulat, non producat ex se illam fiduciam, et quidem *eo ipso momento* quo primam Deum talem concipit; hæc enim est nativa inter intellectum istum affectivum, et hunc affectum qui fiducia dicitur, relatio."

This leaves a difference with the earlier Protestant Divines concerning the principle; but it shows that there was none concerning the character justified, and the state of mind of all who are justified: and though I think, that, so far as Arminius differed here from the older authorities, he was in a real, and by no means an unimportant error; yet it is manifest how much the practical importance of the error is lessened by the extent of his agreement with them about the character and state of mind of a believer. This agreement appears sufficiently by what I have already quoted: but I add a striking passage, bearing upon the same point, from his *Oratio de Certitudine Sacrosanctæ Theologiæ*. After saying that the certainty of faith which God requires for his word is not satisfied either by *implicit* or *historical* faith, he continues:—"Sed postulat Deus verbo suo illam haberi fidem, qua sensus illo enunciati, quantum quidem ad salutem hominum et gloriam Dei est necesse, intelligantur, atque ita divini esse certo cognoscantur, ut non modo veritatem summam sed etiam summum bonum hominis complecti credantur: quæ fides non tantum credat Deum et Christum esse; neque tantum Deo credat et Christo aliquid enuntiantibus; sed in Deum et Christum credat talia de se affirmantibus, quæ fidē adpræhensa faciunt ut in Deum tanquam Patrem et in Christum tanquam

Salvatorem credatur; quod non theoretici modo, sed et practici intellectus manus esse arbitramur. Qua de causa fidei veræ et vivæ non modo ἀσφάλεια in Scripturis tribuitur, sed et πληροφορία et πεποίθσις. Atque istiusmodi *certitudinis* et fidei postulator et exactor est Deus.

Copious as these references have been, I must give in addition a few from our own writers. To the proof given in Sermon IV., page 121—124 of the declared principles of the Church of England, and the confirmation of it in the following Sermon, I have no wish to add any thing; but I shall subjoin some evidence of the views of the most eminent of her early divines; beginning as before, with the excellent Tindall.

A Pathway into the holy Scripture.

By faith are we saved, onely in belevyng the promises. And though fayth be never without love and good workes, yet is our saving imputed neither to love, nor unto good workes, but unto faith onely.

Parable of the wicked Mammon.

That fayth onely, before all workes, and without all merites, but Christe's onely, justifieth and setteth us at peace with God, is proved by Paul in the first chapiter to the Romans. [And after alleging and explaining the most important texts connected with the doctrine, he says] And of such like ensamples are all the Epistles of Paul full. Marke how Paule laboureth with him selfe to expresse the excedyng misteryes of fayth in the epistle to the Ephesians, and in the epistle to the Colossians. Of these and many such like textes, are we sure that the forgiveness of sinnes, and justifying is appropriate unto faith onely without the addyng to of workes.

CRANMER. *Catechismus. General Preface.*

Wherefore, good children, it is necessarie for you to learne the doctrine of faithe, for without it we can not be justified, or brought agayn into God's favour. For no man is just or righteous before God, that hath not the Holy Gost, and he that will receyve the Holy Gooste, muste beleve in Christe (for by faith we receyve the Holy Goost) therefore, by faith we be iustified. Agayne, yf we wyll be saved we must knowe God and our Lord Jesus Christe, as it is wrytten John the xvii. But we can not

knowe God and hys sonne Jesus Christ, but by fayth, therefore fayth iustifieth vs, and bringeth lyfe euerlastyng.

The Lord's Prayer. The seconde Petition.

For fyrste by faythe we be iustified before God (for fayth maketh vs partakers of the iustice of Christ, and planteth us in Christe) and he that by true faythe doth receive the promise of grace, to hym God gyueth the Holye Ghoste, by whome charitie is spred abrode in our hertes, whiche perfourmeth all the commandementes. Therefore, he that beleveth in Christ, and truely beleveth the gospel, he is just and holy before God, by the iustice of Christe, whiche is imputed and gyven unto him, as Paul saith, Romans iii. We thynke that man is iustified by faith without workes. He is also just before the world, because of the loue and charitie which the Holy Ghost worketh in his herte.

Secondly, faith worketh peace and quietnes in oure heartes and consciences. For by faith we be certified that our synnes be forgynen. Therefore, saythe Sayncte Paule to the Romanes: Beyng iustified, we haue peace and quietnesse wyth God, by oure Lorde Jesus Christe.

Thirdely, this peace bryngeth vnto vs a great and synguler ioy in our hertes and consciences, and maketh vs, for this exceeding benefite of God's mercy and grace towarde vs, feruently to loue hym, gladly to laude and prayse him, to honoure hys name, and to professe the same before all the worlde euermore, to gyue vnto hym moste herty thanks, and to be swift and redye to do all thinges that maye please God, and to eschewe those things that maye displease hym.

BECON. *The Christian Knight* (from the edition of the Tract Society).

In myself I am a sinner; but in Christ, my righteous Maker, I am righteous. For he hath forgiven me all my sins, and hath taken me into his grace, favour, and tuition. He is always ready to help me; he forgiveth me the remnants of my sins, and purgeth them in me daily, till he maketh me altogether new Behold, therefore, [Satan] that thy accusation which thou attemptest against me, cannot have place in me. For, although I fulfil not the commandments of God in the law with mine own works, yet I fulfil them in the gospel with the most perfect

works, and the satisfaction of Christ, in whom I believe. This faith is reckoned to me unto righteousness, although my works of themselves be imperfect. And this is the only and true manner of fulfilling the law of God, that I believe in Christ, the only fulfiller of the law and justifier, without whom the law can never be fulfilled. All these things can I prove by the word of God, &c,

Therefore, it is all one whether we say faith justifies without works—as Paul saith, “God saves us through his mercy, and not for our works”—and as Peter saith, “We believe to obtain health through the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ”—or if we say with the ancient Catholic doctors, Faith alone justifieth or saveth. For we mean none other things by those words than that our righteousness and everlasting salvation comes of the free and mere grace of God promised in Christ; that Christ hath deserved these so great benefits for us, and not we ourselves; that we can none otherwise than by faith lay hand on the mercy of God or on Christ.

And this is the Confession and Faith of all the Catholic church.

The demands of the Holy Scripture.

Who is just or righteous? He that hath faith; for through faith we are justified. To be justified is to have our sins not imputed unto us, but to have them forgiven in Christ and for Christ. Even as David saith, Blessed are they, &c. Now, because the faithful man alone receives and enjoys this mercy, forgiveness, and this no imputing of sin through faith, therefore, he is called just; and we, through faith, are said to be justified.

See further, *The Sufferings of Christ*, p. 469. *The Office of the Holy Ghost*, p. 487, in the valuable collection of Becon's writings, published by the Tract Society.

HOOPER. *Declaration of Christ* (from the edition of the Tract Society) Chap. VII. of *Justification*.

Paul declares that for the death and merits of Christ we are saved, and not by our own virtues. So that faith not only shows us that Christ died, and now sitteth at the right hand of God; but also applies the merits of this death unto us, and makes Christ ours. Faith lays nothing to gage unto the justice of God, but

the death of Christ, and thereupon claims mercy and God's promise, the remission of sin, and desires God to justify and deliver the soul from the accusation of the law, and the right of the devil, which he is bound to do for his promise' sake.

And mark this manner of speech : "We are justified by faith;" that is, "we are just through the confidence of mercy." This word, faith, comprehends as well a persuasion and confidence, that the promise of God appertains to us for Christ's sake, as the knowledge of God. For faith, though it desires the company of contrition and sorrow for sin, yet it contends not in judgment upon the merits of any works, but only for the merits of Christ's death. In case it did, it avails nothing, &c. We must, therefore, only trust to the merits of Christ, which satisfied the extreme jot and uttermost point of the law for us. And he imputes and communicates this his justice and perfection to us by faith.

This example of Nicodemus declares that neither the works that go before justification, neither those that follow justification, deserve remission of sin. Though sole faith excludes not other virtues from being present at the conversion of every sinner, yet sole and only faith excludes the merits of other virtues, and obtains solely remission of sin, for Christ's sake, herself alone.

Confession of Christian Faith.

Art. XIV. I believe and confess Jesus Christ to be the fullness, the end, and accomplishment of the law, to the justification of all that believe, through whom, and by whom only, all the promises of the Father are accomplished, yea, even to the uttermost. Who also alone hath perfectly satisfied the law in that which no other amongst men could perform; as the law doth command things impossible, which, nevertheless, man must accomplish, not by working, but through believing: for so is the law accomplished, through faith, and not through works; and by this means shall men find the righteousness of faith to be available before the Lord, and not the righteousness of works, which leadeth nothing unto perfection.

JEWEL. *Defence of the Apologie of the Church of Englande.*

Two other great quarrelles M. Hardinge moveth; the one of onely Faith; the other, as he calleth it, of the presumptuous

certaintie of salvation. Wherein judge thou uprightly, good Christian reader, howe juste cause he hath to reprove our doctrine. As for the firste hereof, St. Paule saithe, *Justificamur gratis ex gratia ipsius*. Wee be justified freely of his grace: wee judge that a man is justified by Faith without the woorkes of the lawe: wee knowe that a man is not justified by the woorkes of the lawe, but by the faith of Christe. M. Harding wil saie, yet hitherto of *sola fides*—that is, of *onely faith*, we heare nothing. Notwithstanding, when St. Paule excludeth al manner woorkes besides onely faith, what els then leaveth he but faith alone?

With this I shall end my extracts from the writings of British divines, though I could very easily add to these express testimonies, both from the writers referred to, and others of the same period, and carry them down to a later date. Indeed, my own acquaintance with the eminent divines of the Church of England, so far as it extends, fully corroborates the strong assertion of one who had a much larger and more exact knowledge of them—that, up to the year 1640, they were entirely agreed upon all the important parts of this fundamental doctrine. See Bp. Barlow's *Letters on Justification*: reprinted, 1828, pp. 86—110. I cannot refer to this excellent little work without expressing my sense of the obligation which its republication has conferred upon all students in divinity. Its general scholastic form may probably repel other readers; but rather favours the closeness of reasoning for which the letters are remarkable, and therefore is rather an additional recommendation to the class of whom I have spoken. I do not agree in every point with the bishop; I should not wish, indeed, to be understood to profess a perfect accordance upon all points with any even of the writers whom I have quoted oftenest, and most commended. But I agree with him, as I do with them, upon all points of real importance connected with this doctrine; and I consider his work of the highest value, for distinct statements of this great truth, and clear and close reasoning in support of it.

NOTE 15, PAGE 104.

True Connexion of Faith with Justification.

There was no point connected with this doctrine upon which the Reformers were more anxious to be explicit than the one insisted on here: that it is not as one of our virtues or good qualities, taken as the substitute for the others, or as the source and spring of all the rest, that faith justifies us. "Neque intelligi (says Luther) neque defendi potest hæc sententia, *Quod sola fides justificat*, si quis imaginatur ideo fide homines justificari quia fides in nobis sit novitas quædam seu nova qualitas." And, in the Augsburgh Confession, 1540: "Cum igitur dicimus *fide justificamur*, non hoc intelligimus, quod justis propter ipsius virtutis dignitatem. Sed hæc est sententia, consequi nos remissionem peccatorum et imputationem justitiæ per misericordiam propter Christum." The same point is most laboriously pressed in our own Homilies, "So that the true understanding of this doctrine—we be justified freely by faith without works, or that we be justified by faith in Christ only—is not that this, our own act, to believe in Christ, or this our faith in Christ, which is within us, doth justify us, and deserve our justification unto us—for that were to count ourselves to be justified by some act or virtue that is within ourselves—but the true understanding and meaning thereof is, that, although we hear God's word and believe it; although we have faith, hope, charity, repentance, dread and fear of God within us, and do never so many good works thereunto; yet we must renounce the merit of all our said virtues of faith, hope, charity, and all our other virtues and good deeds, which we either have done, shall do, or can do, as things that be far too weak, and insufficient, and imperfect, to deserve remission of our sins, and our justification. And therefore we must trust only in God's mercy, &c."—*Sermon of Salvation*, Part 2. And other equally express declarations to the same effect, both from public documents and eminent divines, could be very easily added. Nor can any one, indeed, understand the doctrine without perceiving the

vital importance of the position which they so carefully lay down, in explanation of it.

But it would seem still less easy to mistake these sound and necessary explanations of the true instrumentality of faith in man's justification, for declarations that it has none. Bull, however, having quoted several such passages from our Homilies, and the Confessions of other Protestant Churches, adds:—*Ex his autem testimoniis sole meridiano clarius est, quam perperam omnino veterum Protestantium doctrinam de justificatione ex sola fide, acceperint plerique sequioris ævi Protestantes, qui eos fidei præ cæteris virtutibus proprie dictam instrumentalitatem in negotio justificationis, tribuisse existimarunt. Merum hoc somnium est. Nam ex ipsorum doctrina jam fusius a nobis explicata, liquido liquet, nihil illos proprie dictæ efficacæ adeoque nec instrumentalitatis fidei præ cæteris virtutibus adscripsisse; sed id tantum voluisse, fidem ex omnibus virtutibus unam respectum connotare ad gratuitam Dei misericordiam, per Christum promissam quæ primaria justificationis nostræ causa est, ideoque figurata quidem, sed non incommoda locutione dici posse, nos sola fide justificari.* This certainly contains some truth; but no reader who has gone through the testimonies with which these notes have supplied him, can be at a loss to see how greatly it misrepresents the views of the Reformers which it professes to explain. To make out, indeed, that their declaration, *that we are justified by faith only*, expresses merely what faith does not do in the matter of our justification, and that it conveys nothing about what faith actually does, or, rather, conveys that it does nothing, is a mode of interpretation which it would be very hard to vindicate to the satisfaction of unprejudiced men. The true statement, as must be sufficiently apparent from all that I have cited from them, is, that having asserted so expressly that *we are justified by faith only*, they are naturally solicitous to guard against the mistake—that this justification is effected by faith, received by God in the way of compromise, a part, instead of all, that His law requires—or by faith, as the principal virtue, the spring and source of all the rest—or in any way which ascribes any meritorious efficacy of any kind to faith. They explain distinctly that this faith is *trust in another*; that it not only is *not trust in ourselves*,

but that it includes a renunciation of *all trust in ourselves, or in any thing in ourselves* ; and that, in the things thus renounced, of course *faith is itself included* : faith is commanded by God, and is the state of mind which becomes a sinner to whom the revelation of mercy is made in the gospel ; it is evidently, therefore, an act of obedience itself ; and the Reformers also declare and show that it is the source of all Christian obedience ; and so it might easily become a ground of dependance before God, like any other of our virtues or good qualities : nay, from its appointed instrumentality in our justification and in our sanctification, we are more peculiarly liable to be thus misled with respect to it than with respect to any other. So that, when this instrumentality has been so distinctly declared, the caution seems obviously to be required, that *trust in our faith*, under this view of its nature, is no more *justifying faith* than trust in our works, or our holiness, or our repentance, or any thing else wrought by us, or appertaining to us ; that, on the contrary, such trust is opposed to justifying-faith, and subversive of it ; and that the faith by means of which we are justified is *trust in Christ, and in his work*. When they join faith then with the other virtues, as not less to be excluded from our grounds of dependance before God, they do indeed assert that it has, *in this way*, no more and no other efficacy than the rest, that is to say, none whatever : but, is this asserting that it has in no other way a part to perform which they have not ? It is so far from this, that it is intended to be a description of the real nature of that faith, by which *only* it has been previously asserted that *we are justified* ; for, faith being trust, a statement in any particular case of what are and what are not the objects or grounds of trust, may be taken as the only account of the nature of the principle which can be needed. But, further, this instrumentality of faith is distinctly re-asserted—often in the course of these explanations, always by the writers who thus explain themselves, so as to leave no doubt of the extent and design of the explanatory passages. I might refer to past quotations for evidence of this ; but I will subjoin one or two new passages from the same sources. Bull's great point against the peculiar instrumentality of faith is, that in the sense in which other virtues are not instru-

mental (i. e. in any sense which ascribes merit to them) neither is it so : and that in the only sense in which it is instrumental (i. e. as a condition) so are all others. The point now is not how far this latter assertion is *true* (the other is not questioned), but how far it is the doctrine of the Protestant churches and eminent divines. I have given, as I said, ample materials for the decision of this point ; but I add the following passage from the Homilies ; expecting that, with any fair man who reads it, it cannot fail to be conclusive as to the principles of our own church. Having explained the cause and effects of the Lord's death, the Homily proceeds to point out the mode of applying it, *as a medicine to our wounds, so that it may work the same effect in us wherefore it was given, namely, the health and salvation of our souls.* " Almighty God commonly worketh by means ; and in this thing he hath also ordained a certain mean whereby we may take fruit and profit to our soul's health. What mean is that ? Forsooth, it is faith ! Not an inconstant and wavering faith, but a sure, steadfast, grounded, and unfeigned faith By this, then, you may well perceive, that the *only mean and instrument of salvation required of our parts is faith* ; that is to say, a sure trust and confidence in the mercies of God : whereby we persuade ourselves that God both hath and will forgive our sins ; that he hath accepted us again into his favour ; that he hath released us from the bonds of damnation, and received us again into the number of his elect people, not for our merits or deserts, but only and solely for the merits of Christ's death and passion ; who became man, &c. This faith is required at our hands. And this, if we keep steadfastly, there is no doubt but we shall obtain salvation at God's hands, as did Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob ; of whom the Scripture saith that they believed, and it was imputed unto them for righteousness. Was it imputed unto them only, and shall it not be imputed unto us also ? Yes, if we have the same faith as they had, it shall as truly be imputed unto us for righteousness as it was unto them. For it is one faith which must save both us and them, even a sure and steadfast faith in Christ Jesus Therefore, I say unto you, that we must apprehend the merits of Christ's death and passion by faith ; and that with a strong and

steadfast faith, nothing doubting but that Christ, by his own oblation and once offering of himself upon the cross, hath taken away our sins, and hath restored us again into God's favour so fully and perfectly that no other sacrifice shall hereafter be requisite or needful in all the world.

"Thus have you heard, in few words, the mean whereby we must apply the fruits and merits of Christ's death unto us, so that it may work the salvation of our souls—even a sure, steadfast, perfect, and grounded faith. For as all they which beheld steadfastly the brazen serpent, were healed and delivered, at the very sight thereof, from their corporal diseases and bodily stings, even so all they which behold Christ crucified, with a true and lively faith, shall undoubtedly be delivered from the grievous wounds of the soul, be they never so deadly or many in number.

"Therefore, dearly beloved, if we chance at any time, through frailty of the flesh, to fall into sin—as it cannot be chosen but we must needs fall often—and if we feel the heavy burthen thereof to press our souls, tormenting us with the fear of death, hell, and damnation; let us, then, use *that mean which God hath appointed in his word, to wit, the mean of faith, which is the only instrument of salvation now left unto us.* Let us steadfastly behold Christ crucified with the eyes of our heart. Let us only trust to be saved by his death and passion, and to have our sins clean washed away through his most precious blood; that in the end of the world," &c.—*Sermon on the Passion*, Part 2.

Nothing need be added to this in proof of the views of our Church, concerning the reality and the nature of faith's office in our Justification. As to the Continental Churches and Divines, the reader is desired to look at the passages from *the Apology for the Augsburg Confession* prefixed to Sermons IV. and VIII. Or this short extract from the Confession itself—"Cum igitur dicimus *Fide Justificamur*, non hoc intelligimus quod justi simus propter ipsius virtutis dignitatem. Sed hæc est sententia, consequi nos remissionem peccatorum et imputationem justitiæ per misericordiam propter Christum. Verum hæc misericordia non potest accipi nisi fide, et fides hic non tantum historiæ notitiam significat, sed significat credere promissioni misericordiæ quæ nobis

propter mediatorem Christum contingit." *De Fide*.—And the Saxon Confession : " Itaque et correlative intelligenda est hæc oratio, *Fide Justificamur*, hoc est, fiducia Filii Dei justificamur, non propter nostram qualitatem, sed quia ipse est propitiator, in quo cor acquiescit, fiducia promissæ misericordiæ propter eum." *De Rem. Pecc. et Just.*—And again in Art. IX. *Quomodo placeat nova obedientia*. " Primum statuatur renatus se reconciliatum esse Deo, sola fide, id est, fiducia mediatoris, et quanquam jam habitant in eo Pater, et Filius, et Spiritus Sanctus juxta illud, *venimus ad eum*, &c. tamen statuatur personam justam reputari propter Filium Dei mediatorem et deprecatores, gratis propter ipsius meritum." And Art. XVI. *De Pœnitentia* : " Sed qui credit sibi remitti peccata propter hunc mediatorem, jam certo accipit remissionem peccatorum propter Christum, qui efficax est in eo, et vivificat et sanctificat eum Spiritu suo sancto : et reconciliatus jam certo reputatur justus propter mediatorem, et est hæres vitæ æternæ." In the Belgic Confession, Art. XXII. " Merito igitur jureque dicimus cum D. Paulo, *Nos sola fide justificari*, seu *fide absque operibus legis*. Cæterum proprie loquendo, nequaquam intelligimus ipsam fidem per se, seu ex se, nos justificare, ut quæ sit duntaxat, veluti instrumentum, quo Christum justitiam nostram, apprehendimus. Christus igitur ipse est nostra justitia, qui omnia sua nobis merita imputat, *fides vero est instrumentum*, quo illi in societatum seu communionem omnium bonorum ipsius copulamur atque in ea retinemur ; adeo ut illa omnia nostra effecta, plus quam satis nobis sint ad nostri absolutionem a peccatis." And, finally, the Helvetic Confession, upon the same point testifies in the same way :—" Proprie ergo loquendo, Deus solus nos justificat, et duntaxat propter Christum justificat non imputans nobis peccata sed imputans ejus nobis justitiam. Quoniam vero nos justificationem hanc recipimus, non per ulla opera, sed per fidem in Dei misericordiam et Christum : ideo docemus et credimus cum Apostolo, hominem peccatorem justificari sola fide in Christum, non lege, aut ullis operibus. Dicit enim Apostolus. Ergo quia fides Christum justitiam nostram recipit, et gratiæ Dei in Christo omnia tribuit, ideo fidei tribuitur justificatio, maxime propter Christum, et non ideo, quia nostrum opus est. Donum enim

Dei est. Cæterum nos Christum fide recipere multis ostendit Dominus apud Joan. in Cap. vi. ubi pro *credere* ponit *manducare*, et pro *manducare*, *credere*. Nam sicut manducando cibum recipimus, ita credendo participamus Christo. Itaque Justificationis beneficium non partimur, partim gratiæ Dei vel Christo, partim nobis aut dilectioni, operibusve vel merito nostro, sed in solidum gratiæ Dei in Christo per fidem tribuimus. Sed et non possent Deo placere dilectio et opera nostra, si fierent ab injustis : proinde oportet nos prius justos esse quam diligamus, aut faciamus opera justa. Justi vere efficimur, quemadmodum diximus, per fidem in Christum, mera gratia Dei, qui peccata nobis non imputat, sed justitiam Christi, adeoque fidem in Christum ad justitiam nobis imputat.”—*De vera Fidelium Justificatione*.

The reader who has gone through these extracts is in a better condition to determine whether any special instrumentality in the Justification of sinners is ascribed to *faith* by the Reformers, and what that instrumentality is, than when he had only Bull’s account of their principles, though backed by an argument which the author warrants as *sole meridiano clarius*. Indeed, any one who reads carefully the foregoing extracts will not only be enabled to correct his mis-statement, but will be in full possession of the Protestant doctrine of Justification. And as the point at issue is of such vital importance to that doctrine, I am tempted to add a few passages from eminent divines, rather with the view of enlarging the explanations already given, than of adding to their authority. Thus, *Luther* : “Quando igitur fide in verbum Dei edoctus, apprehendo Christum, et tota fiducia cordis, (quod tamen sine voluntate fieri non potest) credo in eum, hac noticia justus sum. Sic fide seu hac notitia me justificato,” &c.—*In Ep. ad Galat. Præfat.* And on Chap. 2 : “Quare fides pure est docenda, quod scil. per eam sic conglutineris Christo, ut ex te et ipso fiat quasi una persona, non possit segregari sed perpetuo adhærescat ei ; ut cum fiducia dicere possis ; ego sum Christus, hoc est, Christi justitia, victoria, vita, &c. est mea. Et vicissim Christus dicat, Ego sum ille peccator, hoc est, ejus peccata, mors, &c. sunt mea quia adhæret mihi, et ego illi ; conjuncti enim sumus per fidem in unam carnem et os. Eph. v. &c.” And on Genesis, Chap. xv. “Quo-

modo igitur acquisivit justitiam? Hoc solo modo, quod Deus loquitur et Abraham loquenti Deo credit. Accedit autem Spiritus Sanctus, testis fide dignus, et affirmat, hoc ipsum credere, seu hanc ipsam fidem esse justitiam, seu imputari ab ipso Deo pro justitia, et haberi pro justitia." *Melancthon* has already supplied (Note 14) equally distinct declarations of this special instrumentality of faith; and, in adding a few from him, I am chiefly anxious to choose them of moderate length:—"Estque semper hæc propositio correlative intelligenda, Fide sumus justificati, id est, fiducia misericordiæ propter Christum sumus accepti non propter nostras virtutes Ideo necesse est sic intelligi hoc dictum, Fide habemus remissionem, id est, hæc fiducia quod propter Filium Dei recipiamur."—*Loci Theol.* "*Adseveramus igitur fide justificari hominem sine operibus legis.* Est ergo sententia propositionis, asseveramus hominem accipere remissionem peccatorum, reconciliationem, et imputationem justitiæ propter Filium Dei mediatorem per misericordiam gratis non propter legem, seu nostras virtutes, seu opera. Et hanc misericordiam accipi oportet fide."—*In Ep. ad Rom.* Cap. III. His Theological Disputations from 1523 to 1534 were originally published with a commendatory preface by Luther, and republished by himself, 1558. "2. Impossibilis est remissio peccatorum nisi fide in Christum, cum apprehendimus Christum mediatorem et opponimus eum iræ Dei. Hæc fides consolatur et erigit conscientias." "5. Igitur manifestum est quod sola fide justificamur, hoc est, ex injustis accepti efficiamur et regeneremur." "17. Promissio fide accipitur. Prius ergo fide justi sumus quia accipimus promissam reconciliationem, quam legem facimus." "24. Ideo nec postea reputamur justi coram Deo propter illam legis impletionem sed ideo quia fide habemus accessum per Christum." "36. Cum dicimus, *sola fide justificamur*, intelligi hoc debet non tantum quod fides initio accipiat remissionem peccatorum, et convertat, sed etiam quod deinceps sola fides reputatur a Deo pro justitia, tametsi impletio legis necessario sequetur, verum hæc impletio legis non est accepta coram Deo nisi propter Christum qui apprehenditur Fide." In his reply to the propositions of Malvenda in the Conference at Ratisbon, 1546: "Constat autem ex illis quæ hactenus disputavimus: solo Christi

Jesu merito, sola Christi justitia, plene purgari fideles ; nec ulla ratione alia vitam nobis restitui in primo parente nostro amissam, nisi Christo qui solus vita est inseramur. *Inserimur autem ei per fidem* unde alibi legimus fide purificari corda nostra ; et iterum, fide, non lege non ullis meritis aut operibus sed, fide justificari credentes."

I may, I think, stop here. Indeed, if I could hope that a reference to the quotations already given in preceding notes would be exactly obeyed, I need not have swelled this to such a size. But the point is one which has derived considerable importance from the unfair mode in which the argument has been managed upon the opposite side ; so as to justify all the pains which are necessary for setting it right. The Reformers, as I have said, declare expressly, and in various forms, that we are justified by faith only, and they declare, too, that faith sanctifies us : such statements of the operation of faith require cautions lest it should be supposed that so much is ascribed to this principle of justification on account of its proper worth, or of its effects upon our character ; such cautions are accordingly added, and they necessarily are a good deal occupied in stating what faith does not do ; and it is easy to see how, by enlarging upon this part of them, and neglecting the rest, a plausible case may be made for the position that the writers maintain, that faith has no instrumentality distinct from the other virtues, and no office except such as it shares with others. My readers have now the means of satisfying themselves how grossly this mis-states the whole truth, even when the assertions are so framed as to contain a part of it.

Bishop Bull is sometimes very dexterous in producing a false impression in this way : besides, affected as his style is, its real spirit and point, his confident tone, and ostentation of the forms of exact reasoning, would account sufficiently for his great success with careless and prejudiced readers. But he is so pugnacious and discursive that he involves himself in many difficulties from which a quieter and closer writer would have escaped, and falls into some inconsistencies so glaring that no prepossession in his favour can lead his more discerning admirers to rely altogether upon him. And they, I think, judge wisely in being more disposed in general to trust their cause to Archbishop Lawrence, by whom it

seems on the whole more effectively, though less brilliantly, maintained. He is much less flippant, and noisy, and absolute, than Bull; makes fewer positive assertions, and constructs fewer syllogisms; lauds himself less strenuously, and vituperates his adversaries more mercifully: but, though he does not display his skill so studiously, or stop so often to admire it, his readers must, I think, feel that he possesses more real dexterity, as well as more temper and judgment. The bishop stands *at his own wonders wondering*; certifying every argument that he gives as *omni exceptione majus*; *luce clarius*, or *sole meridiano clarius*; and qualifying every one who hesitates as *talpâ cecior*, or something worse: the archbishop proceeds steadily, neither praising himself nor abusing his opponents; and, by quietly suggesting his own views, while he seems to allow others to speak for themselves; putting forward prominently undoubted and important parts of the true doctrine, while he keeps back the obnoxious parts altogether, or assigns them an obscure position, or assails them by assailing erroneous views with which he confounds them; he contrives, I think, to convey as low a view of the doctrine of justification, and as unfaithful a representation of the Reformers' principles, as Bull; though he certainly does not lay himself open to so many direct contradictions, and throughout makes better provision against any brief objections to his statements. I cannot of course attempt a detailed analysis either of Bull's work, or of the part of the Archbishop's with which I am concerned; but, as they are likely to be considered the principal writers on their side, and as they seem to be really the most effective, at least of those with whom I am acquainted, I have thought it right to notice occasionally in these notes every thing in either that appeared to me most likely to mislead: and I shall now subjoin a word or two upon a device which is common to both of them in the discussion of the question, and which I think it may be an important safeguard to my readers to be made distinctly to understand.

The great artifice of the archbishop's argument is to fix attention upon the monstrous errors of the scholastic scheme of justification; and to represent the doctrine of justification by faith only, not as the assertion of an important truth, concerning

the *mode of our justification*, so much as a form devised to combat and overthrow these errors concerning the *grounds of it*. "Never, therefore, should it be forgotten that when they spoke of justification by faith alone, they solely opposed the scholastical system so frequently alluded to, which attributed to our merits the expiation of crime, and a readmission into the favour of God; this, with an inflexibility not greater than the occasion demanded, they constantly laboured to annihilate, and to restore in its stead the plain doctrine of a perfect propitiation and satisfaction for sin, by the death of Christ," &c.—Bampton Lectures, Ser. vi. p. 140.

Bull has pursued the same course in his attempt to fix the doctrine of justification as delivered by St. Paul. He states the errors of the different parties, both Jew and Gentile, with whom the Apostle had to deal; and thinks himself warranted in interpreting Paul's most explicit and direct statements of doctrine, as if they were less designed to convey saving truth than to overthrow these dangerous errors. The effects of such representations when they succeed are manifest. They lead those who receive them to be satisfied with the loosest interpretation of the most exact and express statements; and, in fact, not to look for the meaning of a writer in his own mode of expressing it, however precise, but, to take up contentedly with the most inadequate, forced, and vague explanations of his language, however ill they agree with what he says, or with each other, provided they make him contradict something which it is supposed he designed to contradict. I think it cannot be necessary to say any thing to show how perverse and hazardous a mode this is in general of seeking for an author's sense, and how calculated it is to favour evasions or misrepresentations of his meaning. And, after all that I have said of the statements of this great truth, both in the Scriptures and in the writings of the Reformers, I hope I need not add much to show how peculiarly inapplicable the principle of interpretation is to them, and how certain it is to mislead us when applied to them.

It is true that St. Paul, and those fearless assertors of his doctrine to whom we owe so much, had to deal with errors of the kind described by Bull and Lawrence; but it is no less certain

that their chief mode of combating these errors is by distinct statements of the truth: and they manifestly feel that, altogether independently of this object, their highest and most important duty was the publication of the truth; and they discharge that duty by express and reiterated declarations of it in forms fitted to convey it to all—not merely to those infected with such errors—but to those who were as ignorant of these corruptions of the gospel as of the gospel itself. St. Paul declares, as I have often shown, not only the true grounds of a sinner's justification, but the true mode of it; and the one as distinctly as the other. And I have given abundant proof, even in this note, that the Reformers were solicitous to be as distinct in declaring the latter as the former. Indeed, as we have seen (p. 82), the Reformers who signed the Apology for the Augsburg Confession, declare *that it is not more essential to the truth to maintain the Lord's work as the sole meritorious ground of justification, than it is to maintain faith as the sole instrument or means of effecting it.* And, in fact, I do not think it is difficult to see that the latter cannot be let go without losing hold of the other. But, at all events, it must be felt that the scriptural provision against the error of exalting our works into meritorious grounds of justification, must be a more effectual safeguard than any declarations against it, however strong. If our works are not allowed to be *means* or *conditions* of our justification; if we can perform no work that is good or acceptable in the sight of God until after we are justified; then there is no possibility (to those I mean who so believe) of regarding these works as in any respect, in whole or in part, the meritorious cause of our justification; of which they are not even made the instrumental cause, but the consequences and effects. This must be abundantly clear. And the Reformers, doubtless, perceived and prized this effect of the doctrine of Justification by faith alone; but we have abundant reason to know that it was not upon any calculation of its results that they so strenuously asserted it, and rejected the other, but because they found it distinctly asserted in Scripture, and the other distinctly denied.

I must not, however, suffer myself to be led beyond my limited purpose in introducing the subject, which was to guard against

this dangerous scheme of interpretation, by showing upon what false principles it is grounded; having elsewhere sufficiently shown how widely it has misled those who have employed it. Archbishop Lawrence asserts, we have seen, that, in speaking of justification by faith alone, the Reformers *solely* opposed the scholastical system, which ascribed justification to human merits. The Apologists, when they undertake to prove that *we are justified by faith*, assert the proposition to be as important as the one which declares *that we are justified through Christ*,—ubi primum monendi sunt lectores quod sicut necesse est hanc sententiam tueri *quod Christus sit Mediator*, ita necesse sit defendere *quod fides justificat*. The Archbishop says (Lectures, p. 124) that the effective principle, or meritorious cause of justification, was the great point contested: the Apologists assert that there was another point objected to in their Confession; and, as they have informed us that they regarded the maintenance of it equally important, so they give us no intimation that their adversaries assailed it with less hostility: Utrumque enim damnant, et quod negamus homines propter sua merita consequi remissionem peccatorum; et quod affirmamus homines fide consequi remissionem peccatorum, et fide in Christum justificari. This would seem to show that the Reformers' declarations of the doctrine of Justification by faith only, were felt, both by those who made them, and those who opposed them, to contain something beyond the great truth, that we are justified only for the merits of our blessed Lord. And I add one reiteration of their views, not merely because it contains so strong a declaration of the instrumentality of faith, but because it distinctly states the doctrine as it is found in St. Paul. Et ne putemus temere excidisse Paulo sententiam *quod fides justificat*, longa disputatione munit et confirmat eam in IV Rom. et deinde in omnibus Epistolis repetit Hic clare dicit fidem ipsam imputari ad justitiam. Fides est illa res quam Deus pronunciat esse justitiam; et addit gratis imputari, et negat posse gratis imputari si propter opera deberetur.

NOTE 16, PAGE 118.

Origen.

ORIGEN has abundance of errors to answer for on many points, and no lack of them upon this particular doctrine: but I have some reason to think that I have charged him with this one wrongfully. I mentioned his name upon the authority of Calvin, who, both in his Institutes, and in his Commentary, ascribes to him the invention of this strange exposition of the meaning of *law* in this passage of the Epistle to the Romans. Chemnitz makes the same charge, and I think I have seen it elsewhere. Calvin and Chemnitz must have had some grounds for the assertion; they probably, indeed, had very sufficient grounds for it; but certainly Origen's commentary upon the passage furnishes none. It contains some strange misrepresentations of the Apostle's meaning, but I have been unable to discover this particular one. He, on the contrary, lays down distinctly the reality and obligation of the law of nature, as forming a part of the Apostle's argument. He thinks that in his language the written law is the *law of Moses*, and that the law of nature is the *law of God*, distinctively; and that it is by means of this latter that the Apostle is able to bring in the whole world guilty before God. It is this law, he thinks, which is meant in v. 19, 20, 21; except that in this last verse the law of Moses also appears in ἡπὸ τοῦ νόμου καὶ τῶν προφητῶν; and he takes occasion thence to lay down a rule of interpretation which shows that he could not have understood the ritual law to have been intended in v. 28: namely, *that when the law of Moses is meant, the word has the article: but that it is anarthrous when the law of nature is intended.* I need not continue the examination any further. He commits, as I said, some most extraordinary mistakes about the Apostle's meaning, but they are intermixed with some judicious remarks, and occasionally some sound doctrinal statements. Instead of dwelling on his errors I shall atone for my false charge against him (for such, so far as I am able to see now, it was) by giving one or two examples of the soundness which he at times exhibits; premising that his commentary is only preserved in the Latin translation of Rufinus. Rom. iii. 27, 28. Dicit

sufficere solius fidei justificationem ita ut credens quis tantummodo, justificatur, etiam si nihil ab eo operis fuerit expletum [he gives as an example the thief on the cross; and says, that no good work is set down to him in the gospel but this, that he cried to the Lord, *et pro hac sola fide* ait ei Jesus, *Amen dico*, etc. And that here boasting was excluded plainly by the law of faith, and not by the law of works] Per fidem enim justificatus est hic latro sine operibus legis; quia super hoc dominus non requisivit quid prius operatus esset, nec expectavit quid operis, cum credidisset, expleret, sed sola confessione justificatum comitem sibi eum paradisum ingressurus assumpsit. [He then refers to the story of the woman in Simon's house, Luke vii. 36, 50; and, having spoken of the parable told by the Lord, adds] Et ex nullo legis opere sed pro sola fide ait ad eam, *Remittuntur tibi peccata tua*, et iterum *Fides tua te salvam fecit, vade in pace*. The phrase *pro sola fide* may suggest to some that he is putting faith in the place of the Saviour, but he had before laid down His office in the justification of sinners, and sometimes with great clearness. Deus enim justus est, et justus justificare non poterat injustos, ideo interventum voluit esse propitiatoris, ut per ejus fidem justificarentur qui per opera propria justificari non poterant. It is much more pleasant to dwell upon such a man's sound statements of the truth than his corruptions of it; and it is comfortable to believe in his case, as well as in that of others, that the former represent his abiding feelings, and the latter his occasional notions. "Etsi autem interdum veteres Scriptores negligentius locuti sint, tamen non dubium est omnes conversos ad Deum testari hanc sententiam veram esse, quam multi didicerunt etiam in sua conversione, quanquam in explicando alias magis, alias minus plane loquantur."—*Melancthon. Responsio ad Bavaricos Articulos* 1559.

NOTE 17. PAGE 124.

Evasions of the Proof, furnished by Articles XI., XII., XIII., of our Church's Views of Justification.

THE evasion noticed here in this Sermon is the one adopted by Burnet when he comes to Art. XII. He had, in his Com-

mentary on Art. XI., endeavoured to prove that “by *faith only* is not to be meant faith as it is separated from the other evangelical graces and virtues [it is hardly necessary to point out the ambiguity of the word *separated*, and how it affects the truth of the statement. If by *separated* be meant *considered apart from all such graces, and to the exclusion of them all*, it, no doubt, *was* the sense in which *sola, only*, was annexed to faith in the Article. If it mean *existing in a mind in which no other grace or virtue exists*, the Reformers certainly did not mean this, but, on the contrary, unanimously denied that the principle ever did or could so exist], but faith, as it is opposite to the rites of the Mosaical dispensation.” That “our faith, which includes our hope, our love, our repentance, and our obedience, is the condition that makes us capable of receiving the benefits of this redemption and free grace.” And, amidst much shifting and confusion, he plainly labours very anxiously to establish *this* point: that *these Christian graces, and this Christian obedience, are, together with our faith, and in the same way, conditions of our Justification*.

But when he comes to Art. XII., he finds that this obedience, which he has thus laboured to present as a part of the condition of our justification, is not only declared to be the fruit of our faith, but *to follow after Justification*.^{*} And he then, with

* This position of Art. xii. is but a repetition of the well-known *dictum* of Augustin—*Bona opera sequuntur justificatum non præcedunt justificandum*; which has given much annoyance to many of Burnett's way of thinking, who all desire, very naturally, to have Augustin on their side; and some of whom, indeed, not very reasonably, determine that he shall stand with them whether he consents or not. Bull's mode of getting over the difficulty is not an unfair specimen of his imperious and evasive style under such embarrassments:—“Nimirum intelligendus est Augustinus non de operibus quibuscunque, sed de longa et jugi operatione; ut sensus ejus sit, pauciora ac minora esse opera quæ justificandum præcedunt, quam quæ justificatum sequuntur. Absque hoc grano salis axioma illud (adeo ab omnibus decantatum) a manifesta falsitate vix ac ne vix quidem purgari possit.”—Diss. Post. cap. iii. § 2. This is pretty well; but his editor, Grabe, furnishes even a better example of the sort of relief which will be hailed by a man in distress:—“Isti Augustini dicto cum clarissimam lucem afferant verba suprâ laudati et nunquam satis laudandi, Gulielmi Forbesii, in considerationibus suis pacificis de Justificatione. Lib. i. cap. 3. § 3. ea hic annotare operæ pretium duxi. “Quod, inquit, ad nauseam usque ex Augustino de Fide et operibus, cap. 14. repetunt *Bona opera*

admirable coolness, turns about, and tells us that, provided obedience be allowed to be *necessary to salvation*, it is very little matter how, why, where, or when it comes in. And thus he quietly dismisses the direct contradiction which this Article gives to his representation of the doctrine of the preceding one; first, however, pretty severely condemning the framers of the Articles for setting about the determination of such a nicety: and, indeed, not obscurely intimating that he thinks that they have determined it erroneously; but that it is no great matter! “Whatever subtleties some may have set up, to separate the consideration of faith from a holy life in *the point of Justification* [the very subtlety of this Article, be it remembered]—yet none among us have denied that it was absolutely necessary to salvation; and so it be owned as necessary [see p. 124 seq., for the ambiguity of this word] it is a nice curiosity to examine whether it is of itself a condition of justification, or if it is the certain distinction and constant effect of that faith which justifies. These are speculations of very little consequence, so long as the main point is still maintained, that Christ came to bring us to God, &c. . . . And, therefore, even when *the thread of men’s speculations of these matters may be thought too fine, or in some points of them wrong drawn*; yet so long as the

sequi justificatum, non autem præcedere justificandum, næ illi mentem Augustini nunquam sunt assequuti. Loquitur eò loci Augustinus de operibus justitiæ quæ percepta et professa Fide (ut ipse ait) fidelibus deinde diligenter toto vitæ cursu præstanda sunt, seu de operibus illis quæ per justitiam habituales i. e. in ipsa justificatione infusam, inhærentem et permanentem, efficiuntur, atque sic speciali quadam ratione dicuntur bona opera; non autem de iis, quæ per Spiritus Sancti gratiam assistantem et præparantem fiunt ante et ad justificationem peccatoris, &c. By which the reader will see that Augustin does not mean to tell us any thing of good works generally, but merely to inform us, that the good works which are wrought *by faith*, are not wrought by any man *before he has faith*; and those good works which are wrought *by that righteousness which is infused into us at justification* are not wrought until a man is justified! One cannot say that this is very profound; but then it seems, in recompence, highly probable, if not absolutely certain. And if the illustrious father upon whom W. Forbes *suprà laudatus et nunquam satis laudandus* has thrown such bright light, had always dealt in such safe apophthegms, the Christian world might have lost some important truth, but it certainly would have escaped some angry controversy.

foundation is preserved, that every one who nameth the name of Christ does depart from iniquity, so long the doctrine of Christ is preserved pure in this capital and fundamental point." Upon the XIIIth Article, as connected with the doctrine, he says nothing.

Bull's mode of dealing with this embarrassing Article is no less extraordinary. Having determined that to justification or remission of sins is necessarily required repentance, as an antecedent condition, without which none can obtain pardon of his sins from God, he settles, as we saw, that repentance comprehends *eleven works, all of which* are declared by God's Spirit to be absolutely necessary to the obtaining of pardon of sin. Har. Ap. Diss. I. Cap. 2. §§ 6, 7. To which notable piece of theology his learned editor, Grabe, thus emphatically sets his seal: "Per bona opera, speciatim per actus pœnitentiæ, nos gratiam Dei, ac remissionem peccatorum impetrare, vir Reverendus pluribus sacrorum Scripturæ testimoniis solidissime probavit:" while Bull himself refers to his proof of this principle with great complacency, *Diss. Post. Cap. 3.* Nemo enim (ut supra *argumentis omni exceptione majoribus* evicimus) vel ad primam justificationis gratiam pervenire potest, qui pœnitentiæ opera non præstiterit." He, however, subjoins the qualification that these works which precede the *first Justification*, are far less and fewer than those which follow it, and that it is after Justification that we are enabled to bring forth *opera egregia ac vere Heroica*. At length, however, it becomes necessary to take some notice of the Article that describes good works as *the fruits of faith, and as following after Justification*; which certainly would seem embarrassing enough to one who had proved, to his own satisfaction, that *good works do not only accompany justifying faith, but that they are no less necessary to justification than faith itself, and that the same kind of causality is to be ascribed to faith and to works; i. e. that faith and works conjointly are the condition of Justification solummodo prescribed in the gospel covenant.* *Diss. Prior. Cap. 6, § 3.* But Bull is ready with a *distinguo*. We are, he tells us, carefully to distinguish between the first and second Justification, and so between the good works required for each. "Atque hic statuendum omnino est ad pri-

mam Justificationem opera tantum interna fidei, pœnitentiæ, spei, charitatis, &c. esse absolute necessaria; cætera vero externa opera, quæ in factis externis, sive in actuali singularum virtutum quas modo enumeravimus exercitio conspiciuntur, signa tantum esse fructusque pietatis internæ, et Justificatione posteriora eaque demum lege præstanda si non desit opportunitas." —*Diss. Post. Cap. XVIII. § 8.* And he adds that this is, without doubt, what is meant by the church in Article XII. But, without attending at present to that point, what foundation does this Article or any other supply for this distinction of a first and second justification? Any one who reads these Articles in connection, must see that the justification which they describe as effected by faith, and which good works follow, and which no good works precede, that this is the only justification of which they speak,—the justification which we have for the merits of Jesus Christ. If there be another justification, the Articles do not speak of it, or even glance at it. They tell us, indeed, of a justification before which no good works are done, and after which all good works are done; but they do not intimate to us, in any way, that this is but inchoate, and that there is another justification, to the obtaining of which *all these good works are necessary*. Would not this be a strange way of presenting this important doctrine,—that there should be three, and but three, Articles given on the subject of Justification, its causes and effects; and that we should be left in ignorance of what this second Justification is*—how it is to be obtained—or even that it has any existence? Is this credible?

Bull's proceeding in bringing the point forward is a curious specimen of his style. When he has to explain St. Paul's dictum, *that we are justified by faith without the deeds of the law*, Justification is allowed to be (as we have seen, p. 340) *the act of God as judge, absolving, according to Christ's gracious law, the accused, pronouncing him righteous, and admitting him to the reward of righteousness, viz., eternal life*. He

* "And when Mr. More (says Tindall) is come to himselfe, and sayth, The first fayth, and the first justifying is geven us without our deservyng; God be thanked, and I would fayne that he would describe me what he meaneth by the second justifying."

even thinks, we saw (p. 341) that Grotius must have been blind not to have perceived that this forensic sense of *regarding, or declaring one righteous*, is the common sense throughout the Bible, and specially the New Testament. But then he is able to settle that faith means *faith, and every thing else*; that *faith without the deeds of the law* means *faith with the deeds of the law*, only they must not be done as prescribed in the Mosaical law, or as parts of that covenant, &c. : and so far the matter is left on a sure footing. When we come to the Protestant principle, *that we are justified by faith only*, which is so often declared, by all the writers who maintained it, to be only another form of expressing Paul's doctrine, it would seem that *Justification* and *Faith* would necessarily bear the same signification as in the Apostle's own enunciation of the same truth. And so the matter would of course be left, but for this XIIth Article; which renders it impossible to receive *faith* as *expressing the whole condition of the gospel covenant,—as comprehending all the works of Christian piety, &c.*; and, therefore, since practising upon it is put out of the question, *Justification* and *works* must be tried; and the matter is pretty safe again when it is settled that by *Justification* is meant the *first Justification*; and that by the works which *follow it* are only meant external acts; that to this first Justification all the internal virtues, from which these external acts spring, are essential, i. e. faith, repentance, hope, charity, &c.; and that this is undoubtedly, *dubio procul*, what our church means in this XIIth Article, that is, that it means that external obedience is a necessary condition to the *second Justification*, and inward obedience, to the *first*.

Such a proceeding might be left without any further remark, but the subject seems to deserve to be exhibited a little more distinctly. It would appear that it cannot be denied that *faith*, in Art. XII., is *faith* and nothing else. I do not venture to say so from my own notion of the sense of the Article, but because Bull, in commenting upon it here, speaks of *opera interna fidei, pœnitentiæ, spei, charitatis, &c.*; so that I suppose it is admitted by every one that by *faith*, in Article XII., is meant a *state of mind*; and one, moreover, distinct from these other states enumerated. It will hardly be

maintained, then, I suppose, that in Article XI., in which we are said to *be justified by faith only*, *faith* means any thing different from what it does in Article XII., unless it be thought that it was the *purpose* of the framers of the Articles to mislead or to perplex us about this important doctrine which they profess to declare. Indeed, as I have before intimated, I believe it was because Article XII. determined so clearly the sense of *faith*; and the connection between the two Articles rendered it so hopeless to attempt assigning a different sense to the term in Article XI. that this new experiment upon *Justification* was resorted to. But, however that be, so far appears pretty clear, viz. what the faith of Art. XII. is, and that by *that faith*, and *by it only*, we are said, in Article XI., to *be justified*.

But what is *Justification*? Why, whatever it be, I presume it will be in the same way allowed by all who do not regard our Articles as dangerous enigmas, that it means the same thing in all these three Articles upon the Doctrine; and that, fixing its sense in any of them, is fixing its sense in all. What is its sense, however, in Article XI. we have, as I before have shown, various means of determining. The article itself, as I notice, p. 134, establishes that *to be justified*, and *to be counted righteous before God*, mean the same thing. And this would be quite enough. But, moreover, all Protestant writers who put forward the declaration contained in the XIth Article, *that we are justified by faith only*, maintain that it is exactly equivalent to Paul's declaration, *that we are justified by faith, without the deeds of the law*. We saw, for example, in p. 374, that Jewel defends the Protestant declaration expressly on the ground that it is precisely equivalent to the Scriptural one; and the same language is uniformly maintained by the other Reformers. I suppose, therefore, that it cannot be questioned that by JUSTIFICATION in *their* enunciation of the truth, these men intended to express whatever Paul designed that the term should stand for in *his*. What that is we may let Bull himself settle: he determines, as we have seen, p. 340, that it is the act by which God, as judge, remits our sins, acquits us, counts us as righteous, &c. This is the Justification, therefore, of the eleventh Article; and therefore, as I said, of the other

two also. This is the Justification which we have by *faith only*—Article XI.; which *good works follow*—Article XII.; and which *no good works precede*—Article XIII. Of this justification, which includes our acquittal by our Almighty Judge, the recognition of our righteousness by Him, and the plenary acceptance by which *we have peace with God*, the Articles are careful to give us distinct information : of the other they tell us nothing. If this be but our *first Justification*, it is the only one of which the Articles speak. If there be a *second Justification* which is *not by faith only*, and which *good works do precede*, our Articles are certainly silent about it, and we may very safely leave it in the same obscurity.

Having gone so far upon these corruptions of the truth, I can add little to what has been said in the Sermon upon others, except to give the authors of those adverted to there. The first explanation of what *faith* is (p. 120), and what *counting faith for righteousness* means, is from Dr. Clarke's XVII. Sermons, Sermon XI. The metonomies in the same page are Bull's. The account (page 130) of Paul's sense of *Justification* is from a Sermon by Mr. Manning, of whom I know nothing beyond what is given about him in a strange publication by the Rev. H. J. Todd, entitled "*Faith and Justification*;" which consists of a Sermon by Archbishop Sharp on Justifying Faith; the one by Manning, referred to, on Justification; and an Appendix, in which are collected, with considerable diligence, certain interesting testimonies, which Divines of the Church of England, eminent and obscure, have from time to time borne against that *most wholesome doctrine and very full of comfort,—that we are Justified by Faith only*. As Mr. Todd only requires of his authorities some declaration of hostility to this doctrine, it may be imagined that some want of harmony in their views at times appears. This does not, perhaps, lessen the right of any enemy of the doctrine to count them all, in the gross, upon his side; but, when he enters into details, it sometimes assumes a form that makes it hard to understand what is the value of the aid that they give to one who is determined to have them all as auxiliaries.

Thus, Mr. Manning holds that, when the Apostle asserts that we are justified by faith without the deeds of the law, "*his doctrine is clear*

beyond a doubt, *that we are justified by faith, and that without works of any kind, even works of moral righteousness.*" And, moreover, he gives it as his opinion, that it is attributing to the Apostle a mode of expressing himself *unworthy of so able a reasoner* to suppose that he meant to say that "man is justified by faith alone exclusive of any works, and to tell us at the same time that by faith alone he meant gospel faith," "which," Mr. M. adds, "we all know, does include works of moral righteousness." So far very well. Bishop Bull then comes, who, we have seen, teaches us another meaning of this expression, of *faith without the works of the law*—viz.: that the works which it intends to exclude from justification are not evangelical works, or such acts of obedience as are done in, and proceed from, faith in Christ. And, as to faith, we have seen, (p. 282), that *faith* does, according to him, in Paul's statements of the doctrine of Justification, include all *works of Christian piety*.

But these Divines agree, notwithstanding. Yes, they agree, by means of another difference upon the Apostle's meaning,—by assigning different senses to *Justification* in his doctrinal statements. Mr. Manning holds, in the passages in which St. Paul "speaks so repeatedly as he does of being *justified by faith without the works of any law*, he means that *first* kind of Justification whereby converts, whether Jew or Gentile, whether of his own or succeeding times, are admitted into the body of Christ's visible church in this present world." And he says, and repeats, that this first Justification *is the chief subject of Paul's argument when he treats of Justification* at all. What Bull thinks on this matter we have seen; and, from Dr. Jackson, Mr. Todd gives what he describes as a "perspicuous and impressive sentence," on the same point; by which it appears that he thinks this *second, or final Justification*, is the sense which the word bears generally in St. Paul. "There is another acceptation of Justification yet behind, *most frequent with St. Paul*, to wit, the actual sentence of the judge acquitting or absolving us, or for *final absolution*, or actual acquittance of the parties so qualified as St. James requires."

But of what importance can it be that one of these men thinks that St. Paul generally uses the term in one sense, while another thinks that it is generally used by him in a different sense? Of

no importance whatever to me, certainly. But it can hardly be treated as of little importance to any one who intends to avail himself of their authority in the case. For I presume it is not as confident propounders of their own views, but as sound interpreters of St. Paul's language, that they can be expected to have any weight. They agree, it is true, in the end, in deriving from his writings pretty nearly the same views of the way in which a sinner may be reconciled to God; and if we were shut out from all knowledge of the process by which they have arrived at the conclusion, one who from indolence or modesty would be disposed to leave it to such eminent persons to settle the sense of Scripture for him, might find in this agreement with each other, some added reason for acquiescing in their decision. But we are let behind the scenes too much to allow any man such a plea for following their guidance. The declaration of the Apostle, *that we are justified by faith without the deeds of the law*, is to be interpreted:—What does he mean by our JUSTIFICATION? He means, say Bull and Jackson, our acquittal by God's sentence, and our acceptance by Him as Judge. And this *is the most frequent sense with St. Paul*, adds Jackson; and a man must *be blind not to see that it is the most frequent sense of the word through the whole of the New Testament*, subjoins Bull. He means no such thing, cries our other guide; he means, *our admission into God's visible church*. And not only here, but *generally*, when St. Paul speaks of our Justification, this, and not the other, is the sense in which he uses the word. So much for the thing effected: now for St. Paul's account of the mode of effecting it; that it is *by faith without the deeds of the law*. What does he mean by *faith*? What by, *without the deeds of the law*? Bull holds that *faith* here includes evangelical righteousness, and that *without the deeds of the law* is *not* meant to exclude *works of obedience*. Manning holds not only that *without the deeds of the law* does mean *without deeds of any law*, without any *works even of moral righteousness*; but that if we suppose that in *faith* the Apostle includes works of moral righteousness, we disparage his reasoning powers, and therefore, I suppose, prove our own to be but indifferent.

It is not, perhaps, very strange that a violent opponent of the

doctrine of Justification by faith only, should feel some gratification at finding, in any writer of repute, any evidence of an agreement with his own opinion of the falsehood or the danger of that doctrine; and if he were a diligent man, as Mr. Todd is, it is not extraordinary that such testimonies should find their way separately to his common-place book: but that, reviewing them together there, he should think it served his cause to show to the public upon what different and even incompatible grounds the doctrine had been assailed, and how widely and irreconcilably the great opponents of it differed in their explanation of the leading texts, from which a knowledge of the true doctrine is to be derived; this certainly seems passing strange. I would recommend the book strongly in the hope that these diversities will produce the proper impression; and that the readers of the volume will make the best use of it—taking Jackson's or Bull's notion of what St. Paul means by *Justification* in his doctrinal statements, and Manning's view of the mode in which he describes Justification effected,—and they will have something like scriptural views upon this important subject.

I do not know whether some of Mr. T.'s authorities would not be found to be pressed into the service;—at least, in the quotations which he gives, some of them appear assailing, not the doctrine itself, but abuses, or misrepresentations of it. But I am content to leave him all of them except one. He endeavours to show that CRANMER's authority is clear for the distinction of Justification into first and final. His chief proof is that *The Erudition of a Christian man* contains it; and that it is likely that it was introduced into that tract by Cranmer. His proof of the probability of this is rather curious, but I shall not stop to notice it, as the point is of so little consequence; I only wish to remind my readers that we have Cranmer's examination of that book with the view of supplying such corrections as it required. It must be felt, therefore, fair to collect his principles from this review, rather than from the work without these corrections; whatever part he may be supposed to have had in its composition. And, if my readers consent to take this obviously fair course of informing themselves of his views of Justification, I desire nothing more. They will find the entire of these notes

upon the King's book in Richmond's Fathers of the English Church; and the most important parts of them in the volume of the Tract Society's BRITISH REFORMERS, which contains Cranmer.

NOTE 18. PAGE 150.

Upon the Objection to the Doctrine of Justification by Faith only, derived from James ii.

It will be seen that in the mode in which I have attempted to obviate this objection, I differ somewhat from other defenders of the true doctrine of Justification. And I feel it necessary to say a few words in explanation and defence of the difference.

Some eminent writers think, that by Justification, St. James means, not, as St. Paul does, our Justification *before God*, but our Justification *before men*. This is, I believe, much the most general mode of accommodating the apparent difference between the Apostles; it is the one adopted by Tindall, Bishop Jewel, Bishop Barlow, and a host of more recent writers. Hooker holds that in St. James, Justification means that *acquisition of righteousness* by obedience, which is a part of the course of every Believer. I do not know that he is followed by any maintainer of the true doctrine of Justification. Bucer's view is also, so far as I know, a singular one; he thinks that the word means, in St. James, the public honouring and rewarding by God of some special act of obedience to His will.

When I say that I am dissatisfied with all these modes of reconciling the Apostles, I hope the amount of my dissatisfaction will not be overrated. I would wish to be understood to hold that the least probable of them is attended, in my apprehension, with infinitely less difficulty than the process to which they are opposed:—that of taking the doctrine of the Justification of sinners from St. James's position, that *a man is justified by works, and not by faith only*; and then, wresting Paul's reasoning, and distorting and mutilating his statements, to bring about his agreement with a doctrine which he has so often clearly argued against, and expressly contradicted. I would take any of them, I repeat, unhesitatingly, rather than acquiesce

in what appears to be so preposterous and irrational a proceeding. Nay, if I had not so good an explanation of St. James as any of them furnishes, I would (as I have said, p. 151) be content to say, St. James appears to me, here, to contradict what I know to be the truth. I am sure, if I understood him rightly, his meaning would be found to be perfectly consistent with it; but I am obliged to confess that I cannot explain the passage so as to show their consistency: and I leave it unexplained without feeling my conviction of the doctrine which I have learned from St. Paul in the slightest degree disturbed by a contradiction which I know can be but apparent. I think, however, that the explanation which I have offered removes this difficulty, and does not itself involve any of moment: but before I speak of it, I must state what I think are the unsatisfactory points in the other modes of getting over the objection.

The first has the recommendation of being perfectly consistent with the particular fact, of representing the Apostle as stating a principle undoubtedly true, and of doing no violence to his language. For these reasons, and on account of the high names of all periods by which it has been sanctioned, I feel some difficulty in saying any thing against it; still I am constrained to confess that it does not appear satisfactory to me. For, first, whatever errors men may have fallen into connected with this doctrine, I can hardly think that it could ever be necessary to prove formally, or declare authoritatively, to any, that we can only be justified *before men* by outward actions which men can see and judge; that it is impossible that we can be justified *before them* by an internal principle which they cannot discern. I say, I cannot conceive it possible that any man could be in a condition in which it should be necessary to prove such a point as this to him. And, secondly, when it was proved, it would seem to fall far short of meeting the case for which it was intended. Suppose that, to one who was abusing the doctrine of justification by faith only, it was thus declared or proved—that “we are justified *before men* by works, and not by faith only; and that Abraham himself was justified *before men* by works.” Might not such a one be expected to say, “Be it so. And let all that desire to be justified *before men* do the works

whereby they may be so justified. For me it is enough to be justified *before God*. And you do not venture to deny that, *before HIM*, a man is justified by faith only." For these reasons, —because, that is, it represents the Apostle as proving what it is hard to believe that any one could doubt, and what he does not seem to gain much by proving:—for these reasons I cannot regard this popular mode of explaining the passage as a correct one. And, against Hooker's, without inquiring to what extent it is open to this latter objection, I have the decisive one that it assigns a meaning to the word which it no where else (See Note 11, p. 334) bears in the New Testament. Bucer's sense of the term is not so inadmissible; for, as this honouring or rewarding is the result of the recognition of a man's innocence or righteousness, it is not strange to find it used in the meaning which he ascribes to it in this place; but his solution is evidently open to the evasion which I have supposed applied to the first, and does not, independently of that, give so natural a sense to the passage.

As to my own explanation,—I believe I have with me almost all who have attempted to explain the passage upon any thing of sound principles, when I regard St. James as using *faith* in the false sense in which those with whom he had to do understood the term. I consider the proof of this point given in the Sermon page 154, as satisfactory, and not requiring any addition. Nor do I think there is any real force, though there is some appearance of it, in Bull's argument—that it must have been true faith that St. James meant, as he says that a man is not justified *by faith only*, whereas, if it were false faith he could not be justified by it *in part*. *Har. Ap. Diss. Post. Cap. ii. § 3*. This is a sort of reasoning in which Bull deals largely, and it is very showy, but not equally solid. When a man, for the purpose of condemning a doctrine, states it in the very words of those who hold it, he very clearly tells us what he rejects, but does not give us the same direct information as to what he admits. And we are liable, manifestly, to fall into great mistakes concerning his views, when we proceed to make them out from the statement which he quotes and denies, in this way:—by laying an emphasis upon a part of it, and, fixing that he only means to reject it in the sense which this emphasis

assigns to it; and that he would admit the proposition in the sense that it would bear, if the part which we have selected as the ground of his special objection were taken away. If the insecurity of such a process do not appear upon a simple statement of it, it may be seen by a striking example of its effects. The Council of Trent anathematize those who hold that we are justified by the imputation of Christ's righteousness *only*. *Sess. 6. Can. 11.* And hence Chemnitz infers that they admit that we are justified by it *in part*. Bellarmin, however, takes him to task, and very fairly, for this precipitancy; and tells him, that the Church of Rome, desiring to condemn the error of those who hold that we are justified by the imputation of Christ's righteousness only, does expressly, and in terms, condemn that doctrine; but that it would be most hasty and unfair to collect their adoption of the other error, that we are justified by it partly, even if they had not elsewhere expressed their dissent from *it* also. This seems not only fair in the particular case, but will be taken, I hope, as a sufficient proof generally, how precarious a mode of arriving at a man's opinions we adopt when we attempt to collect them in this way. But, indeed, the direct proof of the point is too strong to be overthrown by a better argument than Bull's: and I do not think that any one who considers fairly the whole passage, and weighs the form of St. James's introduction, and two illustrations referred to p. 154, *sq.* can doubt that by *faith* he expresses what these false professors with whom he was dealing understood by the term. And in this, as I said, I do not differ from any of those who hold the true doctrine. I only suppose, in addition, that he *throughout* adopts the language of these persons; that he uses *justification* in their sense too, and speaks of *justification by faith only* in the sense in which they spoke of it, for the purpose of impressing upon them the conviction that their view of it must be erroneous. This supposition, which makes the whole proceeding of the Apostle consistent, supplies me with an easy sense of this declaration of his—*that Abraham was justified by works*; and of the general principle which he lays down—*that a man is justified by works, and not by faith only*. He seems, in this, to assert a falsehood, and to deny a certain truth; but this mode of explaining his language shows that he

does neither ; that he adopts a practical mode of correcting the error which all must, I think, allow to be the very error with which he had to deal.

Every one must, I think, allow that the error with respect to the doctrine into which these men fell, was the notion that they who were justified by faith were not required to perform works of obedience ; that to perform such works *was to be justified by works, and not by faith only*. Now, if there were persons who mistook this belief of devils which they possessed for real faith, and who so far misconceived the doctrines of justification by faith, and justification by works, as to think that they differed in this : that the man justified by faith only, when a demand was made upon him of obedience to God, could reply, "I have been justified *by faith*, you are treating me as if I were seeking to be justified *by works*. No doubt, this obedience of which you speak would be needful if I desired to be justified by works, but such bondage is not to be imposed on any who are justified by faith only,"—could there be a better mode of removing this error adopted than by taking, as St. James does, the very *type* of the whole class of those who are justified *by faith only*, and showing that, according to this view of the nature of justification by faith and justification by works, he was *justified by works, and not by faith only* ? And does not this too assign a true and consistent meaning to his declaration that every one [who is justified] *is justified by works, and none by faith only* ? St. James, indeed, sufficiently shows that he did not mean that these words should be taken literally, when he subjoins that, to every one who understands the doctrine, this act of Abraham was not a contradiction of the Scripture record of his justification by faith, but a clear confirmation of it. But, without dwelling upon this, I hope that I have said enough to vindicate my exposition to all who will take the trouble of understanding it : and that the only suppositions which I make as the foundation of the explanation, are such as there ought to be no difficulty in admitting, namely, that these persons were in the habit of using language which expressed distinctly, what (whether they so expressed it or not) must be allowed to have been their real error about this doctrine ; and that St. James adopts their language *throughout* as he confessedly does at the outset.

NOTE 19. PAGE 159.

Upon the Objection, Faith is itself a Work.

The thing that hath been is that which shall be, applies to few of the things *that are done under the Sun* more emphatically than to religious controversy, and to no controversy certainly more entirely than to this one concerning justification. The first preacher of the truth appears to have been assailed by the strongest objections which have ever been devised against it; and there is scarcely one of the many minor cavils against his doctrine which we hear at the present day, that the first revivers of the truth upon the Continent and in England, do not seem to have been called upon to answer. This, for example, which passes generally for a very recent sophism, appears among the objections answered by Melancthon in his *Enarratio Symboli Niceni Ultima* 1557.—*Fide sumus justi, Fides est opus, ergo operibus sumus justi*. And his answer, while it sets in a clear light the mistake upon which the cavil rests, shows very clearly too what I have often attempted to exhibit from the Reformers' writings,—their sound views of the real place which faith holds in the justification of sinners. His answer to the major is —“*Hæc propositio, Fide sumus justi, correlative intelligenda est, videlicet misericordia propter Filium Dei sumus justi. Sed hanc oportet fide apprehendi audita voce evangelii; quia certe aliquid esse oportet quo fiat applicatio misericordiæ.*” He then notices the minor, “*Postea et de minore dicas, fides est opus, sed non sumus justi propter ipsius operis dignitatem, sed quia apprehendit misericordiam propter filium promissam. Alii respondent fidem non esse opus, quia sit donum Dei. Hæc responsio est aliena, quia cum dicitur non sumus justi ex operibus, etiam illæ virtutes intelliguntur, dilectio, castitas, patientia, quæ sunt accensæ a Spiritu Sancto.*” The same cavil is examined and exposed upon the same principles in his *Enarr. in Ep. ad Rom.* Cap. iv.

The reader will notice how, in exposing the erroneous view of the meritorious efficacy of our faith (upon which this cavil is grounded) the true instrumentality of the principle in our justification is re-asserted and explained. But, further, the grounds

upon which Melancthon declines adopting the answer, [*Faith is no work, for it is God's gift*, deserve especial notice. He says, the reply would be nothing to the purpose, for it would apply equally to all those virtues or good qualities which are excluded from the office of justifying us under the name of *works*. This is evidently the meaning of his answer, and it shows at once the error of those who hold that *works* are only denied a share in the office of justifying us, *as they were results of our own unaided strength*; and that of those who hold that the *works* excluded are *those acts of superstition, for which this place was claimed by the Church of Rome*. The former is Bull's theory, proposed with his usual courage; the latter is put forward by Archbishop Lawrence, in the following cautious form. "Our Reformers, indeed, frequently reprobated in the strongest language, the idea of a justification by *our own* works. But, how harsh soever may have been their censures upon this head, we are not surprised at their zeal when we turn to the Injunctions of Ridley, in the year 1550; for there we perceive from the various superstitions enumerated with the proscribed doctrine, what those works of *our own* properly were which they principally kept in view when they expressed themselves on the occasion with so much severity. 'Item, that none maintain purgatory, invocation of saints, the six articles, bedrowls, images, reliques, rubric primers with invocation of saints, *justification of man by his own works*, holy bread, palms, ashes, candles, sepulchre paschal, creeping to the cross, hallowing of the fire or altar, or any such-like abuses and superstitions, now taken away by the king's grace's most godly proceedings.'—Burnet, vol. ii. p. 206. Records." *Notes on Sermon VI. note 20*. If there be any thing strange in the place which this false doctrine holds in this enumeration of superstitions, it is certainly not half so extraordinary as the speculation which the Archbishop founds upon it. He evidently wishes it to be understood, though he does not seem prepared to say so expressly, that if the Romanists, in maintaining *justification by our own works*, had included among these works none of a superstitious character, our Reformers would not have opposed the doctrine so strongly, or, at least, that they ought not. We are in no want of proofs that this is greatly to mistake the true grounds upon which the

Reformers rejected the Romish doctrine of justification. "Alii sic interpretati sunt, *fide*, id est, *operibus a Deo mandatis*, iusti sumus non *operibus traditionum humanarum*. Alii hoc modo depravant, *fide*, id est, *interiore cultu non externis operibus* iusti sumus." Melancthon Arg. in Ep. ad Rom. would of itself sufficiently show that it was not the nature of the works required, which formed the great difference between the doctrine of the Reformers and their opponents. Indeed, in the first Augsburg Confession, it is noticed that the Romish doctrine had in such points undergone important improvements. "De quibus rebus olim parum docebant concionatores; tantum puerilia et non necessaria opera urgebant, ut certas ferias, certa jejunia, fraternitates, peregrinationes, cultus sanctorum, rosaria, monachatum et similia. Hæc adversarii nostri admoniti nunc dediscunt, nec perinde prædicant hæc inutilia opera, ut olim. Præterea incipiunt fidei mentionem facere, de qua olim mirum erat silentium. Docent, nos non tantum operibus justificari, sed conjungunt fidem et opera, et dicunt, nos fide et operibus justificari. Quæ doctrina tolerabilior priore, et plus afferre potest consolationis, quam vetus ipsorum doctrina." XX. *de bonis operibus*. Lest this last sentence should be interpreted, however, into an admission that this modified doctrine is *tolerable*, I add an extract from Melancthon's Disputations, between 1523 and 34, published first with a commendatory preface by Luther in the latter year, and afterwards, in 1558, by himself. He says, that there are two classes of persons who hold that we are justified by faith and works; the first assign the higher place to works, and make faith mere knowledge; and these are easily refuted: the second opinion is "homines principaliter justos esse fide, id est, fiducia misericordiæ; minus principaliter propter dignitatem operum, eo quod legi nemo satisfaciât, ideoque fiducia misericordiæ sarciat id quod deest. Hæc secunda opinio concinna est in specie, ideo diligenter excutienda." And, accordingly, he proceeds to examine and expose it. Luther, on Gen. 22 (quoted p. 364) contains a still more distinct condemnation of all such modifications of the doctrine; and I could give various other proofs, if it were necessary, that, though the nature of the works joined with faith, might be allowed so far to qualify the error as to make it more or less gross, every statement in which they were united

with it as means of justification, was rejected by these assertors of the truth as equally false, and equally subversive of the true doctrine of justification.

NOTE 20. Page 235.

Upon the Gospel Doctrine of Reward.

I AM aware that the doctrine of this Sermon is liable to be misconceived and abused by all who are ignorant of the gospel : and that it is likely to startle and offend many real Christians. I have felt bound, in putting it forward, to take all reasonable precautions to obviate abuses of it, and to conciliate prejudices against it : but, finding it clearly taught in God's word, I did not feel that I should be warranted in holding it back, under any apprehensions of the way in which it might be received. And in the form in which I have stated it, I have the satisfaction of knowing that it has been found in the Bible by those with whom I am most anxious to agree. I have prefixed to the Sermon an extract from the Augsburg Confession, in which the doctrine is very distinctly laid down, that *after the person is accepted in Christ by faith, his obedience is pleasant in God's sight, and is accounted righteousness in a certain sense, and deserves reward.* Postea vero placere etiam obedientiam erga legem et reputari quandam justitiam, et mereri præmia. And the writers repeat the assertion and the caution most distinctly in the Article, *De bonis operibus.* They say that the grounds on which our insufficient obedience is pleasing to God are necessary to be taught, Non enim ideo placet quia legi satisfaciatur sed quia personæ reconciliatæ et justæ sunt propter Christum, et credunt sibi condonari imbecillitatem suam. Sic Paulus docet, *Nulla nunc est condemnatio, &c.* Quamquam igitur hæc nova obedientia procul abest a perfectione legis tamen est justitia et meretur præmia *ideo quia personæ reconciliatæ sunt.* The same doctrine is taught in the Saxon Confession, Article IX., *Quomodo placeat nova obedientia,* and Article X., *De Præmiis.* And in the XVIth Article of the Helvetic Confession, the question is very fully opened, and the same principles are most distinctly laid down. Placent vero approbanturque a Deo opera quæ a nobis fiunt, per fidem. Quia illi placent Deo propter fidem in Chris-

tum, qui faciunt opera bona ; quæ insuper per Spiritum Sanctum ex gratia Dei sunt facta. Etenim docemus Deum bona operantibus amplam dare mercedem, juxta illam prophetæ sententiam, Jerem. xxxi. Isaïæ iv. *Cohibe vocem tuam a fletu ; quoniam erit merces operi tuo.* In Evangelio quoque dixit Dominus, Matt. v. x. *Gaudete et exultate, quia merces vestra multa est in cælis. Et qui dederit uni ex minimis meis poculum aquæ frigidæ, amen dico vobis, non perdet mercedem suam.* Referimus tamen mercedem hanc, quam Dominus dat, non ad meritum hominis accipientis, sed ad bonitatem, vel liberalitatem, et veritatem Dei promittentis, atque dantis. Qui cum nihil debeat cuiquam, promisit tamen se suis cultoribus fidelibus mercedem daturum ; qui interim dat eis etiam ut ipsum colant. Sunt multa præterea indigna Deo, et imperfecta plurima inveniuntur in operibus etiam Sanctorum ; quia vero Deus recipit in gratiam, et complectitur propter Christum operantes, mercedem eis promissam persolvit.—And among the Articles agreed upon by both sides at the Conference at Altenburg was “ Bona opera habere præmia tum in præsentī tum in æterna vita.” But I believe that there is no opposition of views among the early Protestant divines upon the point, though there may be considerable difference in the degree of distinctness or prominence which it has in their statements. Tyndall, it is true, seems to say very hard things against the doctrine, “ If I worke for a worldly purpose, I get no reward in heaven ; even so if I worke for heaven, or a hyer place in heaven, I get then no rewarde. But I must do my worke for the love of my neighbour, because he is my brother, and the price of Christes bloode, and because Christ hath deserved it, and desireth it of me, and then my rewarde is great in heaven.”—*Answer to M. More.* In *A Pathway into the Holy Scriptures*, he holds the same language. After exhibiting Christ’s free love to sinners as the proper object of their imitation ; and shewing that we cannot either do or forbear to do any thing, to procure heaven itself, without doing wrong to His blood, he adds, “ Neither that I loke for a higher rounge in heaven. for that were the pride of Lucifer,” and he elsewhere speaks in the same tone. I should be sorry to find myself differing from Tyndall upon any important point. I per-

suade myself, however, that there is no real difference between us here; but that his disapprobation is directed against an abuse of the doctrine, against which I have attempted carefully to guard, and which I should be ready to condemn in as severe language as any that he employs. He says distinctly that "We know that good deedes are rewarded, both in this lyfe and in the lyfe to comẽ;" but he feels that to make these rewards the motive of obedience to God, is inconsistent with the character of a Christian; and this I have endeavoured to express in the following Sermon (p. 252) and to show that the leading principle of Christian obedience is love to God. I have been anxious to assign to this principle of self-love a place strictly subordinate; and, even in this way, I am aware that it can be spoken of safely only when it is spoken of with very great caution, when the true foundation has been very carefully laid, and is never suffered to pass away from the memory. I have not only laboured to present it in this way, but I hope I have done something in this Sermon to clear up the Christian doctrine of future rewards, by showing its connection with Christian discipline, and the effects of a course of obedience upon the character of the believer: and I meant to explain, that the only form in which I think it desirable or allowable that it should operate upon us, is by giving us a deeper sense of the momentous importance of every part of our appointed course; and that it is fitted to do this by showing us upon such intelligible principles, how unending may be the consequences of every part of that course. But my views upon this part of the subject are expressed with even more distinctness in a Discourse delivered subsequently to the same Congregation; and as the question is one of such great importance, and so liable to be misunderstood, I shall venture to subjoin the concluding passage of that Sermon, as the best mode that I can take of setting in a clear light the practical application of the doctrine which I have been anxious here to teach.

"But is it necessary to our advancement in the divine life that we should constantly bear about us the anxieties to which such views seem calculated to give rise? Are we to carry into daily life, and all its most trivial concerns, this painful recollection of the connexion of each with the formation of our character; and, through

this connexion, the effects of each upon our eternal well-being? Certainly not. It is neither necessary nor desirable that we should do thus. This would tend to assign a constant agency to what was designed to be but occasional in its operations; it would have a tendency to exalt into the chief place that which was designed to be but a subsidiary motive; it would be keeping out of view the main principles which conduct is designed to call into action; and so would be frustrating rather than promoting the main end of the discipline of life. What is most to be desired is that, *having received the kingdom of God as little children, we should so walk therein,—that we should walk in love.* It is not necessary for the full effect of the bodily exercises of childhood in strengthening the frame, that the child who performs them should be aware of their effect upon his health and vigour, and upon the comfort of his maturer years. It is not necessary for the best effects of the mental exercises which parental care prescribes to him in early youth, that he should be able to see in them the materials of all his future powers of intellectual exertion, of his habits of self-command; the foundation of the respectability and happiness of his after-life. The perception of the connexion is in no wise necessary; and it would be manifestly injurious that it should be constantly borne in mind by those who are capable of perceiving it. Still the connexion is not for this the less real, or the less important; nor are the consequences of remitting such salutary exercises, mental or bodily, a jot less sure. And, though those who perceive it clearly, would certainly impede the best effects of such courses by constantly bearing it in mind; it might manifestly be advantageously recalled to their recollection, to quicken their diligence occasionally, and to impress upon them more deeply the danger and the folly of negligence and sloth.

“Even so those who are walking now as God’s *dear children*; who are enabled to wait upon Him in the humble, docile, and tender frame of mind that becomes that endearing relation; to follow the course which He has prescribed to them, looking for no reason beyond this—that their Father has commanded it; acquiescing meekly in His appointments, submitting patiently to His chastisements, and obeying humbly His commands; in them

the transforming process, which is to fit them for the *glory, and honour, and immortality* of eternal life, is assuredly going on here, whether they have ever cast a thought upon it or not. They are, doubtless, the blessed subjects of the Spirit's teaching, and in them is his happiest work advancing, whether they can trace its progress or not; whether they can understand the mode of its operation or not. But religion embraces wide diversities of character; and, though its aim and its effect be to produce in all, the great features of resemblance which mark the children of one family, it by no means seeks to obliterate those minor differences which are not incompatible with the closest kindred: nay, differences, which are finally to disappear under its teaching, it eradicates patiently, and wisely takes advantage of while they remain. The end of religion is to bring all who *name the name of Christ* under the dominion of THE LOVE OF GOD; but, in the progress of our pupillage, it does not refuse to employ, in their proper place, subsidiary motives in aid of the main one, and to accommodate them to the various intellectual habits of individuals, and to the diversities of their moral state. Under all temptations to delay obedience to the call of duty, there are many who will be preserved by the knowledge that such delay is an act of real disobedience to their gracious Father; of real ingratitude to their dear Redeemer; that it is grieving the Spirit, *by which they are sealed to the day of redemption*. But there are doubtless some whose resolution against such temptations may be strengthened, and in whom graver habits of caution against their own hearts' deceitfulness may be infix'd more deeply, by having thus impressed upon them the views which I have been unfolding, of the peculiar connection of this world with the eternal world that awaits us; by being taught, hence, to regard in their true character the negligence, and sloth, and procrastination, of which we are prone to think so lightly,—to see how awful their effects are, and how enduring they may be; that they are impeding that work in our hearts which it is the great business of the Spirit's teaching to effect there—that they are preparing for us sharp chastisement in the present life, or impairing for ever the glory and the happiness of the life which is to come."

